About this topic
Summary Disjunctivism in the philosophy of mind typically concerns either the nature of perceptual experience (metaphysical disjunctivism) or its epistemological significance (epistemological disjunctivism). At a minimum, metaphysical disjunctivism holds that veridical experience and at least some non-veridical experiences are fundamentally different.  The primary motivation for disjunctivism about perceptual experience is naïve realism, the view that veridical experience fundamentally consists in the subject perceiving things in her environment. Since some non-veridical experiences (total hallucinations) don’t involve perceiving things in one’s environment, these must be fundamentally different from veridical experiences as naïve realism characterizes them. Epistemological disjunctivism holds that veridical experience puts its subject in a superior epistemic position with respect to propositions about her environment than subjectively indiscriminable non-veridical experiences do. It is employed as an anti-skeptical strategy: in the context of one kind of argument for skepticism about the external world, it constitutes a denial of the premise that a veridical experience puts one in the same epistemic position as a subjectively indiscriminable illusion or hallucination. Arguably, epistemological disjunctivism neither entails nor is entailed by metaphysical disjunctivism. 
Key works Prominent proponents of metaphysical disjunctivism include Hinton 1967Martin 2004, and Fish 2009, and prominent critics include Johnston 2004 and Siegel 2008. Prominent proponents of epistemological disjunctivism include McDowell 1983 and Pritchard 2012, and Wright 2002 is a prominent critic of the view. Byrne & Logue 2009 is a collection of classic texts concerning both metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism, and Haddock & Macpherson 2008 is a collection of more contemporary essays on the views.
Introductions Encyclopedia entries include Soteriou 2009, HTML::Element=HASH(0x55e425c05ef8) 2009, and Brogaard 2010.
Related

Contents
283 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 283
  1. Characterizing disjunctivism.Anil Gomes - manuscript
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Uncovering Appearances.Michael G. F. Martin - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  3. What Is Negative Disjunctivism?David de Bruijn - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-21.
    Negative disjunctivists like Mike Martin and Bill Fish understand hallucinations in purely epistemic terms, and do not attribute phenomenal character to these visual misfires. However, the approaches by Martin and Fish are importantly different, and there has been little systematic work on how negative disjunctivism is motivated. In this paper, I argue for a version of negative disjunctivism that centers on the idea that perception involves the exercise of a fallible self-conscious capacity. I claim that this at once explains hallucinations (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-luminosity Arguments.David de Bruijn - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Epistemological disjunctivists hold that perceiving subjects have “reflective access” to factive perceptual support for belief. However, little has been done to elaborate the intended notion of reflection, or introspective awareness more generally. Moreover, critics have pointed out that the disjunctivist conception of “reflective access” can seem vulnerable to varieties of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. In this paper I defend disjunctivism from this charge, arguing that it holds the resources for a potent defense of the claim that knowledge of perceptual states is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Conditionality Problem for Externalism.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    Epistemological disjunctivism (ED) has been thought to solve the conditionality problem for epistemic externalism. This problem arises from externalists’ characterization of our epistemic standings as conditional on the obtaining of worldly facts which we lack any reflective access to. ED is meant to avoid the conditionality problem by explicating subjects’ perceptual knowledge in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge via their possession of perceptual reasons that are both factive and reflectively accessible. I argue that ED’s account of reflectively accessible factive perceptual (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. Correction to: Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection.Dirk Franken - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-1.
  7. Disjunctivism and the Paradox of Tragedy.Richard Gaskin - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    The paper offers a disjunctivist solution to the paradox of tragedy. The first part of the paper defends a version of disjunctivism as that doctrine is understood in the epistemology of perception, and contrasts it with its rival, conjunctivism. In the second part of the paper, it is argued that the traditional paradox of tragedy—the question why tragedy gives pleasure—can be solved by adopting a disjunctivist approach to the relevant felt emotions. The tragic audience does not really feel ‘sorrow, terror, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Review of Perception: Essays After Frege, by Charles Travis. [REVIEW]James Genone - forthcoming - Mind.
  9. Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination.Alex Moran - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.
    Disjunctivists maintain that perceptual experiences and hallucinatory experiences are distinct kinds of event with different metaphysical natures. Moreover, given their view about the nature of perceptual cases, disjunctivists must deny that the perceptual kind of experience can occur during hallucination. However, it is widely held that disjunctivists must grant the converse claim, to the effect that the hallucinatory kind of experience occurs even during perception. This paper challenges that thought. As we will see, the argument for thinking that the hallucinatory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. Of the perfect and the ordinary: Indistinguishability and hallucination.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    The claim that perfect hallucination is introspectively indistinguishable from perception has been a centrepiece of philosophical theorizing about sense experience. The most common interpretation of the indistinguishability claim is modal: that it is impossible to distinguish perfect hallucination from perception through introspection alone. I run through various models of introspection and show that none of them can accommodate the modal interpretation. Rejecting the modal interpretation opens up two alternative interpretations of the indistinguishability claim. According to the generic interpretation, hallucination is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. The Hard Problem of Access for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Grad Paweł - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    In this paper, I identify the hard problem of access for epistemological disjunctivism (ED): given that perceptual experience E is opaque with respect to its own epistemic properties, subject S is not in a position to know epistemic proposition (i) (that E is factive with respect to empirical proposition p) just by having E and/or reflecting on E. This is the case even if (i) is true. I first motivate the hard problem of access (Section 2) and then reconstruct and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. In touch with the facts: epistemological disjunctivism and the rationalisation of belief.Edgar Phillips - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The idea of believing for a good reason has both normative and psychological content. How are these related? Recently, a number of authors have defended a ‘disjunctivist’ view of rationalisation, on which a good reason can make a subject’s responses to it intelligible in a way that mere ‘apparent reasons’ cannot. However, little has been said about the possible epistemological significance of this view or its relationship to more familiar forms of disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception. This paper examines (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism in advance.Duncan Pritchard - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Epistemological Disjunctivism in advance.Duncan Pritchard - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. Husserl and Disjunctivism Revisited.Alessandro Salice - forthcoming - Husserl Studies:1-18.
    In a recent series of important papers, Søren Overgaard has defended a disjunctivist reading of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perception. According to Overgaard, Husserl commits to disjunctivism when arguing that hallucination intrinsically differs from perception because only experiences of the latter kind carry singular content and, thereby, pick out individuals. This paper rejects that interpretation by invoking the theory of intentionality developed by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. It is claimed that this theory not only lacks the notion of singular (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Gazing inward.Charles Travis - forthcoming - In A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Is Margaret Cavendish a Naïve Realist?Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    Perception plays a central and wide-ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of hallucination and of illusion, and the individuation of kinds. While Cavendish takes perception to have representational content, I explain how this is consistent with naïve realism. In closing, I address challenges to the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. O disjuntivismo ecológico e o argumento causal.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2023 - Trans/Form/Ação (46):147-174.
    In this paper, I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism concerning the nature of the experience would then be false. I identify (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.
    According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a subject, S, has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of reasons for her belief that p which are both factive and reflectively accessible to S. It has been argued that ED is better placed than both knowledge internalism and knowledge externalism to undercut underdetermination-based skepticism. I identify several principles that must be true if ED is to be uniquely placed to attain this goal. After (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Moderatism and Truth.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):271-287.
    According to MODERATISM, perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges like <There is an external world>, <I am not a brain in a vat (BIV)>, and so on. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by combining the claim that external world propositions have a substantive truth property like correspondence with the claim that hinges (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge.Chung Him Kwok, Shane Ryan & Chienkuo Mi - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):584-597.
    This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Naïve Realism and the Relationality of Phenomenal Character.Roberta Locatelli - 2023 - Topoi 43 (1).
    Naïve realism (also called ‘relationalism’ or ‘object view’) is becoming increasingly popular, but the specific outline of its commitments remains often underspecified by proponents and misunderstood by critics. Naïve realism is associated with two claims, both concerning genuine, veridical perceptual experience (where this excludes hallucinations). Constitutive Claim (CC): The phenomenal character of perception is (partly) constituted by the mind-independent objects in one’s surrounding and their properties. Relational Claim (RC): Perception is a relation to mind-independent objects in the environment and their (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. The Common Kind Theory and The Concept of Perceptual Experience.Neil Mehta - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2847-2865.
    In this paper, I advance a new hypothesis about what the ordinary concept of perceptual experience might be. To a first approximation, my hypothesis is that it is the concept of something that seems to present mind-independent objects. Along the way, I reveal two important errors in Michael Martin’s argument for the very different view that the ordinary concept of perceptual experience is the concept of something that is impersonally introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. This conceptual work is significant (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Truth and the Limits of Ethical Thought: Reading Wittgenstein with Diamond.Gilad Nir - 2023 - In Jens Pier (ed.), Limits of Intelligibility: Issues from Kant and Wittgenstein. Routledge.
    This chapter investigates how a reading of Wittgenstein along the lines laid out by Cora Diamond makes room for a novel approach to ethical truth. Following Diamond, I develop the connection between the kinds of elucidatory propositions by means of which we spell out and maintain the shape of our theoretical thinking, such as “‘someone’ is not the name of someone” and “five plus seven equals twelve,” and the kind of propositions by means of which we spell out and maintain (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Husserl and Disjunctivism: Reply to Bower.Søren Overgaard - 2023 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 61 (3):499-513.
    Abstractabstract:In a recent issue of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. Epistemic Disjunctivism and Religious Knowledge.Kegan J. Shaw - 2023 - In John Greco, Tyler Dalton McNabb & Jonathan Fuqua (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Misfiring: Tyler Burge Contra Disjunctivism.Vanja Subotić - 2023 - Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):5-26.
    Recently, Charles Goldhaber (2019) has argued that Tyler Burge’s (2005, 2010, 2011) arguments against disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception fail when juxtaposed with the literature in perceptual psychology. In addition, Goldhaber traces Burge’s motives for dismissing disjunctivism: his underlying theoretical assumptions vis-à-vis human rationality virtually force him to maintain that there is a genuine inconsistency between disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. While Goldhaber aims to defend epistemological disjunctivism à la John McDowell, my concern will be the other target of Burge’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. X—Disjunctivism and Cartesian Idealization.Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):218-238.
    This paper examines the dispute between Burge and McDowell over methodology in the philosophy of perception. Burge (2005, 2011) has argued that the disjunctivism posited by naive perceptual realists is incompatible with the results of current perceptual science, while McDowell (2010, 2013) defends his disjunctivism by claiming an autonomous field of enquiry for perceptual epistemology, one that does not employ the classificatory schemes of the science. Here it is argued that the crucial point at issue in the dispute is Burge’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. 4. Resolute Disjunctivism.James Conant - 2022 - In Matthew Boyle & Evgenia Mylonaki (eds.), Reason in Nature: New Essays on Themes From John Mcdowell. Harvard University Press. pp. 111-152.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge.Chung Him Kwok, Shane Ryan & Chienkuo Mi - 2022 - Episteme:1-14.
    This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. Memory Disjunctivism: a Causal Theory.Alex Moran - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (4):1097-1117.
    Relationalists about episodic memory must endorse a disjunctivist theory of memory-experience according to which cases of genuine memory and cases of total confabulation involve distinct kinds of mental event with different natures. This paper is concerned with a pair of arguments against this view, which are analogues of the ‘causal argument’ and the ‘screening off argument’ that have been pressed in recent literature against relationalist (and hence disjunctivist) theories of perception. The central claim to be advanced is that to deal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3325-3348.
    According to capacitism, to perceive is to employ personal-level, perceptual capacities. In a series of publications, Schellenberg (2016, 2018, 2019b, 2020) has argued that capacitism offers unified analyses of perceptual particularity, perceptual content, perceptual consciousness, perceptual evidence, and perceptual knowledge. “Capacities first” (2020: 715); appealing accounts of an impressive array of perceptual and epistemological phenomena will follow. We argue that, given the Schellenbergian way of individuating perceptual capacities which underpins the above analyses, perceiving an object does not require employing a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Philosophy of Perception and Liberal Naturalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Liberal Naturalism. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 299-319.
    This chapter considers how Liberal Naturalism interacts with the main problems and theories in the philosophy of perception. After briefly summarising the traditional philosophical problems of perception and outlining the standard philosophical theories of perceptual experience, it discusses whether a Liberal Naturalist outlook should incline one towards or away from any of these standard theories. Particular attention is paid to the work of John McDowell and Hilary Putnam, two of the most prominent Liberal Naturalists, whose work was also very influential (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Perception and self‐awareness in Merleau‐Ponty and Martin.David Suarez - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1028-1040.
    Merleau-Ponty suggests that to perceive is to be “geared into” the world. In perceiving, we are related to a temporally structured modal space of bodily possibilities that is co-constituted by the body and the world. When we perceive, we are “geared into” this structure and responsive to it; when we misperceive, we are not. In misperceiving, we are unaware of our failure to be geared into the world, and in this respect, we lack awareness of what we are doing. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Does Property-Perception Entail the Content View?Keith A. Wilson - 2022 - Erkenntnis (2).
    Visual perception is widely taken to present properties such as redness, roundness, and so on. This in turn might be thought to give rise to accuracy conditions for experience, and so content, regardless of which metaphysical view of perception one endorses. An influential version of this argument—Susanna Siegel’s ’Argument from Appearing’—aims to establish the existence of content as common ground between representational and relational views of perception. This goes against proponents of ‘austere’ relationalism who deny that content plays a substantive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Defending Disjunctivism about Perception知覚についての選言説を擁護する.Tomohiro Yamashita - 2022 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 54 (2):71-91.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Why Phenomenology Doesn't Need Disjunctivism: Merleau-Ponty on Intentionality and Transcendence.Peter Antich - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (1):81-102.
    Commentators have argued that disjunctivism, from a phenomenological perspective, is the most coherent response to certain skeptical concerns. They find two phenomenological beliefs in tension: that intentionality is transcendent and that perceptions and hallucinations have a similar intentional content. While not ruling out a disjunctivist phenomenology, I show that phenomenologists are not forced into disjunctivism in order to avoid skeptical problems posed by hallucination. Instead, Merleau-Ponty's approach to the horizonal structure of experience supports a novel nondisjunctivist solution: first, by distinguishing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Problem of Perception is a pervasive and traditional problem about our ordinary conception of perceptual experience. The problem is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perceptual experience be what we ordinarily understand it to be: something that enables direct perception of the world? These possibilities of error challenge the intelligibility of our ordinary conception of perceptual experience; the major theories of experience are responses to this challenge.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  39. An ecological approach to disjunctivism.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Radical Views on Cognition):285–306.
    In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. On Being Internally the Same.Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1. Oxford University Press.
    Internalism and externalism disagree about whether agents who are internally the same can differ in their mental states. But what is it for two agents to be internally the same? Standard formulations take agents to be internally the same in virtue of some metaphysical fact, for example, that they share intrinsic physical properties. Our aim in this chapter is to argue that such formulations should be rejected. We provide the outlines of an alternative formulation on which agents are internally the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. Disjunctivism about intending.Yair Levy - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):161-180.
    The overwhelmingly predominant view in philosophy sees intending as a mental state, specifically a plan-like state. This paper rejects the predominant view in favor of a starkly opposed novel alternative. After criticizing both the predominant Bratman-esque view of intention, and an alternative view inspired by Michael Thompson, the paper proceeds to set out and defend the idea that acting with an intention to V should be understood disjunctively, as either one’s V-ing intentionally or one’s performing some kind of failed intentional (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. The Tractability of the Debate on Relationalism.Roberta Locatelli - 2021 - In Louise Richardson & Heather Logue (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 85-106.
    The debate between relationalism and representationalism in the philosophy of perception seems to have come to a standstill where opponents radically disagree on methodological principles or fundamental assumptions. According to Fish (this volume) this is because, not unlike Kuhnian scientific paradigms, the debate displays some elements of incommensurability. This diagnosis makes advancing the debate impossible. I argue that what is hindering progress is not a clash of research programmes, but a series of misunderstandings that can be avoided by disentangling the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. “In a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic”: Wittgenstein’s Anti-Psychologism and the Normativity of Logic.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Disputatio 10 (18):165-185.
    Wittgenstein’s Tractatus construes the nature of reasoning in a manner which sharply conflicts with the conventional wisdom that logic is normative, not descriptive of thought. For although we sometimes seem to reason incorrectly, Wittgenstein denies that we can make logical mistakes (5.473). My aim in this paper is to show that the Tractatus provides us with good reasons to rethink some of the central assumptions that are standardly made in thinking about the relation between logic and thought. In particular, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions.Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2169-2191.
    There are passages in Kant’s writings according to which empirical intuitions have to be (a) singular, (b) object-dependent, and (c) immediate. It has also been argued that empirical intuitions (d) are not truth-apt, and (e) need to provide the subject with a proof of the possibility of the cognized object. Having relied on one or another of the a-e constraints, the naïve realist readers of Kant have argued that it is not possible for empirical intuitions to be representations. Instead they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  45. Husserl’s philosophical estrangement from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate.Andrea Cimino - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):743-779.
    Various attempts have been made recently to bring Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussion on sensory illusion and hallucination. On the one hand, this has resulted in a renewed interest in what one might call a ‘phenomenology of sense-deception.’ On the other hand, it has generated contrasting—if not utterly incompatible—readings of Husserl’s own account of sense perception. The present study critically evaluates the contemporary discourse on illusion and hallucination, reassesses its proximity to Husserl’s reflection on sensory perception, and highlights the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46. Ernst Cassirers Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung.Tobias Endres - 2020 - Hamburg, Deutschland: Felix Meiner Verlag.
    Auf die Frage „Was ist Wahrnehmung und welche Rolle spielt sie für die Objektivität der Erfahrung?“ hätte Ernst Cassirer vermutlich schlicht geantwortet: „Wahrnehmung ist eine erste Form objektiver Erfahrung.“ Tobias Endres macht es sich zur Aufgabe, Cassirers „Philosophie der symbolischen Formen“ einer Neu- und Gesamtinterpretation zu unterziehen und sie als eine „Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung“ auszulegen. In Auseinandersetzung mit klassischen und gegenwärtigen Wahrnehmungstheorien wie der Sinnesdatentheorie, dem Disjunktivismus oder dem Enaktivismus gelingt es dem Autor, die Aktualität und Originalität solch einer phänomenologischen (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection.Dirk Franken - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):63-85.
    Perceptual disjunctivism, as I regard it in this paper, is the view that veridical perceptions and hallucinations, while indistinguishable via introspection, are states of fundamentally different kinds. This fundamental difference can be spelled out in various ways. According to the view I will be concerned with, it is a fundamental difference in the personal-level structure of both states. Against this version of disjunctivism, I will raise a new challenge. It is a variant of what can be seen as the standard (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):148-166.
    If you want to understand McDowell's spatial metaphors when he talks about perceptual knowledge, place him side-by-side with Dretske on perceptual knowledge. Though McDowell shows no evidence of reading Dretske's writings on knowledge from the late 1960s onwards (McDowell mentions "Epistemic Operators" once in passing), McDowell gives the same four arguments as Dretske for the conclusion that knowledge requires "conclusive" reasons that rule of the possibility of mistake. Despite various differences, we think it is best to read McDowell as re-discovering (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  49. Reasoning's relation to bodily action.David Jenkins - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):87-96.
    Recent philosophical work on the relation between reasoning and bodily action is dominated by two views. It is orthodox to have it that bodily actions can be at most causally involved in reasoning. Others have it that reasoning can constitutively involve bodily actions, where this is understood as a matter of non‐mental bodily events featuring as constituents of practical reasoning. Reflection on cases of reasoning out‐loud suggests a neglected alternative on which both practical and theoretical reasoning can have bodily actions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. The Basis Problem of Epistemological Disjunctivism and Paradigmatic Cases.Changsheng Lai - 2020 - Journal of Dialectics of Nature 42 (11):17-24.
    Epistemological disjunctivism argues that one can have perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of factive and reflectively accessible rational support, e.g., one’s ‘seeing that p’. A well-known challenge to this view is the so-called basis problem of epistemological disjunctivism, which argues that one’s ‘seeing that p’ cannot constitute the rational support for one’s knowledge that p, as ‘seeing that p’ is just a way of ‘knowing that p’. The basis problem is taken to be based on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 283