The chapter of Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that deals with the question of freedom is the longest of Book II. It underwent extensive revisions during the Essay’s five first editions, some of which are acknowledged by Locke in II, 21, §§71-72, and in the Epistle to the Reader, where he says, “I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last determination to the Will in all voluntary action.” Several changes (...) are due to Locke’s recognition and explanation, in the second edition, of weakness of the will, absent in the first edition. His explanation depends on two issues, duly discussed in the second and subsequent editions: the causal role of the psychological state of uneasiness, and the power to suspend one’s desires. All three themes—weakness of the will, uneasiness, suspension of desires— belong to moral psychology. However, we also find another significant modification. Locke repeatedly says that free will is impossible, but in the fifth edition he inserts a passage in which he affirms a certain sort of “Liberty in respect of willing”. (shrink)
[Richard Glauser] Shaftesbury's theory of aesthetic experience is based on his conception of a natural disposition to apprehend beauty, a real 'form' of things. I examine the implications of the disposition's naturalness. I argue that the disposition is not an extra faculty or a sixth sense, and attempt to situate Shaftesbury's position on this issue between those of Locke and Hutcheson. I argue that the natural disposition is to be perfected in many different ways in order to be exercised in (...) the perception of the different degrees of beauty within Shaftesbury's hierarchy. This leads to the conclusion that the exercise of the disposition depends, from case to case, on many different cognitive and affective conditions, that are realised by the collaborative functionings of our ordinary faculties. Essential to Shaftesbury's conception of aesthetic experience is a disinterested, contemplative love, that causes (or contains) what we may call a 'disinterested pleasure', but also an interested pleasure. I argue that, within any given aesthetic experience, the role of the disinterested pleasure is secondary to that of the disinterested love. However, an important function of the disinterested pleasure is that, in combination with the interested pleasure, it leads one to aspire to pass from the aesthetic experience of lower degrees of beauty to the experience of higher ones in the hierarchy. /// [Anthony Savile] (1) If Shaftesbury is to be seen as the doyen of modern aesthetics, his most valuable legacy to us may not so much be his viewing aesthetic response as a sui generis disinterested delight as his insistence on its turning 'wholly on [experience of] what is exterior and foreign to ourselves'. Not that we cannot experience ourselves, or what is our own, as a source of such admiration. Rather our responses, favourable or no, are improperly grounded in any essentially reflexive, or first-personal, ways of taking what engages us. The suggestion is tested against the case of Narcissus. (2) Glauser interestingly emphasizes Shaftesbury's neo-Platonic conception of a hierarchy of aesthetic experience that culminates in the joyful contemplation of God. That hierarchy must be something that is less unitary and systematic than Shaftesbury himself had supposed, even when his emphasis on the tie between aesthetic pleasure and contemplative experience is allowed to extend beyond perception and to encompass episodes of thought itself. (shrink)
The chapter of Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that deals with the question of freedom is the longest of Book II. It underwent extensive revisions during the Essay’s five first editions, some of which are acknowledged by Locke in II, 21, §§71-72, and in the Epistle to the Reader, where he says, “I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last determination to the Will in all voluntary action.” Several changes (...) are due to Locke’s recognition and explanation, in the second edition, of weakness of the will, absent in the first edition. His explanation depends on two issues, duly discussed in the second and subsequent editions: the causal role of the psychological state of uneasiness, and the power to suspend one’s desires. All three themes—weakness of the will, uneasiness, suspension of desires— belong to moral psychology. However, we also find another significant modification. Locke repeatedly says that free will is impossible, but in the fifth edition he inserts a passage in which he affirms a certain sort of “Liberty in respect of willing”. (shrink)
Although several passages in Berkeley are related to the question whether two or more finite substances can simultaneously perceive numerically identical sensible ideas, it is only in TDHP that he addresses the question explicitly and in some detail. Yet, Berkeley’s less than straightforward reply is notoriously difficult to pin down. Some commentators take Berkeley to be endorsing a clear‐cut positive reply, whereas others have him giving an emphatically negative one; others hold that for Berkeley there is no fact of the (...) matter that determines an answer one way or the other. I argue that all three readings find some justification at one point or another in the passage, and all hold a kernel of truth. Yet, none of them can be taken unrestrictedly because Philonous’s considered position is disjunctive: either there is no problem at all, or, if there is one, it makes equally against ‘materialism’ and immaterialism. I argue that the passage can be given an overall interpretation that explains why Berkeley is entitled to hold that there is some truth in each direction. I propose answers to the questions why Berkeley thinks there may nevertheless be a problem after all, and if so, why he can yet legitimately feel entitled to let it rest, that is, why he remains confident, within the philosophical context of his day, that his philosophy does not lead to solipsism. (shrink)
It is unquestionably one of the last objections Descartes might have expected, that if ideas exist, external objects are unknowable. How indeed could he have foreseen such an objection? Did he not seek to establish through his metaphysics, in the Meditations, the certainty of the existence of bodies, as well as the reality of the scientific knowledge we claim to have of them? And this procedure had necessarily to presuppose the existence of ideas: first, in order to demonstrate the existence (...) of God, then, to demonstrate the existence of bodies and to establish the reality of our knowledge of those objects. Hence Descartes could not have imagined the above-mentioned objection. And to my knowledge he does not envisge it at any moment in his writings. In the general form in which I have stated it it would have astonished Spinoza, Arnauld, Malebranche and Leibniz as well. And it did not fail to surprise Locke. The objection was formulated in 1697 by John Sergeant in his work: Solid Philosophy Asserted. In this paper I wish to present that objection. (shrink)
Dans l'Essai pour une nouvelle théorie de la vision (1709) Berkeley critique un usage illégitime de l'optique géométrique dans l'explication de la perception des qualités spatiales. Toutefois, dans la Théorie de la vision défendue et expliquée (1733), il assigne à l'optique géométrique un rôle théorique positif, à côté de sa propre théorie de la vision. Nous défendons la thèse suivant laquelle une image rétinienne, chez Berkeley, est une configuration de corpuscules en mouvement, tangibles de droit. Cette lecture corrobore l'interprétation d'une (...) forme de corpuscularisme dans le système immatérialiste. In An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709) Berkeley objects to an illegitimate use of geometrical optics in the explanation of our perception of spatial qualities. However, in The Theory of Vision, Vindicated and Explained (1733), he grants geometrical optics a positive theoretical role alongside his own philosophical theory of vision. I defend the claim that a retinal image, for Berkeley, is a configuration of moving corpuscles that are tangible in principle. This reading corroborates the interpretation according to which Berkeley accommodates a form of corpuscularism within his immaterialism. (shrink)
