Reduction

a cuestión de si la realidad es homogénea o heterogénea es uno de los debates más antiguos de la filosofía occidental y se repite en prácticamente todas las tradiciones filosóficas del mundo. Hay tres motivaciones principales para adoptar una visión heterogénea de la realidad: para dar cuenta de errores categoriales, para resolver paradojas, y para respetar la aparente heterogeneidad de nuestra experiencia, pensamiento y lenguaje. A continuación, revisaremos cada una de ellas, para después ver los principales retos que enfrenta quién (...) quiera defender una visión plural del ser. (shrink)

Functionalism is the view that being x is to play the role of x. This paper defends a functionalist account of three-dimensional entities in the context of Wave Function Realism (WFR), that can explain in detail how we can recover three-dimensional entities out of the wavefunction. In particular, the essay advocates for a novel version of WFR in terms of a functional reductionist approach in the style of David Lewis. This account entails reduction of the upper entities to the bottom (...) ones, when the latter behave appropriately. As applied to WFR, it shows how the wavefunction can turn out to be identical to three-dimensional objects, provided certain conditions. The first major goal of the paper is thus to put forward an improved and more rigorous version of WFR, which dissolves several extant issues about the theory, and can serve as a starting point for future literature on the topic. Moreover, the second major goal of the article is to take WFR as a case study to demonstrate the pros of functional reductionism, especially in the form defended here, thereby helping to bring this view back in the philosophy of science debate. The positive upshots of this paper suggest a possible application of functional reductionism also to other contexts. (shrink)

Functional reductionism characterises inter-theoretic reduction as the recovery of the upper-level behaviour described by the reduced theory in terms of the lower-level reducing theory. For instance, finding a statistical mechanical realiser that plays the functional role of thermodynamic entropy allows for establishing a reductive link between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. This view constitutes a unique approach to reduction that enjoys a number of positive features, but has received limited attention in the philosophy of science. This paper aims to clarify the (...) meaning of functional reductionism in science, with a focus on physics, to define both its place with respect to other approaches to reduction and its connection to ontology. To do so, we develop and explore two alternative frameworks for functional reduction, called Syntactic Functional Reductionism and Semantic Functional Reductionism. They represent two different possible stances on the view that expand and improve the basic functional reductionist approach along different lines, and make clear how the approach works in practice. The former elaborates on David Lewis’ account, is connected with the syntactic view of theories, is committed to a logical characterisation of functional roles, and is embedded within Nagelian reductionism. The latter adopts a semantic view of theories, spells out functional roles mainly in terms of mathematical roles within the models of theories, and is expressed in terms of the related structuralist approach to reduction. The development of these frameworks has the final goal of advancing functional reductionism, to make it a fully-fledged alternative account for reduction in science. (shrink)

Negli ultimi anni, il richiamo al concetto di emergenza si è fatto sempre più diffuso in molte aree della filosofia e della scienza. Il termine viene usato per riferirsi alla circostanza in cui un sistema (fisico, chimico, biologico, ma anche sociale) manifesta delle proprietà e dei comportamenti che sembrano nuovi rispetto a quelli delle sue parti più semplici. Questo libro si propone di chiarire questo fenomeno, tenendo conto, da un lato, che le discipline coinvolte nel dibattito sono molte, quindi un (...) approccio univoco all'emergenza potrebbe non bastare e, dall'altro, che per comprendere cosa sia l'emergenza è necessario delinearne le relazioni con altre questioni filosofiche di primaria importanza come quelle che coinvolgono la fondamentalità, la complessità e la causalità. (shrink)

Intuitivamente, la realidad está formada por entidades y hechos existentes y concretos. Sin embargo, nuestro lenguaje y pensamiento versa también sobre hechos meramente posibles, sobre cosas inexistentes y entidades abstractas. ¿Cómo es esto posible? ¿Significa ello que cuando hablamos y pensamos de estas otras cosas no hablamos de nada real? ¿o mas bien la realidad está mas poblada de lo que pensábamos y hay diferentes maneras de formar parte de la realidad además de la de existir de manera positiva y (...) concreta? En este libro trataremos de arrojar luz a estas y otras preguntas similares, poniendo atención a las estrategias argumentativas generales que suelen esgrimirse en esta rama de la filosofía. (shrink)

Recent discussions of emergence in physics have focussed on the use of limiting relations, and often particularly on singular or asymptotic limits. We discuss a putative example of emergence that does not fit into this narrative: the case of phonons. These quasi-particles have some claim to be emergent, not least because the way in which they relate to the underlying crystal is almost precisely analogous to the way in which quantum particles relate to the underlying quantum field theory. But there (...) is no need to take a limit when moving from a crystal lattice based description to the phonon description. Not only does this demonstrate that we can have emergence without limits, but also provides a way of understanding cases that do involve limits. (shrink)

La conversion de la France à une politique de « réduction des risques » , est généralement interprétée comme l’indice d’un changement de paradigme en matière de toxicomanie. Il est néanmoins possible de la voir comme une forme de réagencement politique du monde des consommations de drogues, visant à définir de nouveaux seuils, les plus bas possibles, pour l’entrée dans des dispositifs de soin et de service. L’examen des visions du monde sur lesquelles reposent ces équipements politiques, en France comme (...) dans le reste de l’Union européenne, montre d’ailleurs que la vision du monde autonomiste y compose avec d’autres, compensatoires et additives, plus anciennement implantées. C’est sans doute pourquoi on retrouve, à divers niveaux, un véritable décalage entre les mesures volontaristes liées à ces politiques publiques et les contextes dans lesquels elles sont mises en œuvre : qu’il s’agisse des promoteurs, professionnels ou amateurs, ou qu’il s’agisse des destinataires, tout le monde semble s’accommoder d’un fonctionnement minimal de ces dispositifs, vérifiant ainsi une fois de plus la force des liens faibles.The French turn to the so-called « risk reduction policy » , is generally interpreted as a shift of the paradigm of drug addiction policies. One can, nevertheless, see it as a kind of new political layout of the drug addiction field, intended to define new thresholds for one’s entering in the treatment and care devices. When we examine the worldviews which sustain these political equipments , we can see that the autonomist worldview has to come to terms with others, namely : the compensatory and additive ones. That is probably why we can see, at various levels, a real discrepancy between the strong willings supporting the actions promoted by the risk reduction policies, and the contexts in which they take place : would it be the main actors , or the beneficiaries, everyone seems to be satisfied with a minimal functioning of these devices, verifying once again the strength of the weak ties. (shrink)

The groups of problems that fall under the titles ‘reduction’ and ‘emergence’ appear at the boundaries of seemingly independent and well-established scientific disciplines, such as chemistry and biology, biology and psychology, biology and political theory, and so on. They arise in this way.

Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. This paper presents a framework for studying levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and discuss several applications, some of which refer to descriptive or explanatory levels while others refer to ontological levels. I illustrate the usefulness of this framework by bringing it to bear on some familiar philosophical questions. Is there a hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the (...) bottom? And what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? Are there emergent higher-level properties? Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be viewed as one involving levels? And might a levelled framework shed light on the relationship between third-personal and first-personal phenomena? (shrink)

. In this paper, I examine three models of reduction. The first, and the most restrictive, is the model developed by Ernest Nagel as part of the logical empiricist program. The second, articulated by Jerry Fodor, is significantly broader, but it seems unable to make sense of a salient feature of scientific practice. The third, and the most lenient, model is developed within Newton da Costa and Steven French’s partial structures approach. I argue that the third model preserves the benefits (...) of Fodor’s proposal, and it is still able to accommodate relevant aspects of scientific practice. In particular, it offers a conception of reduction without reductionism, and an account of the relation between reduced and reducing theories via unsharp mappings and partial structures—even in the presence of incomplete information. (shrink)

Atomistic metaphysics motivated an explanatory strategy which science has pursued with great success since the scientific revolution. By decomposing matter into its atomic and subatomic parts physics gave us powerful explanations and accurate predictions as well as providing a unifying framework for the rest of science. The success of the decompositional strategy has encouraged a widespread conviction that the physical world forms a compositional hierarchy that physics and other sciences are progressively articulating. But this conviction does not stand up to (...) a closer examination of how physics has treated composition, as a variety of case studies will show. (shrink)

Rom Harré thinks that the Emergence–Reduction debate, conceived as a vertical problem, is partly ill posed. Even if he doesn’t wholly reject the traditional definition of an emergent property as a property of a collection but not of its components, his point is that this definition doesn’t exhaust all the dimensions of emergence. According to Harré there is another kind (or dimension) of emergence, which we may call—somewhat paradoxically—“horizontal emergence”: two properties of a substance are horizontally emergent relative to each (...) other if they cannot be displayed in the same conditions. Contrary to vertical emergence, horizontal emergence is a symmetrical relation. Harré endorses horizontal emergentism. I argue that this position faces a principled difficulty: it makes it impossible to bind different horizontally emergent discourses in an interesting way. Physics and biology for example become “island” discourses, each speaking of a distinct kind of entities. The only way to ensure that two different discourses can relate to the same entity is to reintroduce verticality into the picture. (shrink)

In 1973, Nickles identified two senses in which the term `reduction' is used to describe the relationship between physical theories: namely, the sense based on Nagel's seminal account of reduction in the sciences, and the sense that seeks to extract one physical theory as a mathematical limit of another. These two approaches have since been the focus of most literature on the subject, as evidenced by recent work of Batterman and Butterfield, among others. In this paper, I discuss a third (...) sense in which one physical theory may be said to reduce to another. This approach, which I call `dynamical systems reduction,' concerns the reduction of individual models of physical theories rather than the wholesale reduction of entire theories, and specifically reduction between models that can be formulated as dynamical systems. DS reduction is based on the requirement that there exist a function from the state space of the low-level model to that of the high-level model that satisfies certain general constraints and thereby serves to identify quantities in the low-level model that mimic the behavior of those in the high-level model - but typically only when restricted to a certain domain of parameters and states within the low-level model. I discuss the relationship of this account of reduction to the Nagelian and limit-based accounts, arguing that it is distinct from both but exhibits strong parallels with a particular version of Nagelian reduction, and that the domain restrictions employed by the DS approach may, but need not, be specified in a manner characteristic of the limit-based approach. Finally, I consider some limitations of the account of reduction that I propose and suggest ways in which it might be generalised. I offer a simple, idealised example to illustrate application of this approach; a series of more realistic case studies of DS reduction is presented in another paper. (shrink)

Convincing disputes about explanatory reductionism in the philosophy of biology require a clear and precise understanding of what a reductive explanation in biology is. The central aim of this book is to provide such an account by revealing the features that determine the reductive character of a biological explanation. Chapters I-IV provide the ground, on which I can then, in Chapter V, develop my own account of explanatory reduction in biology: Chapter I reveals the meta-philosophical assumptions that underlie my analysis (...) of reduction, Chapter II introduces the previous debate about reduction in the philosophy of biology by pointing out the most crucial lessons one should learn from this debate, Chapter III critically discusses the two perspectives on explanatory reduction that have been proposed in the philosophy of biology so far, and Chapter IV clarifies in what ways the issue of reduction is entangled with the issue of explanation. In Chapter V I present my own account of explanatory reduction. My main claim is that reductive explanations in the biological sciences possess three main characteristics: they explain the behavior of a biological system S, first, exclusively in terms of factors that are located on a lower level of organization than S, second, by focusing on factors that are internal to S , and third, by describing the genuine parts of S only as “parts in isolation”. This account is ontic because it traces the reductivity of an explanation back to certain relations that exist in the world. (shrink)

The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the reference of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the competent use of normative predicates. CTR might pose a challenge to ethical theorists as well. Long argues that CTR entails the falsity of any normative ethical theory. First-order (...) theory attempts to specify what purely descriptive property is a fundamental right-making property (FRM). Long contends that the notion that the FRM causally regulates competent use of the predicate ‘right’ leads to a reductio. The failure of this argument is nevertheless instructive concerning a point at which ethics and metaethics overlap. (shrink)

The present volume aims at giving a discussion ot the problems ot reductionism in contemporary life sciences. It contains six papers which deals with reduction/reductionism in different fields ot biological research. Also, the holistic perspective, 1. e. the systems view, is discussed in some ot the papers. The message ot this discussion Is that - whereas reductionism is indeed an important strategy - the systems approach is needed. It is argued by some ot the authors that organisms are complex systems (...) and not just heaps of molecules, 50 that the analytical method does not suffice. Recent developments in systems theory offer the possibility to install a more comprehensive view ot living systems what can be seen particularly in the field ot evolutionary biology. It is true that any organismic activity is molecular, this is to say that it is based on molecular mechanisms. But it is also true that the whole organism displays certain patterns ot behavior which are not just molecular. Any organism can be described as a system ot different levels ot organization different levels ot order and complexity - and it is important, theretore, to study all ot the organizational levels and to see their peculiarities. It should be obvious, however, that there is not one problem ot reduction/reductionism, but that there are many problems linked together and that these problems appear at different levels ot biological research and bio philosophical reflections. (shrink)

This study of inter-theoretic reduction and reductionism in biology explores problems logical empiricist approaches face in giving a meaning analysis of reduction, and three real issues in biology involving reductionism: teleology and evolution, levels of organization, and the reduction of Mendelian to molecular genetics. ;It is denied that there is an answer to the logical empiricist question, "What single correct reduction concept is universally and realistically applicable to all science?" The question is unsatisfactory. First, it presupposes that philosophy of science (...) concepts like 'reduction' have meaning in isolation, the same meaning across all variation in their associated philosophical, scientific, formal, and ordinary language contexts. Second, it hopes that reduction so analyzed will have significant application to real science. But the presupposition is undercut by the failure of the analytic/synthetic distinction and the hope is not borne out by scrutiny of reductionism in biology. ;A radical reversal of perspective is in order. Rather than expecting science to conform to philosophy of science concepts concocted in a vacuum of abstraction from context, we should ask, "For a given context, what concept of reduction is appropriate for that context?" This alternative approach is argued for by exposing the weakness inherent in the strategy of meaning analysis logical empiricists use, and by the study of the cited real issues in biology. (shrink)

Nothing-but claims hold that one sort of entity is ultimately another sort of entity. That the mental is nothing but the physical, that the macroscopic is nothing but the microscopic, and that the prescriptive is nothing but the descriptive are controversial examples. To settle whether one of these claims is true or false, what sort of evidence would one have to have? The dissertation formulates a criterion for culling false nothing-but claims from true by clarifying the concept of ontological reduction. (...) A claim that x is nothing but y is true, the dissertation maintains, if x is identical to y or if x does not exist, 'x' being a mistaken designation for y. Otherwise it is false. The dissertation has five chapters. Since a certain sort of ontological reducibility is to serve as a criterion for acceptable nothing-but claims, what counts as an ontological reduction occupies Chapter One. Four criteria are rounded up before two of them are rejected for their radically Pythagorean consequences. One of the rejected criteria, due to Quine, could perhaps be emended so as to block these Pythagorean consequences. Chapter Two argues that, even if this could be done, the criterion would still be unacceptable; it trivializes ontological endeavor, and its philosophical presuppositions imply a falsehood. Combined, the two non-Pythagorean criteria of Chapter One are presented as a necessary and sufficient condition for ontological reduction. Chapter Three distinguishes other kinds of reduction. Besides ontological reduction, there are theoretical reduction and theoretical replacement. The dissertation holds that instances of one of these kinds of reduction need not be instances of the others, and that only certain kinds of ontological reduction are directly relevant to the assessment of nothing-but claims. The resulting conceptual grid is applied to contemporary nothing-but claims in the final two chapters. Chapter Four contends that certain claims advanced on the basis of supervenience relations are philosophically unsound, while Chapter Five holds that other claims connected with the functionalist philosophy of mind are philosophically sound, though empirically undecided. (shrink)