This book aims to develop certain aspects of Gottlob Frege’s theory of meaning, especially those relevant to intensional logic. It offers a new interpretation of the nature of senses, and attempts to devise a logical calculus for the theory of sense and reference that captures as closely as possible the views of the historical Frege. (The approach is contrasted with the less historically-minded Logic of Sense and Denotation of Alonzo Church.) Comparisons of Frege’s theory with (...) those of Russell and others are given. It is in the end shown that developing Frege’s theory in these ways reveals serious problems hitherto largely unnoticed, including those possibly rendering a Fregean intensional logic inconsistent even if his naïve class theory is excluded. (shrink)

The genetic analysis of development has revealed the importance of small sets of interacting genes in most morphogenetic processes. The results of gene interactions have so far been examined intuitively. This approach is largely sufficient when one deals with simple interactions, a feedback circuit for example. As more components become involved, however, it is difficult to make sure that the intuitive approach gives a comprehensive view of the behaviour of the system. In this paper, we illustrate the use (...) of a logical approach to describe the genetic circuit that underlies the singling out of sense organ precursor cells in Drosophila. We show how to apply logical modelling to a realistic problem, and how this approach allows an easy assessment of the dynamic properties of the system, i.e., of its possible evolutions and of its reactions to fluctuations and perturbations. BioEssays 25:802–807, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

An incisive analysis of Deleuze's philosophy of eventsSean Bowden shows how the Deleuzian event should be understood in terms of the broader metaphysical thesis that substances are ontologically secondary with respect to events. He achieves this through a reconstruction of Deleuze's relation to the history of thought from the Stoics through to Simondon, taking account of Leibniz, Lautman, structuralism and psychoanalysis along the way.This exciting new reading of Deleuze focuses firmly on his approach to events. Bowden also examines and (...) clarifies a number of Deleuze's most difficult philosophical concepts, including sense, problematic Ideas and intensive individuation, and engages with material by Lautman and Simondon that has not yet been translated into English. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the dominant approaches to climate change impede a meaningful set of political interventions that might be galvanised in the face of destructive transformations in the climate. If one overemphasises the possibility of unexpected turns of events, the ability to build and pursue a political agenda is undermined. If, however, one overemphasises humanity's mastery over the course of events, deliberate interventions will falter when the unexpected occurs. Using Lewis Carroll to illustrate the former and Sophocles’ (...) depiction of Theban sovereigns to illustrate the latter, I propose a Deleuzian-inspired middle ground: thinking through climate change as a Deleuzian ‘event’ described in The Logic of Sense provides a novel set of strategies for becoming alongside the changing climate. As resources, I call on both Sophocles and Lucretius to provide an account of the world that is marked by predictable events and occasional swerves in the normal course of things. Ultimately, I argue Deleuze's Event captures creative potentiality but insists on a degree of predictability and agentic influence. By drawing on the Event, the goal is to mitigate the dangers involved with the masterful agent in Oedipus as well as the nihilism that results from being at the whim of the fates – both of which preclude meaningful action in the face of climate change. Rather than ignoring, denying, or controlling the outcome of widespread transformation, I propose creatively participating in the metamorphosis. (shrink)

The article discusses the concept of logic of sense – one of the key concepts in the philos­ophy of A.V. Smirnov. The text details the considerations expressed by the author at the round table “Process logic and philosophy of consciousness”. Unlike the formal-logical approach, the conceptual framework of which is based on the concept of a formal system, the theoretical status of the “logic of sense” is fully manifested only in the context of the (...) concept of culture. The logical form corresponding to the procedures of sense-generation is dynamic, not substantial. In different cultures, it is characterized by a peculiar combi­nation of regulatory and constitutive principles for the generation of intersubjective se­mantics. The necessity, which constitutes logical aspects of sense generation, manifests itself in the fact that it 1) forms the horizon of possible culture-forming conventions fixed by one or another “natural” language and their corresponding practices, and 2) separates the conventions themselves from their consequences, which are already not conventional. (shrink)

This is the first critical study of The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze's most important work on language and ethics, as well as the main source of his vital philosophy of the event.James Williams explains the originality of Deleuze's work with careful definitions of all his innovative terms and a detailed description of the complex structure he constructs. This reading makes connections to his ground-breaking work on literature, to his critical but also progressive relation to the sciences, and (...) to his controversial denial of the priority of standard logics, human values and 'meaning' in thinking.This book will open new debates and develop current ones around Deleuze's work in philosophy, politics, literature, linguistics, cultural studies and sociology. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present a paraconsistent formal system and a corresponding intended interpretation according to which true contradictions are not tolerated. Contradictions are, instead, epistemically understood as conflicting evidence, where evidence for a proposition A is understood as reasons for believing that A is true. The paper defines a paraconsistent and paracomplete natural deduction system, called the Basic Logic of Evidence, and extends it to the Logic of Evidence and Truth. The latter is a (...) logic of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness that is able to express not only preservation of evidence but also preservation of truth. LETj is anti-dialetheist in the sense that, according to the intuitive interpretation proposed here, its consequence relation is trivial in the presence of any true contradiction. Adequate semantics and a decision method are presented for both BLE and LETj, as well as some technical results that fit the intended interpretation. (shrink)

In this article, I outline a logic of design of a system as a specific kind of conceptual logic of the design of the model of a system, that is, the blueprint that provides information about the system to be created. In section two, I introduce the method of levels of abstraction as a modelling tool borrowed from computer science. In section three, I use this method to clarify two main conceptual logics of information inherited from modernity: Kant’s (...) transcendental logic of conditions of possibility of a system, and Hegel’s dialectical logic of conditions of in/stability of a system. Both conceptual logics of information analyse structural properties of given systems. Strictly speaking, neither is a conceptual logic of information about the conditions of feasibility of a system, that is, neither is a logic of information as a logic of design. So, in section four, I outline this third conceptual logic of information and then interpret the conceptual logic of design as a logic of requirements, by introducing the relation of “sufficientisation”. In the conclusion, I argue that the logic of requirements is exactly what we need in order to make sense of, and buttress, a constructionist approach to knowledge. (shrink)

I will briefly discuss the history of research-related projects that Mark Burgin and I worked on together. I will then discuss our joint research related to the circle of sense and nonsense. One paper was entitled In a search for deeper meanings: navigating the circle of Sense and Nonsense and in turn articulating logical varieties as knowledge illuminators and the second was entitled In the Circle of Sense and Nonsense, Including A Mathematic Model of Meaning. This research (...) represents a bridge between the media arts and sciences (my artwork) as a means of embodying ideas exploring a particular approach to meaning production and related computation, as well as Burgin’s concepts related to logical varieties and mathematical models of meaning. I will refer to the full papers and links because they present a very robust and full articulation of the concepts discussed here. In this paper, I will briefly touch on the areas of research, supply short definitions, and refer to the relevant historical publications. (shrink)

The first part of the paper_ outlines the development of causality in Greek philosophy. Some remarks are made on how some medieval philosophers approached to the problem. The paper shows also how modern philosophy understood causation. The paper inquires into the characteristics of causal relation as it is accepted in the domain of modern and recent physics. In the second part of the paper one finds some remarks concerning the programme of construing a new system CI of logic of (...) causal propositions. This system is adequate to the manner in which causality is presented in physics. The system CI is being construed to characterize the connective of relativistic conditionals ‘$\rightsquigarrow$’ by means of the methods of recent logic. This connective should be read as follows: ‘if …, then for that reason …’. The arguments of the connective ‘$\rightsquigarrow$’ may be propositional formulas describing a particular event. The new system of non-classical logic is based on the classical propositional calculus, on the one of systems of temporal logic, and on a system ZI of logic of change. The findings concerning causation, as outlined in the first part of the paper, constitute descriptive semantics of the system CI presented in the second part of the paper. This system may play a positive role in the indirect justification of theorems in philosophy in a broad sense. (shrink)

This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel's conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper (...) consists in working out the claim that one can have Hempel's cake and eat it too - in the sense that there is a logic of theory assessment that takes into account both of the two conflicting aspects of plausibility and informativeness. According to the semantics of this logic, a is an acceptable theory for evidence β if and only if a is both sufficiently plausible given β and sufficiently informative about β. This is spelt out in terms of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988) and shown to represent the syntactically specified notion of an assessment relation. The paper then compares these acceptability relations to explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations (Flach, 2000) as well as to nonmonotonic consequence relations (Kraus et al., 1990). It concludes by relating the plausibility-informativeness approach to Carnap's positive relevance account, thereby shedding new light on Carnap's analysis as well as solving another problem of confirmation theory. (shrink)

In the artificial intelligence literature a promising approach to counterfactual reasoning is to interpret counterfactual conditionals based on causal models. Different logics of such causal counterfactuals have been developed with respect to different classes of causal models. In this paper I characterize the class of causal models that are Lewisian in the sense that they validate the principles in Lewis’s well-known logic of counterfactuals. I then develop a system sound and complete with respect to this class. The (...) resulting logic is the weakest logic of causal counterfactuals that respects Lewis’s principles, sits in between the logic developed by Galles and Pearl and the logic developed by Halpern, and stands to Galles and Pearl’s logic in the same fashion as Lewis’s stands to Stalnaker’s. (shrink)

We consider a version of so called T x W logic for historical necessity in the sense of R.H. Thomason (1984), which is somewhat special in three respects: (i) it is explicitly based on two-dimensional modal logic in the sense of Segerberg (1973); (ii) for reasons of applicability to interesting fields of philosophical logic, it conceives of time as being discrete and finite in the sense of having a beginning and an end; and (iii) (...) it utilizes the technique of systematic frame constants in order to handle the problem of irreflexivity in tense logics, well known since Gabbay (1981). Axiomatizations are given for two infinite hierarchies of two-dimensional modal tense logics, one without and one with the characteristic operators for historical necessity and possibility. Strong and weak completeness results are obtained for both hierarchies as well as a result to the effect that two approaches to their semantics are equivalent, much in the spirit of Di Maio and Zanardo (1996) and von Kutschera (1997). (shrink)

An algebraic approach to programs called recursive coroutines — due to Janicki [3] — is based on the idea to consider certain complex algorithms as algebraics models of those programs. Complex algorithms are generalizations of pushdown algorithms being algebraic models of recursive procedures (see Mazurkiewicz [4]). LCA — logic of complex algorithms — was formulated in [11]. It formalizes algorithmic properties of a class of deterministic programs called here complex recursive ones or interacting stacks-programs, for which complex algorithms (...) constitute mathematical models. LCA is in a sense an extension of algorithmic logic as initiated by Salwicki [14] and of extended algorithmic logic EAL as formulated and examined by the present author in [8], [9], [10]. In LCA — similarly as in EAL-ω + -valued logic is applied as a tool to construct control systems (stacks) occurring in corresponding algorithms. The aim of this paper is to give a complete axiomatization. of LCA and to prove a completeness theorem. (shrink)

Utilizing a broadly Levinasian framework, specifically the interplay among his ideas of possession, violence, and negation, Gabriel Keehn and Deron Boyles illustrate how the relatively recent sharp turn toward the hypercorporatized school and the concomitant transition of the student from simple customer to a type of hybrid consumer/consumable has rendered it more difficult for students to see themselves as engaged in any type of serious ethical relationship with those around them. To be unable to see their peers as Others, in (...) other words, makes it easier for students to perpetrate a specific type of violence against them. Keehn and Boyles suggest that current popular policy responses to gun violence in schools are approaches that, at best, fail to address the root cause of gun violence in schools and, at worst, are themselves branches of that root: namely, a homogenizing corporatism that creates an ethical vacuum in the schoolhouse. (shrink)

In this paper we sketch a logic of message and reply. The logic is intended for application in a wide variety of situations, not restricted to the two-person, turn-taking situation. Each message has a body and a vector; the vector specifies the from, to, and the like. To reply to a message, it suffices to give either (1) a complete reply to the body or (2) a corrective reply to at least one presumption derivable from the vector. We (...) discuss the problems of achieving effectiveness and completeness with respect to certain aspects of communication. The results are mixed. In section 9 we argue semi-formally that, in a certain sense, dialogue is necessary. Finally we note that this logic is not a rival of other approaches but may be combinable with them. (shrink)

In this paper we sketch a logic of message and reply. The logic is intended for application in a wide variety of situations, not restricted to the two-person, turn-taking situation. Each message has a body and a vector; the vector specifies the from, to, and the like. To reply to a message, it suffices to give either (1) a complete reply to the body or (2) a corrective reply to at least one presumption derivable from the vector. We (...) discuss the problems of achieving effectiveness and completeness with respect to certain aspects of communication. The results are mixed. In section 9 we argue semi-formally that, in a certain sense, dialogue is necessary. Finally we note that this logic is not a rival of other approaches but may be combinable with them. (shrink)

Approaching Martin Luther King Jr. as a constructive political theorist, I present a synthetic view of his thought that is able to make cogent and compelling sense of prominent concepts and lines of reasoning in his writings. I contend that King's political thought, which is grounded in his moral, metaphysical, and theological convictions, is best understood as structurally teleological and oriented to the construction of an inclusive, democratic community as its end. To make this case and fill out the (...) picture of his view, I offer an analysis of King's “Letter from Birmingham Jail” and argue that his account of nonviolence, which provides the key to understanding his political thought, ought to be understood as operating within and on behalf of this teleological vision by patterning what I term dialogical relations between persons. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Remnants of SenseAlastair Morgan, PhD (bio)In an interview outlining her approach to understanding mental distress, Lucy Johnstone states that when faced with ostensibly bizarre, irrational or distressing experiences:[T]he guiding principle of "At some level it all makes sense" applies. In fact, I can't immediately think of anyone I've worked with for whom it did not, in the end, turn out to be true.1The two commentaries on (...) my paper point to two levels where this sense-making might operate; a structural and an individual level.Havi Carel (2023) draws attention to the important concept of power in the Power Threat Meaning Framework and suggests a widening of the concept of threat to a concept of vulnerabilization that refers to the multiple factors that expose people to institutional neglect and violence that is interlaced with a range of forms of discrimination, neglect and disadvantage. Whilst the main strength of the PTMF approach is to draw attention to the structural importance of power in contributing to forms of psychic distress, the emphasis on a concept of threat tends towards a reactive and reductive concept of power. Carel (2023) helpfully points to a wider concept of power that can be utilised for further work in understanding the impact of societal violence on forms of mental distress.Such a widening of the concept of power does not only rest on a critique of institutions but also an understanding of the ways in which people can be abandoned and neglected by state support of one kind or another. Power operates through a dual logic of exposure and abandonment. Some people are particularly exposed to forms of institutional power from an early age and vulnerabilized by such exposure, but there is also a logic of abandonment within such exposure; the ever present possibility of neglect. Such an operation of power is not univocal (or embedded in one profession) but dispersed and differentially applied. As Didier Fassin (2018, p. 43) writes: "All lives are precarious but certain lives much more so than others—and above all, quite differently."Psychiatric power is one important focus when trying to understand this process of the exposure and abandonment of power, however, as Carel (2023, p. 75) notes, "the medical realm is not its own kingdom." Psychiatry is inserted into a network of dispersed power that has multiple and differential effects, both positive and negative. The focus on the question of psychiatric diagnosis as the apotheosis of societal power neglects the multiple effects of diagnosis or the lack of diagnosis on people who are particularly vulnerable to the operations of power. In situations where institutional care is crumbling and under-resourced the focus on psychiatric care alone as a problem of power risks just compounding such an institutional neglect. [End Page 77] Veena Das (2020) asks the question of what happens before the arrival of the psychiatrist on the scene of care and after her disappearance. Das (2020, p. 174) is interested in the multiple ways that power flows across and between both formal and informal institutions to produce a "milieu of madness." Such flows of power will also apply to increasingly hegemonic psychological formulations of signs of distress as problems in living, as problems in adaptive reactions to adversity. Such formulations are themselves inserted into a nexus of power relations and processes of vulnerabilization and are not somehow free of the taint of other forms of understanding. Indeed, as Carel notes, the process of demedicalization and de-professionalisation can very easily be inserted into the dual logic of exposure and abandonment that I discussed earlier. People can be exposed to power in a wider range of settings as psychic distress is demedicalized but also subjected to abandonment and neglect as mental distress is no longer thought of as an illness but just one of many wider and non-medical problems in living that does not require state support.The structural account of the determinants of mental distress offers an important corrective to individualised and medicalised approaches to meaning, but doesn't completely erase the problem of understanding and interpreting mental distress. Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed's commentary raises important issues with the... (shrink)

The last twenty years have seen remarkable developments in our understanding of how the ancient Greek thinkers handled the general concept of being and its several varieties. The most general examination of the meaning of the Greek verb 'esti'/'einai'/'on' both in common usage and in the philosophical literature has been presented by Charles H. Kahn, most extensively in his 1973 book The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek. These discussions are summarized in Kahn's contribution to this volume. By and large, they (...) show that conceptual schemes by means of which philosophers have recently approached Greek thought have not been very well suited to the way the concept of being was actually used by the ancients. For one thing, being in the sense of existence played a very small role in Greek thinking according to Kahn. Even more importantly, Kahn has argued that Frege and Russell's thesis that verbs for being, such as 'esti', are multiply ambiguous is ill suited for the purpose of appreciating the actual conceptual assumptions of the Greek thinkers. Frege and Russell claimed that a verb like 'is' or'esti' is ambiguous between the 'is' of identity, the 'is' of existence, the copulative 'is', and the generic 'is' (the 'is' of class-inclusion). At least a couple of generations of scholars have relied on this thesis and fre quently criticized sundry ancients for confusing these different senses of 'esti' with each other. (shrink)

Agenda Relevance is the first volume in the authors' omnibus investigation of the logic of practical reasoning, under the collective title, A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems. In this highly original approach, practical reasoning is identified as reasoning performed with comparatively few cognitive assets, including resources such as information, time and computational capacity. Unlike what is proposed in optimization models of human cognition, a practical reasoner lacks perfect information, boundless time and unconstrained access to computational complexity. The (...) practical reasoner is therefore obliged to be a cognitive economizer and to achieve his cognitive ends with considerable efficiency. Accordingly, the practical reasoner avails himself of various scarce-resource compensation strategies. He also possesses neurocognitive traits that abet him in his reasoning tasks. Prominent among these is the practical agent's striking (though not perfect) adeptness at evading irrelevant information and staying on task. On the approach taken here, irrelevancies are impediments to the attainment of cognitive ends. Thus, in its most basic sense, relevant information is cognitively helpful information. Information can then be said to be relevant for a practical reasoner to the extent that it advances or closes some cognitive agenda of his. The book explores this idea with a conceptual detail and nuance not seen the standard semantic, probabilistic and pragmatic approaches to relevance; but wherever possible, the authors seek to integrate alternative conceptions rather than reject them outright. A further attraction of the agenda-relevance approach is the extent to which its principal conceptual findings lend themselves to technically sophisticated re-expression in formal models that marshal the resources of time and action logics and label led deductive systems. Agenda Relevance is necessary reading for researchers in logic, belief dynamics, computer science, AI, psychology and neuroscience, linguistics, argumentation theory, and legal reasoning and forensic science, and will repay study by graduate students and senior undergraduates in these same fields. Key features: relevance action and agendas practical reasoning belief dynamics non-classical logics labelled deductive systems. (shrink)

The article discusses the civilizational approach, which was formed in the 20thcentury and has become one of the main research approaches both in Russia and in the Western countries. The author presents a brief overview of the main milestones in the development of civilizational theory and its main representatives in Russia and the West. It is shown that in Russia, the importance of the civilizational approach is caused by the “change of epochs” that occurred after the 1990s and (...) demanded to consider the civilization principles in the social sciences and in the socio-political structure of the country. A brief description of the civilizational theory in the West, which has its own characteristics, not only demonstrates the universality of this scientific method but also reveals both its positive and negative aspects that were identified by the researchers. Although the Russian and Western scholars focus on the specifics of their own situations, they agree that in order to overcome the limitations of the civilizational approach, it is necessary to supplement it with other methods of scientific analysis. Since this article deals with the problems faced by Russia, the author presents the arguments of the Russian researchers, who suggest supplementing the civilizational analysis with the logic of sense, formations, geopolitical, ideological and worldview research approaches. It should be noted that the logic of sense approach is the latest achievement of the philosophical thought and a kind of scientific discovery (authored by A.V. Smirnov). It is concluded that all the supplementing methods find their meaning and place in relation to each other only within the framework of a holistic interdisciplinary approach, which provides a theoretical understanding of a larger set of problems that the country is facing today. (shrink)

The fields of machine learning (ML) and cognitive science have developed complementary approaches to computationally modeling human behavior. ML's primary concern is maximizing prediction accuracy; cognitive science's primary concern is explaining the underlying mechanisms. Cross-talk between these disciplines is limited, likely because the tasks and goals usually differ. The domain of e-learning and knowledge acquisition constitutes a fruitful intersection for the two fields’ methodologies to be integrated because accurately tracking learning and forgetting over time and predicting future performance based on (...) learning histories are central to developing effective, personalized learning tools. Here, we show how a state-of-the-art ML model can be enhanced by incorporating insights from a cognitive model of human memory. This was done by exploiting the predictive performance equation's (PPE) narrow but highly specialized domain knowledge with regard to the temporal dynamics of learning and forgetting. Specifically, the PPE was used to engineer timing-related input features for a gradient-boosted decision trees (GBDT) model. The resulting PPE-enhanced GBDT outperformed the default GBDT, especially under conditions in which limited data were available for training. Results suggest that integrating cognitive and ML models could be particularly productive if the available data are too high-dimensional to be explained by a cognitive model but not sufficiently large to effectively train a modern ML algorithm. Here, the cognitive model's insights pertaining to only one aspect of the data were enough to jump-start the ML model's ability to make predictions—a finding that holds promise for future explorations. (shrink)

The fields of machine learning (ML) and cognitive science have developed complementary approaches to computationally modeling human behavior. ML's primary concern is maximizing prediction accuracy; cognitive science's primary concern is explaining the underlying mechanisms. Cross-talk between these disciplines is limited, likely because the tasks and goals usually differ. The domain of e-learning and knowledge acquisition constitutes a fruitful intersection for the two fields’ methodologies to be integrated because accurately tracking learning and forgetting over time and predicting future performance based on (...) learning histories are central to developing effective, personalized learning tools. Here, we show how a state-of-the-art ML model can be enhanced by incorporating insights from a cognitive model of human memory. This was done by exploiting the predictive performance equation's (PPE) narrow but highly specialized domain knowledge with regard to the temporal dynamics of learning and forgetting. Specifically, the PPE was used to engineer timing-related input features for a gradient-boosted decision trees (GBDT) model. The resulting PPE-enhanced GBDT outperformed the default GBDT, especially under conditions in which limited data were available for training. Results suggest that integrating cognitive and ML models could be particularly productive if the available data are too high-dimensional to be explained by a cognitive model but not sufficiently large to effectively train a modern ML algorithm. Here, the cognitive model's insights pertaining to only one aspect of the data were enough to jump-start the ML model's ability to make predictions—a finding that holds promise for future explorations. (shrink)

The 2007+ crisis led to an increase in occasional and task work, which unleashed the potential of new technological and organizational solutions. The advancements in digital technological platforms stimulated the growth of the segment referred to as gig economy. The article aims to apply a systematic approach to the driving forces behind the emergence of gig economy and its success to date and to assess its development prospects. It argues to confirm the thesis that gig economy has its own (...) inherent logic, while it remains part of the multi-stage process of the evolution of employee-employer relations, from the industrial stage to the digital era to platform-mediated work. Based on the analysis of the current world literature, the article posits that gig economy, as the next stage of development, has significantly reduced the quality of work, but it may also not meet the individual needs of the contemporary consumer. This increases the likelihood of the need for its change. The article also envisages the direction of this change towards post-platform economy based on distributed market spaces and provides the characteristics of its determinants, including social capital and a sense of individual entrepreneurship. The primary methods used in the study involved analysis and critique of the current world literature as well as the method of analysis and logical construction. (shrink)

The paper contains two concepts of implication that can be called analytic in the sense of Parry [5] or Fine [2]. Contrary to the Parry's approach, these implications do not involve S4 strict implication but the classical one. This fact refers to the similar notion of so-called demodalized analytic implication of Dunn [1] and strong implication of Vanderveken, cf. [4, 6]. The features of analytic classical implications are presented in the form of two propositional logics on the pure (...) implicational language. (shrink)

The present study starts from the question if there can be any logic of religion. The answer is affirmative for logic in a wide sense. The attempts from the logic of beliefs account for this. However, the study focuses on the specific of the logic of religious terms, a less approached domain by logicians and philosophers. In this line issues like those of the logic of analogy, of the distinctions between the specific, general and (...) total content of terms, between logical distributive and collective conjunctions, etc are brought into discussion. In the end, dogmatic concepts are analyzed, as the core of religious concepts. (shrink)

The need for another study on the doctrine of analogy in the writings ofSt Thomas may not be obvious, since a complete bibliography in this area would doubtless assume depressing proportions. The present work is felt to be justified because it attempts a full-fledged alternative to the interpretation given in Cajetan's De nominum analogia, an interpretation which has provided the framework for subsequent discussions of the question. Recently, it is true, there has been growing dissatisfaction with Cajetan's approach; indeed (...) there have been wholesale attacks on the great commentator who is alleged to have missed the clef de voute of the metaphysics of his master. Applied to our problem, this criticism leads to the view that Cajetan was not metaphysical enough, or that he was metaphysical in the wrong way, in his discussion of the analogy of names. As its title indicates, the present study is not in agreement with Cajetan's contention that the analogy of names is a metaphysical doctrine. It is precisely a logical doctrine in the sense that "logical" has for St Thomas. We have no desire to be associated with attacks on Cajetan, the meta physician, attacks we feel are quite wrongheaded. If Cajetan must be criticized for his interpretation of the analogy of names, it is imperative that he be criticized for the right reasons. Moreover, criticism ofCajetan in the present study is limited to his views on the analogy of names. (shrink)

Though scholarship has explored Karin Costelloe-Stephen’s contributions to the history of psychoanalysis, as well as her relations to the Bloomsbury Group, her philosophical work has been almost completely ignored. This paper will examine her debate with Bertrand Russell over his criticism of Bergson. Costelloe-Stephen had employed the terminology of early analytic philosophy in presenting a number of arguments in defence of Bergson’s views. Costelloe-Stephen would object, among other things, to Russell’s use of an experiment which, as she points out, was (...) first conducted by Carl Stumpf. Russell appeals to Stumpf's experiment in his attempt to prove that sense data are terms in logical relations, a thesis presupposed by the project of logical analysis outlined in Our Knowledge of the External World. A reformulated version of Costelloe-Stephen's argument put forth by this paper shows that Russell's argument fails to provide adequate proof for his thesis. Further modifications of the argument can also address a reconstruction (based on contemporary reports) of Russell's reply to Costelloe-Stephen. In his reply, Russell would use, already in 1914, the term ‘analytic philosophy’ in contrasting his and Moore’s approach to a continental one, exemplified by Bergson and Costelloe-Stephen. (shrink)

A decade ago, Isham and Butterfield proposed a topos-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics, which meanwhile has been extended by Döring and Isham so as to provide a new mathematical foundation for all of physics. Last year, three of the present authors redeveloped and refined these ideas by combining the C*-algebraic approach to quantum theory with the so-called internal language of topos theory (Heunen et al. in arXiv:0709.4364). The goal of the present paper is to illustrate our abstract setup (...) through the concrete example of the C*-algebra M n (ℂ) of complex n×n matrices. This leads to an explicit expression for the pointfree quantum phase space Σ n and the associated logical structure and Gelfand transform of an n-level system. We also determine the pertinent non-probabilisitic state-proposition pairing (or valuation) and give a very natural topos-theoretic reformulation of the Kochen–Specker Theorem.In our approach, the nondistributive lattice ℘(M n (ℂ)) of projections in M n (ℂ) (which forms the basis of the traditional quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann) is replaced by a specific distributive lattice $\mathcal{O}(\Sigma_{n})$ of functions from the poset $\mathcal{C}(M_{n}(\mathbb{C}))$ of all unital commutative C*-subalgebras C of M n (ℂ) to ℘(M n (ℂ)). The lattice $\mathcal{O}(\Sigma_{n})$ is essentially the (pointfree) topology of the quantum phase space Σ n , and as such defines a Heyting algebra. Each element of $\mathcal{O}(\Sigma_{n})$ corresponds to a “Bohrified” proposition, in the sense that to each classical context $C\in\mathcal{C}(M_{n}(\mathbb{C}))$ it associates a yes-no question (i.e. an element of the Boolean lattice ℘(C) of projections in C), rather than being a single projection as in standard quantum logic. Distributivity is recovered at the expense of the law of the excluded middle (Tertium Non Datur), whose demise is in our opinion to be welcomed, not just in intuitionistic logic in the spirit of Brouwer, but also in quantum logic in the spirit of von Neumann. (shrink)

This chapter explores one of the most problematic theoretical commitments of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological projects: the idea of a logic of consciousness or phenomeno-logic. It shows why Husserl is committed to this idea and why it is so out of step with contemporary approaches in the philosophy of mind. It then tries to render the idea intelligible along two paths. First, to take the idea of a logic of consciousness seriously, we must challenge our entrenched atomistic assumptions (...) about conscious states. Second, to recognize the sense in which a science of consciousness might be logical, we must come to terms with Husserl's conception of an ideal science. For on a Husserlian conception, apophantic logic and phenomenology must be seen as two varieties of ideal science: systematic articulations of the content and structure of an ideal that is constitutive for conscious experience of a world. (shrink)

1.1 In standard modal logics, the worlds are 2-valued in the following sense: there are 2 values that a sentence may take at a world. Technically, however, there is no reason why this has to be the case. The worlds could be many-valued. This paper presents one simple approach to a major family of many-valued modal logics, together with an illustration of why this family is philosophically interesting.

“For there shall be days when you will say: Blessed is the womb which has not conceived, and those breasts which have not given suck.”The Apocryphal Gospel of Thomas (1)“ Oh man! why is the world becoming so narrow for you? You want to possess it alone; but if you had possessed it, it would not have been spacious enough for you:Ah! this is the pride of the devil who has fallen from heaven into hell.”.

There are at least two politically salient senses of “representation”—acting-for-others and portraying-something-as-something. The difference is not just semantic but also logical: relations of representative agency are dyadic (x represents y), while portrayals are triadic (x represents y as z). I exploit this insight to disambiguate constructivism and to improve our theoretical vocabulary for analyzing political representation. I amend Saward’s claims-based approach on three points, introducing the “characterization” to correctly identify the elements of representational claims; explaining the “referent” in pragmatic, (...) not metaphysical terms; and differentiating multiple forms of representational activity. This enables me to clarify how the represented can be both prior to representation and constituted by it, and to recover Pitkin’s idea that representatives ought to be “responsive” to the represented. These points are pertinent to debates about the role of representatives, the nature of representative democracy, and the dynamics of revolutionary movements. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of (...) beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing \ as a desire means to desire \ and to desire \. However, desiring \ and \ at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations, hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals. (shrink)

Abstract.The paper outlines the approach to the analysis of deontic conditionals taken in earlier work by Jones and Pörn, compares it very briefly with two main trends within dyadic deontic logic, and then discusses problems associated with the augmentation principle and the factual detachment principle. The author then modifies Jones and Pörn's previous system, using a classical but not normal (in the sense of Chellas) deontic modality to provide the basis for an alternative analysis of deontic conditionals. (...) This new analysis validates neither the factual detachment nor the augmentation principles. However, influenced by the approach of James Delgrande to default reasoning, the author tries to show how a restricted form of factual detachment may be accommodated within the revised system. (shrink)

The new logic of partitions is dual to the usual Boolean logic of subsets (usually presented only in the special case of the logic of propositions) in the sense that partitions and subsets are category-theoretic duals. The new information measure of logical entropy is the normalized quantitative version of partitions. The new approach to interpreting quantum mechanics (QM) is showing that the mathematics (not the physics) of QM is the linearized Hilbert space version of the (...) mathematics of partitions. Or, putting it the other way around, the math of partitions is a skeletal version of the math of QM. The key concepts throughout this progression from logic, to logical information, to quantum theory are distinctions versus indistinctions, definiteness versus indefiniteness, or distinguishability versus indistinguishability. The distinctions of a partition are the ordered pairs of elements from the underlying set that are in different blocks of the partition and logical entropy is defined (initially) as the normalized number of distinctions. The cognate notions of definiteness and distinguishability run throughout the math of QM, e.g., in the key non-classical notion of superposition (= ontic indefiniteness) and in the Feynman rules for adding amplitudes (indistinguishable alternatives) versus adding probabilities (distinguishable alternatives). (shrink)

Considered one of the most important works of one of France's foremost philosophers, and long-awaited in English, The Logic of Sense begins with an extended exegesis of Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland. Considering stoicism, language, games, sexuality, schizophrenia, and literature, Deleuze determines the status of meaning and meaninglessness, and seeks the 'place' where sense and nonsense collide. Written in an innovative form and witty style, The Logic of Sense is an essay in literary and psychoanalytic (...) theory as well as philosophy, and helps to illuminate such works as Anti-Oedipus. (shrink)

This paper introduces the logic of evidence and truth \ as an extension of the Belnap–Dunn four-valued logic \. \ is a slightly modified version of the logic \, presented in Carnielli and Rodrigues. While \ is equipped only with a classicality operator \, \ is equipped with a non-classicality operator \ as well, dual to \. Both \ and \ are logics of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness in which the operator \ recovers classical logic for (...) propositions in its scope. Evidence is a notion weaker than truth in the sense that there may be evidence for a proposition \ even if \ is not true. As well as \, \ is able to express preservation of evidence and preservation of truth. The primary aim of this paper is to propose a probabilistic semantics for \ where statements \\) and \\) express, respectively, the amount of evidence available for \ and the degree to which the evidence for \ is expected to behave classically—or non-classically for \ \). A probabilistic scenario is paracomplete when \ + P 1\), and in both cases, \ < 1\). If \ = 1\), or \ = 0\), classical probability is recovered for \. The proposition \, a theorem of \, partitions what we call the information space, and thus allows us to obtain some new versions of known results of standard probability theory. (shrink)

The parameters governing our behavior are in constant flux. Accurately capturing these dynamics in cognitive models poses a challenge to modelers. Here, we demonstrate a mapping of ACT-R's declarative memory onto the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA), a mathematical model describing a competition between evidence accumulation processes. We show that this mapping provides a method for inferring individual ACT-R parameters without requiring the modeler to build and fit an entire ACT-R model. Existing parameter estimation methods for the LBA can be used, (...) instead of the computationally expensive parameter sweeps that are traditionally done. We conduct a parameter recovery study to confirm that the LBA can recover ACT-R parameters from simulated data. Then, as a proof of concept, we use the LBA to estimate ACT-R parameters from an empirical dataset. The resulting parameter estimates provide a cognitively meaningful explanation for observed differences in behavior over time and between individuals. In addition, we find that the mapping between ACT-R and LBA lends a more concrete interpretation to ACT-R's latency factor parameter, namely as a measure of response caution. This work contributes to a growing movement towards integrating formal modeling approaches in cognitive science. (shrink)

The study examines Russian philosopher Andrei Smirnov’s conception of the logic of sense as a way of providing exposition of the reasons for the Russian-Ukrainian war. The logic of sense is simultaneously a theory of rules of sense-setting and the very rules of sense-setting created by a culture and the ruling culture. Smirnov thinks that the reasons lie in the clash between common-human European culture and its logic of sense and all-human Russian (...) culture and its logic of sense. Smirnov sees no difference between Russians and Ukrainians and considers the Ukrainian culture an essential and indispensable part of Russian culture. Therefore, the expansion of the common-human European culture to Ukraine challenges the all-human Russian culture. (shrink)

This paper argues that the slogans “A Woman's Right to Choose” and “The Personal is the Political” typify different traditions within feminist thinking; one emphasizing rights and equality, the other the unconscious and the personal. The author responds to both traditions by bringing together mind and body, and reason and emotion, via the figure of the copula. The copula expresses an alternative model of identity which indicates that value can be produced only in relation.Let us say that the problem is (...) violence. At its most naive: how can the sexual relation, which is supposedly full of love, be violent?I mean the sexual relation in its resonances and ambiguity—to indicate the relation between the sexes, and the relation between lovers. In no way can the relation be confined to love, either heterosexual or homosexual, since it is often a contest. It cannot be reduced solely to a social relation, because in one of its aspects it addresses the most intimate subjectivity.In a certain feminist lifestyle advocacy, those women who are in same sex relations avoid sexual violence by avoiding men, and those who are in heterosexual relationships strive to find the “right kind”—that is, relationships of respectful and supportive love—rejecting all signs of aggression, from sexist disparagement and emotional cruelty to sexual humiliation and physical assault, as “abuse.”Strangely, this dichotomy does not explain the proximity of passion and aggression, whether in love between men and women or in same-sex relationships between feminist women. As rational counsel, it resists the important sense in which the erotic is, and is even valued as, the excess of the rational. And as an analysis of the oppression of women it defeats itself, for to insist on masculinity as violence itself, and/or on the sexual relation as properly governed by reason, seems to miss the point of both love and feminism.Stranger still, feminisms, which set out to address and redress the oppression of women, have become rivalrous themselves. Are these aggressions a legacy of the intellectual world they must take place in. Have we overlooked an aspect of the relation between sisters? Feminism has not addressed the question of aggression in feminism as anything more than contamination.Perhaps, after all, the thing that feminism has not yet successfully addressed is love. The “battle between the sexes” has not rendered the ambivalence of the heterosexual relation. As a species of theory, feminism has relished the rigor of distinction and has not found it easy to tolerate the proximity of opposites.And yet, in evoking the body, some feminisms approach closer to this difficulty. It remains to take up the relation between the body and the concept more thoroughly, in order to find out whether sexual difference could ever be philosophical. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus construes the nature of reasoning in a manner which sharply conflicts with the conventional wisdom that logic is normative, not descriptive of thought. For although we sometimes seem to reason incorrectly, Wittgenstein denies that we can make logical mistakes (5.473). My aim in this paper is to show that the Tractatus provides us with good reasons to rethink some of the central assumptions that are standardly made in thinking about the relation between logic and thought. In (...) particular, the rejection of logical mistakes is to be understood in connection with Wittgenstein’s non-psychological approach to the thinking subject (5.641). On Wittgenstein's view, inference, understanding, and meaning are holistically related; cases of defective reasoning are to be explained in terms of a defective grasp of meaning which manifests in an indeterminate use of signs. Invalid reasoning therefore does not count for Wittgenstein as a species of reasoning, but rather as the mere illusion of reasoning. The rejection of logical mistakes thus gives voice to a radical disjunctivist approach. (shrink)

Much of cognitive science seeks to provide principled descriptions of various kinds and aspects of rational behaviour, especially in beings like us or AI simulacra of beings like us. For the most part, these investigators presuppose an unarticulated common sense appreciation of the rationality that such behaviour consists in. On those occasions when they undertake to bring the relevant norms to the surface and to give an account of that to which they owe their legitimacy, these investigators tend to (...) favour one or other of three approaches to the normativity question. They are the analyticity or truth-in-a-model approach; the pluralism approach; and the reffective equilibrium approach.All three of these approaches to the normativity question are seriously flawed, never mind that the first two have some substantial provenance among logicians and the third has enjoyed a flourishing philosophical career.Against these views, we propose a strong version of what might be called normatively immanent descriptivism. We attempt to elucidate its virtues and to deal with what appears to be its most central vulnerability, embodied in the plain fact that actual human behaviour is sometimes irrational. (shrink)

Debunking arguments typically attempt to show that a set of beliefs or other intensional mental states bear no appropriate explanatory connection to the facts they purport to be about. That is, a debunking argument will attempt to show that beliefs about p are not held because of the facts about p. Such beliefs, if true, would then only be accidentally so. Thus, their causal origins constitute an undermining defeater. Debunking arguments arise in various philosophical domains, targeting beliefs about morality, the (...) existence of God, logic, and others. They have also arisen in material-object metaphysics, often aimed at debunking common-sense ontology. And while most of these arguments feature appeals to ‘biological and cultural contingencies’ that are ostensibly responsible for our beliefs about which kinds of objects exist, few of them take a serious look at what those contingencies might actually be. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to remedy this by providing empirical substantiation for a key premise in these debunking arguments by examining data from cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology that support a ‘debunking explanation’ of our common-sense beliefs and intuitions about which objects exist. Second, to argue that such data also undermines a particular kind of rationalist defense of common-sense ontology, sometimes employed as a response to the debunking threat. (shrink)

Considered one of the most important works of one of France's foremost philosophers, and long-awaited in English, _The Logic of Sense_ begins with an extended exegesis of Lewis Carroll's _Alice in Wonderland_. Considering stoicism, language, games, sexuality, schizophrenia, and literature, Deleuze determines the status of meaning and meaninglessness, and seeks the 'place' where sense and nonsense collide. Written in an innovative form and witty style, _The Logic of Sense_ is an essay in literary and psychoanalytic theory as (...) well as philosophy, and helps to illuminate such works as _Anti-Oedipus_. (shrink)

This article is divided into five parts. After a brief example in the first part, the second explains what historical sense-generation is about. The third characterizes tradition as a pregiven condition of all historical thinking. With respect to this condition, the constructivist theory of history is criticized as one-sided. The fourth part presents tradition as one of the four basic sense criteria of historical narration. The article concludes with a discussion of the role of tradition in the historical (...) culture of modern societies.Historical sense-generation is a mental procedure by which the past is interpreted for the sake of understanding the present and anticipating the future. This mental procedure is an anthropological universal in the cultural orientation of human practical life and will lead to a concept of the course of time as a necessary factor in the cultural orientation of human life.Today the dominant opinion in metahistory conceives of historical sense-generation in a constructivist way. The sense of the past is understood as an ascription of meaning onto the past; the past itself has no impact on this meaning. But I hold that the past is already present in the circumstances and conditions under which historical thinking is performed and is obviously influenced by it. This presence can be called tradition. Before historians construct the past they themselves are already constructed by the present outcome of past developments in the world. Thus tradition is always at work in historical thinking before the past is thematized as history.Historical sense-generation needs basic principles of sense and meaning. Using these principles transforms the experience of the past into a meaningful history for the present. Despite cultural differences, four sense criteria can be identified as basic for making historical sense of the past. One of the four principles is tradition. It is the most fundamental one upon which all other modes of making sense of the past are grounded. It presents temporal change in the human world such that the world’s order is maintained despite all its changes. Since the emergence of the so-called advanced civilizations, other types of historical narration have overshadowed the constitutive role of tradition. Historical narration has been supplemented by exemplary, genetic, and critical approaches to the past. Yet the traditional one has remained the most frequently used and is the most basic and popular. (shrink)