Este artículo pretende analizar la teoría moral que J. Rawls propuso en su famosa obra A Tbeory of Justice (1971). Este análisis se hace tratando tres conceptos básicos de la moral, como son bien, deber y virtud. Tales conceptos muestran que la visión del hombre y de la ética que Rawls propone es individualista, rasgo que dificulta seriamente la pretensión de universalidad que el autor dio a su teoría moral y política.

En la actualidad, la ética está excesivamente centrada en la reflexión y en el establecimiento de reglas, de normas. Muchos debates sobre ética empiezan o acaban en la reflexión sobre qué normas o reglas deben aceptarse pública o universalmente, sobre cuáles de ellas deben ser leyes civiles, sobre qué comportamientos la ley civil debería prohibir y por qué. A juicio del autor, este hecho supone un reduccionismo y hace olvidar que lo más importante de la ética es el desarrollo integral (...) del individuo. Las reglas tienen su importancia en ética, pero no son el factor más relevante en ella porque no son suficientes para ayudar al individuo al desarrollo de sus capacidades, para su vida buena. El artículo muestra cómo la virtud juega un papel fundamental en ese proceso. (shrink)

El concepto de virtud de Alasdair MacIntyre ha recibido, por parte de la crítica, un tratamiento no sistemático y poco profundo. En concreto, la virtud de la prudencia ha recibido escasa atención. La prudencia es una virtud muy importante en el pensamiento de MacIntyre, aunque el autor no la haya analizado de manera unitaria y sistemática. Sus principales propuestas sobre el ser humano y la investigación moral no pueden ser comprendidas sin la virtud de la prudencia. El objetivo de este (...) artículo es ofrecer una exposición y un análisis de dicha virtud en el pensamiento de MacIntyre. (shrink)

This collection of essays is dedicated to the prolific career of Paul Ricoeur. Honoring his work, this anthology addresses questions and concerns that defined Ricoeur’s.

This paper will critically assess Popper’s evolutionary philosophy. There exists a rich literature on the topic with which we have many reservations. We believe that Popper’s evolutionary philosophy should be assessed in light of the intriguing theoretical insights offered, during the last 10 years or so, by the philosophy of biology, evolutionary biology and molecular biology. We will argue that, when analysed in this manner, Popper’s ideas concerning the nature of selection, Lamarckism and the theoretical limits of neo-Darwinism can be (...) appreciated in their full biological and philosophical value. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a methodology to maximize the benefits of interdisciplinary cooperation in AI research groups. Firstly, we build the case for the importance of interdisciplinarity in research groups as the best means to tackle the social implications brought about by AI systems, against the backdrop of the EU Commission proposal for an Artificial Intelligence Act. As we are an interdisciplinary group, we address the multi-faceted implications of the mass-scale diffusion of AI-driven technologies. The result of our exercise (...) lead us to postulate the necessity of a behavioural theory that standardizes the interaction process of interdisciplinary groups. In light of this, we conduct a review of the existing approaches to interdisciplinary research on AI appliances, leading to the development of methodologies like ethics-by-design and value-sensitive design, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. We then put forth an iterative process theory hinging on a narrative approach consisting of four phases: definition of the hypothesis space, building-up of a common lexicon, scenario-building, interdisciplinary self-assessment. Finally, we identify the most relevant fields of application for such a methodology and discuss possible case studies. (shrink)

The field of genetics has seen major advances in recent decades, particularly in research, prevention and diagnosis. One of the most recent developments, the genomic editing technique Clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)-Cas9, has opened the possibility for genetic therapies through genome modification. The technique marks an improvement on previous procedures but poses some serious ethical conflicts. Bioethics is the discipline geared at finding answers to ethical challenges posed by progress in medicine and biology and examining their repercussions for (...) society. It can also offer a conceptualization of these ethical dilemmas. The aim of this paper is to offer a map of the ethical dilemmas associated with this technique by way of a critical analysis of current literature. The main issues can be grouped in four areas: efficacy and security; the types of cells which can be targeted by the technique (somatic, embryonic and gametes); the goal of the therapy; and accessibility and justice. (shrink)

Bas Van Fraassen is a nifty philosopher of science. He received his PhD in Pittsburgh in 1966, under the guidance of Adolf Grünbaum, he taught at Yale University, the university of Toronto, the University of Southern California, he has been McCosh Professor of Philosophy in Princeton, and eventually joined the department of philosophy at San Francisco State University, where he has the title of Distinguished Professor of Philosophy. He first gained attention with his book An Introduction to the Philosophy of (...) Time and Space where he tried to develop a formal theory of space and time based on the notion of causality. The book had an enormous legacy, with experts of the likes of John Earman and David Malament joining the debate. However, he achieved V.I.P. status with his classic The Scientific Image, where he defends a combination of empiricism and antirealism towards unobservable entities based on a re-definition of what the scientific enterprise is. His last achievement is the tome Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspectives, where he combines his scientific empiricism with the view that theories are best thought as models or structures, rather than sets of sentences. In this interview, we talk about his philosophical influences and the birth of The Scientific Image during a journey through North-Africa, Turkey and Eastern Europe, we talk about saving the phenomena and suspending judgement over the existence of unobservable entities, living in world full of mysteries and leaving unanswerable questions unanswered, rationality and irrationality, living in a simulation, the historical interplay between theorizing and experimenting, the meaning of particle detectors for an empiricist, the unity of science and physicalism, the condemnation of Galilei by the Church, and the distinction between Appearance and Reality…. (shrink)

This paper aims to demonstrate how philosophy and ethics shed light on professional ethics. One of the most important issues in professional ethics nowadays is to establish and justify rules to achieve and sustain good behavior in persons involved in specific activities. During the second half of the twentieth century, professional ethics became increasingly more important for philosophy, while the number of codes of ethics continues to grow. This exposition is based on some fundamental ethical concepts, like ‘end,’ ‘rule,’ ‘virtue,’ (...) etc., some of which are taken from Alasdair MacIntyre’s thought. (shrink)

This paper aims to demonstrate how philosophy and ethics shed light on professional ethics. One of the most important issues in professional ethics nowadays is to establish and justify rules to achieve and sustain good behavior in persons involved in specific activities. During the second half of the twentieth century, professional ethics became increasingly more important for philosophy, while the number of codes of ethics continues to grow. This exposition is based on some fundamental ethical concepts, like ‘end,’ ‘rule,’ ‘virtue,’ (...) etc., some of which are taken from Alasdair MacIntyre’s thought. (shrink)

En Una Teoría de la Justicia (A Theory of Justice, 1971), la justicia —sus dos principios— viene a regular los intereses, fundamento y motor de la sociedad y del individuo ralwsianos. No obstante, tal regulación —individualista— preserva y favorece la libertad máxima individual, de modo que ésta, sin embargo, no llegue a alterar el orden social. Sobre la moralidad que Rawls propone, ante todo, hay que saber que la justicia como imparcialidad (Justice as fairness como él llama a su teoría) (...) no pretende la completa especificación de la conducta, sino más bien aproximarse a unos límites, a un marco dentro de los cuales los individuos y asociaciones son libres de perseguir sus fines (Rawls, 1978: 566). Acaso sean la indefinición o la poca importancia de pensar acerca de dichos fines los que hagan considerar a Rawls la moralidad como una simple preferencia (1978: 244), rasgo común en las tradiciones con las que se relaciona (utilitarismo y contractualismo). El concepto de bien se halla implícito en toda la teoría de la justicia de Rawls y sus conceptos (sociedad, individuo, deber, etc.), y, por tanto, en muchos debates que Rawls ha generado, aunque, a nuestro juicio, no ha sido examinado con suficiente detenimiento. El análisis que se propone discurre por tres temas distintos: el contexto del concepto de bien, la teoría específica (del bien) y la teoría general (del bien), para terminar con la conclusión. (shrink)

The framework presented by Bayefsky and Berkman is based on having clear and accurate genetic information to offer parents, for them to either decide to prepare for birth or to terminate the...

De Bie et al. (2023) introduces a framework to conceptualize ethical issues based on four different domains, but the problem lies in the domains being falsely bounded. Apart from the step from doma...

A letter to The Times of London, May 9, 1992 protesting the Cambridge University proposal to award an honorary degree to M. Jacques Derrida.

The nonlinear differential equation governing the periodic motion of the one-dimensional, undamped, and unforced cubic-quintic Duffing oscillator is solved exactly by obtaining the period and the solution. The period is given in terms of the complete elliptic integral of the first kind and the solution involves Jacobian elliptic functions. We solve the cubic-quintic Duffing equation under arbitrary initial conditions. Physical applications are provided. The solution to the mixed parity Duffing oscillator is also formally derived. We illustrate the obtained results with (...) concrete examples. We give high accurate trigonometric approximations to the Jacobian function cn. (shrink)

Cet article propose une vue d’ensemble de la doctrine des Intermédiaires mathématiques (τὰ μεταξύ) qu’Aristote attribue à Platon dans sa Métaphysique, des objections qu’Aristote lui adresse et des questions philosophiques qu’elle soulève. Suivant Aristote, Platon avance que les vérités de la géométrie et de l’arithmétique ne peuvent pas porter sur des objets perceptibles ni sur des Formes, mais doivent porter sur une troisième classe d’entités intermédiaires entre les deux. Je soutiens que la critique d’Aristote la plus efficace de cette doctrine (...) montre que les raisons avancées en faveur de l’existence des Intermédiaires par les Platoniciens ne sont pas concluantes, mais ne peut pas montrer qu’ils n’existent pas. En m’appuyant sur quelques remarques de David Ross sur la démarche d’Aristote, je soutiens également que, s’il est vrai que le fait que toute science est caractérisée par des propositions de la forme « Tout F est G » n’implique pas qu’elle porte sur des entités intermédiaires, il peut y avoir des raisons pour accepter leur existence eu égard à une science mathématique en particulier, à savoir la géométrie. (shrink)

Functionalism is the view that being x is to play the role of x. This paper defends a functionalist account of three-dimensional entities in the context of Wave Function Realism (WFR), that can explain in detail how we can recover three-dimensional entities out of the wavefunction. In particular, the essay advocates for a novel version of WFR in terms of a functional reductionist approach in the style of David Lewis. This account entails reduction of the upper entities to the (...) bottom ones, when the latter behave appropriately. As applied to WFR, it shows how the wavefunction can turn out to be identical to three-dimensional objects, provided certain conditions. The first major goal of the paper is thus to put forward an improved and more rigorous version of WFR, which dissolves several extant issues about the theory, and can serve as a starting point for future literature on the topic. Moreover, the second major goal of the article is to take WFR as a case study to demonstrate the pros of functional reductionism, especially in the form defended here, thereby helping to bring this view back in the philosophy of science debate. The positive upshots of this paper suggest a possible application of functional reductionism also to other contexts. (shrink)

Firstly, this contribution proposes to address synthographies – images generated through Text-to-image technologies – by deepening the epistemological shift related to the possibility of transposing the image-creation process from the analogue arts to the notational ones (or, by drawing on Nelson Goodman's terminology, from the “autographic” to the “allographic” forms of art). Secondly, the paper highlights how synthographies can be considered partly autographic and partly allographic, since the linguistic prompts constitute only the notational aspect of the generated images. Furthermore, this (...) contribution argues that the recent critiques around such images, which referenced aspects related to the absence of authorial presence and mechanicality, characterised the history of photography since its beginning. Finally, the contribution explores how the possibility to create synthographies that are almost indistinguishable from photographies easily might further separate the interaction between the detective and the depictive functions to the advantage of the latter, erasing what remains of the visual reliability and documental value of images. (shrink)

There are various forms of teleological thinking central to debates in the early modern and modern periods, debates in which David Hume (1711–1776) is a key figure. In the first section, we shall introduce three levels at which teleological considerations have been incorporated into philosophical accounts of man and nature, and sketch Hume’s criticisms of these approaches. In the second section, we turn to Hume’s non-teleological ‘science of man’. In the third section, we show how Hume has an account (...) of human flourishing that is not dependent on teleology. In the fourth section, we shall speculate as to the relation between Hume’s account of human nature and contemporary evolutionary accounts of morality and reasoning. (shrink)

Functional reductionism characterises inter-theoretic reduction as the recovery of the upper-level behaviour described by the reduced theory in terms of the lower-level reducing theory. For instance, finding a statistical mechanical realiser that plays the functional role of thermodynamic entropy allows for establishing a reductive link between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. This view constitutes a unique approach to reduction that enjoys a number of positive features, but has received limited attention in the philosophy of science. -/- This paper aims to clarify (...) the meaning of functional reductionism in science, with a focus on physics, to define both its place with respect to other approaches to reduction and its connection to ontology. To do so, we develop and explore two alternative frameworks for functional reduction, called Syntactic Functional Reductionism and Semantic Functional Reductionism. They represent two different possible stances on the view that expand and improve the basic functional reductionist approach along different lines, and make clear how the approach works in practice. The former elaborates on David Lewis’ account, is connected with the syntactic view of theories, is committed to a logical characterisation of functional roles, and is embedded within Nagelian reductionism. The latter adopts a semantic view of theories, spells out functional roles mainly in terms of mathematical roles within the models of theories, and is expressed in terms of the related structuralist approach to reduction. The development of these frameworks has the final goal of advancing functional reductionism, to make it a fully-fledged alternative account for reduction in science. (shrink)

It has been argued that Humean Supervenience is threatened by the existence of quantum entanglement relations. The most conservative strategy for defending HS is to add the problematic entanglement relations to the supervenience basis, alongside spatiotemporal relations. In this paper, I’m going to argue against this strategy by showing how certain particular cases of tripartite entanglement states – i.e. GHZ states – posit some crucial problems for this amended version of HS. Moreover, I will show that the principle of free (...) recombination – which is strictly linked to HS – is severely undermined if we add entanglement relations to the supervenience basis. I conclude that the conservative move is very unappealing, and therefore the defender of HS should pursue other, more controversial, strategies. (shrink)

As Price (2009) famously mused, if a philosopher were to be magically transported, perhaps through means of time travel, from the 1950s to the modern day, they would indeed be shocked by the resurgence of metaphysics in the analytic tradition. Most of all, perhaps, they would be shocked by the popularity of power metaphysics. What a strange item to have in a philosopher’s curriculum, they might think: after all, didn’t David Hume claim that “[t]here are no ideas which can (...) occur in metaphysics more obscure and uncertain than those of power, force, energy, or necessary connection”? Indeed, much has changed since then. At the pain of using overly vague terminology, we can call “power metaphysics” the subdiscipline of metaphysics interested in the development and evaluation of a family of positions which we will refer to under the umbrella term of “dispositionalism”. According to dispositionalists, the world we inhabit is also populated by genuine and irreducible powers, dispositions, and capacities of objects. (shrink)

David Hume is famous for developing a ‘science of man’ based on a thorough investigation of passions and sentiments. What is most surprising is that, in his sentimental geography, shame appears to play a rather marginal role. In this essay, I shall maintain that it is nonetheless possible to find room for shame in Hume, and that the most promising way to do so is to consider it in the light of a different passion on which Hume dwells at (...) length, the passion of humility. I shall thus examine where Hume explicitly refers to shame and how it relates to humility. By comparing Hume’s reflections with those of some more recent philosophers such as Gabriele Taylor, Bernard Williams, and Richard Wollheim, I shall argue that, as in the case of humility, so with shame Hume considers it to be a negative and vicious passion. That is because, like humility, shame as well produces a distorted and repressed conception of the self, with the consequence of leading to an oppressive and suffocating ethical perspective that is ultimately immoral. On the contrary, ‘a due degree of pride’ is the passion that, for Hume, allows us to give stability to our practical self, enabling us to establish ourselves as proper moral agents. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Eugenio Lecaldano’s way of tackling the issue of the meaning of life. I highlight the dependence of his individualistic approach on the specific character of the person who inquires into the meaning of life. I also sketch a weaker way of understanding the meaning of life as an attempt to provide reasons which are valid from the standpoint of the present, and which will make us continue living.

RésuméL'article examine la thèse leibnizienne de la tendance à l'existence de toutes les essences et de la réalisation de la série des êtres possibles qui, ensemble, ont le plus d'entité. Bien qu'elle offre une réponse à la question de savoir pourquoi il y a un monde – et pourquoi il s'agit du monde réel et non d'un autre –, la thèse se heurte à de nombreux obstacles. On tend actuellement àécarter les lectures nécessitaristes. L'article s'inscrit en faux contre cette tendance; (...) il vise à montrer les difficultés qui entourent l'interprétation de la nécessité fondée en théorie de la preuve, non seulement en général mais aussi en particulier par rapport à Leibniz. Une issue aux difficultés pourrait consister à développer la notion leibnizienne des degrés de réalité, en concevant aussi des degrés d'existence. Cela permettrait d'éviter la rupture entre l'ordre des possibles et celui des existants. Alors que Leibniz reconnaît des variations dans le degré d'entité des possibles, il est mené par son attachement à la logique aristotélicienne à faire du passage de la possibilitéà l'existence un bond métaphysique, l'actualitéétant ainsi rque comme une question de tout ou rien. Une approche gradualiste permettrait de concilier une partie des motivations métaphysiques de Leibniz avec un réalisme modal apparentéà celui de David Lewis, mais dûment nuancé. (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss David Hume’s reasoning on free will as he presents it in A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I proceed by showing how Hume’s compatibilist solution acquires meaning in the light of his sentimentally based science of human nature, which conceives human beings as reasonable, social, and active creatures. Within Hume’s empiricist, naturalistic, and sceptical approach, we deal only with perceptions and never with things themselves, and human experience is structured (...) in a causal order which allows us to organise both the way we experience the world and our existence in relation to that of others. In such a scenario, the question of free will depends on human practices, such as the attribution of responsibility, which follow a causal order and are not affected by metaphysical doubts about the loss of responsibility if determinism were true. I argue that Hume traces responsibility back to the expression of feelings for or against particular characters; people become the object of judgements of responsibility in so far as, through their actions, they show that they possess characters of a certain kind which reflect a whole series of dispositions and traits, empirically verifiable and causally explainable, acquired over time. I conclude by highlighting how free will may represent a problem on a practical level once moral or religious issues come into play and why this is not so for Hume. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette BaierLorenzo GrecoJoyce Jenkins, Jennifer Whiting, and Christopher Williams, eds. Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette Baier. Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. Pp. 368. ISBN 0-268-03263-7, Cloth, $53.00.Annette Baier stands out as a figure of prime importance on the contemporary philosophical horizon. This volume finally brings the proper recognition she deserves, presenting a rich collection (...) of essays in her honor. Persons and Passions proves to be extremely interesting both for the discussion of Baier’s own philosophical reflection and as an example of how Baier represents an unparalleled source of inspiration for anyone concerned with the philosophers who have been at the forefront of her interests. Although Baier’s preference is surely for David Hume, her intellectual curiosity and scholarly mastery cover a wider area spanning from Descartes to Kant.This is well represented by the structure of Persons and Passions: the volume is composed of sixteen essays which broadly fall into three groups, respectively concerned with the philosophy of Hume, Descartes or Kant. Lisa Shapiro, William Beardsley, Amy Morgan Schmitter, and Cecilia Wee are all concerned with the philosophy of Descartes, in particular as it is presented in the Meditations on First Philosophy. A major segment of the volume is devoted to examining diverse tenets of Hume’s thought, with essays by Saul Traiger, Lilli Alanen, Donald Ainslie, Janet Broughton, Alasdair MacIntyre, David Gauthier, and Robert Shaver. Then, in their papers, Sergio Tenenbaum and Michele Moody-Adams defend a Kantian explanation of the notions of friendship and cruelty. Finally, Karen Jones and Jennifer Whiting close the book by exploring the specular notions of trust and distrust. Baier’s lessons have been carefully absorbed by all contributors. A detailed analysis of the essays would take more space than a review allows, so I will concentrate only on those concerned with Hume, and try to single out from them the trace of Baier’s teaching.The notions of person and passion (as Christopher Williams explains in his useful introduction) are central to Baier’s general approach to philosophy, and they play an important part in the section of the book dedicated to Hume. Traiger looks into the relation between reason and the passions starting from the example of the man hanging over a precipice in an iron cage Hume introduces in A Treatise of Human Nature 1.3.13, and investigates how other philosophers before Hume had explained the reason-passions relation by means of the same argument. Traiger’s conclusion is that whereas for Montaigne, Pascal and Malebranche the precipice phenomenon proves that our passions will always overwhelm our best reasoning (in turn, demonstrating the separation of mind and body), for Descartes and Hume [End Page 229] it is not so. But whereas in Descartes this is because of the power reason possesses as a separate and independent faculty to silence the passions, in Hume the instance of the fear we feel before a precipice is a clear illustration of the interdependence of reason, passion, and imagination, which occupy “a shared arena, where regularities can be investigated and appropriate conclusions drawn” (114).Many of the essays echo one of the main features of Baier’s interpretation of Hume, namely the necessity of defining a peculiar kind of naturalism which has to be conceived within the frame of the reflective practices in which human beings are engaged as social animals. Alanen offers an analysis of the structure of the passions in Hume, starting from a consideration of the various ways the notion of reflection can help clarify the nature of passions and their intentionality. She defends a form of “natural intentionality” (133), according to which passions are intentional acts with bodily expressions which do not need to presuppose conceptually articulated propositions or judgments. In doing this Alanen discusses the role played by emotional exchange among human beings in the constitution of a unified notion of the self. A similar topic is at the center of Ainslie’s essay, which presents a thorough exploration of the principle of sympathy and of the role the self occupies within its mechanism. Ainslie... (shrink)

Annette Baier stands out as a figure of prime importance on the contemporary philosophical horizon. This volume finally brings the proper recognition she deserves, presenting a rich collection of essays in her honor. Persons and Passions proves to be extremely interesting both for the discussion of Baier’s own philosophical reflection and as an example of how Baier represents an unparalleled source of inspiration for anyone concerned with the philosophers who have been at the forefront of her interests. Although Baier’s preference (...) is surely for David Hume, her intellectual curiosity and scholarly mastery cover a wider area spanning from Descartes to Kant. (shrink)