About this topic
Summary There is a contrast between attitudes which represent things from a god's eye perspective and attitudes which represent things from a first-person point of view. Third-person attitudes concern what the universe is like; first-person attitudes, on the other hand, concern our position within the universe—what we ourselves are like, and where we are located in space or time. John Perry and David Lewis have argued that first-person attitudes challenge the received understanding of propositional attitudes. First-person attitudes also seem to play a special role in cognition and action.  
Key works Pioneering papers on the significance of first-person attitudes are Castañeda 1966 and Castaneda 1967. The by now orthodox view that first-person attitudes are incompatible with the traditional theory of attitudes was argued for by Perry 1977, Perry 1979 and Lewis 1979. Early criticisms of Perry's and Lewis's arguments are found in Boer & Lycan 1980 and  Stalnaker 1981. More recent opposition against orthodoxy can be found in Cappelen & Dever 2013 and Magidor 2015. Torre & Weber 2019 offer a defence of the orthodox view. 
Introductions Feit 2008Ninan 2010Ninan 2016;  García-Carpintero & Torre 2016; Torre & Weber 2021
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  1. First Person Singular: Review Of: Brian Rotman: Becoming Beside Ourselves: Alphabet, Ghosts, Distributed Human Beings. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - manuscript
    Brian Rotman argues that (one) “mind” and (one) “god” are only conceivable, literally, because of (alphabetic) literacy, which allowed us to designate each of these ghosts as an incorporeal, speaker-independent “I” (or, in the case of infinity, a notional agent that goes on counting forever). I argue that to have a mind is to have the capacity to feel. No one can be sure which organisms feel, hence have minds, but it seems likely that one-celled organisms and plants do not, (...)
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  2. First-Person Plural Quantum Mechanics.Ulrich J. Mohrhoff - manuscript
    Doing justice to quantum mechanics calls for a deeper examination of the relations between our experience, its objects, and its subjects than either third-person interpretations or the first-person singular interpretation of the QBist permit. The metaphysical space opened by Bohr's employment of the "Kantian wedge" between the objective world, about which we can communicate, and the world "in itself" allows quantum mechanics to unfold its metaphysical potential. This in turn makes it possible to go a long way towards bridging the (...)
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  3. Moore’s Paradox and Essential Indexicality.Woomin Park - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to argue that Moore’s paradox stands for Essential Indexicality because it occurs only when self-reference appears, and thus, for the case of Moore’s paradox, to contend that it is not possible to construct a case of the Frege counterpart that Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever assert as a counterexample to John Perry’s Essential Indexical. Moore’s paradox is widely regarded as a typical example of the peculiarity and irremovability of the first-person, but curiously, Cappelen and (...)
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  4. Self-Locating Belief and the Goal of Accuracy.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    The goal of a partial belief is to be accurate, or close to the truth. By appealing to this norm, I seek norms for partial beliefs in self-locating and non-self-locating propositions. My aim is to find norms that are analogous to the Bayesian norms, which, I argue, only apply unproblematically to partial beliefs in non-self-locating propositions. I argue that the goal of a set of partial beliefs is to minimize the expected inaccuracy of those beliefs. However, in the self-locating framework, (...)
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  5. Perspective Reasoning and the Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Xianda Gao - 2018
    This paper proposes a new explanation for the paradoxes related to anthropic reasoning. Solutions to the Sleeping Beauty Problem and the Doomsday argument are discussed in detail. The main argument can be summarized as follows: -/- Our thoughts, reasonings and narratives inherently comes from a certain perspective. With each perspective there is a center, or using the term broadly, a self. The natural first-person perspective is most primitive. However we can also think and express from others’ perspectives with a theory (...)
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  6. Kant and the Significance of Self-Consciousness.Matthew Boyle - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Human beings who have mastered a natural language are self-conscious creatures: they can think, and indeed speak, about themselves in the first person. This dissertation is about the significance of this capacity: what it is and what difference it makes to our minds. My thesis is that the capacity for self-consciousness is essential to rationality, the thing that sets the minds of rational creatures apart from those of mere brutes. This, I argue, is what Kant was getting at in a (...)
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  7. The First Person.James Cargile - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
    James Cargile ABSTRACT: Many languages have a first person singular subject pronoun. Fewer also have a first person singular object pronoun. The term ‘I’ is commonly used to refer to the person using the term. It has a variety of other uses. A normal person is able to refer...
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  8. Time's Arrow and Self-Locating Probability.Eddy Keming Chen - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    One of the most difficult problems in the foundations of physics is what gives rise to the arrow of time. Since the fundamental dynamical laws of physics are (essentially) symmetric in time, the explanation for time's arrow must come from elsewhere. A promising explanation introduces a special cosmological initial condition, now called the Past Hypothesis: the universe started in a low-entropy state. Unfortunately, in a universe where there are many copies of us (in the distant ''past'' or the distant ''future''), (...)
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  9. Self, Me and I in the Repertoire of Spontaneously Occurring Altered States of Selfhood: Eight Neurophenomenological Case Study Reports.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen - forthcoming - Cognitive Neurodynamics.
    This study investigates eight case reports of spontaneously emerging, brief episodes of vivid altered states of Selfhood (ASoSs) that occurred during mental exercise in six long-term meditators by using a neurophenomenological electroencephalography (EEG) approach. In agreement with the neurophenomenological methodology, first-person reports were used to identify such spontaneous ASoSs and to guide the neural analysis, which involved the estimation of three operational modules of the brain self-referential network (measured by EEG operational synchrony). The result of such analysis demonstrated that the (...)
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  10. Minimal Fregeanism.Aidan Gray - forthcoming - Mind:fzab076.
    Among the virtues of relationist approaches to Frege’s puzzle is that they put us in a position to outline structural features of the puzzle that were only implicit in earlier work. In particular, they allow us to frame questions about the relation between the explanatory roles of sense and sameness of sense. In this paper, I distinguish a number of positions about that relation which have not been clearly distinguished. This has a few pay-offs. It allows us to shed light (...)
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  11. Primitive Self-Ascription: Lewis on the De Se.Richard Holton - forthcoming - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell.
    There are two parts to Lewis's account of the de se. First there is the idea that the objects of de se thought (and, by extension of de dicto thought too) are properties, not propositions. This is the idea that is center-stage in Lewis's discussion. Second there is the idea that the relation that thinkers bear to these properties is that of self-ascription. It is crucial to LewisÕs account that this is understood as a fundamental, unanalyzable, notion: self-ascription of a (...)
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  12. Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.
    Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Hacking (1987) and White (2000) influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idealized setting). This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems (...)
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  13. When You Isn't You. The Attraction of Self­-Ascription in Children’s Interpretation of Pronouns in Reported Speech.Franziska Köder & Maier Emar - forthcoming - Glossa.
    In language comprehension, 'you' is a de se pronoun, which means that its interpretation is guided by a simple de se rule ('you' = self-ascription by addressee), while the interpretation of other pronouns requires more complicated reasoning. This predicts that 'you' should be easier to process than 'I' or 'he', especially for children. But not all occurrences of 'you' can be correctly interpreted via self-ascription. We consider two cases where 'you' does not indicate self-ascription: interpretation as an eavesdropper and 'you' (...)
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  14. The First Person Singular in Advance.Alphonso Lingis - forthcoming - Philosophy Today.
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  15. The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐Intentional Awareness.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The (...)
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  16. Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern of reference. Echeverri maintains that such a guarantee is explained by a (...)
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  17. Indexicality and de Se Reports.Philippe Schlenker - forthcoming - In Maienborn von Heusinger & Mouton Gruyter Portneder (eds.), Handbook of Semantics.
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  18. Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About It: Confusions, Virtues and Challenges of Higher-Order Theories (in) Qualitative Consciousness: Themes From the Philosophy of David Rosenthal.Miguel Angel Sebastian - forthcoming - Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
  19. De Se Thought and Communication: An Introduction.Stephan Torre - forthcoming - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.
    This chapter provides a critical overview of various influential accounts of de se attitudes including those proposed by Frege, Lewis and Perry. It also addresses the charge that there is nothing distinctive about de se attitudes. The second half outlines a widely accepted and influential model of communication and various complications that arise in applying this model to the communication of de se thoughts. The final section provides an overview of the papers in this volume.
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  20. Reference, Representation, and the Meaning of the First-Person Singular Pronoun.Monima Chadha - 2021 - Philosophy East and West 71 (1):38-56.
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  21. Putting I-Thoughts to Work.Santiago Echeverri - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (7):345-372.
    A traditional view holds that the self-concept is essentially indexical. In a highly influential article, Ruth Millikan famously held that the self-concept should be understood as a Millian name with a sui generis functional role. This article presents a novel explanatory argument against the Millian view and in favor of the indexical view. The argument starts from a characterization of the self-concept as a device of information integration. It then shows that the indexical view yields a better explanation of the (...)
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  22. Defending Functionalism and Self-Reference in Memory.Jordi Fernández - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía 64:223-236.
    In recent work, Sarah Robins, Gerardo Viera and Steven James have provided some insightful objections to the ideas offered in my book, Memory: A Self-Referential Account. In this paper, I put forward some responses to those objections. Robins challenges the idea that being a memory could be a matter of having a particular functional role within the subject’s cognitive economy. Viera challenges the idea that the content of a memory could explain some of its phenomenological properties. And James challenges the (...)
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  23. Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation.Ali Hossein Khani - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):153-184.
    Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self-knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson’s account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation”. It has also been claimed that Davidson’s account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call the “Externalist Explanation”. I will (...)
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  24. Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the "Here-Replacement" Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (4):188-213.
    According to the Self-Location Thesis, certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person, spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-reflexive visual experiences, which involve the movement of an object toward the location of the perceiving subject. The main aim of this paper is (...)
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  25. Centred Propositions, What is Asserted, and Communication.Jakub Rudnicki - 2021 - Theoria 87 (1):187-206.
    In recent years there has been a heated debate on how to accommodate John Perry's observations about the essentiality of indexicality into our models of linguistic communication. This article is an attempt at providing a new perspective on this issue. I argue that we should jettison two elements taken for granted by the views I present, and criticize, here: no centring, uncentring, recentring and multicentring. These elements are: (1) taking the asserted content to be a part of the communication process (...)
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  26. First-Person Representations and Responsible Agency in AI.Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7061-7079.
    In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...)
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  27. What is Special About De Se Attitudes?Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2021 - In Stephen Biggs & Heimir Geirsson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. Routledge. pp. 464-481.
    De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.
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  28. The Second Person Perspective.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1693-1711.
    Recent philosophical developments on personal indexicals reveal a disagreement between those who defend and those who deny the existence of a distinctive class of second person thoughts. In this piece, I tackle this controversy by highlighting two crucial constraints based on paradigmatic felicitous singular uses of the second person pronoun. On the one hand, the Addressing Constraint is brought out by the awareness and action capabilities displayed in successfully addressing another. On the other hand, the Merging Constraint arises, among other (...)
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  29. Perspectives on de Se Immunity.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10089-10107.
    Concept-individuating reference rules offer a well-known route for the explanation of immunity to error through misidentification in judgments involving first person or de se thought. However, the ‘outright’ version of this account—one that sanctions a one-to-one correspondence between the reference-fixing rule and immunity—cannot do justice to the unassailable ground-relativity of the target phenomenon. In this paper, I outline a version of the reference-rule account that circumvents this problem. I state a reference rule for the de se concept that makes space (...)
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  30. Davidson, First-Person Authority, and Direct Self-Knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13421-13440.
    Donald Davidson famously offered an explanation of “first-person authority”. However, he described first-person authority differently across different works—sometimes referring to the presumptive truth of agents’ self-ascriptions of their current mental states, and sometimes referring to the direct self-knowledge that agents often have of said states. First, I show that a standard Davidsonian explanation of first-person authority can at best, and with some modification, explain the presumptive truth of agents’ self-ascriptions. I then develop two Davidsonian accounts of direct self-knowledge—one accounting for (...)
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  31. First-Personal Moral Testimony: A Defence.David A. Borman - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):163-179.
    Several authors have discussed and defended what is sometimes called the Asymmetry Thesis in social epistemology: that while reliance on testimony is essentially incontrovertible in epistemology, it is uniquely problematic for moral knowledge. This conclusion results, I argue, from considering the wrong sort of moral testimony: namely, ‘third-personal’ rather than ‘first-personal’ testimony. First-personal moral testimony is an inescapable part of the constitution of legitimate moral norms, and its role cannot be deflated as a form of mere information to be taken (...)
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  32. Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):579-584.
    Self-locating beliefs cause a problem for conditionalization. Miriam Schoenfield offers a solution: that on learning E, agents should update on the fact that they learned E. However, Schoenfield is not explicit about whether the fact that they learned E is self-locating. I will argue that if the fact that they learned E is self-locating then the original problem has not been addressed, and if the fact that they learned E is not self-locating then the theory generates implausible verdicts which Schoenfield (...)
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  33. Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049.
    The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which ‘essentially indexical’ information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief.
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  34. First Person Implicit Indirect Reports in Disguise.Alessandro Capone - 2020 - In Antonino Pennisi & Alessandra Falzone (eds.), The Extended Theory of Cognitive Creativity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Performativity. Springer Verlag. pp. 303-318.
    In this paper, I deal with implicit indirect reports. First of all, I discuss implicit indirect reports involving the first person. Then, I prove that in some cases second person reports are implicit indirect reports involving a de se attribution. Next, I draw analogies with implicit indirect reports involving the third person. I establish some similarities at the level of free enrichment through which the explicature is obtained and I propose that the explicature is syntactically active, given that it sanctions (...)
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  35. Acting Without Me: Corporate Agency and the First Person Perspective.Herman Cappelen & Joshua Dever - 2020 - In Stephen Biggs & Heimir Geirsson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York: Routledge. pp. 599-613.
    In our book The Inessential Indexical we argue that the various theses of essential indexicality all fail. Indexicals are not essential, we conclude. One essentiality thesis we target in the third chapter is the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action. Our strategy is to give examples of what we call impersonal action rationalizations , which explain actions without citing indexical attitudes. To defeat the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action, it suffices that there could be even (...)
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  36. The First Person in Cognition and Morality by Béatrice Longuenesse (Review). [REVIEW]Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Review of Metaphysics 73 (4):846-848.
    Review of The First Person in Cognition and Morality by Béatrice Longuenesse, formulating how Freud’s genealogy of the moral imperative is compatible with Kant’s investigation of the justificatory structure of a priori cognition and moral reasoning.
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  37. De Se Attitudes and Computation.Neil Hamilton Fairley - 2020 - Theoria 87 (1):207-229.
    There has been debate between those who maintain that indexical expressions are not essential and those who maintain that such indexicals cannot be dispensed with without an important loss of content. This version of the essentialist view holds that thoughts must also have indexical elements. Indexical thoughts appear to be in tension with the computational theory of mind. In this case we have the following inconsistent triad: De se thoughts are essential. De se thoughts are indexical, they have a character. (...)
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  38. Apperception and Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness in Kant.Luca Forgione - 2020 - International Philosophical Quarterly 60 (4):431-447.
    Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense (empirical apperception) grounded in a sensory form of self-awareness and transcendental apperception. The aim of this paper is to show that a sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness, which contains a pre-reflective self-consciousness as its first level, is provided by the notion of transcendental apperception. The necessity for a pre-reflective self-consciousness has been pointed out in phenomenological literature. According to this account, every self-ascription of any property implies a more fundamental form (...)
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  39. Understanding Self‐Ascription.Frank Jackson & Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):141-155.
    David Lewis argues that believing something is self‐ascribing a property rather than holding true a proposition. But what is self‐ascription? Is it some new mysterious primitive? Is Lewis saying that every belief you have is about you? Several recent authors have suggested that, in the light of these questions, Lewis's theory should be rejected, despite its enormous influence. But this neglects the fact that Lewis makes two relevant proposals about belief: one about belief de se , another about belief de (...)
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  40. Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.
    This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View, the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s de (...)
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  41. First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.
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  42. Self-ascription and the de se.James Openshaw - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2039-2050.
    This paper defends Lewis’ influential treatment of de se attitudes from recent criticism to the effect that a key explanatory notion—self-ascription—goes unexplained The Blackwell companion to David Lewis, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 399–410, 2015). It is shown that Lewis’ treatment can be reconstructed in a way which provides clear responses. This sheds light on the explanatory ambitions of those engaged in Lewis’ project.
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  43. Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.
    In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue that various thought insertion-involving scenarios do not give (...)
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  44. Pronominal typology and the de se/de re distinction.Pritty Patel-Grosz - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (5):537-587.
    This paper investigates how regular pronominal typology interfaces with de se and de re interpretations, and highlights a correlation between strong pronouns and de re interpretations, and weak pronouns and de se interpretations. In order to illustrate this correlation, I contrast different pronominal forms within a single language, null versus overt pronouns in Kutchi Gujarati, and clitic versus full pronouns in Austrian Bavarian. I argue that the data presented here provide cross-linguistic comparative support for the idea of a dedicated de (...)
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  45. Pronominal typology and the de se/de re distinction.Pritty Patel-Grosz - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (5):537-587.
    This paper investigates how regular pronominal typology interfaces with de se and de re interpretations, and highlights a correlation between strong pronouns and de re interpretations, and weak pronouns and de se interpretations. In order to illustrate this correlation, I contrast different pronominal forms within a single language, null versus overt pronouns in Kutchi Gujarati, and clitic versus full pronouns in Austrian Bavarian. I argue that the data presented here provide cross-linguistic comparative support for the idea of a dedicated de (...)
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  46. Pronominal typology and the de se/de re distinction.Pritty Patel-Grosz - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (5):537-587.
    This paper investigates how regular pronominal typology interfaces with de se and de re interpretations, and highlights a correlation between strong pronouns and de re interpretations, and weak pronouns and de se interpretations. In order to illustrate this correlation, I contrast different pronominal forms within a single language, null versus overt pronouns in Kutchi Gujarati, and clitic versus full pronouns in Austrian Bavarian. I argue that the data presented here provide cross-linguistic comparative support for the idea of a dedicated de (...)
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  47. Loar's Compromised Internalism.David Pitt - 2020 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, Language. New York: Routledge. pp. 203-224.
    According to Brian Loar, an adequate theory of intentionality must acknowledge the fundamental role phenomenology plays in the determination of intentional content. It must take into account individuals’ experience of their intentional states, from a subjective point of view. From this perspective, intentional content is internally determined (given that phenomenology is). On the other hand, Loar is convinced (by arguments given by Tyler Burge) that mental states also have externally determined contents, fixed by objective facts about thinkers’ sociolinguistic environments. This (...)
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  48. Elimination of Bias in Introspection: Methodological Advances, Refinements, and Recommendations.Radek Trnka & Vit Smelik - 2020 - New Ideas in Psychology 56.
    Building on past constructive criticism, the present study provides further methodological development focused on the elimination of bias that may occur during first-person observation. First, various sources of errors that may accompany introspection are distinguished based on previous critical literature. Four main errors are classified, namely attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error. Furthermore, methodological recommendations for the possible elimination of these errors have been determined based on the analysis and focused excerpting of introspective scientific literature. The following groups of methodological (...)
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  49. Intercorporeity and the First-Person Plural in Merleau-Ponty.Philip J. Walsh - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):21-47.
    A theory of the first-person plural occupies a unique place in philosophical investigations into intersubjectivity and social cognition. In order for the referent of the first-person plural—“the We”—to come into existence, it seems there must be a shared ground of communicative possibility, but this requires a non-circular explanation of how this ground could be shared in the absence of a pre-existing context of communicative conventions. Margaret Gilbert’s and John Searle’s theories of collective intentionality capture important aspects of the We, but (...)
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  50. What is It Like to Think About Oneself? De Se Thought and Phenomenal Intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):919-932.
    The topic of the paper is at the intersection of recent debates on de se thought and phenomenal intentionality. An interesting problem for phenomenal intentionality is the question of how to account for the intentional properties of de se thought-contents---i.e., thoughts about oneself as oneself. Here, I aim to describe and consider the significance of a phenomenological perspective on self-consciousness in its application to de se thought. I argue that having de se thoughts can be explained in terms of the (...)
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