- First Person Singular: Review of: Brian Rotman: Becoming Beside Ourselves: Alphabet, ghosts, distributed human beings. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - manuscriptdetails
- First-Person Plural Quantum Mechanics.Ulrich J. Mohrhoff - manuscriptdetails
- Being Embodied: First-Person Judgements and Their Relation to Embodiment.Anne Newstead - manuscriptdetails
- Self-locating belief and the goal of accuracy.Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
- Perspective Reasoning and the Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Xianda Gao - 2018details
- Kant and the significance of self-consciousness.Matthew Boyle - forthcoming - Philosophy.details
- The First Person.James Cargile - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.details
- Time's arrow and self‐locating probability.Eddy Keming Chen - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
- The Sense of Mineness.M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.details
- When you isn't you. The attraction of self-ascription in children’s interpretation of pronouns in reported speech.Franziska Köder & Maier Emar - forthcoming - Glossa.details
- The First Person Singular in advance.Alphonso Lingis - forthcoming - Philosophy Today.details
- Dretske’s Naturalistic Representationalism and Privileged Accessibility Thesis.Manas Kumar Sahu - forthcoming - Philosophia 50 (4).details
- Indexicality and de se reports.Philippe Schlenker - forthcoming - In Maienborn von Heusinger & Mouton Gruyter Portneder (eds.), Handbook of Semantics.details
- Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About It: Confusions, Virtues and Challenges of Higher-order Theories (in) Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal.Miguel Angel Sebastian - forthcoming - Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.details
- De Se Thought and Communication: An Introduction.Stephan Torre - forthcoming - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.details
- Contemplating on the Nature of Selfhood in DoC Patients: Neurophenomenological Perspective.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2023 - Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 22 (1):23.details
- Depersonalization Puzzle: A New View from the Neurophenomenological Selfhood Perspective.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2022 - Journal of Neurophilosophy 1 (2):181-202.details
- Self, Me and I in the repertoire of spontaneously occurring altered states of Selfhood: eight neurophenomenological case study reports.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen - 2022 - Cognitive Neurodynamics 16:255–282.details
- Minimal Fregeanism.Aidan Gray - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):429-458.details
- Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):241-294.details
- Selfless Memories.Raphaël Millière & Albert Newen - 2022 - Erkenntnis:0-22.details
- The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):659-675.details
- Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):628-640.details
- De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):50-76.details
- Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
- Reference, Representation, and the Meaning of the First-Person Singular Pronoun.Monima Chadha - 2021 - Philosophy East and West 71 (1):38-56.details
- Brandom and A Spirit of Trust.Willem A. deVries - 2021 - Humana Mente 29 (2):236-250.details
- Putting I-Thoughts to Work.Santiago Echeverri - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (7):345-372.details
- Defending functionalism and self-reference in memory.Jordi Fernández - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 64:223-236.details
- Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation.Ali Hossein Khani - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):153-184.details
- Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the "Here-Replacement" Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (4):188-213.details
- Centred Propositions, What is Asserted, and Communication.Jakub Rudnicki - 2021 - Theoria 87 (1):187-206.details
- First-person representations and responsible agency in AI.Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7061-7079.details
- What is Special about De Se Attitudes?Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2021 - In Stephen Biggs & Heimir Geirsson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. Routledge. pp. 464-481.details
- The Second Person Perspective.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1693-1711.details
- Perspectives on de se immunity.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10089-10107.details
- Davidson, first-person authority, and direct self-knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13421-13440.details
- First-Personal Moral Testimony: a Defence.David A. Borman - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):163-179.details
- Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):579-584.details
- Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049.details
- First Person Implicit Indirect Reports in Disguise.Alessandro Capone - 2020 - In Antonino Pennisi & Alessandra Falzone (eds.), The Extended Theory of Cognitive Creativity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Performativity. Springer Verlag. pp. 303-318.details
- Acting Without Me: Corporate Agency and the First Person Perspective.Herman Cappelen & Joshua Dever - 2020 - In Stephen Biggs & Heimir Geirsson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York: Routledge. pp. 599-613.details
- The First Person in Cognition and Morality by Béatrice Longuenesse (review). [REVIEW]Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Review of Metaphysics 73 (4):846-848.details
- De Se Attitudes and Computation.Neil Hamilton Fairley - 2020 - Theoria 87 (1):207-229.details
- Apperception and Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness in Kant.Luca Forgione - 2020 - International Philosophical Quarterly 60 (4):431-447.details
- Understanding self‐ascription.Frank Jackson & Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):141-155.details
- Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.details
- First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.details
- Self-ascription and the de se.James Openshaw - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2039-2050.details
- Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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