About this topic
Summary A liar paradox is generated by a sentence or proposition (or any truth bearer more generally) that says that it is false.  If we use the name 'S' for the sentence ‘S is false’, then that very sentence says of itself that it is false. We can reason intuitively that if it is true, then what it says is true, namely that it is false. So it is true that it is false, or, more directly, it is false. On the other hand, if it is false, then what it says is false, namely that it is false. So it is false that it is false, or, more directly, it is true. Thus, we derive that it is false from the assumption that it is true, and we derive that it is true from the assumption that it is false. It takes just a couple of steps from here to the claim that S is both true and false.  The above reasoning relies on the following two principles regarding truth (for some class of sentences p of which S is a member): (i) if p is true, then p, and (ii) if p, then p is true.  It also relies on principles of classical (and intuitionistic) logic.  Approaches to the liar paradox usually reject one of the principles of truth, one of the logical principles, or find some defect in S and any other sentence like it.  The liar paradox is closely related to several other paradoxes associated with truth, including Curry's paradox and Yablo's paradox.
Key works The classic work on the liar paradox in analytic philosophy is Tarski 1936. Kripke 1975 solidified the importance of logical rigor in investigations of the liar paradox. Early contextual approaches include Parsons 1974 and Burge 1979Priest 1979 and Chihara 1979 initiated the inconsistency approach. Gupta 1982 and Herzberger 1982 were the first to offer revision theories of truth. 
Introductions Introductory works include the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry: Beall & Glanzberg 2010
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2088 found
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1 — 50 / 2088
  1. Paradoxes of Logical Equivalence and Identity.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Topoi (1):1-10.
    In this paper a principle of substitutivity of logical equivalents salve veritate and a version of Leibniz’s law are formulated and each is shown to cause problems when combined with naive truth theories.
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  2. De la ingeniosa disolución que dio el gobernador Sancho Panza a la paradoja del suicida.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    This is the story of how the noble squire Sancho Panza, while governing what he thought to be an insula, ingeniously solved a paradox not unlike those of modern logic.
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  3. How to Conquer the Liar and Enthrone the Logical Concept of Truth: an informal exposition.Boris Culina - manuscript
    This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counter-arguments for various proposed solutions (``the revenge of the Liar''). Any solution to the paradoxes of truth necessarily establishes a certain logical concept of truth. This solution complements the classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own failure and, when the procedure fails, through (...)
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  4. The Synthetic Concept of Truth and its Descendants.Boris Culina - manuscript
    The concept of truth has many aims but only one source. The article describes the primary concept of truth, here called the synthetic concept of truth, according to which truth is the objective result of the synthesis of us and nature in the process of rational cognition. It is shown how various aspects of the concept of truth -- logical, scientific, and mathematical aspect -- arise from the synthetic concept of truth. Also, it is shown how the paradoxes of truth (...)
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  5. The Power of Naive Truth.Hartry Field - manuscript
    While non-classical theories of truth that take truth to be transparent have some obvious advantages over any classical theory that evidently must take it as non-transparent, several authors have recently argued that there's also a big disadvantage of non-classical theories as compared to their “external” classical counterparts: proof-theoretic strength. While conceding the relevance of this, the paper argues that there is a natural way to beef up extant internal theories so as to remove their proof-theoretic disadvantage. It is suggested that (...)
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  6. Some Open Questions about Degrees of Paradoxes.Ming Hsiung - manuscript
    We can classify the (truth-theoretic) paradoxes according to their degrees of paradoxicality. Roughly speaking, two paradoxes have the same degrees of paradoxicality, if they lead to a contradiction under the same conditions, and one paradox has a (non-strictly) lower degree of paradoxicality than another, if whenever the former leads to a contradiction under a condition, the latter does so under the same condition. In this paper, we outline some results and questions around the degrees of paradoxicality and summarize recent progress.
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  7. Meaning, Presuppositions, Truth-relevance, Gödel's Sentence and the Liar Paradox.X. Y. Newberry - manuscript
    Section 1 reviews Strawson’s logic of presuppositions. Strawson’s justification is critiqued and a new justification proposed. Section 2 extends the logic of presuppositions to cases when the subject class is necessarily empty, such as (x)((Px & ~Px) → Qx) . The strong similarity of the resulting logic with Richard Diaz’s truth-relevant logic is pointed out. Section 3 further extends the logic of presuppositions to sentences with many variables, and a certain valuation is proposed. It is noted that, given this valuation, (...)
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  8. Cut elimination for systems of transparent truth with restricted initial sequents.Carlo Nicolai - manuscript
    The paper studies a cluster of systems for fully disquotational truth based on the restriction of initial sequents. Unlike well-known alternative approaches, such systems display both a simple and intuitive model theory and remarkable proof-theoretic properties. We start by showing that, due to a strong form of invertibility of the truth rules, cut is eliminable in the systems via a standard strategy supplemented by a suitable measure of the number of applications of truth rules to formulas in derivations. Next, we (...)
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  9. Formalizing the logical (self-reference) error of the Liar Paradox.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    This paper decomposes the Liar Paradox into its semantic atoms using Meaning Postulates (1952) provided by Rudolf Carnap. Formalizing truth values of propositions as Boolean properties of these propositions is a key new insight. This new insight divides the translation of a declarative sentence into its equivalent mathematical proposition into three separate steps. When each of these steps are separately examined the logical error of the Liar Paradox is unequivocally shown.
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  10. Provability with Minimal Type Theory.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    Minimal Type Theory (MTT) shows exactly how all of the constituent parts of an expression relate to each other (in 2D space) when this expression is formalized using a directed acyclic graph (DAG). This provides substantially greater expressiveness than the 1D space of FOPL syntax. -/- The increase in expressiveness over other formal systems of logic shows the Pathological Self-Reference Error of expressions previously considered to be sentences of formal systems. MTT shows that these expressions were never truth bearers, thus (...)
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  11. The Notion of Truth in Natural and Formal Languages.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    For any natural (human) or formal (mathematical) language L we know that an expression X of language L is true if and only if there are expressions Γ of language L that connect X to known facts. -/- By extending the notion of a Well Formed Formula to include syntactically formalized rules for rejecting semantically incorrect expressions we recognize and reject expressions that evaluate to neither True nor False.
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  12. Defining a Decidability Decider.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    By extending the notion of a Well Formed Formula to include syntactically formalized rules for rejecting semantically incorrect expressions we recognize and reject expressions that have the semantic error of Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004). The foundation of this system requires the notion of a BaseFact that anchors the semantic notions of True and False. When-so-ever a formal proof from BaseFacts of language L to a closed WFF X or ~X of language L does not exist X is decided to be semantically (...)
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  13. Minimal Type Theory (MTT).Pete Olcott - manuscript
    Minimal Type Theory (MTT) is based on type theory in that it is agnostic about Predicate Logic level and expressly disallows the evaluation of incompatible types. It is called Minimal because it has the fewest possible number of fundamental types, and has all of its syntax expressed entirely as the connections in a directed acyclic graph.
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  14. Montague's Paradox without Necessitation.T. Parent - manuscript
    Some such as Dean (2014) suggest that Montague's paradox requires the necessitation rule, and that the use of the rule in such a context is contentious. But here, I show that the paradox arises independently of the necessitation rule. A derivation of the paradox is given in modal system T without deploying necessitation; a necessitation-free derivation is also formulated in a significantly weaker system.
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  15. Xeno Semantics for Ascending and Descending Truth.Kevin Scharp - manuscript
    As part of an approach to the liar paradox and the other paradoxes affecting truth, I have proposed replacing our concept of truth with two concepts: ascending truth and descending truth.1 I am not going to discuss why I think this is the best approach or how it solves the paradoxes; instead, I concentrate on the theory of ascending and descending truth. I formulate an axiomatic theory of ascending truth and descending truth (ADT) and provide a possible-worlds semantics for it (...)
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  16. A Quantificational Analysis of the Liar Paradox.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It seems that the most common strategy to solve the liar paradox is to argue that liar sentences are meaningless and, consequently, truth-valueless. The other main option that has grown in recent years is the dialetheist view that treats liar sentences as meaningful, truth-apt and true. In this paper I will offer a new approach that does not belong in either camp. I hope to show that liar sentences can be interpreted as meaningful, truth-apt and false, but without engendering any (...)
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  17. Truth and Subjunctive Theories of Knwledge: No Luck?Johannes Stern - manuscript
    The paper explores applications of Kripke's theory of truth to semantics for anti-luck epistemology, that is, to subjunctive theories of knowledge. Subjunctive theories put forward modal or subjunctive conditions to rule out knowledge by mere luck as to be found in Gettier-style counterexamples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Because of the subjunctive nature of these conditions the resulting semantics turns out to be non-monotone, even if it is based on non-classical evaluation schemes such as strong Kleene (...)
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  18. Inconsistency theories: The importance of being metalinguistic.Douglas Patterson - manuscript
    This is a discussion of different ways of working out the idea that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are somehow “inconsistent”. I take the workable form of the idea to be that there are expressions such that a necessary condition of understanding them is that one be inclined to accept inconsistent claims (an conception also suggested by Matti Eklund). I then distinguish “simple” from “complex” forms of such views. On a simple theory, such expressions are meaningless, while on (...)
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  19. Models for liars in bradwardine's theory of truth.Greg Restall - manuscript
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  20. On berry/russell paradoxes.Jordan Howard Sobel - manuscript
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  21. Not much of a liar paradox: An exercise.Jordan Howard Sobel - manuscript
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  22. The Paradox of Liar and Fazil Sarab's Solution.Muhammed Ejei - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 36.
    In spite of the various responses and solutions provided for the paradox of liar, different scholars and thinkers are still trying to discover some new points in this regard. We can say that this paradox has attracted the attention of a lot of philosophers due to its simplicity of formulation, long history and complexity of solution. In fact, the existing diversity in the presented solutions to this paradox is not less than the diversity in the solutions provided for the very (...)
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  23. Something is True.Jamin Asay - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The thesis that nothing is true has long been thought to be a self-refuting position not worthy of serious philosophical consideration. Recently, however, the thesis of alethic nihilism—that nothing is true—has been explicitly defended (notably by David Liggins). Nihilism is also, I argue, a consequence of other views about truth that have recently been advocated, such as fictionalism about truth and the inconsistency account. After offering an account of alethic nihilism, and how it purports to avoid the self-refutation problem, I (...)
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  24. The Liar Paradox: Between Evidence and Truth.Jonas Becker Arenhart & Ederson Safra Melo - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-23.
    Systems of paraconsistent logics violate the law of explosion: from contradictory premises not every formula follows. One of the philosophical options for interpreting the contradictions allowed as premises in these cases was put forward recently by Carnielli and Rodrigues, with their epistemic approach to paraconsistent logics. In a nutshell, the plan consists in interpreting the contradictions in epistemic terms, as indicating the presence of non-conclusive evidence for both a proposition and its negation. Truth, in this approach, is consistent and is (...)
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  25. Buddhist epistemology and the liar paradox.Szymon Bogacz - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction with one’s own (...)
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  26. A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof.Massimiliano Carrara - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    In the 1951 Gibbs lecture, Gödel asserted his famous dichotomy, where the notion of informal proof is at work. G. Priest developed an argument, grounded on the notion of naïve proof, to the effect that Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem suggests the presence of dialetheias. In this paper, we adopt a plausible ideal notion of naïve proof, in agreement with Gödel’s conception, superseding the criticisms against the usual notion of naïve proof used by real working mathematicians. We explore the connection between (...)
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  27. Nothing is true.W. Gamester - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper motivates and defends alethic nihilism, the theory that nothing is true. I first argue that alethic paradoxes like the Liar and Curry motivate nihilism; I then defend the view from objections. The critical discussion has two primary outcomes. First, a proof of concept. Alethic nihilism strikes many as silly or obviously false, even incoherent. I argue that it is in fact well-motivated and internally coherent. Second, I argue that deflationists about truth ought to be nihilists. Deflationists maintain that (...)
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  28. Paradoxes of truth-in-context-X.Christopher Gauker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    We may suppose that the truth predicate that we utilize in our semantic metalanguage is a two-place predicate relating sentences to contexts, the truth-in-context-X predicate. Seeming paradoxes pertaining to the truth-in-context-X predicate can be blocked by placing restrictions on the structure of contexts. While contexts must specify a domain of contexts, and what a context constant denotes relative to a context must be a context in the context domain of that context, no context may belong to its own context domain. (...)
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  29. Paradox and context shift.Poppy Mankowitz - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    The Liar sentence L, which reads ‘L is not true’, can be used to produce an apparently valid argument proving that L is not true and that L is true. There has been increasing recognition of the appeal of contextualist solutions to the Liar paradox. Contextualist accounts hold that some step in the reasoning induces a context shift that causes the apparently contradictory claims to occur at different contexts. Attempts at identifying the most promising contextualist account often rely on timing (...)
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  30. Marxism as a Disguised Epimenides Liar Paradox and false consciousnes.Richard Michael McDonough - forthcoming - Future Journal of Social Science and Humanities:75-93.
    One of Marx‘s and Engels‘ main claims (hereafter ―original Marxism) in their account of the historical ―inevitability of the collapse of capitalism is that one‘s material (economic) conditions, not one‘s ideas, arguments or philosophy, determines one‘s ―consciousness and actions. However, the self-reference in this characterization of philosophical views generates a paradox analogous to the 7th century B.C. Epimenides ―Liar paradox. The Epimenides-paradox arises when Epimenides, a Cretan, states that all Cretans are liars. Epimenides-statement is paradoxical in the sense that if (...)
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  31. Scharp on inconsistent concepts and their engineered replacements, or: can we mend these broken things?Mark Pinder - forthcoming - Tandf: Inquiry:1-22.
    Kevin Scharp’s influential work on the alethic paradoxes combines an extensively developed inconsistency theory with a substantial conceptual engineering project. I argue that Scharp’s inconsistency theory is in tension with his conceptual engineering project: the inconsistency theory includes an account of concepts that implies that the conceptual engineering project will fail. I recommend that Scharp revises his account of concepts, and show how doing so allows him to resolve the tension. The discussion is important for ongoing work on conceptual engineering. (...)
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  32. Classical Logic and the Liar.Yannis Stephanou - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    The liar and kindred paradoxes show that we can derive contradictions when we reason in accordance with classical logic from the schema (T) about truth: S is true iff p, where ‘p’ is to be replaced with a sentence and ‘S’ with a name of that sentence. The paper presents two arguments to the effect that the blame lies not with (T) but with classical logic. The arguments derive contradictions using classical logic, but instead of appealing to (T), they invoke (...)
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  33. Review of Wright & Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. [REVIEW]Andreas Stokke - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  34. Proof-theoretic semantics, paradoxes and the distinction between sense and denotation.Luca Tranchini - forthcoming - Journal of Logic and Computation 2014.
    In this paper we show how Dummett-Prawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics has to be modified in order to cope with paradoxical phenomena. It will turn out that one of its basic tenets has to be given up, namely the definition of the correctness of an inference as validity preservation. As a result, the notions of an argument being valid and of an argument being constituted by correct inference rules will no more coincide. The gap between the two notions is accounted for by (...)
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  35. Exceptional Logic.Bruno Whittle - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-37.
    The aim of the paper is to argue that all—or almost all—logical rules have exceptions. In particular, it is argued that this is a moral that we should draw from the semantic paradoxes. The idea that we should respond to the paradoxes by revising logic in some way is familiar. But previous proposals advocate the replacement of classical logic with some alternative logic. That is, some alternative system of rules, where it is taken for granted that these hold without exception. (...)
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  36. Truth, Hierarchy and Incoherence.Bruno Whittle - forthcoming - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford University Press.
    Approaches to truth and the Liar paradox seem invariably to face a dilemma: either appeal to some sort of hierarchy, or declare apparently perfectly coherent concepts incoherent. But since both options lead to severe expressive restrictions, neither seems satisfactory. The aim of this paper is a new approach, which avoids the dilemma and the resulting expressive restrictions. Previous approaches tend to appeal to some new sort of semantic value for the truth predicate to take. I argue that such approaches inevitably (...)
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  37. Review of Nuel Belnap, Michael Perloff, and Ming Xu's Facing the Future. [REVIEW]S. Wölfl - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  38. Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic.Thomas Hofweber - unknown - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    Although there is a prima facie strong case for a close connection between the meaning and inferential role of certain expressions, this connection seems seriously threatened by the semantic and logical paradoxes which rely on these inferential roles. Some philosophers have drawn radical conclusions from the paradoxes for the theory of meaning in general, and for which sentences in our language are true. I criticize these overreactions, and instead propose to distinguish two conceptions of inferential role. This distinction is closely (...)
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  39. The Laws of Thought and the Laws of Truth as Two Sides of One Coin.Ulf Hlobil - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (1):313-343.
    Some think that logic concerns the “laws of truth”; others that logic concerns the “laws of thought.” This paper presents a way to reconcile both views by building a bridge between truth-maker theory, à la Fine, and normative bilateralism, à la Restall and Ripley. The paper suggests a novel way of understanding consequence in truth-maker theory and shows that this allows us to identify a common structure shared by truth-maker theory and normative bilateralism. We can thus transfer ideas from normative (...)
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  40. The Liar Without Relativism.Poppy Mankowitz - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):267-288.
    Some in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between the Liar paradox and _semantic relativism_: the view that the truth values of certain occurrences of sentences depend on the contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi (Erkenntnis 82(4):913–928, 2017) argues that contextualist accounts of the Liar paradox are committed to relativism, and Rudnicki and Łukowski (Synthese 1–20, 2019) propose a new account that they classify as relativist. I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived (...)
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  41. What of multi- and interdisciplinarity? A (personal) case study.Luis M. Augusto - 2022 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 3 (2):1-3.
    An analysis of--yet another--case of academic failure in multi- and interdisciplinarity. An editorial of the Journal of Knowledge Structures & Systems.
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  42. KF, PKF and Reinhardt’s Program.Luca Castaldo & Johannes Stern - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-26.
    In “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Truth Predicate”, Reinhardt [21] famously proposed an instrumentalist interpretation of the truth theory Kripke–Feferman in analogy to Hilbert’s program. Reinhardt suggested to view $\mathrm {KF}$ as a tool for generating “the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ ”, that is, as a tool for deriving sentences of the form $\mathrm{Tr}\ulcorner {\varphi }\urcorner $. The constitutive question of Reinhardt’s program was whether it was possible “to justify the use of nonsignificant sentences (...)
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  43. In Search of Modal Hypodoxes using Paradox Hypodox Duality.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (5):2457-2476.
    The concept of hypodox is dual to the concept of paradox. Whereas a paradox is incompatibly overdetermined, a hypodox is underdetermined. Indeed, many particular paradoxes have dual hypodoxes. So, naively the dual of Russell’s Paradox is whether the set of all sets that are members of themselves is self-membered. The dual of the Liar Paradox is the Truth-teller, and a hypodoxical dual of the Heterological paradox is whether ‘autological’ is autological. I provide some analysis of the duality and I search (...)
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  44. The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox.Bryan Frances - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    By pooling together exhaustive analyses of certain philosophical paradoxes, we can prove a series of fascinating results regarding philosophical progress, agreement on substantive philosophical claims, knockdown arguments in philosophy, the wisdom of philosophical belief, the epistemic status of metaphysics, and the power of philosophy to refute common sense. As examples, this Element examines the Sorites Paradox, the Liar Paradox, and the Problem of the Many – although many other paradoxes can do the trick too.
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  45. A truth-maker semantics for ST: refusing to climb the strict/tolerant hierarchy.Ulf Hlobil - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.
    The paper presents a truth-maker semantics for Strict/Tolerant Logic (ST), which is the currently most popular logic among advocates of the non-transitive approach to paradoxes. Besides being interesting in itself, the truth-maker presentation of ST offers a new perspective on the recently discovered hierarchy of meta-inferences that, according to some, generalizes the idea behind ST. While fascinating from a mathematical perspective, there is no agreement on the philosophical significance of this hierarchy. I aim to show that there is no clear (...)
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  46. Dissolving the paradoxicality paradox.William Nava - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Logic 19 (4):133-146.
    Non-classical solutions to semantic paradox can be associated with conceptions of paradoxicality understood in terms of entailment facts. In a K3-based theory of truth, for example, it is prima facie natural to say that a sentence φ is paradoxical iff φ ∨ ¬φ entails an absurdity. In a recent paper, Julien Murzi and Lorenzo Rossi exploit this idea to introduce revenge paradoxes for a number of non-classical approaches, including K3. In this paper, I show that on no understanding of ‘is (...)
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  47. Gödel mathematics versus Hilbert mathematics. I. The Gödel incompleteness (1931) statement: axiom or theorem?Vasil Penchev - 2022 - Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 14 (9):1-56.
    The present first part about the eventual completeness of mathematics (called “Hilbert mathematics”) is concentrated on the Gödel incompleteness (1931) statement: if it is an axiom rather than a theorem inferable from the axioms of (Peano) arithmetic, (ZFC) set theory, and propositional logic, this would pioneer the pathway to Hilbert mathematics. One of the main arguments that it is an axiom consists in the direct contradiction of the axiom of induction in arithmetic and the axiom of infinity in set theory. (...)
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  48. The Consistency of a Certain Medieval-Like Solution to the Liar Paradox. Proof Given by Bolesław Sobociński.Kordula Świętorzecka - 2022 - History and Philosophy of Logic 43 (3):275-283.
    In Formale Logik, published in 1956, J. M. Bocheński presented his first proposal for the solution to the liar paradox, which he related to Paul of Venice's argumentation from Logica Magna. A formalized version of this solution was then presented in Formalisierung einer scholastischen Lösung der Paradoxie des ‘Lügners’ in 1959. The historical references of the resulting formalism turn out to be closer to Albert de Saxon's argument and the later solution by John Buridan. Bocheński did not pose the question (...)
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  49. Deflationism as Alethic Fictionalism via a SPIF Account of Truth-Talk.Bradley Armour-Garb & James Woodbridge - 2021 - In Michael P. Lynch, J. Wyatt, N. Kellen & J. Kim (eds.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, 2nd Edition. Cambridge, MA, USA: pp. 429-453.
    The aim of this chapter is to explain, motivate, and provide the central details of a specific version of what has come to be called alethic fictionalism—namely, a fictionalist account of truth (or, more accurately, of truth-talk, that fragment of discourse that involves the truth-predicate and other alethic-locutions). Our particular brand of alethic fictionalism is sometimes described as a “pretense theory of truth,” and a catchphrase for our view is “truth is a pretense.” But a more precise label for the (...)
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  50. Indeterminate Truth and Credences.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2021 - In Johannes Stern & Carlo Nicolai (eds.), Modes of Truth. Routledge.
    When one allows truth to be indeterminate, “fixed point” interpretations can be found even when the language includes sentences such as the liar paradox. In this chapter this kind of account is applied to rational credences, to find non-undermining indeterminate epistemic states even in certain situations which have been discussed as challenges for rationality. In the process of doing this, a deeper understanding of how the supervaluational account of truth works is obtained, especially when one focuses on sets of precisifications.
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