Interpreting an action from what we perceive and what we expect

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (1):9-38 (2007)
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In update logic as studied by Baltag, Moss, Solecki and van Benthem, little attention is paid to the interpretation of an action by an agent, which is just assumed to depend on the situation. This is actually a complex issue that nevertheless complies to some logical dynamics. In this paper, we tackle this topic. We also deal with actions that change propositional facts of the situation. In parallel, we propose a formalism to accurately represent an agent's epistemic state based on hyperreal numbers. In that respect, we use infinitesimals to express what would surprise the agents by contradicting their beliefs. We also use a subjective probability to model the notion of belief. It turns out that our probabilistic update mechanism satisfies the AGM postulates of belief revision.



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Citations of this work

AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
DEL-sequents for progression.Guillaume Aucher - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (3-4):289-321.
Dynamic Formal Epistemology.Patrick Girard, Olivier Roy & Mathieu Marion (eds.) - 2010 - Berlin, Germany: Springer.

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References found in this work

A General Non-Probabilistic Theory of Inductive Reasoning.Wolfgang Spohn - 1990 - In R. D. Shachter, T. S. Levitt, J. Lemmer & L. N. Kanal (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 4. Elsevier.
Probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic.Barteld P. Kooi - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (4):381-408.

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