Varieties of Value

Epistemic consequentialism has been challenged on the grounds that it is overly demanding. According to the Epistemic Junk Problem, this view implies that we are often required to believe junk propositions such as ‘the Great Bear Lake is the largest lake entirely in Canada’ and long disjunctions of things we already believe. According to the Numerosity Problem, this view implies that we are frequently required to have an enormous number of beliefs. This paper puts forward a novel version of epistemic (...) consequentialism which avoids these twin demandingness problems. The key is to recognise, first, that the final epistemic value of a true belief depends at least in part on the duration for which it is retained by the agent and, second, that our cognitive makeup places important constraints on which beliefs are retained and for how long. (shrink)

An important philosophical issue in the study of addiction is what difference the fact that a person is addicted makes to attributions of autonomy (and responsibility) to their drug-oriented behavior. In spite of accumulating evidence suggesting the role of emotional dysregulation in understanding addiction, it has received surprisingly little attention in the debate about this issue. I claim that, as a result, an important aspect of the autonomy impairment of many addicted individuals has been largely overlooked. A widely shared assumption (...) in the philosophical literature is that for addiction to impair a person’s autonomy it has to make them (in some sense) take drugs against their will. So-called “willing addicts” are therefore usually seen as exempted from the autonomy impairment believed to characterize “unwilling addicts”, the latter being those who ‘truly want’ to stop using drugs but find their attempts repeatedly derailed by failures of self-control. In this article, I argue that the association between addiction and emotional dysregulation shows why this assumption is false. Emotional dysregulation is not only consistent with the possibility that many addicts take drugs ‘willingly’, it supports the hypothesis that they use drugs because they truly want to. The article proposes an explanation for why emotional dysregulation should nevertheless be seen as an aspect of their loss of control and an important reason why they have impaired autonomy. I end by exploring some implications of this account for addict’s decision-making capacity when they are prescribed the drugs to which they are addicted. -/- . (shrink)

According to the orthodox view, the goodness of a life depends exclusively on the things that actually happened within it, such as its pleasures and pains, the satisfaction of its subject’s preferences, or the presence of various objective goods and bads. In this paper, I argue that the goodness of a life also depends on what could have happened, but didn’t. I then propose that this view helps us resolve ethical puzzles concerning the standards for a life worth living for (...) animals and the significance of a life’s shape. (shrink)

Explícita o implícitamente la relación entre poder y valor ha estado muy presente en la historia del pensamiento filosófico-político. Debido a que el poder, en cualquiera de sus formas, tiende siempre a normar y regular la convivencia y actividad conjunta entre grupos humanos, cualquier reflexión filosófica sobre su naturaleza habrá de cuestionarse, directa o indirectamente, el asunto de su racionalidad ética, de su vínculo con los valores humanos. Al mismo tiempo, pensar los valores debe conducir, tarde o temprano, a relacionarlos (...) con el poder. En otras palabras, al tema en cuestión que nos ocupa puede (y debe) arribarse tanto desde una reflexión inicialmente centrada en el asunto del poder, como desde el estudio de los valores. Sin embargo ha sido mucho más frecuente la primera línea de desplazamiento reflexivo que la segunda. Tres ejemplos nos servirían para mostrar lo anterior: un pensador clásico de la Modernidad como Rousseau, uno de los representantes ilustres del pensamiento contemporáneo como Foucault y un intelectual mucho más cercano a nuestro contexto como Luis Villoro. (shrink)

Vivimos una época en que la tolerancia, más que una actitud ética opcional, se ha convertido en una exigencia para la convivencia de hombres y pueblos diferentes en culturas y sistemas políticos, pero iguales en derecho; interdependientes económicamente y unidos en el enfrentamiento de los mismos problemas globales que amenazan la supervivencia de la humanidad. ¿Cuáles son los fundamentos axiológicos que legitiman y hacen necesaria la tolerancia y cuáles los que le imponen un límite a la misma? Sobre esta relación (...) entre tolerancia y valores trata este artículo. (shrink)

El texto representa una reseña al libro Leopoldo Zea: Filosofar a la altura del hombre, publicado por la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, en el año 1993, con 391 páginas. El libro, compilado por el propio Zea, contiene diversos materiales escritos por él en distintas épocas y múltiples respuestas que sus ideas han suscitado en autores de variados lugares, periodos y tendencias de pensamiento, en una original manera de presentar las ideas a través de un diálogo vivo, crítico y creador (...) que sólo puede aflorar ante la presencia de un pensamiento auténtico e innovador. (shrink)

A inicio de los años 90 la sociedad cubana se enfrentaba a un proceso de profundas transformaciones internas como consecuencia de los cambios en la esfera de las relaciones internacionales, el recrudecimiento del bloqueo de Estados Unidos y la necesidad de insertarse en la nueva dinámica de las relaciones económicas mundiales después de desaparecida la URSS y el socialismo este-europeo. Todo ello tuvo un importante impacto en los valores de la sociedad cubana, especialmente en los jóvenes. Debido a ello, la (...) Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular convocó a una audiencia pública sobre la formación de valores en las nuevas generaciones, llevada a cabo los días 24 y 25 de abril de 1995. Este texto se corresponde con la ponencia del autor en dicho evento, la primera de cinco intervenciones centrales realizadas el día 24 de abril. (shrink)

En el ensayo se muestra y argumenta por qué debe considerarse la contradictoria relación entre los valores universales y propios como el más importante problema axiológico que ha enfrentado la praxis y el pensamiento latinoamericanos, al tiempo que se proyecta la solución teórica de ese problema como consecuencia posible y necesaria de su solución práctica.

Se ofrece un grupo de reflexiones acerca del vínculo entre dos conceptos de amplio uso en el lenguaje académico y no académico contemporáneo: valores universales y problemas globales. ¿Qué son los valores universales? ¿Por qué los seres humanos difieren en cuanto a su interpretación? ¿En qué medida el surgimiento y agudización de los problemas globales se asocia a una práctica distanciada de los verdaderos valores universales? ¿Qué hacer para que sean estos últimos los que en realidad sustenten las relaciones internacionales? (...) ¿Qué papel desempeñan estos valores en la búsqueda de soluciones a los problemas globales? El presente trabajo pretende aproximar una respuesta a estas interrogantes. (shrink)

If you love someone, is it good to believe better of her than epistemic norms allow? The partiality view says that it is: love, on this view, issues norms of belief that clash with epistemic norms. The partiality view is supposedly supported by an analogy between beliefs and actions, by the phenomenology of love, and by the idea that love commits us to the loved one’s good character. I argue that the partiality view is false, and defend what I call (...) the epistemic view. On the epistemic view, love also issues norms of belief. But these say simply that you should adhere to epistemic norms in forming and maintaining beliefs about loved ones. I offer two arguments for the epistemic view. The first appeals to the emotional responses of love, which, when sensitive to what the loved one is really like, can make love great and be morally transformative. The second is a new argument for why caring for a loved one requires true beliefs about him. We see that there may be some boundaries, such as stuffy traditions, that love is right to defy, but that epistemic boundaries are not among them. (shrink)

Es posible abordar el tema de la relación entre la educación y los valores, desde múltiples horizontes, desde una perspectiva pedagógica, psicológica, histórica, sociológica e incluso antropológica. En este trabajo se aborda la cuestión desde una dimensión más general, filosófica, o axiológica. Para ello se arranca reflexionan sobre la relación entre vida y valores, para luego pasar al análisis del vínculo entre educación y valores. Finalmente se comparten algunas experiencias cubanas en el trabajo de formación de valores mediante la educación.

The aim of the paper is to reassess the prospects of a widely neglected affective conception of the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art. On the proposed picture, the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art are non-contingently constituted by a particular kind of pleasure. Artworks that are valuable qua artworks merit, deserve, and call for a certain pleasure, the same pleasure that reveals (or at least purports to reveal) them to be valuable in the way that they are, and constitutes (...) their aesthetic evaluation and appreciation. This is why and how art is non-contingently related to pleasure. Call this, the Affective View. While I don’t advance conclusive arguments for the Affective View in this paper, I aim to reassess its prospects by (1) undermining central objections against it, (2) dissociating it from hedonism about the value of artworks (the view that this value is grounded in, and explained by, its possessors’ power to please), and (3) introducing some observations on the practice of art in support of it. Given that the objections I discuss miss their target, and given the observations in support of it, I conclude that the Affective View is worth serious reconsideration. (shrink)

nvited talk at the Philosophy Club April 14th at University of St Andrews in which I Outline three positions regarding the distinction between good (period) and good-for and I then discuss Richard Kraut’s recent attack on Good, period and my own approach to the distinction. Eventually, this discussion develioped into the book The Value Gap (OUP 2021).

This essay articulates a kind of conservatism that it argues is the most fundamental and important kind of conservatism, viz. existential conservatism, which involves an affirmative and appreciative stance towards the given world. While this form of conservatism can be connected to political conservatism, as seen with Roger Scruton, it need not be, as seen with G. A. Cohen. It is argued that existential conservatism should be embraced whether or not one embraces political conservatism, though it is also shown that (...) existential conservatism imposes constraints on our political thinking. In particular, it is argued that Cohen's ‘luck egalitarianism’ stands at odds with his existential conservatism and that one should be a sufficientarian rather than an egalitarian with regard to economic justice. (shrink)

The theories of most writers on Ethics, with whose works I am acquainted, appear to be based upon the assumption of the unique character of goodness or The Good. By the word unique these writers mean, I think, among other things that goodness cannot be analysed into or described in terms of anything other than itself, that it can be and is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of some other thing which is not goodness, and (...) that the apprehension of or desire for goodness is a distinct and specific character of our mental states. By asserting, however, that the state of mind constituted by the apprehension of goodness, or that the state of emotion aroused by the desire for goodness, is distinguished by a specific and unique property, they do not, I think, necessarily mean that this property is the same as the specific property of goodness itself. Most writers on Ethics have also believed that man is free to desire goodness, and to act in accordance with his desire, that is to say, they have held in some form or other the doctrine of free-will. (shrink)

Achievement is among the central goods in life, but just what is achievement, and how is it valuable? There is reason to think that it is a constitutive part of wellbeing; yet, it is possible to sacrifice wellbeing for the sake of achievement. How might it have been worthwhile, if not in terms of wellbeing? Perhaps, achievement is an intrinsic good, or perhaps it is valuable in terms of meaning in life. This article considers various ways in which we can (...) understand the nature and value of achievement, as well as the significance of achievement for other areas of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

G.E. Moore said that rightness was obviously a matter of maximising plain goodness. Peter Geach and Judith Thomson disagree. They have both argued that ‘good’ is not a predicative adjective, but only ever an attributive adjective: just like ‘big.’ And just as there is no such thing as plain bigness but only ever big for or as a so-and-so, there is also no such thing as plain goodness. They conclude that Moore’s goodness is thus a nonsense. However attention has been (...) drawn to a weakness in their arguments. Mahrad Almotahari and Adam Hosein have sought to plug that weakness. If their plug holds, then there is no goodness. Doing most of their work is the following premise: adjective φ is predicative only if it can be used predicatively in ‘x is a φ K’ otherwise it is attributive. In this paper I argue that this premise is false, that their plug does not hold and that if one is to reject plain goodness it will have to be for other reasons. (shrink)

The emotions we experience are crucial to who we are, to what we think, and to what we do. But what are emotions, exactly, and how do they relate to agency? The aim of this book is to spell out an account of emotions, which is grounded on analogies between emotions and sensory experiences, and to explore the implications of this account for our understanding of human agency. The central claim is that emotions consist in perceptual experiences of values, such (...) as the fearsome, the disgusting or the admirable. A virtue of this account is that it affords a better grasp of a variety of interconnected phenomena, such as motivation, values, responsibility and reason-responsiveness. In the process of exploring the implications of the Perceptual Theory of emotions, several claims are proposed. First, emotions normally involve desires that set goals, but they can be contemplative in that they can occur without any motivation. Second, evaluative judgements can be understood in terms of appropriate emotions in so far as appropriateness is taken to consist in correct representation. Third, by contrast with what Strawsonian theories hold, the concept of moral responsibility is not response-dependent, but the relationship between emotions and moral responsibility is mediated by values. Finally, in so far as emotions are perceptions of values, they can be considered to be perceptions of practical reasons, so that on certain conditions, acting on the basis of one's emotions can consist in responding to one's reasons. (shrink)

Argues against G. E. Moore’s conception of organic unities, attempting to replace it with a conception more amenable to particularism. Considers the possibility of a form of default value acceptable to particularism. Ends by contrasting the views expressed here with those of Kagan.

_Art and Morality_ is a collection of groundbreaking new papers on the theme of aesthetics and ethics, and the link between the two subjects. A group of distinguished contributors tackle the important questions that arise when one thinks about the moral dimensions of art and the aesthetic dimension of moral life. The volume is a significant contribution to philosophical literature, opening up unexplored questions and shedding new light on more traditional debates in aesthetics. The topics explored include: the relation of (...) aesthetic to ethical judgement; the relation of artistic experience to moral consciousness; the moral status of fiction; the concepts of sentimentality and decadence; the moral dimension of critical practice, pictorial art and music; the moral significance of tragedy; and the connections between artistic and moral issues elaborated in the writings of central figures in modern philosophy, such as Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The contributors share the view that progress in aesthetics requires detailed study of the practice of criticism. This volume will appeal both to the philosophical community and to researchers in areas such as literary theory, musicology and the theory of art. (shrink)

In a recent article, Sven Nyholm argues that the use of biomedical enhancements in our romantic relationships would fail to secure the final value we attribute to love. On Nyholm's view, one thing we desire for its own sake is to be at the origin of the love others have for us. The satisfaction of this desire, he argues, is incompatible with the use of BE insofar as they are responsible for the attachment characteristic of love. In particular, the use (...) of BE in order to create and sustain the sort of attachment characteristic of love would be less desirable than the creation and sustainment of it by more ordinary means. If one needs such enhancements in order for one's love to be created or sustained, then one's love is of lesser quality than the love we want. In this reply, I raise doubts about the argument. (shrink)

A discussion of how and whether judgment regarding the happiness, flourishing or well-being of a life is appropriately influenced by false belief or ignorance on matters central to that life. That is, is it so that what we don't know does not, or cannot hurt us? How much does it matter if the false belief was owing to betrayal or deception by others who mattered deeply to the now dead person? Further, is truthfulness about such betrayal something a friend of (...) a dying person may eschew or is it itself a kind of betrayal? (shrink)

Art is changing, and a great deal of contemporary work does not fit into the categories of the past. Is "conceptual" work art at all? Should artists learn a traditional craft before their work is considered valuable? Can we learn to love art, or must we take it or leave it? These questions and more are discussed in six essays from people on different sides of the debate.

ABOUT THIS BOOK Be Good to Yourself is yet another of those marvelous gems from Marden. Originally written for business professionals, it is useful to anyone seeking to improve themselves, as the concepts and advice are timeless: joy, love, good will, the ability to enjoy the family, to treat employees fairly, the qualities of a born leader, and how to develop the passion for achievement, are only a few of the concepts developed in this extremely good book.

Following the integration of artistic disciplines within the university, artists have been challenged to review their practice in academic terms. This has become a vigorous epicentre of debates concerning the nature of research in the artistic disciplines. The special issue "On Reflecting and Making in Artistic Research Practice" captures some of this debate. This editorial article presents a broad-brush outline of the debates raging in the artistic disciplines and presents three discernible trends in those debates. The trends highlight different core (...) questions: Art as research: Can artistic practice represent forms of inquiry acceptable within academic settings? Academically-attuned practice-led research: Can art practice and research practice cooperate as equal partners within the university context? Artistic research: Can the academic notion of research be extended to include the unique results possible through artistic research? The articles in the special issue offer a discussable overview of the current stage in the development of artistic research, demonstrating how creative practice and research practice can come together. (shrink)