German Idealism

This paper attempts to rethink the philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and challenge the still prevailing tendency in Iqbal scholarship to view it merely as an outcome of the influence of the ideas of various Western/European philosophers. I present Iqbal’s arguments in their particular historical and intellectual context to show that they developed in response to a specific philosophical problem and that Iqbal looked for a solution to that problem in Islamic tradition. I suggest that Iqbal’s philosophy is best understood (...) in the context of, and as a response to, the problem of nihilism as it was debated in modern German philosophy during ‘the pantheism controversy’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To demonstrate this, I analyse Iqbal’s article on ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī to show his concern with the problem of nihilism, and his solution to it based on al-Jīlī’s Sufism. (shrink)

What is the highest good actually good for in Kant’s third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good’s practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with "bündiges" thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in (...) the third Critique’s moral proof for God’s existence. I show that the original meaning of "bündig," which is from the carpentry trade and has been forgotten, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant’s system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant’s proof for God’s existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant’s reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labor costs. (shrink)

This thesis explores the relationship between philosophy and the gothic affect by examining the ways in which each handles conceptions of truth, identity, and visibility. While philosophy's idea of truth has traditionally been conceptualized through the metaphorics of light and its power of disclosure, this thesis argues that a distinctly gothic conception of truth emerges with the arrival of Kant's philosophy. Kant relies on a method and notion of truth which is not predicated on light but shadow and the constitutive (...) function of illusion in knowledge. The thesis aims to demonstrate the shadowy and apparitional nature of the Kantian transcendental imagination and how the fully speculative consequences of this move are developed in Hegel's philosophy. Whereas philosophy traditionally sought to exorcize shadow and illusion from its vision of truth, to an-aestheticize the role of imagination, the works of Kant and Hegel put the shadow and illusion to productive use in the endeavor towards truth. In comparing their respective employments of the shadow (qua truth), it is argued that Kant's framework remains in a tragic gothic mode while in Hegel's emerges a more ludic gothic conceptuality-a move that is regarded as a shift from a theory of representation to presentation. In Hegel, imaginative or figurative activity becomes central to the conceptualization of truth itself, and reason takes the form of a shadow-work. Some implications for literary criticism are examined and a close reading of visibility and reasoning in Bram Stoker's Dracula is conducted. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the topic of skepticism is central to Hegel’s philosophical work. However, I contend that in returning to the subject of skepticism throughout his career, Hegel does not treat skepticism simply as an epistemological challenge to be overcome on the way to truth, as some commentators suggest, but as part of the very truth which it is philosophy’s task to explain. I make this case by considering three texts through which Hegel develops the connection between (...) skepticism and the ‘negative’ or ‘dialectical’ dimension of reality: “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy” (1802), the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), and the Encyclopedia Logic (1817). In this, I also demonstrate how the topic of skepticism informs the development of Hegel’s speculative metaphysics throughout his career and, thus, present a problematic that sheds light on the important continuity between these different phases of Hegel’s project. (shrink)

While it is now accepted in the secondary literature to treat Frühromantik - early German Romanticism - as a philosophical movement in its own right, the exact determination of the philosophical nature of this movement still remains one of the central stumbling blocks faced by interpreters. At the heart of this debate is the question of the relationship between the early romantics and Fichtean idealism. One point of rupture with Fichte and his theory of nature seems particularly obvious at first (...) glance: Novalis's substitution of the pronoun "you" for the Fichtean "Not-I". This occurs in one of Novalis’s most famous expressions: "(You). Instead of the Not-I – You.” ((Du). Statt Nicht-Ich – Du). For most commentators, when analyzing the romantic relationship between the human being and nature, this substitution becomes the clearest expression that Novalis rejects the supposed subjectivism of Fichte's philosophy. Here the Nicht-Ich, the Not-I, - i.e. nature – is often read in Fichte as something negative, as an abstract antithesis of the I - as everything that is not human or the subject. - Whereas Novalis, on the other hand, reinjects the human element, the "you", back into nature. It is furthermore argued by these commentators that this radical substitution is motivated by the romantic call to realize not only the inseparability of the human being and nature, but to recognize their equal value. It indicates a necessary departure from transcendental idealism in favor of a rapprochement with Schelling's philosophy of nature. However, could such an interpretation be based on a preconception, or even on a prejudice? I argue that it is; and that it is based on the assumption that Novalis breaks with Fichte’s philosophy. In contrast, I defend the view that the idea of Nature as a “You” is already to be found implicitly in Fichte and that Novalis’s above well-known expression should be read as in continuity with Fichte’s transcendental epistemology and as an original dialogical extension of it. To see this, one needs to retrace the context and the philosophical chain of events from Novalis back to Fichte, and from Fichte back to Jacobi. (shrink)

This third 2021 issue of "SYMPHILOSOPHIE: International Journal of Philosophical Romanticism" contains a main dossier of new research articles guest edited by Leif Weatherby (New York University) and devoted to the topic of early German romanticism and science. In addition to the papers of this main section issue number 3 of SYMPHILOSOPHIE includes translations of primary sources and book reviews. All contents are freely available online.

孫善豪（1960年11月2日—2017年6月23日），臺灣政治學者、政治人物，曾任中國民主社會黨主席、國立政治大學政治系教授、東吳大學政治系兼任教授、華梵大學哲學系兼任教授，專長為馬克思主義、德國唯心 論哲學、西洋政治思想史、意識型態、新儒家等。1960年出生，2017年去世，享壽57歲。李煒、吳冠緯等編輯，感謝孫善豪妻子陳品蓉女士及學生蔡慶樺、王名釤等提供文獻 。.

La question de la légitimation de la philosophie est l'un des fils conducteurs de l'idéalisme allemand. Dans la première génération des successeurs de Kant en effet, certains ont pour ambition explicite de reprendre ses résultats, mais d'une manière suffisamment justifiée pour répondre aux objections sceptiques. D'autres, en revanche, décident de s'installer dans le renoncement à la fondation systématique, accusant la raison discursive d'être incapable de saisir la vie et la liberté. Quels sont, chez les auteurs de l'idéalisme allemand, les arguments (...) qui plaident en faveur d'un fondement du discours philosophique? Un tel principe est-il théorique ou pratique, inaugural ou terminal, intuitif ou discursif, tel qu'il adopte la forme d'une proposition singulière ou tel qu'il se confond avec le tout du discours? En somme, l'enjeu est d'examiner, sous un point de vue nouveau, le thème de la raison dans l'idéalisme allemand. La question est ici abordée dans une perspective historique autant que systématique. La variété et la richesse des études témoignent de la vitalité des recherches actuelles sur l'idéalisme allemand. (shrink)

This work tells the story of the rise of the modern German environmental imagination, with particular emphasis on its narrative and visual components.

Die Autorin zeigt anhand der Texte von Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Novalis und Jean Paul, wie Motive aus der nachkopernikanischen und newtonschen Astronomie zu Schlüsselmetaphern werden. Die Denker und Dichter erörtern mit diesen die Möglichkeiten eines neuen Grundlagendenkens und -handelns im Angesicht der Verwissenschaftlichung des Weltbildes.

Nach einem Vierteljahrhundert deutscher Einheit ist es an der Zeit einmal zu diskutieren, was uns Deutsche eigentlich ideell verbindet, was wir gemeinsam anstreben, m.a.W. worin unsere Identität besteht. Dabei geht es nicht um Abgrenzung gegenüber anderen Nationen, sondern um den besonderen Beitrag, den wir für die Zukunft der gefährdeten Menschheit leisten können. Nun brauchen wir, wenn uns diese Frage gestellt wird, gottseidank gar nicht zu spekulieren, sondern können an gegebene Tatsachen anknüpfen. Denn wie sich beim G-7-Treffen in Elmau wieder gezeigt (...) hat, ist die Bundesrepublik faktisch in der Umweltpolitik der Vorreiter unter den großen Industrienationen. Der Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie ist beschlossene Sache und das Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz ist bisher so erfolgreich gewesen, dass über 65 Länder in und außerhalb Europas es nachgeahmt haben. Allerdings ist die Frage bisher unbeantwortet, welche historischen Gründe es denn für diese deutsche Sonderrolle gibt. Zwar ist bekannt, dass der Schlüsselbegriff "Nachhaltigkeit" aus der deutschen Forstwirtschaft des 17. Jahrhunderts stammt oder dass die Deutschen stark durch die Romantik geprägt sind. Das vorliegende Buch möchte jedoch eine umfassendere und tiefere Antwort geben, indem es zeigt, dass sich die deutsche konfessionelle und philosophische Tradition im Naturverständnis deutlich von der angelsächsischen unterscheidet. Von der Reformation bis hin zur Relativitäts- und zur Quantentheorie hat sie überwiegend einen ökologischen Sinn. Dr. Edelbert Richter, geb. 1943, wohnhaft in Weimar, vor der Wende Dozent an der Predigerschule in Erfurt. 1977 bis 1989 Engagement in regimekritischen Gruppen und in der Friedens- und Ökologiebewegung, August 1989 Mitbegründer des "Demokratischen Aufbruch", Januar 1990 Übertritt in die SPD, Mitglied der letzten Volkskammer der DDR, 1991 bis 1994 Abgeordneter im Europäischen Parlament, 1994 bis 2002 Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages, 1991 bis 2005 Mitglied der Grundwertekommission beim Parteivorstand der SPD, Mitglied der Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler, seit 2004 Lehrbeauftragter für Philosophie. Zahlreiche Veröffentlichungen. (shrink)

Biographische InformationenDr. Yvonne Al-Taie ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für Neuere deutsche Literatur und Medien der Universität Kiel. ReihePalaestra Untersuchungen zur europäischen Literatur - Band 341.

Civil rights; human rights; law; philosophical aspects; idealism, German; philosophy, German.

In this chapter, Robb Dunphy is concerned with the nature of G.E. Schulze's scepticism as he presents it in his 1792 work Aenesidemus, and with its relation to the metaphysical projects of Kant, Reinhold, and later German Idealists. After introducing Schulze's text, Dunphy turns to a recent interpretation offered by Jessica Berry, who claims that the extent to which Schulze endorsed a genuinely Pyrrhonian Scepticism has gone unacknowledged, both by his idealist contemporaries and by the majority of the secondary literature (...) on the period. Berry suggests that this unacknowledged Pyrrhonism in Aenesidemus provides the resources for a more radical criticism of the German Idealists' scientific, systematic metaphysical ambitions, to which they remain fundamentally vulnerable. Despite agreeing that an exploration of Schulze's debt to Pyrrhonism represents a valuable addition to our understanding of his scepticism, in the latter parts of the chapter Dunphy suggests that the Berry's attribution of a Pyrrhonian Scepticism to Schulze should to some extent be rejected, and that such a scepticism is perhaps not quite as problematic for the projects of Kant and the German Idealists as she suggests. (shrink)

Against caricatures of the poet-philosopher Friedrich Schiller as an unoriginal popularizer of Kant, or a forerunner of totalitarianism, Frederick Beiser reinterprets him as an innovative, classical republican, broadening his analysis to include Schiller’s poetry, plays, and essays not widely available in English translation, such as the remarkable essay, “On Grace and Dignity.” In that spirit, the present article argues that the latter text, misperceived by Anglophone critics as self-contradictory, is better understood as centering on gender and dance. In brief, grace (...) is a virtuous power of beautiful gestures associated with women, while dignity is a power of sublime gestures associated with men, and the improvised combination thereof is a divinely androgynous power of gesture that I term “stateliness,” in a three-step choreography of aesthetic education. (shrink)

For Heidegger, Hegel understands being, ‘the highest actuality’, as the categories which pervade and thereby form all objects and events. Since, Heidegger argues, the categories are, in Hegel, present-at-hand, Hegel conceives of being as presence-at-hand. This is a problem, for Heidegger, because it entails the full transparency and knowability of being, whereas, in his view, being is partially hidden and unknowable. I consider the objection to this Heideggerian critique of Hegel that Hegelian logic understands being not only as the list (...) of categories but also as their derivation and movement from pure being to the absolute idea, which (derivation and movement) establish being not only as presence but also as implication. Since being-as-implication is (a) not presence-at-hand and (b) necessary to being, it cannot be said that Hegel's account of being turns it into full transparency and knowability. Heidegger's critique should, therefore, be rejected. I argue that this objection is unsuccessful because there is strong evidence in the Logic that Hegel ‘subordinates’ being-as-implication to presence-at-hand. Implication's way of being is, in Hegel, only a collapse into presence-at-hand and hence ‘merely a modification of presence’. Consequently, Heidegger's critique of Hegel should not be rejected based on the objection. I conclude the article with a remark on the relation between language and being-as-implication. I argue that Hegel's account of being-as-implication in language disrespects the autonomy of being-as-implication therein and that Haas's argument for such an autonomy based on the phenomenon of the syntactic ellipsis of ‘is’ fails to undermine Hegel's account. (shrink)

La structure du comportement details consciousness-nature relations by navigating between realist and intellectualist alternatives. A phenomenological reading of form guides its attempt to formulate a view that does not reduce consciousness to matter or perceptual structure to a product of mind. I show that this strategy relies on hitherto overlooked idealist commitments. Forms are perceived objects whose intentional structure is intelligibly organized. Having denied that forms are constituted by mind or emergent from matter, Merleau-Ponty likens form-constitution to an ideal process (...) of intentional self-organization. Despite recognizing that Gestalt psychology develops fruitful models of perceptual self-organization, and adopting the transcendental view that form is significant for consciousness, his revisionary interpretation of form outstrips these accounts’ ontologies of mind and nature, and is better understood in light of a post-Kantian philosophical heritage. These results cast Merleau-Ponty’s relation to the Gestalt, post-Kantian, and phenomenological traditions in new light, challenge naturalizing interpretations of Structure, and motivate a rethinking of the status of metaphysics in his early thought. (shrink)

This essay discusses how, for Hegel, freedom can be realized in nature in a rudimentary fashion in solar systems. This solves a problem in Kant’s account of freedom, namely, the problem that Kant only gives a negative argument for why freedom is not impossible but does not give a positive account of how freedom is real. I give a novel account of Kant’s negative argument. Then, I show how, according to Hegel, solar systems can be considered as exhibiting freedom in (...) a rudimentary fashion. Finally, I lay out how Hegel systematically develops this point about the freedom of solar systems in the ‘Mechanism’-chapter of the Science of Logic. In doing so, he uses Kant’s negative argument in a ‘purified’ form to arrive at an account of an ‘intimate token-type relation’ between the planets in a solar system and the law that governs their motion. The essay as a whole provides a concrete example of how Hegel is an inheritor and radicalizer of Kant, both with respect to freedom’s reality and with respect to philosophical method. (shrink)

Heidegger has a reputation for reading himself into the philosophers he interprets, and his interpretation of Kant has therefore had little uptake in anglophone Kant scholarship. In this book, Morganna Lambeth provides a new account of Heidegger's method of interpreting Kant, arguing that it is more promising than is typically recognized. On her account, Heidegger thinks that Kant's greatest insights are located in moments of tension, where Kant struggles to articulate something new about his subject-matter. The role of the interpreter, (...) then, is to disentangle competing strands of argument, and to determine which strand is most compelling. Lambeth traces Heidegger's interpretive method across his reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and situates Heidegger's reconstruction of Kant's best line of argument against other post-Kantian readings. She finally shows how Heidegger's deep engagement with Kant sheds light on Heidegger's own philosophical views. (shrink)

Fichte’s Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre 1794 is one of the most fundamental books in classical German philosophy. The use of laws of thought to establish foundational principles of transcendental philosophy was groundbreaking in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and is still crucial for many areas of theoretical philosophy and logic in general today. Nevertheless, contemporaries have already noted that Fichte’s derivation of foundational principles from the law of identity is problematic, since Fichte lacked the tools to correctly (...) present the formal parts of Foundations. In this paper, however, we argue that Fichte’s approach intuitively offers an important contribution to transcendental philosophy, and especially to philosophy of logic. We first point out the difficulties of Fichte’s logic in the Foundations and improve it in a second part on the basis of a formal system in which both propositional logic and syllogistic are combined. (shrink)

El libro ilustra un caso de migración de ideas a través de un análisis contextual e histórico-filosófico que introduce al lector en la traducción de la tesis doctoral del filósofo japonés Nakajima Rikizo (1858-1918), La doctrina kantiana de la cosa en sí (1889), defendida en la Universidad de Yale. En el estudio introductorio se examina la aportación del pensador a la luz de la querella sobre la cosa en sí de Kant y esta se enmarca en la corriente neokantiana del (...) siglo XIX, extrayéndose, de ahí, consecuencias para situar el papel de la disertación en el interior de la recepción del idealismo alemán y el neokantismo en la historia de la modernidad filosófica en Japón a partir de la época Meiji (1868). En la tarea de la edición literaria que acompaña a la traducción, el lector encontrará referenciadas de manera sistemática las muchas fuentes que cita Nakajima en su tesis doctoral, aunque, como signo de su tiempo, en el original lo haga sin una convención coherente y, en ocasiones, sin detalles suficientes. Así pues, al aportar al lector acceso a las referencias a los libros que manejó el filósofo, se contribuye a que el texto tenga, además, un interés histórico que se suma al eminentemente filosófico, con el objetivo de impulsar y potenciar estudios sobre la red de interacciones filosóficas que atraviesan el escrito del autor japonés. Por último, el libro se suma a las publicaciones que, en torno a la obra de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), ganan relevancia filosófica en un momento en el que se está a las puertas de la celebración del 300 aniversario de su nacimiento. (shrink)

This Introduction surveys "political theology" as an interdisciplinary site of inquiry, explicating its contemporary stakes and its connection to the movement of thought known as German Idealism.

In dialogue with the critiques of the modern world in Sylvia Wynter and Afrofuturism, this chapter offers a reading of Early German Romanticism as a project of universal construction, where "universal" refers at once to conceptual universality and to the post-Copernican universe. For Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, and August Wilhelm Schlegel, the joint task of poetry and philosophy is to re-mediate post-Copernican reality across all of its scales. This project of cross-scalar poiesis is inherently ambivalent, entwined as it is with the (...) colonial project of modernity, including the Western-centric racialized construction of global humanity and the ambition to master reality through the human mind. This project is also constitutively impossible due to the infinite, and infinitely fragmented, nature of post-Copernican reality. This impossibility generates, I suggest, the Romantic aporias of incompletion that later come to the fore in poststructuralism, which itself emerges from a renewed crisis of global and planetary reality. Most radically, these aporias call for a no to the meta-standpoint of universal history—for a refusal and ungrounding of the world, which I explore through the non-position of Blackness in Wynter, the antagonistic inhabitation of geocosmic depths in Afrofuturism, and Friedrich Schlegel's insistence on cosmic irony, contingency, and chaos. (shrink)