Hume: Philosophy of Mind

Numerous concerns have been raised for Hume's positive account of personal identity, his bundle theory of the human person. Some of these concerns are pitched as the very concerns that Hume has in mind when he later backs off from his earlier conclusions in the Appendix. Others are pitched as standalone concerns. In this paper, I focus on the latter. Here I discuss three lingering concerns for his bundle theory of the human person, which I call The Problem of Reference, (...) The Problem of Persistence, and The Problem of Individuation. I argue that, despite recent attempts by various authors to address or dissolve these concerns for Hume's account, Hume's bundle theory of the human person remains, in at least three different ways, either inconsistent with his larger philosophical system or incapable of preserving some of our most important attitudes, expectations, and practices concerning the identity of human persons. (shrink)

Some of Hume’s central arguments in the Treatise—for example, arguments about causality, the self, and motivation—concern which of our perceptions represent, and what these perceptions can and cannot represent. A growing body of literature aims to reconstruct the theory of mental representation that (it is presumed) underwrites these arguments. The most popular type of interpretation says that, according to Hume’s theory, copying plays a significant role in explaining mental representation. This paper raises two challenges to such interpretations. First, they cannot (...) be squared with Treatise Book 2’s account of passions formed via sympathy (hereinafter, sympathetic passions). Second, Hume’s treatment of copying and representation in his later works differs significantly from that of the Treatise, and provides no clear evidence that the mature Hume accepted a theory of mental representation based on copying. (shrink)

Hume is widely understood to believe that all virtues and vices are “durable principles of the mind,” and that durable principles of the mind are character traits. Several scholars therefore read him as a virtue ethicist. I argue that we should reject all such interpretations. I argue that Hume allows that some virtues and vices are simply single perceptions, such as a motivationally strong desire to help a stranger or to murder someone. Therefore, I argue, we should not read him (...) as a virtue ethicist. Hume is, however, a reductionist about character, who understands a character trait as simply a long-lasting but interrupted succession of perceptions. On my interpretation, a durable principle of the mind is an uninterrupted, relatively short-lived succession of different perceptions within an actor’s mind, of a kind that mainly interests Hume because he thinks it enables observers to associate a person’s action with her mind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume on the Self and Personal Identity ed. by Dan O’BrienBridger EhliDan O’Brien, ed. Hume on the Self and Personal Identity. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Pp. xxiv + 321. Softcover. ISBN: 9783031042751. $129.99This is an engaging collection of essays on a central topic in Hume’s philosophy. Perhaps Hume’s best-known contribution to the philosophy of the self is his denial, in section 1.4.6 of the Treatise, “Of personal identity,” (...) of the existence of a simple, enduring self that is accessible by reflection. But as his distinction between personal identity “as it regards our thought or imagination” and personal identity “as it regards our passions or the concern we take for ourselves” suggests, he has more to say about the self and personal identity than the skeptical doctrines presented in T 1.4.6 (T 1.4.6.5). One virtue of the collection is that it strives to capture the breadth and complexity of Hume’s thinking about the self.The collection, which focuses primarily on the Treatise, is divided into three parts. The essays in Part 1 consider Book 1 and the Appendix. Andrew Ward’s “How Sceptical is Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity?” argues for the provocative thesis that Hume’s intention in the Appendix is not to express dissatisfaction with either his metaphysics of the self or his psychological explanation of ascriptions of identity and simplicity to the self. According to Ward, Hume’s aim is rather to “clarify and strengthen his sceptical position” by reinforcing his rejection of realist accounts of personal identity (13). To my mind, Ward does not adequately address the textual evidence that has led other commentators to believe that the Appendix identifies a defect in T 1.4.6’s discussion of the self, such as Hume’s complaint that he does not “know how to correct [his] former opinions, nor how to render them consistent” (T App 10).Donald Ainslie’s “Hume’s Bundle” is also chiefly concerned with the interpretation of the Appendix. Ainslie has defended an influential reading according to which Hume’s problem in the Appendix concerns his psychological explanation of ascriptions of unity to the self. Here, he argues against interpretations according to which Hume’s problem concerns his metaphysical account of the self as a bundle of perceptions. According to Ainslie, Hume did not worry about how one’s perceptions come to be bundled together, because he treated the fact that perceptions come in distinct bundles as brute. This argument against the bundling interpretation seems less than decisive. At least some versions of that interpretation can be understood to hold that Hume’s problem in the Appendix arises from his being unable to answer a causal question: what is the cause of one’s perceptions’ being bundled together? In the “Letter from a Gentleman,” Hume suggests that the maxim according to which everything has a cause enjoys moral, albeit neither intuitive nor demonstrative, certainty [End Page 377] (LG 26). Insofar as he accepts this maxim, he would hold that the question of the cause of the bundling of one’s perceptions has an answer and, accordingly, that the bundling of one’s perceptions is not brute.The themes of Galen Strawson’s “What I Call Myself ” will be familiar to readers of his The Evident Connexion. Strawson argues against a traditional reading of Hume according to which he both holds that the self is nothing more than a bundle of perceptions and denies the existence of subjects of experience. Central to Straw-son’s case is what he calls the “Experience/Experiencer Thesis,” which says that the existence of an experience requires the existence of a subject of experience. Strawson takes Hume to endorse this “necessary truth” and, hence, to hold that no perception can exist without its being experienced by a subject (48). But there is a text that tells against Hume’s endorsing the Experience/Experiencer Thesis. In section 1.4.2, “Of scepticism with regard to the senses,” Hume argues that “the continu’d existence of... perceptions involves no contradiction” (T 1.4.2.40). Because what it is for perceptions... (shrink)

In the Treatise, Hume attempts to explain why we all believe that the self is a single unified entity that persists over time, a belief which Hume calls a fiction. In this paper, I demonstrate how Hume uses a type of functional explanation to account for this belief. After explicating Hume's view, I shall argue that it faces two related problems, which constitute a sort of dilemma. In the final section, I show how one of the horns of this dilemma (...) is plausibly what troubles Hume in the famous Appendix passage where he retracts his positive account of personal identity. (shrink)

Volume 32, Issue 6, December 2024, Page 1438-1447.

Comparisons have been drawn between certain aspects of Hume’s philosophy and Buddhist philosophy, particularly concerning their views on the self. While it is intriguing to discover affinities between two philosophical systems that are separated far apart by both time and space, comparison would become superficial if similarities are found merely in their general, overall claims or doctrines. Although engaging in a comparative exploration between Hume and Buddhist philosophers on the self can reveal remarkable similarities in their accounts, it can also (...) provide valuable insights into their differences. The differences between Hume’s and Buddhist philosophers’ views become evident when considering the debates about the self among Buddhist philosophers, which have resulted in diverse accounts within the Buddhist tradition. Indeed, it is those differences that prove to be more illuminating for recognizing and understanding subtle aspects and various components of Hume’s account, which may not be adequately described or distinguished by Hume himself. These aspects are particularly revealed in Hume’s brief description of dissatisfaction with his own account in the Appendix. The primary objective of this paper is to uncover the system of reality underlying Hume’s account of the self, which creates a labyrinth for him, by drawing upon Buddhist ideas and debates regarding the self. (shrink)

I argue that dreams can contain perceptual elements in multifarious, heretofore unthought-of ways. I also explain the difference between dreams that contain perceptual elements, perceptual experiences that contain dream elements, and having a dream and a perceptual experience simultaneously. I then discuss two applications of the resulting view. First, I explain how my taxonomy of perception in dreams will allow “dream engineers”—who try to alter the content of people’s dreams—to accurately classify different dreams and explore creating new forms of perception (...) in dreams. Second, I consider the consequences of the view for the role of memory in dreaming and imagination. I argue that not every element of dreams or sensory imaginations must rely on memory. The resultant view of sensory imagination provides a counterexample to Hume’s account of sensory imagination, according to which sensory imagination must be built up from faint copies of sensory impressions stored in memory. (shrink)

This article argues that Hume is committed to the cognitive phenomenology of believing. For Hume, beliefs have some distinctively cognitive phenomenology, which is different in kind from sensory phenomenology. I call this interpretation the “cognitive phenomenal interpretation” (“CPI”) of Hume. CPI is coherent with, and supported by, the textual evidence from A Treatise of Human Nature as well as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In both texts, Hume talks about the distinctive “manner” of believing, and CPI provides us with the (...) best explanation of Hume’s remarks on this distinctive “manner.”. (shrink)

En este trabajo me ocuparé de las resonancias que tuvo el modo en el que Hume aborda la cuestión de la materialidad de la mente en uno de los materialistas más notables de las Islas Británicas del siglo XVIII, Joseph Priestley. La influencia que ejerció el enfoque humeano acerca del materialismo en la obra de Priestley no ha sido suficientemente puesta de relieve o ha sido desestimada. En buena medida, esto se debe a que Priestley tienen una actitud crítica hacia (...) las consecuencias escépticas y ateas que se desprenden de la filosofía de Hume, por lo que generalmente se tiende a presentarlo como uno de sus adversarios. Sin embargo, existen dos grandes puntos de contacto entre sus propuestas que estudiaré en lo que sigue: (1) ambos abordan la cuestión del origen del pensamiento, haciendo a un lado la cuestión de la naturaleza de la sustancia de la que estaría compuesta la mente —por ser inaccesible a nuestro conocimiento— y preguntándose por la causa del pensamiento, y (2) Priestley se sirve de una concepción de la causalidad inspirada en buena medida por la de Hume y la emplea como uno de los pilares de su materialismo, al sostener que la conjunción constante entre características mentales y organismos con un cerebro funcional nos da la mayor seguridad posible de que existe una relación causal entre ambos. (shrink)

Despite its long period of dominance, the details of associationism as developed by the British Empiricists in the 18th and 19th centuries are often ignored or forgotten today. Perhaps as a result, modern understandings of Empiricist associationism are often oversimplified. In fact, there is no single core view that can be viewed as definitional, or even weaker, as characteristic, of the tradition. The actual views of associationists in this tradition are much more diverse than any such view would allow, even (...) on fundamental aspects of the concept of association. This paper presents some of the most striking theoretical diversity and most significant discussions within the Empiricist associationist tradition. Recognizing this diversity, Empiricist associationism is best viewed as a project with shared questions and methods rather than a shared substantive theory of mind. This discussion can inform our understanding of the historical tradition, and also inform our current use of association and associationism. The concept of association is more flexible than it is often treated, and even its basic nature and function remain up for debate. (shrink)

Throughout his writings, Hume extols the benefits of an attribute he calls “Strength of Mind,” which he defines as the “prevalence of the calm passions over the violent” (T 2.3.3.10). But there is some question as to how he thought a person could attain this important trait. Contemporary scholars have committed Hume to the view that only indirect and social methods, such as state punishment or sympathetic pressure, could effectively cultivate it. Yet a closer examination of Hume’s corpus reveals a (...) more direct approach applicable at the individual level. Though rarely achieved and difficult to execute, self-government of the passions is possible according to Hume. The key to success lies in harnessing the power of habit. In its most sophisticated form, the process centrally involves cultivating a certain transformative connoisseurship, the ability to appreciate regularities in one’s own mental activity and thereby alter it. (shrink)

A survey of work on perception, mind, and mental representation by 18th century philosophers after Berkeley, notably Robert Smith, William Porterfield, David Hume, Etienne de Condillac, and Thomas Reid.

La philosophie de David Hume entend rompre avec une théorie classique des facultés, redessinant la place que l'imagination joue dans notre vie psychique et déployant ainsi une géographie mentale inédite. Instrument privilégié de son scepticisme philosophique, cette théorie de l'imagination pose cependant autant de questions qu'elle n'en résout, du fait même qu'associant imagination et conception, elle se voit chargée de rendre compte de tendances contradictoires au sein de l'esprit humain. Une clarification terminologique et conceptuelle permet alors, faute de résoudre ces (...) tensions, d'éclairer les nouveaux enjeux proposés par une telle approche. (shrink)

Cet article a pour but de mettre en regard l’analyse de l’esprit de Hume avec les critiques de l’associationnisme qu’on faites William James et Henri Bergson à la fin du XIXe siècle, lorsqu’ils proposèrent de renverser l’ordre des genèses psychologiques : non pas association d’éléments atomiques séparés (les impressions et idées), mais dissociation de touts vagues confus (les expériences pures). Il cherche à montrer sur l’exemple de la perception de la ressemblance que Hume est sauf du reproche d’avoir ainsi « (...) atomisé » la vie mentale, ce que montre notamment la fonction sélective et donc discriminante du principe de ressemblance. Le commentaire de Deleuze qui voit dans le dualisme de l’atomisme et de l’associationnisme chez Hume le critère même de définition de l’empirisme en général s’en trouve de ce fait contesté. (shrink)

Durante los siglos XVII y XVIII hubo un intenso debate en las Islas Británicas en torno al materialismo. Mi objetivo consiste en caracterizar la postura de David Hume en el marco de ese debate. Sostengo que, no obstante rechazar la metafísica sustancialista para centrarse en el estudio de las percepciones, Hume sienta una posición respecto de la relación entre mente y materia. Sin embargo, esa posición reviste cierta complejidad en tanto no es explicitada en los textos que se editaron en (...) vida de Hume. Propongo definirla como un materialismo restringido, ya que, respecto de la naturaleza de la mente, Hume desestima tanto las posturas materialista como inmaterialista, pero respecto de las causas del pensamiento, termina acercándose al materialismo a partir de argumentos basados en la experiencia y en la analogía con la naturaleza. (shrink)

(1) Alors que Hume distingue plusieurs sortes de propositions, nous expliquons pourquoi il se focalise sur l’inférence causale lorsqu’il examine la nature de la croyance. (2) Après avoir considéré les réponses qu’il écarte concernant la nature de la croyance, nous étudions sa solution. (3) Nous dégageons les implications de sa position, dirigée entre autres contre la théorie cartésienne du jugement. (4) Une interprétation du rôle asymétrique de la croyance par rapport aux passions et à l’action est proposée. (5) La position (...) de Hume au sujet de la nature de la croyance, pensons-nous, rencontre une difficulté : elle est peu apte à rendre compte de la nature de la croyance existentielle négative. (shrink)

La réflexion philosophique qui se déploie dans cet essai porte sur la question de savoir si l'empirisme de Hume fait vraiment le deuil du sujet de la connaissance. Dans le cas contraire, quelle peut être la nature du rapport du sujet humien aux sujets cartésien et kantien? D'après l'auteur de cet essai, l'empirisme de Hume ne sonne pas totalement le glas du sujet de la connaissance, car si le sujet y brille d'abord par sa passivité, il finit par donner la (...) preuve de son dynamisme cognitif lorsqu'il fait valoir sa spontanéité, à travers l'exercice de son pouvoir d'anticiper le futur, d'élaborer des idées complexes, générales ou abstraites, et de construire des relations là où l'expérience ne donne que des perceptions atomisées et fluctuantes. (shrink)

본 논문의 목적은 흄의 믿음 이론에 있어 ‘힘과 활력’이라는 성질의 본성을 밝히는 것이다. 흄이 사용한 힘과 활력이라는 개념에 대해 다양한 해석들이 존재한다. 첫 번째 입장에 따르면, 흄이 힘과 활력 개념을 어떤 기술적(technical) 의미로 사용한 것이 아니므로 우리는 이 개념들을 글자그대로 이해해야 한다는 것이다. 필자는 이와 같은 입장을 ‘표준적 해석’ 또는 ‘전통적 해석’이라고 부르겠다. 두 번째 해석에 따르면 힘과 활력 개념은 흄이 허용한 것 보다 더 복잡하며 기술적인 의미를 지닌다. 필자는 두 번째 해석을 힘과 활력에 관한 흄주의(Humean) 이론이라고 부르겠다. 비록 흄이 (...) 힘과 활력 개념에 의존하여 인간 마음의 작용을 설명하는데 있어 어려움에 직면하긴 했지만, 우리가 흄주의 해석을 취하면 흄은 이 개념을 오직 믿음을 설명하기 위한 것이었음을 알게 될 것이다. 나는 이와 같은 점에서 흄주의 해석에 동조하게 될 것이다. 그러나 흄이 몇 가지 점에서 힘과 활력에 관한 글자그대로의 개념에 의존했음은 분명하다. 힘과 활력이라는 말은 다양한 의미로 이해될 수 있다. 1) ‘강도 또는 강렬함’, 2) ‘실재감(verisimilitude)’, 3) ‘반성적인 의식 활동 속에서 접할 수 있는 성질, 4) ‘마음의 다른 상태와 기능적으로 연관된 느낌’등의 의미가 있다. 이 글에서 필자는 1)과 2)는 인상과 관념간의 구분에만 적용될 수 있으며, 3)과 4)는 믿음과 동일시됨을 보이게 될 것이다. 또한 2), 3), 4)는 일상적 의미가 아니라는 점에서 공통점을 가지며, 기술적인 의미로 사용되고 있음을 밝힐 것이다. 우리가 『인성론』에서 흄이 사용하고 있는 ‘힘과 활력’이란 용어에 관해 일의적인 의미로 해석하기를 시도했을 때 그 핵심적 특징을 이해할 수 없지만 두 종류의 해석으로부터 어느 정도의 타당성을 발견할 수 있다고 필자는 제안할 것이다. 즉 3) ‘생각의 방식으로서 의식적으로 떠올려진 명제 또는 관념’과 4) ‘마음의 다른 상태 예컨대, 욕망과 기능적으로 연관된 느낌’이 ‘힘과 활력’에 관한 가장 정당한 해석이라고 제안하게 될 것이다. 그러나 문제는 이 두 해석, 즉 (3)과 (4)가 서로 조화될 수 있는지 하는 것이다. 현대 기능주의자들은 믿는 명제를 그것에 따라 적절하게 행위하려는 경향성과 동일시함으로써 네 번째 해석을 지지한다. 필자는 이와 같은 기능주의 해석에 동의한다. 그러나 믿음이 갖는 ‘힘’과 ‘활력’ 개념에 관한 세 번째 해석 즉 부사구주의 해석이 더 강력한 지지를 얻기 위해서는 흄의 관념 이론도 부사구주의로 읽을 수 있는지가 증명되어야할 문제로 남는다. (shrink)

This article presents a critical bibliographic review of the central characteristics of Hume's Theory of Passions and Emotions, which conceived the philosophy of human nature as an analytical and experimental science. This view is contrary to the ancient and medieval ideas that passions were movements of the lower parts of the soul. For Hume, passions in general are among the perceptions of the mind, although they also serve as motivations to act and even to reason. The apparent dichotomy that existed (...) between passions and reason was abandoned and reason was treated as a calm passion. Hence, Hume dethroned reason from its sovereign position in knowledge. For him, passions are neither subordinate nor independent of reason; it is the reason that is subordinate to passions. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Basic Distinctions Basic Principles References Further Reading.

This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. (...) In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds. (shrink)

In this paper, I will make the case that an associative account of predication in Hume seems to allow for impossible predicative conceptions—that is, the conceiving of impossible states of affairs involving subjects instantiating properties or qualities—which violate his Conceivability Principle. The natural response is to argue that such conceptions are not clear and distinct, but substantive worries are raised about a number of attempted solutions along these lines. This poses a predicament for Hume scholars: either we must modify or (...) abandon the Conceivability Principle, or reject an associative account of predication, or concede that Hume faces a difficulty he cannot solve. (shrink)

At the level of the individual, current research suggests that most of our daily actions are done out of habit. At the same time, individuals are part of larger social units, and their behavior gives rise to customs and institutions. Hume recognized the indispensable role of custom and habit in human life in his science of the mind, a science which aims to form the most general principles possible. Custom and habit are singled out by Hume as particularly potent general (...) principles of human nature, describing them as the “great guide of life” and essential to human affairs. The aim of this paper is to explore the role custom and habit play in Hume’s work, especially as it concerns his political philosophy and experimental method, while considering intersections with contemporary discussions in political science. (shrink)

Abstract:What is Hume’s hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which a passion arises? How does it operate in structuring his system? These are primary questions that need to be answered in order to understand Hume’s intention in the Treatise. Yet, there exists no reasonable answers, nor serious attempts to answer them, probably because this hypothesis is considered as a limited issue, relevant only to the indirect passions, or because it is too mechanical and unsophisticated to excite (...) critics’ curiosities. My present aim is to show that Hume’s double relation of impressions and ideas operating in the production of indirect passions is integral to his entire system not only in that it serves as a powerful weapon to advocate his naturalistic position, but also in that it is a highly sophisticated psychological mechanism that functions as a schema for the cooperation of the imagination and the passions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Imagination in Hume’s Philosophy: The Canvas of the Mind by Timothy M. CostelloeSaul TraigerTimothy M. Costelloe. The Imagination in Hume’s Philosophy: The Canvas of the Mind. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018. Pp. xv + 312. Hardback. ISBN: 9781474436397. $107.00.If anything about Hume’s philosophy can be characterized as widely accepted, it is that the imagination is front and center in Hume’s account of the mind. The aim of (...) Timothy Costelloe’s book is to fully develop the observation, that the imagination, as Hume understands it, is “the canvas of the mind.” Costelloe amply demonstrates that the imagination is a broad canvas, ranging from Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics, to his aesthetics, moral and political philosophy, history, philosophy of religion, and his general conception of philosophy itself. Seven substantial chapters cover these areas, and show how Hume takes the imagination to play a pivotal role in each.One of the many strengths of this book is that Costelloe responsibly mines the secondary literature, carefully explaining the interpretations he seconds and those he finds wanting. The attention to the relevant secondary literature is apparent from the start, where Costelloe laments the surprising dearth of book-length treatments of Hume on the imagination, but helpfully highlights both the lesser known Hume-centric monographs on the imagination by Furlong and Wilbanks, as well as more widely read interpretations.The introductory chapter makes important distinctions and introduces some main concepts. Hume differentiates the imagination’s “combinatory power” from its “creative power.” While the uninhibited ability to concatenate ideas might also be seen as a creative act, Costelloe sees the creative power where the imagination [End Page 173] “generates a class of ideas—‘fictions’ of a certain sort—independent of experience and according to its own inner logic” (21). This characterization makes sense when viewing the imagination’s function as directed towards a goal, such as achieving coherence or creating an aesthetically pleasing effect. Costelloe suggests that achieving an aesthetically pleasing effect is an element in any exercise of the imagination’s creative power. The imagination creates easy transitions among ideas where there were none, where doing so is pleasurable, or aided by the passions.Costelloe introduces his account of Hume’s fictions as errors of the imagination whereby ideas are formed in a manner different from the standard derivation from antecedent impressions. He insists, helpfully, that fictions are not illusions, but rather errors of a different kind. Though both involve error, fictions, unlike illusions, are not described in terms of jest or irony (30).Though he acknowledges that Hume does not describe any fictions as “artificial,” Costelloe finds it helpful to draw a distinction between natural and artificial fictions. Natural fictions are generated without reflection. Artificial fictions, such as those created by poets and philosophers, issue from “the voluntary act of imagination” (31). Costelloe holds that artificial fictions “are rarely taken to refer to objects with real existence and that any professed belief is really a matter of people being persuaded of something and taking the ideas in question as having real referents, thus only lending themselves to their existence for one reason or another” (31). This is a bit unclear. Certainly, poetic fictions are voluntary creations not intended to refer to real objects. But substance, and the double existence of ideas and external objects, as philosophical fictions, surely both involve belief and the corresponding existential commitments on the part of the philosophers who are committed to them. It is also difficult to see the purported contrast between belief and taking ideas to have real referents.Chapter 2, on metaphysics, is the longest chapter in the book, and it addresses the fictions of the imagination in Hume’s account of space and time, continued and distinct existence, liberty and necessity, and personal identity. Costelloe is sensitive to the worry that classifying Hume’s subject in Book 1 of the Treatise as metaphysics may appear to be slighting the central epistemological concerns and failing to appreciate Hume’s nascent cognitive psychology. Such worries fall away as Costelloe explores the roles that the imagination plays in the formation of our conception of duration without change, and the identity... (shrink)

Etude des passions dans la philosophie et la littérature à l'âge classique, et de la façon dont Descartes, Hume, les matérialistes et les romanciers du XVIIe siècle pensaient cette notion.

In this paper, I examine the notion of the ‘psychological dynamics’ that Professor Shun uses for explicating Confucian moral anger, based on David Hume’s (1711–76) psychological account of mind, to reconsider the role that object-based distinctions of emotions play in the Confucian moral tradition. First, by appealing to Hume’s investigation of the mental processes involved in feeling moral sentiments, I suggest that imagination, as a component in the ‘psychological dynamics’, explains how ‘dust’ settles on the mind to yield inappropriate emotional (...) responses. Second, by re-examining Confucius’s approval of Yan Hui’s moral anger, that he ‘never misdirects his anger’, I argue that though Confucians would not characterize the difference in emotional responses by distinguishing the first- and third-person perspectives, their goal of moral self-cultivation would encourage them to recognize the practical significance of distinguishing objects in situations, along with perceiving situations as a whole. While our minds as mental mirrors can reflect the whole situation, they are unique mirrors that resonate more vigorously with specific objects such as others’ minds. (shrink)

Taxonomies of the passions have long claimed to serve a quest for self-knowledge, by specifying conditions under which certain passions arise, formal objects they possess, and qualities essential to their particular feelings. I argue that David Hume's theory of the passions provides resources for a different kind of self-knowledge – a sceptical self-knowledge depending on our ability to articulate how the passions feel rather than always identifying our passions as tokens of an identifiable passion-type. These resources are distinctions between four (...) qualitative aspects that passions may possess – pleasantness or painfulness, calmness or violence, invigoration or softening, and directedness or lack thereof towards specific actions. Reflection on these aspects produces a more accurate understanding of the nature of our emotions and chastens our judgmental tendencies in ways that benefit both self and others. (shrink)

본 논문은 흄이 제시하고 있는 시민사회론을 검토함으로써 흄의 정치철학에 대한 이해도를 높이는 것을 목표로 한다. 필자는 본 논문에서 흄이 야만국가에서 시민국가로의 이행에 필수적인 조건으로 제시하는 “도덕적 의무”의 부과에 있어서 “반성”이 중요한 역할을 수행하고 있음을 보일 것이다. 그리고 더 나아가, 흄의 정치철학의 성격을 규정하는데 있어서, 리빙스턴과 스튜어트간의 논쟁을 살펴볼 것이다. 필자는 흄의 정치철학을 프랑스 혁명 이후에 새롭게 대두된 개념인 “철학적 보수주의”로 해석할 것인가, 아니면 “온건한 자유주의”로 해석할 것인가 하는 이들의 논쟁 자체가 생산적이지 못함을 지적할 것이다. 필자가 보기에 오히려 우리가 주목해야할 점은 (...) 흄의 정치 철학에서 반성이 핵심적인 역할을 하고 있으며, 이를 흄이 제시하고 있는 시민사회론에서 확인할 수 있다는 점이다. 이는 흄의 정치철학을 이해하는데 있어서 중요한 시사점을 가진다. 그 이유는 지금까지 많은 학자들에 의해 흄이 “습관과 관습”을 중시한 “반이성주의자”로 이해되어 왔는데, 사실 흄은 정치 철학에서 실천 이성으로서의 이성의 반성적 작용을 강조하고 있다는 점에서, 흄의 입장이 “반이성주의”로 귀결될 수 없다는 것이 본 논문에서 명확히 밝혀질 것이기 때문이다. (shrink)

Abstract:I suggest that Hume’s recantation, in the Appendix to the Treatise, of his account of the idea of personal identity in section 1.4.6 hinges on the contrast between the first-personal cognitive roles of that idea and its imagination-based explanation. In stark, if implicit, contrast with Locke, Hume’s account divorces personal identity from consciousness, considering oneself as oneself. But, later in the Appendix, Hume realized, if imperfectly, that something was missing from the idea of self he had constructed. I suggest that (...) what is missing is the intimate consciousness of ourselves that idea should allow us to achieve. While Hume despaired to find a solution to this problem, a change in the background of his earlier theory—a change he had available and which is perhaps alluded to in a letter to Kames—could have made his original account consistent with the first-personal features of the idea of self. (shrink)

Introduction : Involuntarism and philosophy -- The obscure dust of the world : the unconscious of perception in Leibniz -- Inevitable and persistent inadequacies : the unconscious of ideas in Spinoza -- Deteriora Sequer : the unconscious of desire in Spinoza -- The gravity of ideas : the unconscious of habit in Hume -- Conclusion : obscurity and involvement.