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  1. Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.
    I show that the Lottery Paradox is just a version of the Sorites, and argue that this should modify our way of looking at the Paradox itself. In particular, I focus on what I call “the Cut-off Point Problem” and contend that this problem, well known by Sorites scholars, ought to play a key role in the debate on Kyburg’s puzzle. Very briefly, I show that, in the Lottery Paradox, the premises “ticket n°1 will lose”, “ticket n°2 will lose”… “ticket (...)
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  2. Justice in Epistemic Gaps: The ‘Proof Paradox’ Revisited.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333.
    This paper defends the heretical view that, at least in some cases, we ought to assign legal liability based on purely statistical evidence. The argument draws on prominent civil law litigation concerning pharmaceutical negligence and asbestos-poisoning. The overall aim is to illustrate moral pitfalls that result from supposing that it is never appropriate to rely on bare statistics when settling a legal dispute.
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  3. Outline of a Paradox of Moral Hesitation.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    In this paper, I present an outline of a paradox which is a variation on the lottery paradox and concerns whether we can ignore hesitant moral judgments.
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  4. Paradox and its Undoing: A Speech Act Manifesto.Mariam Thalos - 2001 - In John Woods & Bryson Brown (eds.), Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches. Paris: pp. 297–308.
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  5. Self-Reflexive Cognitive Bias.Joshua Mugg & Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-21.
    Cognitive scientists claim to have discovered a large number of cognitive biases, which have a tendency to mislead reasoners. Might cognitive scientists themselves be subject to the very biases they purport to discover? And how should this alter the way they evaluate their research as evidence for the existence of these biases? In this paper, we posit a new paradox, which bears a striking resemblance to some classical logical paradoxes. Suppose that research R appears to be good evidence for the (...)
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  6. The Poss-Ability Principle, G-Cases, and Fitch Propositions.Noah Gordon - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (1):117-125.
    There is a very plausible principle linking abilities and possibilities: If S is able to Φ, then it is metaphysically possible that S Φ’s. Jack Spencer recently proposed a class of counterexamples to this principle involving the ability to know certain propositions. I renew an argument against these counterexamples based on the unknowability of Fitch propositions. In doing so, I provide a new argument for the unknowability of Fitch propositions and show that Spencer’s counterexamples are in tension with a principle (...)
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  7. Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.
    A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked a considerable amount of philosophical attention: ‘Is it ever appropriate to base a legal verdict on statistical evidence alone?’ Many philosophers who have considered this question reject legal reliance on bare statistics, even when the odds of error are extremely low. This paper develops a puzzle for the dominant theories concerning why we should eschew bare statistics. Namely, there seem to be compelling scenarios in which there are multiple sources of (...)
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  8. Truth and Subjunctive Theories of Knwledge: No Luck?Johannes Stern - manuscript
    The paper explores applications of Kripke's theory of truth to semantics for anti-luck epistemology, that is, to subjunctive theories of knowledge. Subjunctive theories put forward modal or subjunctive conditions to rule out knowledge by mere luck as to be found in Gettier-style counterexamples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Because of the subjunctive nature of these conditions the resulting semantics turns out to be non-monotone, even if it is based on non-classical evaluation schemes such as strong Kleene (...)
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  9. Reasoning Without the Conjunction Closure.Alicja Kowalewska - forthcoming - Episteme:1-14.
    Some theories of rational belief assume that beliefs should be closed under conjunction. I motivate the rejection of the conjunction closure, and point out that the consequences of this rejection are not as severe as it is usually thought. An often raised objection is that without the conjunction closure people are unable to reason. I outline an approach in which we can – in usual cases – reason using conjunctions without accepting the closure in its whole generality. This solution is (...)
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  10. How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual Epistemic Value.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2021 - Erkenntnis:1572-8420.
    This paper is about the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. The most common approaches to this aspect are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where the evaluative approaches are usually comparative (one reasoner is assessed compared to another). These approaches often present problems with blindspots. For example, ought a reasoner to believe a currently true blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently, these approaches often fail in describing a situation of alethic maximality, (...)
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  11. Against Belief Closure.Lina M. Lissia - manuscript
    I argue that we should solve the Lottery Paradox by denying that rational belief is closed under classical logic. To reach this conclusion, I build on my previous result that (a slight variant of) McGee’s election scenario is a lottery scenario (see Lissia 2019). Indeed, this result implies that the sensible ways to deal with McGee’s scenario are the same as the sensible ways to deal with the lottery scenario: we should either reject the Lockean Thesis or Belief Closure. After (...)
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  12. Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact.Paul Silva Jr & Eyal Tal - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas.
    When a belief is self-fulfilling, having it guarantees its truth. When a belief is self-defeating, having it guarantees its falsity. These are the cases of “self-impacting” beliefs to be examined below. Scenarios of self-defeating beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack sufficient reason to have any belief whatsoever. Scenarios of self-fulfilling beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack reason to have any one belief over another. Both scenarios have been used (...)
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  13. Recent Work on the Proof Paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6).
    Recent years have seen fresh impetus brought to debates about the proper role of statistical evidence in the law. Recent work largely centres on a set of puzzles known as the ‘proof paradox’. While these puzzles may initially seem academic, they have important ramifications for the law: raising key conceptual questions about legal proof, and practical questions about DNA evidence. This article introduces the proof paradox, why we should care about it, and new work attempting to resolve it.
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  14. If You Don't Know That You Know, You Could Be Surprised.Eli Pitcovski & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):917-934.
    Before the semester begins, a teacher tells his students: “There will be exactly one exam this semester. It will not take place on a day that is an immediate-successor of a day that you are currently in a position to know is not the exam-day”. Both the students and the teacher know – it is common knowledge – that no exam can be given on the first day of the semester. Since the teacher is truthful and reliable, it seems that (...)
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  15. From McGee's Puzzle to the Lottery Paradox.Lina Maria Lissia - manuscript
    Vann McGee has presented a putative counterexample to modus ponens. I show that (a slightly modified version of) McGee’s election scenario has the same structure as a famous lottery scenario by Kyburg. More specifically, McGee’s election story can be taken to show that, if the Lockean Thesis holds, rational belief is not closed under classical logic, including classical-logic modus ponens. This conclusion defies the existing accounts of McGee’s puzzle.
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  16. Knowability and Other Onto-theological Paradoxes.Franca D’Agostini - 2019 - Logica Universalis 13 (4):577-586.
    In virtue of Fitch-Church proof, also known as the knowability paradox, we are able to prove that if everything is knowable, then everything is known. I present two ‘onto-theological’ versions of the proof, one concerning collective omniscience and another concerning omnificence. I claim these arguments suggest new ways of exploring the intersection between logical and ontological givens that is a grounding theme of religious thought. What is more, they are good examples of what I call semi-paradoxes: apparently sound arguments whose (...)
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  17. Do desacordo ao paradoxo epistêmico: uma análise da concepção de serviço de autoridade de Raz à luz da teoria do “ponto-cego” de R. Sorensen.Ramiro Ávila Peres - 2019 - Dissertatio 48:242-257.
    Abstract: Using a critical review of the literature, we study a challenge from philosophical anarchism to J. Raz's theory of legal authority: it would be irrational to follow an order with which one disagrees, since it would mean acting against what is considered more justified. Through references from decision theory and epistemology, and deploying examples about tools for assisting in routine decision-making, we sketch two possible answers: first, it may be justifiable to put yourself in a situation that leads to (...)
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  18. R. A. Sharpe. Validity and the Paradox of Confirmation. The Philosophical Quarterly , Vol. 14 , Pp. 170–173. [REVIEW]David Kaplan - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (2):251.
  19. Luís Washington Vita. Introduçāo À Filosofia. With a Preface by Miguel Reale. Edições Melhoramentos, São Paulo1964, 252 Pp. [REVIEW]Hugo Ribeiro - 1966 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (1):112-112.
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  20. Frederic B. Fitch. A Theory of Logical Essences. The Monist, Vol. 51 , Pp. 104–109. - Frederic B. Fitch. A Complete and Consistent Modal Set Theory. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 32 , Pp. 93–103. [REVIEW]Bede Rundle - 1969 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (1):125.
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  21. Frederic B. Fitch. A Note on Recursive Relations. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 33 , P. 107.Robert A. DiPaola - 1972 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):758.
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  22. Carl G. Hempel. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, by Carl G. Hempel, The Free Press, New York, and Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1965, Pp. 331–496. [REVIEW]Asa Kasher - 1972 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):747-749.
  23. Tennant Neil. Natural Logic. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1978, Ix + 196 Pp. [REVIEW]Wilfried Sieg - 1983 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (1):215-217.
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  24. Are Contradictions Believable?Yale Weiss - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):42-49.
    A number of philosophers deny that contradictions can be believed. Are they correct? In this note, I show that even in quite weak logics, on pain of inconsistency, if there are false beliefs, either there are propositions which are true but unbelievable or contradictions are believable. Since the antecedent clearly holds, I offer some considerations in favor of the latter disjunct. Objections and variants of the main argument are considered.
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  25. No Justificatory Closure Without Truth.Francesco Praolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):715-726.
    It is well-known that versions of the lottery paradox and of the preface paradox show that the following three principles are jointly inconsistent: (Sufficiency) very probable propositions are justifiably believable; (Conjunction Closure) justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction; (No Contradictions) propositions known to be contradictory are not justifiably believable. This paper shows that there is a hybrid of the lottery and preface paradoxes that does not require Sufficiency to arise, but only Conjunction Closure and No Contradictions; and it argues (...)
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  26. Four Arguments for Denying That Lottery Beliefs Are Justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge:
    A ‘lottery belief’ is a belief that a particular ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, based on nothing more than the odds against it winning. The lottery paradox brings out a tension between the idea that lottery beliefs are justified and the idea that that one can always justifiably believe the deductive consequences of things that one justifiably believes – what is sometimes called the principle of closure. Many philosophers have treated the lottery paradox as an argument against the (...)
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  27. Rigged Lotteries: A Diachronic Problem for Reducing Belief to Credence.Jonathan Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1355-1373.
    Lin and Kelly :957–981, 2012) and Leitgeb :1338–1389, 2013, Philos Rev 123:131–171, 2014), offer similar solutions to the Lottery Paradox, defining acceptance rules which determine a rational agent’s beliefs in terms of broader features of her credal state than just her isolated credences in individual propositions. I express each proposal as a method for obtaining an ordering over a partition from a credence function, and then a belief set from the ordering. Although these proposals avoid the original Lottery Paradox, I (...)
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  28. The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2014 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 29 (2):201-221.
    Some attempts have been made to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as predicates, a new kind of paradox appears. I claim that avoiding this paradox either by weakening the Knowability Principle or by introducing types for both predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also consider the prospect of (...)
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  29. Tell Me Something I Don't Know: Dialogues in Epistemology.Michael Veber - 2018 - Broadview Press.
    _Tell Me Something I Don’t Know_ is a collection of original dialogues in epistemology, suitable for student readers but also of interest to experts. Familiar problems, theories, and arguments are explored: second-order knowledge, epistemic closure, the preface paradox, skepticism, pragmatic encroachment, the Gettier problem, and more. New ideas on each of these issues are also offered, defended, and critiqued, often in humorous and entertaining ways.
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  30. A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces.Martin Smith - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.
    Many epistemologists have responded to the lottery paradox by proposing formal rules according to which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson present an ingenious argument purporting to show that such rules invariably trivialise, in that they reduce to the claim that a probability of 1 warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson’s argument does, however, rest upon significant assumptions – amongst them a relatively strong structural assumption to the effect that the underlying probability space is both finite and uniform. In (...)
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  31. What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.
    According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought—if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference (...)
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  32. Justification as Faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.
    According to deontological approaches to justification, we can analyze justification in deontic terms. In this paper, I try to advance the discussion of deontological approaches by applying recent insights in the semantics of deontic modals. Specifically, I use the distinction between weak necessity modals and strong necessity modals to make progress on a question that has received surprisingly little discussion in the literature, namely: ‘What’s the best version of a deontological approach?’ The two most obvious hypotheses are the Permissive View, (...)
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  33. Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2010 - In Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 336-340.
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  34. Zebras and Cleverly Disguised Mules.Mylan Engel Jr - 2010 - In Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition. Oxford. pp. 788-793.
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  35. More paradoxical epistemics.Martin Hollis - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):217.
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  36. Paradoxes of Knowledge. [REVIEW]C. D. - 1978 - Review of Metaphysics 32 (2):375-376.
    This book attacks an assortment of tendencies and assumptions that the author believes endemic to traditional epistemology. Perhaps the main target is what she sees as a tendency to sublimate the concepts of knowledge and belief, whose roles in everyday life are mundane and unsystematic, into rigid abstractions. This tendency is said to show itself in the allegedly false assumptions that propositions are the objects of knowledge and belief, and that there is a definite set of propositions that one knows (...)
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  37. A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox.Igor Douven - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.
    There is widespread agreement that we cannot know of a lottery ticket we own that it is a loser prior to the drawing of the lottery. At the same time we appear to have knowledge of events that will occur only if our ticket is a loser. Supposing any plausible closure principle for knowledge, the foregoing seems to yield a paradox. Appealing to some broadly Gricean insights, the present paper argues that this paradox is apparent only.
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  38. Kripke and the Dogmatism Paradox.Kaave Lajevardi - manuscript
    I aim at dissolving Kripke's dogmatism paradox by arguing that, with respect to any particular proposition p which is known by a subject A, it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p. Along the way, I offer a definition of 'A is dogmatic with respect to p', and make a distinction between an objective and a subjective sense of 'should' in the statement 'A should ignore all the evidence against p'. For the most part, I deal (...)
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  39. Preface.Uri Abraham, Lev Beklemishev, Paola D'Aquino & Marcus Tressl - 2016 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 167 (10):865-867.
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  40. Preface.Ofer Arieli & Anna Zamansky - 2016 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 24 (3):221-223.
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  41. Preface.L. Magnani - 2013 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 21 (6):879-881.
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  42. Fitch Frederic B.. A Demonstrably Consistent Mathematics. [REVIEW]R. M. Martin - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (4):268-269.
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  43. Tennant Neil. Anti-Realism and Logic. Truth as Eternal. Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1987, Xii + 325 Pp. [REVIEW]W. D. Hart - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1485-1486.
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  44. Anti-Realism and Logic. Truth as Eternal.W. D. Hart & Neil Tennant - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1485.
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  45. The Knower's Paradox and Representational Theories of Attitudes.William J. Rapaport, Nicholas M. Asher & Johan A. W. Kamp - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):666.
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  46. Fitch Frederic B.. Algebraic Simplification of Redundant Sequential Circuits. Synthese, Vol. 15 , Pp. 155–166. Reprinted in Form and Strategy in Science, Dordrecht 1964, Pp. 191-202. [REVIEW]Ann S. Ferebee - 1975 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (4):615-615.
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  47. Between Analytic and Empirical, by J. W. N. Watkins. [REVIEW]David Kaplan - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (2):246-249.
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  48. Hempel Carl G.. A Logical Appraisal of Operationism. The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 79 , Pp. 215–220.Henry Mehlberg - 1958 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (3):354-356.
  49. Burks Arthur W.. Symposium: Justification in Science. Academic Freedom, Logic, and Religion , University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1953, Pp. 109–125. [REVIEW]A. R. Turquette - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):65-65.
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  50. Myhill John R.. Symposium: On the Ontological Significance of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Academic Freedom, Logic, and Religion , University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1953, Pp. 57–70. [REVIEW]A. R. Turquette - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):64-64.
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