Critical thinking is often taught with some emphasis on categories and operations of cognitive biases. The underlying thought is that knowledge of biases equips students to reduce them. The empirical evidence, however, doesn’t provide much support for this thought. We have previously argued that the emphasis on debiasing in critical thinking education is worth preserving, but in light of a more explicit and broader conception of debiasing. We now argue that this broader conception of debiasing strategies obliges critical thinking instructors (...) and curriculum designers to reflect on the teaching approaches that might facilitate the use of those strategies. We propose some teaching techniques to expand the scope of debiasing in the classroom—some untested, some only rarely and recently characterized as critical thinking strategies, rather than as pragmatic considerations in, e.g., design, engineering, marketing. These methods and others like them, we suggest, broaden the prospects for teaching a range of effective critical thinking techniques for debiasing. (shrink)

Biological evolution provides a creative fount of complex and subtle adaptations, often surprising the scientists who discover them. However, because evolution is an algorithmic process that transcends the substrate in which it occurs, evolution’s creativity is not limited to nature. Indeed, many researchers in the field of digital evolution have observed their evolving algorithms and organisms subverting their intentions, exposing unrecognized bugs in their code, producing unexpected adaptations, or exhibiting outcomes uncannily convergent with ones in nature. Such stories routinely reveal (...) creativity by evolution in these digital worlds, but they rarely fit into the standard scientific narrative. Instead they are often treated as mere obstacles to be overcome, rather than results that warrant study in their own right. The stories themselves are traded among researchers through oral tradition, but that mode of information transmission is inefficient and prone to error and outright loss. Moreover, the fact that these stories tend to be shared only among practitioners means that many natural scientists do not realize how interesting and lifelike digital organisms are and how natural their evolution can be. To our knowledge, no collection of such anecdotes has been published before. This paper is the crowd-sourced product of researchers in the fields of artificial life and evolutionary computation who have provided first-hand accounts of such cases. It thus serves as a written, fact-checked collection of scientifically important and even entertaining stories. In doing so we also present here substantial evidence that the existence and importance of evolutionary surprises extends beyond the natural world, and may indeed be a universal property of all complex evolving systems. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à mettre en évidence, au sein de l’histoire du spiritualisme, la fonction transcendantale d’un possible basculement vers l’idéalisme. Au travers de la comparaison et de la confrontation des philosophies de Ravaisson, de Lachelier et de Brunschvicg, on cherchera ainsi à interroger la légitimité de ce passage. En effet, si le spiritualisme refuse dans un premier temps l’idéalisme, c’est pour le considérer ensuite comme un moyen nécessaire afin de dépasser les apories initiales de la philosophie de Ravaisson. Le (...) passage à l’idéalisme a-t-il signé la trahison du spiritualisme, ou a-t-il au contraire permis sa poursuite la plus adéquate? (shrink)

Lorsque, dans Histoire et conscience de classe, Georg Lukács examine la dimension temporelle de ce qu’il nomme le « phénomène de la réification », il s’appuie sur un passage de Misère de la philosophie, passage dans lequel Marx fait la remarque suivante : « Elle [c’est-à-dire la mesure de la valeur par la seule quantité de travail] suppose que les travaux se sont égalisés par la subordination de l’homme à la machine ou par la division extrême du travail ; que (...) les hommes s’effacent devant le t... (shrink)

Guillaume Fréchette | : Il est généralement admis dans la littérature analytique sur l’intuition que celle-ci est principalement, ou même fondamentalement, une attitude propositionnelle. Partant de là, elle est aussi souvent caractérisée comme une croyance que P, comme la formation d’une croyance sans inférence que P, comme une impression que P, comme une impression intellectuelle que P, comme l’attitude consistant à être poussé, mu par P. Dans tous les cas, la spécificité de l’intuition reposerait au moins en partie sur (...) les propriétés doxastiques qui la distingue d’autres attitudes propositionnelles, comme savoir que P ou douter que P.Cette caractérisation de l’intuition semble à première vue incommensurable avec le concept d’intuition discuté dans la tradition phénoménologique, où l’intuition est caractérisée comme ce type d’expérience qui rend les objets présents, et peut certes être caractérisée en termes d’attitude propositionnelle, mais ne l’est pas essentiellement.Dans ce qui suit, je soulève quelques problèmes auxquels fait face la conception de l’intuition comme attitude propositionnelle. Partant de là, j’aimerais suggérer qu’en amendant cette idée, on peut développer une théorie de l’intuition qui peut employer de manière fructueuse les ressources de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique. Cette suggestion montre que l’incommensurabilité des conceptions analytiques et phénoménologiques de l’intuition est superficielle, plus superficielle que ne le laissent entendre ses défenseurs respectifs. | : It is generally acknowledged in the analytic literature on intuitions that these are generally, or even fundamentally, propositional attitudes. For this reason, intuitions are often characterized as beliefs that P, as seeming that P, as the intellectual seeming that P, or as the attitude of being pushed by P. In all cases, the specificity of intuitions would consist at least in part in the doxastic properties that distinguishes them from other propositional attitudes, such as knowing that P or doubting that P.At first glance, this characterization of intuitions seems incommensurable with the concept of intuition discussed in the phenomenological tradition, where intuition is characterized as the type of experience that make objects present to us. While intuitions in this sense may be characterized as propositional attitudes, it doesn’t imply that they fundamentally are propositional.In the following paper, I raise some problems which faces the conception of intuitions as propositional attitudes. I would suggest that amending this idea allows to develop a theory of intuition which can use fruitfully both the resources of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. As a consequence, the alleged incommensurability of analytical and phenomenological conceptions of intuitions appears to be more superficial than it is usually taken to be defenders of intuitions as propositional attitudes. (shrink)

L’auteur montre que le principe de précaution est souvent confondu avec d’autres (notamment principes de prévention ou de préparation). Sa formulation en droit français est restrictive et, même dans cette acception, son application par le législateur ou la jurisprudence est rare. Alors que le principe de précaution exige des évaluations des risques rigoureuses et continues, il est à tort invoqué pour justifier ou critiquer des décisions publiques qui n’en relèvent pas.

Que reste-t-il du "sujet", en littérature, après le retrait du structuralisme? C'est la question que pose ce livre, qui, dans le compte tenu de l'héritage théorique des années 1960-1970, cherche à préciser le statut d'un sujet qui insiste dans les discours critiques contemporains (Compagnon, Clément, Macé) aussi bien que dans les tentatives littéraires récentes (Beck, Deguy, Michon). Trois études articulées, qui sont autant d'expériences de lecture, tentent ici de répondre à cette interrogation : la première, "L'exception du sujet", se propose (...) de relire les psychanalyses existentielles de Sartre ; la seconde, "Poétique et vérité", entre en dialogue avec la lecture d'A la recherche du temps perdu par Gérard Genette ; la troisième, "Prose de soi", s'essaie à décrire la singularité de l'autofiction rimbaldienne, telle qu'elle s'avive dans Une Saison en enfer, et notamment dans sa section prosimétrique, "Alchimie du verbe". Au terme du parcours, une hypothèse : c'est dans l'articulation critique entre la littérature et son commentaire que la forme restante du sujet trouve son lieu paradoxal. (shrink)

Au travers de la multiplicité des usages du field recording, tantôt support d’étude des paysages sonores, tantôt outil de composition musical et environnemental, mais nécessairement dépendant d’un contexte (inter) culturel, David Christoffel et Guillaume Tiger explorent un certain rapport à la nature. Comment parle-t-on de nature via les field recordings? Quel sens donner à la représentation de la nature dans la musique? Comment « justice » est-elle rendue à la nature dans l’élaboration de paysages sonores virtuels? Les réflexions croisées (...) des auteurs sur ces questionnements tournent en sens inverses autour d’un même pot de sons naturels. (shrink)

Nous mènerons nos réflexions communes en trois étapes :En méditant le site de notre questionnement – introduction.En creusant quelques questions essentielles – partie principale.En préparant une décision qui devra se former à partir de telles questions – conclusion.IIl est question de « philosophie ». On peut traduire en allemand le mot grec φιλοσοφία en recourant à la transcription : « amour de la...

Le sens du mot « culture » a changé. En 1938, Marrou formule ce qui lui semble être une évidence. « Culture... se limite au domaine intellectuel, spirituel ; elle laisse en dehors d’elle la vie économique, matérielle, la technique. » Cette évidence restera longtemps non interrogée. L’article « Culturalisme et culture » du Dictionnaire..

The aim of this study was to test the effect of face cooling with cold water vs. face cooling with neutral water during high-intensity swimming training on both the core temperature and thermal perceptions in internationally ranked long-distance swimmers during 2 randomized swimming sessions. After a standardized warm-up of 1,200 m, the athletes performed a standardized training session that consisted of 2,000 m at a best velocity then 600 m of aerobic work. Heart rate was continuously monitored during 5 × (...) 400 m, whereas Tco, thermal comfort, and thermal sensation were measured before and after each 400 m. Before and after each 400 m, the swimmers were asked to flow 200 mL of cold water or neutral water packaged in standardized bottles on their face. The swimmers were asked don’t drink during exercise. The velocity was significantly different between cold water and neutral water. The Tco was increased by ±0.5°C at race pace, under both face cooling conditions with no significant difference. No significant changes were noted in mean HR. TC was higher with Cold Cooling than Neutral Cooling and TS was lower with Cold cooling compared with Neutral cooling. The changes in perceptual parameters caused by face cooling with cold water reflect the psychological impact on the physical parameters. The mean velocity was less important with face cooling whereas the heat rate and Tco were the same in the both conditions. The mechanism leading to these results seems to involve brain integration of signals from physiological and psychological sources. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 284 - 305 Despite the ubiquity of contemporary debate in learned and popular cultures concerning the place of the cosmopolitan and cosmopolitanism, the historical background to this peculiarly Western vision of world unity remains understudied and virtually unknown. This is particularly the case, rather surprisingly, for the early modern period, when the term “cosmopolite” reappeared in European vocabularies for the first time since antiquity. It is during this period, however, that the most significant, (...) enduring and problematic features of the cosmopolitan concept are articulated, particularly in those conceptions of world community which drew on Pauline notions of heavenly citizenship. Employing a modified Begriffsgeschichtliche approach, this article utilizes several case studies of cosmopolitan thought from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – including Erasmus, Guillaume Postel, Johann Valentin Andreae and others – in order to critique the history of the concept of the cosmopolitan. This essay argues, on the basis of this evidence, that there is an aporia which is constitutive of cosmopolitan concept, and which impacts on all attempts to understand, analyse and apply the category from antiquity to the present. Namely, although the cosmopolitan ideal is a peculiarly Western mythology which has always possessed a patina of benevolent inclusivity, it is contingent on establishing boundaries and establishing exclusivity. (shrink)

This is the introduction to a special issue of 'Science in Context' on vitalism that I edited. The contents are: 1. Guido Giglioni — “What Ever Happened to Francis Glisson? Albrecht Haller and the Fate of Eighteenth-Century Irritability” 2. Dominique Boury— “Irritability and Sensibility: Two Key Concepts in Assessing the Medical Doctrines of Haller and Bordeu” 3. Tobias Cheung — “Regulating Agents, Functional Interactions, and Stimulus-Reaction-Schemes: The Concept of “Organism” in the Organic System Theories of Stahl, Bordeu and Barthez” 4. (...) Charles T. Wolfe & Motoichi Terada — “The Animal Economy as Object and Program in Montpellier Vitalism” 5. Timo Kaitaro — “Can Matter Mark the Hours? – Eighteenth-Century Vitalist Materialism and Functional Properties” 6. Elizabeth Williams —“Of Two Lives One? Jean-Charles-Marguerite-Guillaume Grimaud and the Question of Holism in Vitalist Medicine” 7. Philippe Huneman — “Montpellier Vitalism and the Emergence of Alienism in France (1750-1800): The Case of the Passions” 8. Elke Witt —“Form – A Matter of Generation. The Relation of Generation, Form and Function in the Epigenetic Theory of C.F. Wolff” . (shrink)

t. 1. Livres I à IV -- t. 2. Livres V à VII et Notes marginales de Nicolas de Cues.

Il est indéniable que les féministes théorisent, et que leurs théorisations participent à transformer le monde. Mais peut-on--et doit-on--qualifier cette activité théorique? Bien que les théories féministes partagent une visée politique émancipatrice, chercher à définir ce que signifie théoriser en féministe, c'est prendre le risque de masquer la pluralité des situations et des concepts. Dès lors, comment prendre en charge la diversité des contextes qui se trouvent derrière les connaissances? Ne doit-on pas interroger ce que cette question--à la portée pourtant (...) éminemment épistémologique--révèle des frontières du féminisme lui-même? Comment aborder un phénomène qui est tout à la fois un engagement, une identité, une revendication, un outil? Le féminisme se décline au pluriel et se trouve dans une tension permanente, parce qu'il se confronte à des conflits qu'on préfère généralement ignorer, parce qu'il est sujet à des interprétations multiples et, partant, parce qu'il s'élabore par mouvements successifs quoique continus. Suffit-il alors de se revendiquer du féminisme, entendu comme identité politique aussi bien que comme outil scientifique, pour produire un mouvement ou une théorie féministes? Théoriser en féministe, c'est non seulement déclarer son appartenance à une communauté, mais c'est aussi chercher une forme de radicalité pour lutter contre la violence du système, qu'il soit social, politique ou philosophique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

À propos de : Jacques Rancière, Les Mots et les torts. Dialogue avec Javier Basas, Paris, La Fabrique, 2021, 96 p. Comme le titre de l’ouvrage l’indique, il s’agit de la transcription d’un entretien entre le philosophe français et le jeune philosophe espagnol Javier Basas. Ce der- nier interroge Jacques Rancière sur ses pratiques d’écriture, plus précisément sur le rapport entre ces pratiques et la notion d’égalité que le philosophe français met au cœur de sa philosophie de la politique. Il (...) y... (shrink)

Ce livre présente une lecture globale du corpus kantien sous un angle particulier : comment "penser" le mal? Comme simple absence du bien? Comme erreur? Ou, ainsi que Kant l'a mis en évidence, comme une "grandeur négative", qui appartient à...

(2012). DEL-sequents for regression and epistemic planning. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics: Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 337-367. doi: 10.1080/11663081.2012.736703.

Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) deals with the representation and the study in a multi-agent setting of knowledge and belief change. It can express in a uniform way epistemic statements about: 1. what is true about an initial situation 2. what is true about an event occurring in this situation 3. what is true about the resulting situation after the event has occurred. We axiomatize within the DEL framework what we can infer about (iii) given (i) and (ii). Given three formulas (...) φ,φ' and φ" describing respectively (i), (ii) and (iii), we also show how to build a formula φ ? φ' which captures all the information which can be inferred about (iii) from φ and φ'. We show how our results extend to other modal logics than K. In our proofs and definitions, we resort to a large extent to the normal form formulas for modal logic originally introduced by Kit Fine. In a companion paper (Aucher, 2012), we axiomatize what we can infer about (ii) given (i) and (iii), and what we can infer about (i) given (ii) and (iii), and show how to build two formulas φ ? φ" and φ' ? φ" which capture respectively all the information which can be inferred about (ii) from φ and φ", and all the information which can be inferred about (i) from φ' and φ". (shrink)

One way social scientists explain phenomena is by building structural models. These models are explanatory insofar as they manage to perform a recursive decomposition on an initial multivariate probability distribution, which can be interpreted as a mechanism. Explanations in social sciences share important aspects that have been highlighted in the mechanisms literature. Notably, spelling out the functioning the mechanism gives it explanatory power. Thus social scientists should choose the variables to include in the model on the basis of their function (...) in the mechanism. This paper examines the notion of ‘function’ within structural modelling. We argue that ‘functions’ ought to be understood as the theoretical underpinnings of the causes, namely as the role that causes play in the functioning of the mechanism. (shrink)

While Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is often seen to involve voluntary and deliberative approaches such as certification, governments have recently stepped into the picture through national legislation. France’s Law on Duty of Vigilance adopted in 2017 is a landmark case of such legislation. Years of voluntary CSR certification schemes led by Civil Society were replaced by a new philosophy of fighting for mandatory CSR controlled by a judge. We depict the change of mindset and the related change of roles inside (...) the coalition of Civil Society actors represents a Machiavellian Moment. The combination of collective civil society actors’ roles (namely nongovernmental organizations and labor unions) as Machiavellian _Virtue_ with disruptive events as Machiavellian _Fortuna_ made the law’s adoption possible. Based on this case study, we provide an analysis of civil society roles in the development of CSR-related legislation. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de proposer une nouvelle interprétation de la nature et de la fonction du principe d’économie tel qu’il est formulé et employé par Guillaume d’Ockham. Je défends l’idée que le principe d’économie tel qu’il est employé par Guillaume d’Ockham peut être compris comme un précepte méthodologique à suivre pour procéder à une inférence vers la meilleure explication. Je me propose donc de répondre aux deux questions suivantes. En quoi un argument d’économie consiste-t-il et (...) quelle est sa valeur explicative? Quel rapport établit-il entre la théorie adoptée et les faits? Pour défendre ma thèse, je procéderai en deux parties principales. Je commencerai par présenter... (shrink)

Representing an epistemic situation involving several agents obviously depends on the modeling point of view one takes. We start by identifying the types of modeling points of view which are logically possible. We call the one traditionally followed by epistemic logic the perfect external approach, because there the modeler is assumed to be an omniscient and external observer of the epistemic situation. In the rest of the paper we focus on what we call the internal approach, where the modeler is (...) one of the agents involved in the situation. For this approach we propose and axiomatize a logical formalism based on epistemic logic. This leads us to formalize some intuitions about the internal approach and about its connections with the external ones. Finally, we show that our internal logic is decidable and PSPACE-complete. (shrink)

The Grand Challenges literature brings under its umbrella a wide variety of disjointed phenomena but runs the risk of reinventing the wheel as well as overlooking incremental progress and past work. To avert this, scholars need to (dis)connect (dis)similar issues, build on past research on these issues, and create opportunities for generalizability through theoretical examinations.

After observing that the truth conditions of connectives of non–classical logics are generally defined in terms of formulas of first–order logic, we introduce ‘protologics’, a class of logics whose connectives are defined by arbitrary first–order formulas. Then, we introduce atomic and molecular logics, which are two subclasses of protologics that generalize our gaggle logics and which behave particularly well from a theoretical point of view. We also study and introduce a notion of equi-expressivity between two logics based on different classes (...) of models. We prove that, according to that notion, every pure predicate logic with \ variables and constants is as expressive as a predicate atomic logic, some sort of atomic logic. Then, we prove that the class of protologics is equally expressive as the class of molecular logics. That formally supports our claim that atomic and molecular logics are somehow ‘universal’. Finally, we identify a subclass of molecular logics that we call predicate molecular logics and which constitutes its representative core: every molecular logic is as expressive as a predicate molecular logic. (shrink)

In update logic as studied by Baltag, Moss, Solecki and van Benthem, little attention is paid to the interpretation of an action by an agent, which is just assumed to depend on the situation. This is actually a complex issue that nevertheless complies to some logical dynamics. In this paper, we tackle this topic. We also deal with actions that change propositional facts of the situation. In parallel, we propose a formalism to accurately represent an agent's epistemic state based on (...) hyperreal numbers. In that respect, we use infinitesimals to express what would surprise the agents (and by how much) by contradicting their beliefs. We also use a subjective probability to model the notion of belief. It turns out that our probabilistic update mechanism satisfies the AGM postulates of belief revision. (shrink)

Guillaume Collett questions to what extent we can locate Deleuze within the Lacanian School during the late-1960s, prior to Guattari. In so doing, he offers a new, integrated reading of Deleuze's The Logic of Sense by understanding it as a 'psychoanalysis of sense', and gives a new interpretation of Deleuze's conception of philosophy itself. The Psychoanalysis of Sense shows that Deleuze was not merely aware of the debates animating the Lacanian School during the 1960s: he sought to contribute to (...) them. Emphasising his appropriation of the work of post-Lacanian Serge Leclaire, Collett explains how Deleuze constructed a more singular and immanent theory of the linguistic structure of the unconscious - granting the erogenous body a larger structuring role. (shrink)

In epistemic logic, some axioms dealing with the notion of knowledge are rather convoluted and difficult to interpret intuitively, even though some of them, such as the axioms.2 and.3, are considered to be key axioms by some epistemic logicians. We show that they can be characterized in terms of understandable interaction axioms relating knowledge and belief or knowledge and conditional belief. In order to show it, we first sketch a theory dealing with the characterization of axioms in terms of interaction (...) axioms in modal logic. We then apply the main results and methods of this theory to obtain specific results related to epistemic and doxastic logics. (shrink)

In this book, T. L. Short places the notorious difficulties of Peirce's important writings in a more productive light, arguing that he wrote philosophy as a scientist, by framing conjectures intended to be refined or superseded in the inquiries they initiate. He argues also that Peirce held that the methods and metaphysics of modern science are amended as inquiry progresses, making metaphysics a branch of empirical knowledge. Additionally, Short shows that Peirce's scientific work expanded empiricism on empirical grounds, grounding his (...) phenomenology and subverting the fact/value dichotomy, and that he understood statistical explanations in nineteenth-century science as reintroducing the idea of final causation, now made empirical. Those innovations underlie Peirce's late ideas of a normative science and of philosophy as a branch of science. Short's rich and original study shows us how to read Peirce's writings and why they are worth reading. (shrink)

Unlike in physics, the category of thought experiment is not very common in biology. At least there are no classic examples that are as important and as well-known as the most famous thought experiments in physics, such as Galileo’s, Maxwell’s or Einstein’s. The reasons for this are far from obvious; maybe it has to do with the fact that modern biology for the most part sees itself as a thoroughly empirical discipline that engages either in real natural history or in (...) experimenting on real organisms rather than fictive ones. While theoretical biology does exist and is recognized as part of biology, its role within biology appears to be more marginal than the role of theoretical physics within physics. It could be that this marginality of theory also affects thought experiments as sources of theoretical knowledge. Of course, none of this provides a sufficient reason for thinking that thought experiments are really unimportant in biology. It is quite possible that the common perception of this matter is wrong and that there are important theoretical considerations in biology, past or present, that deserve the title of thought experiment just as much as the standard examples from physics. Some such considerations may even be widely known and considered to be important, but were not recognized as thought experiments. In fact, as we shall see, there are reasons for thinking that what is arguably the single most important biological work ever, Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, contains a number of thought experiments. There are also more recent examples both in evolutionary and non-evolutionary biology, as we will show. Part of the problem in identifying positive examples in the history of biology is the lack of agreement as to what exactly a thought experiment is. Even worse, there may not be more than a family resemblance that unifies this epistemic category. We take it that classical thought experiments show the following characteristics: They serve directly or indirectly in the non-empirical epistemic evaluation of theoretical propositions, explanations or hypotheses. Thought experiments somehow appeal to the imagination. They involve hypothetical scenarios, which may or may not be fictive. In other words, thought experiments suppose that certain states of affairs hold and then try to intuit what would happen in a world where these suppositions are true. We want to examine in the following sections if there are episodes in the history of biology that satisfy these criteria. As we will show, there are a few episodes that might satisfy all three of these criteria, and many more if the imagination criterion is dropped or understood in a lose sense. In any case, this criterion is somewhat vague in the first place, unless a specific account of the imagination is presupposed. There will also be issues as to what exactly “non-empirical” means. In general, for the sake of discussion we propose to understand the term “thought experiment” here in a broad rather than a narrow sense here. We would rather be guilty of having too wide a conception of thought experiment than of missing a whole range of really interesting examples. (shrink)

Pour Hegel, le sens s’élabore dans le langage, mais l’usage du langage ne fait pas nécessairement sens. Au niveau du discours, il semble même qu’un problème inévitable survienne. Si l’expérience d’un sens s’élaborant dans le langage ne s’accomplit que sous la forme d’un système autoréférent, comment ce sens peut-il se communiquer sans se contredire? Hegel n’échappe pas à ce problème si bien que l’on peut se poser la question de savoir si la dialectique du système est compatible avec les éléments (...) dialogiques (préfaces, notes, etc.) qui visent à l’instanciation de ce système? Nous montrons alors que pour nouer l’autoréférence du sens à l’idée de communication, Hegel présuppose le moyen terme d’un esprit commun, un "Nous". À partir de celui-ci, nous construisons un modèle dialogique et autoréférent qui dessine certains enjeux propres aux philosophies contemporaines de la communication. (shrink)