German Idealism

With his innovative research on Kant and German Idealism, Eckart Förster has been a major driving force in research on idealism for many years. In particular, his works on Kant’s ‘Opus postumum’ and spatial schematism, on intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding, on Fichte, Hölderlin, and Goethe, on the genesis of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as well as on the importance of Goethe for post-Kantian philosophy have received widespread attention. This volume contains many of his most important essays from the last (...) three decades. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider three different positions on the a priori/a posteriori distinction that have been attributed to Hegel, specifically in the context of the epistemology of the metaphysical claims he defends in his Realphilosophie. I outline and briefly provide evidence for a reading of Hegel that understands him to retain the distinction in question, but to hold that the metaphysical claims he defends in the context of his philosophy of nature and his philosophy of spirit typically involve elements (...) of both a priori and a posteriori knowledge. I then defend this interpretation against two competitors. The first of these also takes Hegel to retain the distinction, but holds that the conclusions of his Realphilosophie, like those of his logic, are principally to be understood as known a priori. The second takes Hegel to abandon the a priori/a posteriori distinction altogether. I argue that these alternatives are less compelling. (shrink)

volume 1. Philosophy and natural science / edited by Karl Ameriks -- volume 2. Historical, social, and political thought / edited by John Walker -- volume 3. Aesthetics and literature / edited by Christoph Jamme and Ian D. Cooper -- volume 4. Religion / edited by Nicholas Adams.

El pensamiento kantiano y en su interior, el concepto de crítica; comprenden un capítulo de la Historia de la Filosofía considerado asidero y objeto constante de recapitulaciones. Kant advierte que el conocimiento filosófico ha llegado a un estado de crisis, y más allá aún, despoja la metafísica de las ataduras arcaicas que la esgrimían al comienzo de la época moderna. Pone al descubierto la necesidad indiscutible de una revolución teórica, que aunque no cumplió su cometido cabalmente, al permanecer en una (...) perspectiva abstracta, contiene méritos de valor en el camino a la subversión de la filosofía. Sería oportuno traer a colación, una serie de argumentos que definen este pensamiento y exponen en su sencillez la esencia de su discurso. (shrink)

The concept of bliss, in its connotations of beatitude and salvation, may seem of little relevance to so-called secular modernity. Bliss Against the World argues otherwise by advancing a novel framework of the entanglement between modernity, Christianity, and bliss through the thought of German Idealist and Romantic philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854). In Schelling's concept of bliss (Seligkeit), the idea of salvation from the world mutates into a burning concern with the negativity of the modern world, and with the way modernity (...) inherits the Christian promise of a non-alienated future that never arrives. Throughout his thinking, Schelling grapples with the question of theodicy: Can this negative world be justified? And what would it mean to be free of the world—to enact bliss right now—when the idea of otherworldly salvation increasingly loses its conceptual relevance? This leads Schelling to conceptualize bliss as what refuses or apocalyptically annihilates this world and its divisions and burdens. Bliss Against the World reinterprets Schelling's philosophical trajectory from the 1790s to the 1840s, showing his metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and natural philosophy to be underwritten by the apocalyptic tension between bliss and theodicy. It argues that this tension is located likewise at the heart of modernity and reconstructs the Schellingian genealogy of the modern age as intensifying what may be termed the general Christian contradiction. It also focuses on Schelling's anxiety about the possibility of universal history in the dark and de-centered universe and critiques his Romantic construction of humanity and his geo-racial theodicy of history—a theodicy that refracts and legitimates the violent logics of post-1492 modernity, including European colonialism, racialization, and transatlantic slavery. Bliss Against the World thus theorizes bliss not only with, but also against Schelling, who emerges from this book as a key thinker of modernity, and of the Christian-modern trajectory as a path to salvation in the shadow of whose failure we continue to live. (shrink)

Scholars often argue that Charles Sanders Peirce was responsible for Josiah Royce's semiotic turn in _The Problem of Christianity_ of 1913. Thus scholars tend to assume that a _Roycean_ approach to semiotics was a later development and derives almost entirely from Peirce's semiotics. Far from a later development, Royce probably read Peirce much earlier. Indeed, even before Royce had read Peirce, the kernel of a Rocyean approach to semiotics is found in the dissertation of 1878. Thus the present essay will (...) prove that a Roycean approach to semiotics did not have a basis in Peirce's semiotics, whether early or later, but rather grew out of Royce's earliest writings. The first part will reconstruct the early pragmatism in the dissertation of 1878 and find that the kernal of a Roycean approach to semiotics was the idea of a _mediating third_. The second part will show how the disseration's pragmatism develops into a phenomenology of time that contains Royce's earliest semiosic insights. The third part will explain how the early pragmatism and phenomenology come together in the argument on the possibility of error from Royce's _The Religious Aspect of Philosophy_ of 1885. The possibility of error is Royce's original argument for absolute idealism, so the essay will conclude that a Roycean approach to semiotics entails a semiotics of the absolute. (shrink)

Ao analisar a teoria da memória mecânica de Hegel, a maioria dos intérpretes considerou apenas dois aspectos da memorização mecânica: o desaparecimento do significado nas palavras mecânicamente memorizadas ou a internalização totalmente abstrata da mente que as memoriza. No primeiro caso, a interpretação concentrou-se na relação entre o significante e o significado das palavras; no segundo caso, concentrou-se na relação entre o signo linguístico como um todo e a mente. Entretanto, a posição específica da memória mecânica na sistematização das atividades (...) cognitivas de Hegel não se baseia nessas duas relações, mas na relação entre o significado de cada palavra e o significado das outras palavras. Ao memorizar de cor fileiras de palavras que não estão conectadas umas às outras por seus significados, mas apenas pela força da mente que decide memorizá-las juntas, a mente se liberta de qualquer conteúdo dado externamente e sublima a referência linear do conteúdo representacional de cada significado à intuição em sua origem. A atualização do poder da mente de interconectar conteúdos de acordo com as próprias regras lógicas da mente realiza, para Hegel, a transição para o pensamento propriamente dito. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator: The Final Paradigm By Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Copyright©2024 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-ND. Imprint 1.0. 2024. All Rights are reserved. Intended copies of this work can be used for research and teaching. No change in the content and must include my full name, Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Enjoying reading and disagreeing. Publisher: Kuhn von Verden Verlag. Language: English and German. Includes bibliographical references and an index. Pages 1-316. Index total pages is 524. Ontology. (...) 2. Metaphysics. 3. Philosophy, German. 4. Thought and thinking. 5. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. 6. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854. 7. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. 10. Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century. 11. Philosophy, Modern -- 19th century. 12. Practice (Philosophy). 13. Philosophy and civilization. 14. Postmodernism. 15. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. 16. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. 17. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel. Table of Contents Mottos Division I. Discussion of the title pages 2-6 Prologue pages 7-14 Heidegger, what do we know about him? page 15-22 Early Heidegger pages 23-41 What are the periods in Heidegger’s thought? pages 42-51 Preface and Setting the Stage pages 52-65 Introduction pages 66-82 Heidegger on Questioning pages 83-94 The Crisis or Krisis in philosophy? pages 95-106 Does Heidegger have a philosophy? pages 107-127 Heidegger about the Nature of Teaching pages 128-132 Heidegger against philosophy as a worldview or the standpoint of standpointlessness pages 133-137 Heidegger’s world-famous book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, SuZ, 1927) pages 138-153 Heidegger’s second attempt Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) pages 154-162 Heidegger on the image of the Bridge pages 163-170 Conclusion pages 171-188 -/- Division II. Engagement with Heidegger on history of philosophy (metaphysics). Reinigung as cleaning, purifying pages 189-191 What is Heidegger’s Metahistory of philosophy? pages 192-243 Appendix A. Reconstruction of a partial letter from Martin Heidegger to Dieter Sinn. Dated. 24 August 1964. pages 244-248 Appendix B. Martin Heidegger's Dialogue and Critical Debate with Hegel. pages 249-253 Appendix C. Heidegger on Pain (Schmerz) pages 254-257 Appendix D. Update: 2023 Oct 24. Daniel Fidel Ferrer replies to Professor Thomas Sheehan (Sein question) pages 258-269 Appendix E. Five Habilitations done with Martin Heidegger. Habilitationsschrift pages 270-272 Heidegger Bibliography Individual Lectures Vortrag or Vorträge. Detailed pages 273-294 Heidegger‘s Gesamtausgabe (HGA or GA). Note GA 72 has yet to be published (2024). pages 295-299 Letters. Briefe. Briefwechsel. Not complete pages 300-303 Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien / Etudes Heideggeriennes (list of Heidegger texts) pages 304-305 Jahresgaben der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft (from the internet) (list of Heidegger texts) pages 306-308 Additional References (bibliographies) pages 309-310 Heidegger Index Projects by Daniel Fidel Ferrer page 311 -/- Martin Heidegger Audio Recordings pages 312-313 -/- Additional acknowledgements pages 314-315 -/- Letter from Hermann Heidegger to Daniel Ferrer den 5.2.2002. In German. Hermann Heidegger’s response to the Barbara Fiand collection being in the USA. -/- One of the thesis: there is no Heidegger philosophy. Read more… -/- “What always counts in the lecture-courses is the manner of proceeding - the sequence of steps - not a claim to final truths. The lecture-courses never wrap up in a completeness and in seemingly "finishing off" the works interpreted, but rather in the inner fullness of the hidden dynamics of questioning.” GA 66. Besinnung (1938/39). GA 66: 421. (shrink)

La exterioridad de una cosa o de un estado de cosas configurados por el ser humano no implica para Hegel que esa cosa o ese estado de cosas deban ya por ello ser considerados como formas del espíritu objetivo, mientras que en contrapartida las formas del espíritu absoluto estarían entonces conformadas por contenidos ideales del pensamiento. La diferencia entre espíritu objetivo y espíritu absoluto no radica en la diferencia entre lo que el espíritu humano “hace” y lo que “conoce”. En (...) efecto, las obras de arte, es decir, configuraciones exteriores hechas por el ser humano utilizando, por ejemplo, piedras, metales, colores o sonidos, son para Hegel instancias del espíritu absoluto, mientras que, por su parte, realidades que en cuanto tales no son intuibles, como, por ejemplo, los contratos o la organización estatal, son instancias del espíritu objetivo. Que Hegel considere al arte como una forma del espíritu absoluto pone de manifiesto que, a sus ojos, las cosas que intuimos en el universo son, en rigor, productos del propio sujeto que las conoce. Espontáneamente el sujeto cognoscente piensa que lo que intuye es algo que recibe desde un mundo externo; sostener que el arte es una forma de conocimiento es justamente el modo como Hegel está expresando que lo intuido es en todos los casos un contenido producido por el propio espíritu, que es, por así decirlo, una obra de arte humano. En el arte mismo, sin embargo, la producción de la cosa intuible es insuficiente, dado que el material que el espíritu utiliza para sus configuraciones conserva en mayor o menor medida, según el caso, una determinidad propia que resiste a la determinidad que el espíritu busca conferirle. Por esta razón, las obras de arte se presentan inicialmente como productos arbitrarios. Recién cuando integra sus intuiciones en la actividad de comprensión -actividad cognitiva con la que opera la filosofía- y media con ello completamente la determinidad de los contenidos intuidos, el espíritu configura finalmente un universo que le es propio y específico. El objetivo de mi ponencia es reconstruir desde el marco teórico recién expuesto el sentido y función que Hegel le atribuye al arte en su teoría del conocimiento. (shrink)

I provide an overview of the differences between psychological pessimism and philosophical pessimism. Based on a historic reading of the original 19th century German pessimist philosophers I provide a definition of what I call "transcendental pessimism" and sketch some of the reasons why it is different from other pessimist perspectives such as anti-natalism.

Die Abschaffung der Sklaverei, die Einführung sozialer Sicherungssysteme, die Sanktionierung von Vergewaltigung in der Ehe gelten gemeinhin als gesellschaftlicher Fortschritt – als ein Wandel zum Besseren. Dennoch hat die Idee einer generellen Fortschrittsbewegung ihren alten Glanz verloren, ja, sie ruft sogar Skepsis hervor. In aller Munde ist hingegen die Diagnose der Regression. Sie wird diversen Zeiterscheinungen gestellt, vom rechtsautoritären Populismus bis zur Demokratiemüdigkeit. -/- Rahel Jaeggi verteidigt in ihrem Buch das Begriffspaar Fortschritt und Regression als unverzichtbares sozialphilosophisches Werkzeug für die (...) Kritik unserer Zeit. Als fortschrittlich oder regressiv versteht sie nicht nur das Resultat, sondern vor allem die Gestalt gesellschaftlicher Transformationen selbst. Indem sie nach den Erfahrungsblockaden fragt, die regressiven Tendenzen Vorschub leisten, entwickelt sie einen Begriff des Fortschritts, der eurozentrische Verzerrungen ebenso vermeidet wie die Vorstellung einer zwangsläufigen Entwicklungstendenz. Fortschritt, so zeigt sie, ist nicht der Vorlauf zu einem bereits bekannten Ziel, sondern der nie abgeschlossene Prozess der Emanzipation. (shrink)

The paper discusses three talks, which were given at the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin) in the mid-1870s. In these talks, the principles of some main movements in contemporary philosophy (realism, absolute idealism, critical idealism) were elaborated and contrasted to each other. The paper focuses on the concepts of real-idealism and ideal-realism. All the discussants, Friedrich Frederichs, C. L. Michelet and J. H. von Kirchmann, introduce these concepts. Frederichs, an adherent of critical idealism, argues (...) only for the standpoint of real-idealism. Michelet, G. W. F. Hegel’s personal student and an adherent of absolute idealism, takes real-idealism and ideal-realism to be the two sides of the one coin. Kirchmann, an advocate of realism, regards real-idealism as an objective, and he is skeptical about the possibility to achieve it. (shrink)

The absence of Islam from recent scholarship on Hegel's account of world religions is puzzling. In the first part of the article, we argue that Hegel's neglect of Islam in his systematic account of religious phenomena is not accidental and that he did not think of Islam as a determinate religion. Its size and believers aside, we suggest that it is not possible to assign any determinacy to Islam as a world-historical phenomenon under Hegel's rubric, because such determinacy that applies (...) to other religions would be in conflict with what Hegel takes to be Islam's emphasis on the negative moment of truth, its revolutionary tendencies, and its lack of any novel conceptual content as a response to Christianity. In the second part of the article, we point out how one could respond to Hegel's characterization of Islam when it is mentioned in relation to other religious traditions. First, we argue that Hegel overemphasizes the significance of Islam qua religion in explaining the history of Muslim peoples. More than that, Hegel does not see that the history of Islamic philosophy and science can be characterized by sublation and that it can be integrated into conceptual developments in the West on these terms. However, our critique of Hegel's Eurocentrism does not remain at this level, for in the third part of the article we argue for the significance of considering the response of Muslim philosophers to Hegel. In particular, we look at the responses by Mohammed al-Khosht and Mahmoud Haider, respectively. We conclude that Hegel's exclusion of Islam from any involvement in the history of the Concept indicates an undialectical commitment on his part and that to this extent being Hegelian today requires that we rectify this oversight. (shrink)

In seiner „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“ unterscheidet Immanuel Kant zwischen rationaler und historischer philosophischer Erkenntnis. Erkenntnis ist historisch, wenn man sich nach fremder Vernunft bildet, und rational, wenn man Erkenntnisse aus eigener Vernunft schöpft. Dazwischen liegt die historisch-rationale philosophische Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Beiträge in diesem Band machen sich alle drei Perspektiven zunutze. Unter den behandelten Themen sind formale Logik, das ‚Transzendentale‘, der Begriff des Begriffs, Begriffsanalyse und Sprachanalyse, Vernunft, Biomimetik, Idealismus, logische Analyse formaler und realer Gegenstände, Asylrecht und Umweltethik. (...) Im Fokus stehen dabei Überlegungen zur Aktualität, Zukunftsrelevanz und zu Weiterentwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Theorien von Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling und Hegel. (shrink)

1. Die religiöse Krisis des deutschen Idealismus.--2. Idealismus und Erweckungsbewegung im Kampf und im Bund.

Based on a passage from the book Sociology in a New Key, in which Helmut Staubmann outlines a semantic reconstruction of the concept of aesthetics in its theoretical-sociological relevance, this paper presents some developments intended to complement Staubmann. I explore fundamentally different meanings of aesthetics, in particular those cultivated within idealist aesthetics in the context of theoretical philosophy. By highlighting key elements in the shift from this aesthetic tradition to classical social theory, specifically the expansion of the sensible realm, the (...) enhanced cognitive aspect of the particular-sensible, and the formulation of distinct forms of intelligibility, this text endeavors to introduce a fresh layer to Staubmann’s analytical framework. It aims to assemble essential components for establishing a perspective on interpreting the diachronic evolution of sociological analysis. This perspective holds the potential to contribute to future projects focused on systematically redefining social theory. (shrink)

In the Wissenschaftslehre 1804-II, Fichte claims to both continue and correct Kant’s transcendental philosophy. I reject this double claim by demonstrating that Fichte’s engagement with Kant is guided by altered premises that make the affiliation to Kant’s transcendental philosophy seem implausible. These divergences culminate in an opposing understanding of unity between the two philosophers, which can be revealed by attention to Fichte’s objections to the KdU. Fichte’s thesis that Kant established three absolutes instead of one absolute is based on Fichte’s (...) own demand for an absolute unity that is not differentiated in itself, which is also reflected in his transposition of Kant’s concept of the root to the KdU. In section 2, I attempt a precise exegetical reconstruction of Fichte’s concept of the absolute, as well as of his thesis of Kant’s triple absolute. In section 3, I raise three interconnected objections to this: first, Fichte’s critique is actually based on an accusation of dualism, which is suggested both by his own concept of the absolute and the programme of the KdU (section 3.1). Second, however, Kant’s two absoluta should be seen more as constructions by Fichte rather than as revealing problems immanent to Kant’s philosophy (section 3.2). Third, these divergences can be traced back to Fichte’s own understanding of unity, which gives rise to his objections to the KdU in the first place (section 3.3). (shrink)

Schelling's philosophy can be seen as perpetrating the philosophical fallacy known as the Myth of the Given, in that it takes rational activity to be affected by an experience which is not conceptually mediated. This is supported by Schelling's repeated claim that there is an experience which is indescribable, and which forces us to silence. In the first part of the paper it will be shown how different readings of Schelling result in this fallacy. In the second and third parts (...) an alternative reading will be developed which avoids the fallacy while still making room for unsayable experience. Finally, the proposed interpretation will enable us to interpret Schelling's claim that expressing the unsayable, conveying it to another, is possible after all. »The wish for intelligibility is a terrible one. It means that we are willing to reveal ourselves through the self 's betrayal of itself.« (Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed. (shrink)

_Hegel and Schelling in Early Nineteenth-Century France_ is a two-volume work that documents the French reception of G. W. F. Hegel and F. W. J. Schelling from 1801 to 1848. It shows that the story of the "French Hegel" didn't begin with Wahl and Kojève by giving readers a solid understanding of the various ways in which German Idealism impacted nineteenth-century French philosophy, as well as providing the first ever English-language translations of excerpts from the most important philosophical texts of (...) the era. Inside volume one, readers will find a number of interpretative frameworks to help them get to grips with this neglected field in the history of ideas. In addition to excerpted translations and a narrative of Hegel’s and Schelling’s fate in France during the early nineteenth century, this volume includes an introduction on transnational reception history, as well as an analytical catalogue of the translations of their work produced in French at this time, of the publications which appropriated or interrogated their philosophical legacy, and of the journals, institutional structures and other mechanisms of dissemination that brought Hegel’s and Schelling’s philosophy into France. The book thus details the ways in which French philosophers of the period took up the debates and concepts of German Idealism, transformed them or rejected them. In this way, it aims to contribute to a reversal of the serious neglect of early nineteenth-century French thought in English-language scholarship and, in so doing, goes beyond a nation-based narrative of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

_Hegel and Schelling in Early Nineteenth-Century France_ is a two-volume work that documents the French reception of G. W. F. Hegel and F. W. J. Schelling from 1801 to 1848. It shows that the story of the "French Hegel" didn't begin with Wahl and Kojève by giving readers a solid understanding of the various ways in which German Idealism impacted nineteenth-century French philosophy, as well as providing the first ever English-language translations of excerpts from the most important philosophical texts of (...) the era. Inside volume two, readers will find a series of scholarly studies to help them get to grips with this neglected field in the history of ideas. The contributors are world-leading and emerging experts from Europe, UK, and North America. They highlight the stakes and trace the pathways of this reception for French and German thought during the period, including the ways in which French philosophers of the period took up the debates and concepts of German Idealism, transformed them or rejected them. In this way, the volume aims to redress the serious neglect of early nineteenth-century French thought in English-language scholarship and, in so doing, goes beyond a nation-based narrative of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

This paper attempts to rethink the philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and challenge the still prevailing tendency in Iqbal scholarship to view it merely as an outcome of the influence of the ideas of various Western/European philosophers. I present Iqbal’s arguments in their particular historical and intellectual context to show that they developed in response to a specific philosophical problem and that Iqbal looked for a solution to that problem in Islamic tradition. I suggest that Iqbal’s philosophy is best understood (...) in the context of, and as a response to, the problem of nihilism as it was debated in modern German philosophy during ‘the pantheism controversy’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To demonstrate this, I analyse Iqbal’s article on ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī to show his concern with the problem of nihilism, and his solution to it based on al-Jīlī’s Sufism. (shrink)

As genealogy has gained greater disciplinary recognition over the last two decades, it has become increasingly common to call any historically oriented philosophy, such as Theodor W. Adorno’s, “genealogy.” In this article, I show that Adorno’s philosophy indeed performs genealogy’s defining functions of “problematization” and “possibilization.” Moreover, it does so in unique ways that constitute a significant contribution to genealogical practice. Adorno’s method, here called “tragic genealogy,” is particularly well-suited to the genealogical analysis of traditional philosophical problems and to the (...) critical reanimation of declining, but ethically significant, values. Nevertheless, I also argue that Adorno’s philosophy cannot be assimilated into genealogical practice without rejecting or revising some of its Hegelian influences, particularly its philosophy of history and its modal metaphysics. (shrink)

What is the highest good actually good for in Kant’s third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good’s practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with "bündiges" thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in (...) the third Critique’s moral proof for God’s existence. I show that the original meaning of "bündig," which is from the carpentry trade and has been forgotten, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant’s system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant’s proof for God’s existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant’s reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labor costs. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Gottesbeweise im Deutschen Idealismus" verfügbar.

This thesis explores the relationship between philosophy and the gothic affect by examining the ways in which each handles conceptions of truth, identity, and visibility. While philosophy's idea of truth has traditionally been conceptualized through the metaphorics of light and its power of disclosure, this thesis argues that a distinctly gothic conception of truth emerges with the arrival of Kant's philosophy. Kant relies on a method and notion of truth which is not predicated on light but shadow and the constitutive (...) function of illusion in knowledge. The thesis aims to demonstrate the shadowy and apparitional nature of the Kantian transcendental imagination and how the fully speculative consequences of this move are developed in Hegel's philosophy. Whereas philosophy traditionally sought to exorcize shadow and illusion from its vision of truth, to an-aestheticize the role of imagination, the works of Kant and Hegel put the shadow and illusion to productive use in the endeavor towards truth. In comparing their respective employments of the shadow (qua truth), it is argued that Kant's framework remains in a tragic gothic mode while in Hegel's emerges a more ludic gothic conceptuality-a move that is regarded as a shift from a theory of representation to presentation. In Hegel, imaginative or figurative activity becomes central to the conceptualization of truth itself, and reason takes the form of a shadow-work. Some implications for literary criticism are examined and a close reading of visibility and reasoning in Bram Stoker's Dracula is conducted. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the topic of skepticism is central to Hegel’s philosophical work. However, I contend that in returning to the subject of skepticism throughout his career, Hegel does not treat skepticism simply as an epistemological challenge to be overcome on the way to truth, as some commentators suggest, but as part of the very truth which it is philosophy’s task to explain. I make this case by considering three texts through which Hegel develops the connection between (...) skepticism and the ‘negative’ or ‘dialectical’ dimension of reality: “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy” (1802), the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), and the Encyclopedia Logic (1817). In this, I also demonstrate how the topic of skepticism informs the development of Hegel’s speculative metaphysics throughout his career and, thus, present a problematic that sheds light on the important continuity between these different phases of Hegel’s project. (shrink)

While it is now accepted in the secondary literature to treat Frühromantik - early German Romanticism - as a philosophical movement in its own right, the exact determination of the philosophical nature of this movement still remains one of the central stumbling blocks faced by interpreters. At the heart of this debate is the question of the relationship between the early romantics and Fichtean idealism. One point of rupture with Fichte and his theory of nature seems particularly obvious at first (...) glance: Novalis's substitution of the pronoun "you" for the Fichtean "Not-I". This occurs in one of Novalis’s most famous expressions: "(You). Instead of the Not-I – You.” ((Du). Statt Nicht-Ich – Du). For most commentators, when analyzing the romantic relationship between the human being and nature, this substitution becomes the clearest expression that Novalis rejects the supposed subjectivism of Fichte's philosophy. Here the Nicht-Ich, the Not-I, - i.e. nature – is often read in Fichte as something negative, as an abstract antithesis of the I - as everything that is not human or the subject. - Whereas Novalis, on the other hand, reinjects the human element, the "you", back into nature. It is furthermore argued by these commentators that this radical substitution is motivated by the romantic call to realize not only the inseparability of the human being and nature, but to recognize their equal value. It indicates a necessary departure from transcendental idealism in favor of a rapprochement with Schelling's philosophy of nature. However, could such an interpretation be based on a preconception, or even on a prejudice? I argue that it is; and that it is based on the assumption that Novalis breaks with Fichte’s philosophy. In contrast, I defend the view that the idea of Nature as a “You” is already to be found implicitly in Fichte and that Novalis’s above well-known expression should be read as in continuity with Fichte’s transcendental epistemology and as an original dialogical extension of it. To see this, one needs to retrace the context and the philosophical chain of events from Novalis back to Fichte, and from Fichte back to Jacobi. (shrink)

This third 2021 issue of "SYMPHILOSOPHIE: International Journal of Philosophical Romanticism" contains a main dossier of new research articles guest edited by Leif Weatherby (New York University) and devoted to the topic of early German romanticism and science. In addition to the papers of this main section issue number 3 of SYMPHILOSOPHIE includes translations of primary sources and book reviews. All contents are freely available online.

孫善豪（1960年11月2日—2017年6月23日），臺灣政治學者、政治人物，曾任中國民主社會黨主席、國立政治大學政治系教授、東吳大學政治系兼任教授、華梵大學哲學系兼任教授，專長為馬克思主義、德國唯心 論哲學、西洋政治思想史、意識型態、新儒家等。1960年出生，2017年去世，享壽57歲。李煒、吳冠緯等編輯，感謝孫善豪妻子陳品蓉女士及學生蔡慶樺、王名釤等提供文獻 。.

La question de la légitimation de la philosophie est l'un des fils conducteurs de l'idéalisme allemand. Dans la première génération des successeurs de Kant en effet, certains ont pour ambition explicite de reprendre ses résultats, mais d'une manière suffisamment justifiée pour répondre aux objections sceptiques. D'autres, en revanche, décident de s'installer dans le renoncement à la fondation systématique, accusant la raison discursive d'être incapable de saisir la vie et la liberté. Quels sont, chez les auteurs de l'idéalisme allemand, les arguments (...) qui plaident en faveur d'un fondement du discours philosophique? Un tel principe est-il théorique ou pratique, inaugural ou terminal, intuitif ou discursif, tel qu'il adopte la forme d'une proposition singulière ou tel qu'il se confond avec le tout du discours? En somme, l'enjeu est d'examiner, sous un point de vue nouveau, le thème de la raison dans l'idéalisme allemand. La question est ici abordée dans une perspective historique autant que systématique. La variété et la richesse des études témoignent de la vitalité des recherches actuelles sur l'idéalisme allemand. (shrink)

This work tells the story of the rise of the modern German environmental imagination, with particular emphasis on its narrative and visual components.

Die Autorin zeigt anhand der Texte von Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Novalis und Jean Paul, wie Motive aus der nachkopernikanischen und newtonschen Astronomie zu Schlüsselmetaphern werden. Die Denker und Dichter erörtern mit diesen die Möglichkeiten eines neuen Grundlagendenkens und -handelns im Angesicht der Verwissenschaftlichung des Weltbildes.

Nach einem Vierteljahrhundert deutscher Einheit ist es an der Zeit einmal zu diskutieren, was uns Deutsche eigentlich ideell verbindet, was wir gemeinsam anstreben, m.a.W. worin unsere Identität besteht. Dabei geht es nicht um Abgrenzung gegenüber anderen Nationen, sondern um den besonderen Beitrag, den wir für die Zukunft der gefährdeten Menschheit leisten können. Nun brauchen wir, wenn uns diese Frage gestellt wird, gottseidank gar nicht zu spekulieren, sondern können an gegebene Tatsachen anknüpfen. Denn wie sich beim G-7-Treffen in Elmau wieder gezeigt (...) hat, ist die Bundesrepublik faktisch in der Umweltpolitik der Vorreiter unter den großen Industrienationen. Der Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie ist beschlossene Sache und das Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz ist bisher so erfolgreich gewesen, dass über 65 Länder in und außerhalb Europas es nachgeahmt haben. Allerdings ist die Frage bisher unbeantwortet, welche historischen Gründe es denn für diese deutsche Sonderrolle gibt. Zwar ist bekannt, dass der Schlüsselbegriff "Nachhaltigkeit" aus der deutschen Forstwirtschaft des 17. Jahrhunderts stammt oder dass die Deutschen stark durch die Romantik geprägt sind. Das vorliegende Buch möchte jedoch eine umfassendere und tiefere Antwort geben, indem es zeigt, dass sich die deutsche konfessionelle und philosophische Tradition im Naturverständnis deutlich von der angelsächsischen unterscheidet. Von der Reformation bis hin zur Relativitäts- und zur Quantentheorie hat sie überwiegend einen ökologischen Sinn. Dr. Edelbert Richter, geb. 1943, wohnhaft in Weimar, vor der Wende Dozent an der Predigerschule in Erfurt. 1977 bis 1989 Engagement in regimekritischen Gruppen und in der Friedens- und Ökologiebewegung, August 1989 Mitbegründer des "Demokratischen Aufbruch", Januar 1990 Übertritt in die SPD, Mitglied der letzten Volkskammer der DDR, 1991 bis 1994 Abgeordneter im Europäischen Parlament, 1994 bis 2002 Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages, 1991 bis 2005 Mitglied der Grundwertekommission beim Parteivorstand der SPD, Mitglied der Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler, seit 2004 Lehrbeauftragter für Philosophie. Zahlreiche Veröffentlichungen. (shrink)

Biographische InformationenDr. Yvonne Al-Taie ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für Neuere deutsche Literatur und Medien der Universität Kiel. ReihePalaestra Untersuchungen zur europäischen Literatur - Band 341.

Civil rights; human rights; law; philosophical aspects; idealism, German; philosophy, German.

In this chapter, Robb Dunphy is concerned with the nature of G.E. Schulze's scepticism as he presents it in his 1792 work Aenesidemus, and with its relation to the metaphysical projects of Kant, Reinhold, and later German Idealists. After introducing Schulze's text, Dunphy turns to a recent interpretation offered by Jessica Berry, who claims that the extent to which Schulze endorsed a genuinely Pyrrhonian Scepticism has gone unacknowledged, both by his idealist contemporaries and by the majority of the secondary literature (...) on the period. Berry suggests that this unacknowledged Pyrrhonism in Aenesidemus provides the resources for a more radical criticism of the German Idealists' scientific, systematic metaphysical ambitions, to which they remain fundamentally vulnerable. Despite agreeing that an exploration of Schulze's debt to Pyrrhonism represents a valuable addition to our understanding of his scepticism, in the latter parts of the chapter Dunphy suggests that the Berry's attribution of a Pyrrhonian Scepticism to Schulze should to some extent be rejected, and that such a scepticism is perhaps not quite as problematic for the projects of Kant and the German Idealists as she suggests. (shrink)

Against caricatures of the poet-philosopher Friedrich Schiller as an unoriginal popularizer of Kant, or a forerunner of totalitarianism, Frederick Beiser reinterprets him as an innovative, classical republican, broadening his analysis to include Schiller’s poetry, plays, and essays not widely available in English translation, such as the remarkable essay, “On Grace and Dignity.” In that spirit, the present article argues that the latter text, misperceived by Anglophone critics as self-contradictory, is better understood as centering on gender and dance. In brief, grace (...) is a virtuous power of beautiful gestures associated with women, while dignity is a power of sublime gestures associated with men, and the improvised combination thereof is a divinely androgynous power of gesture that I term “stateliness,” in a three-step choreography of aesthetic education. (shrink)

For Heidegger, Hegel understands being, ‘the highest actuality’, as the categories which pervade and thereby form all objects and events. Since, Heidegger argues, the categories are, in Hegel, present-at-hand, Hegel conceives of being as presence-at-hand. This is a problem, for Heidegger, because it entails the full transparency and knowability of being, whereas, in his view, being is partially hidden and unknowable. I consider the objection to this Heideggerian critique of Hegel that Hegelian logic understands being not only as the list (...) of categories but also as their derivation and movement from pure being to the absolute idea, which (derivation and movement) establish being not only as presence but also as implication. Since being-as-implication is (a) not presence-at-hand and (b) necessary to being, it cannot be said that Hegel's account of being turns it into full transparency and knowability. Heidegger's critique should, therefore, be rejected. I argue that this objection is unsuccessful because there is strong evidence in the Logic that Hegel ‘subordinates’ being-as-implication to presence-at-hand. Implication's way of being is, in Hegel, only a collapse into presence-at-hand and hence ‘merely a modification of presence’. Consequently, Heidegger's critique of Hegel should not be rejected based on the objection. I conclude the article with a remark on the relation between language and being-as-implication. I argue that Hegel's account of being-as-implication in language disrespects the autonomy of being-as-implication therein and that Haas's argument for such an autonomy based on the phenomenon of the syntactic ellipsis of ‘is’ fails to undermine Hegel's account. (shrink)