Philosophy of Mathematics, Misc

The following essay reconsiders the ontological and logical issues around Frege’s Basic Law (V). If focuses less on Russell’s Paradox, as most treatments of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GGA)1 do, but rather on the relation between Frege’s Basic Law (V) and Cantor’s Theorem (CT). So for the most part the inconsistency of Naïve Comprehension (in the context of standard Second Order Logic) will not concern us, but rather the ontological issues central to the conflict between (BLV) and (CT). These ontological (...) issues are interesting in their own right. And if and only if in case ontological considerations make a strong case for something like (BLV) we have to trouble us with inconsistency and paraconsistency. These ontological issues also lead to a renewed methodological reflection what to assume or recognize as an axiom. (shrink)

While there are satisfactory answers to the question "How to teach children mathematics?", there are no satisfactory answers to the question "Which mathematics to teach children?". This paper provides an answer to the last question for preschool children, although the answer is also applicable to older children. This answer, together with an appropriate methodology on how to teach mathematics, gives a clear conception of the place of mathematics in the children’s world and our role in helping children develop their mathematical (...) abilities. From the point of view of this conception, the standards established today are limiting and too focused on numbers and geometric figures: these topics are too prominent and elaborated, and other mathematical contents are subordinated to them. Adhering to the standards, we drastically limit the mathematics of the child's world, hamper the correct mathematical development of a child, and we can turn her away from mathematics. (shrink)

This paper introduces a novel object that has less structure than, and is ontologically prior to the natural numbers. As such it is a candidate model of the foundation that lies beneath the natural numbers. The implications for the construction of mathematical objects built upon that foundation are discussed.

The purpose of this note is to contrast a Cantorian outlook with a non-Cantorian one and to present a picture that provides support for the latter. In particular, I suggest that: i) infinite hyperreal numbers are the (actual, determined) infinite numbers, ii) ω is merely potentially infinite, and iii) infinitesimals should not be used in the di Finetti lottery. Though most Cantorians will likely maintain a Cantorian outlook, the picture is meant to motivate the obvious nature of the non-Cantorian outlook.

The Simulation Hypothesis proposes that all of reality is in fact an artificial simulation, analogous to a computer simulation. Outlined here is a method for programming relativistic mass, space and time at the Planck level as applicable for use in Planck Universe-as-a-Simulation Hypothesis. For the virtual universe the model uses a 4-axis hyper-sphere that expands in incremental steps (the simulation clock-rate). Virtual particles that oscillate between an electric wave-state and a mass point-state are mapped within this hyper-sphere, the oscillation driven (...) by this expansion. Particles are assigned an N-S axis which determines the direction in which they are pulled along by the expansion, thus an independent particle motion may be dispensed with. Only in the mass point-state do particles have fixed hyper-sphere co-ordinates. The rate of expansion translates to the speed of light and so in terms of the hyper-sphere co-ordinates all particles (and objects) travel at the speed of light, time (as the clock-rate) and velocity (as the rate of expansion) are therefore constant, however photons, as the means of information exchange, are restricted to lateral movement across the hyper-sphere thus giving the appearance of a 3-D space. Lorentz formulas are used to translate between this 3-D space and the hyper-sphere co-ordinates, relativity resembling the mathematics of perspective. (shrink)

Defined are gravitational formulas in terms of Planck units and units of $\hbar c$. Mass is not assigned as a constant property but is instead treated as a discrete event defined by units of Planck mass with gravity as an interaction between these units, the gravitational orbit as the sum of these mass-mass interactions and the gravitational coupling constant as a measure of the frequency of these interactions and not the magnitude of the gravitational force itself. Each particle that is (...) in the mass-state (defined by a unit of Planck mass) per unit of Planck time is directly linked to every other particle also in the mass-state by a discrete unit of $m_P v^2 r = \hbar c$, the velocity of a gravitational orbit is summed from these individual $v^2$. As this approach presumes a digital time, it is suitable for use in programming Simulation Hypothesis models. As this link is responsible for the particle-particle interaction it is analogous to the graviton. Orbital angular momentum of the planetary orbits derives from the sum of the planet-sun particle-particle orbital angular momentum irrespective of the angular momentum of the sun itself and the rotational angular momentum of a planet includes particle-particle rotational angular momentum. (shrink)

Euclid's classic proof about the infinitude of prime numbers has been a standard model of reasoning in student textbooks and books of elementary number theory. It has withstood scrutiny for over 2000 years but we shall prove that despite the deceptive appearance of its analytical reasoning it is tautological in nature. We shall argue that the proof is more of an observation about the general property of a prime numbers than an expository style of natural deduction of the proof of (...) their infinitude. (shrink)

It is shown in this article in how far one has to have a clear picture of Gödel’s philosophy and scientific thinking at hand (and also the philosophical positions of other philosophers in the history of Western Philosophy) in order to interpret one single Philosophical Remark by Gödel. As a single remark by Gödel (very often) mirrors his whole philosophical thinking, Gödel’s Philosophical Remarks can be seen as a philosophical monadology. This is so for two reasons mainly: Firstly, because it (...) pictures a monadology already via its form. And secondly, because Gödel wanted to establish in his Philosophical Remarks a modern monadology in adapting the philosophical principles of Leibniz’s monadology to modern science. This article will only deal with the first aspect that has been mentioned namely that a single remark by Gödel (very often) mirrors his whole philosophy (at the time) for example: set theory, perception and intuition of mathematical objects and axioms, the nature of the human mind, the concept and existence of God, and so on. This renders it extremely difficult to interpret Gödel’s philosophical remarks but interpreting it provides also a deep insight in Gödel’s philosophical thoughts. (shrink)

An updated survey of the research scope in Integral Biomathics.

A key question of the ‘maverick’ tradition of the philosophy of mathematical practice is addressed, namely what is mathematical progress. The investigation is based on an article by Penelope Maddy devoted to this topic in which she considers only contributions ‘of some mathematical importance’ as progress. With the help of a case study from contemporary mathematics, more precisely from tropical geometry, a few issues with her proposal are identified. Taking these issues into consideration, an alternative account of ‘mathematical importance’, broadly (...) within the framework of progress Maddy offers, is developed with a special focus on mathematicians’ peer-review practice. (shrink)

John P. Burgess is the John N. Woodhull Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. He obtained his Ph.D. from the Logic and Methodology program at the University of California at Berkeley under the supervision of Jack H. Silver with a thesis on descriptive set theory. He is a very distinguished and influential philosopher of mathematics. He has written several books: A Subject with No Object (with G. Rosen, Oxford University Press, 1997), Computability and Logic (with G. Boolos and R. Jeffrey, (...) 5th ed., Cambridge University Press, 2007), Fixing Frege (Princeton University Press, 2005), Mathematics, Models, and Modality (Cambridge University Press, 2007), Philosophical Logic (Princeton University Press, 2009), Truth (with A. G. Burgess, Princeton University Press, 2011), Saul Kripke: Puzzles & Mysteries (Polity Press, 2012), Rigor & Structure (Oxford University Press, 2015), and Set Theory (Cambridge Elements, Forthcoming). In this interview, Professor Burgess talks about how his interests in mathematics and philosophy developed and relate to each other. He then answers questions about specific themes of his philosophical work, with a focus on issues pertaining to philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Această carte face parte dintr-un curent recent din filosofia analitică de preocupare cu rolul matematicii în știință și se vrea a fi o contribuție la discuția filosofică recentă despre valoarea explicativă a matematicii în știință și despre contribuția acesteia la înțelegerea naturii. Obiectivul principal al cărții este prezentarea unei teorii filosofice cu privire la felul în care matematica poate contribui la înțelegerea fenomenelor naturii fără a juca un rol explicativ în raport cu acestea.

A passage from Jody Azzouni’s article “The Algorithmic-Device View of Informal Rigorous Mathematical Proof” in which he argues against Hamami and Avigad’s standard view of informal mathematical proof with the help of a specific visual proof of 1/2+1/4+1/8+1/16+⋯=1 is critically examined. By reference to mathematicians’ judgments about visual proofs in general, it is argued that Azzouni’s critique of Hamami and Avigad’s account is not valid. Nevertheless, by identifying a necessary condition for the visual proof to be considered a proper proof (...) in the first place, and suggesting an appropriate way to establish its correctness, it is shown how Azzouni’s assessment of the epistemic process associated with the visual proof can turn out to be essentially correct. From this, it is concluded that although visual proofs do not constitute counterexamples to the standard view in the sense suggested by Azzouni, at least the visual proof mentioned above shows that this view does not cover all the ways in which mathematical truth can be justified. (shrink)

Until recently, discussion of virtues in the philosophy of mathematics has been fleeting and fragmentary at best. But in the last few years this has begun to change. As virtue theory has grown ever more influential, not just in ethics where virtues may seem most at home, but particularly in epistemology and the philosophy of science, some philosophers have sought to push virtues out into unexpected areas, including mathematics and its philosophy. But there are some mathematicians already there, ready to (...) meet them, who have explicitly invoked virtues in discussing what is necessary for a mathematician to succeed. In both ethics and epistemology, virtue theory tends to emphasize character virtues, the acquired excellences of people. But people are not the only sort of thing whose excellences may be identified as virtues. Theoretical virtues have attracted attention in the philosophy of science as components of an account of theory choice. Within the philosophy of mathematics, and mathematics itself, attention to virtues has emerged from a variety of disparate sources. Theoretical virtues have been put forward both to analyse the practice of proof and to justify axioms; intellectual virtues have found multiple applications in the epistemology of mathematics; and ethical virtues have been offered as a basis for understanding the social utility of mathematical practice. Indeed, some authors have advocated virtue epistemology as the correct epistemology for mathematics (and perhaps even as the basis for progress in the metaphysics of mathematics). This topical collection brings together several of the researchers who have begun to study mathematical practices from a virtue perspective with the intention of consolidating and encouraging this trend. (shrink)

The paper explores Hermann Weyl’s turn to intuitionism through a philosophical prism of normative framework transitions. It focuses on three central themes that occupied Weyl’s thought: the notion of the continuum, logical existence, and the necessity of intuitionism, constructivism, and formalism to adequately address the foundational crisis of mathematics. The analysis of these themes reveals Weyl’s continuous endeavor to deal with such fundamental problems and suggests a view that provides a different perspective concerning Weyl’s wavering foundational positions. Building on a (...) philosophical model of scientific framework transitions and the special role that normative indecision or ambivalence plays in the process, the paper examines Weyl’s motives for considering such a radical shift in the first place. It concludes by showing that Weyl’s shifting stances should be regarded as symptoms of a deep, convoluted intrapersonal process of self-deliberation induced by exposure to external criticism. (shrink)

The Polish philosophy of mathematics in the 19th century is not a well-researched topic. For this period, only five philosophers are usually mentioned, namely Jan Śniadecki, Józef Maria Hoene-Wroński, Henryk Struve, Samuel Dickstein, and Edward Stamm. This limited and incomplete perspective does not allow us to develop a well-balanced picture of the Polish philosophy of mathematics and gauge its influence on 19th- and 20th-century Polish philosophy in general. To somewhat complete our picture of the history of the Polish philosophy of (...) mathematics in those times, we here present the profiles of some lesser-known Polish Romantic philosophers of the 19th century, namely Karol Libelt, Bronisław Trentowski, and Józef Kremer. We discuss their contributions to the philosophy of mathematics and their metaphysical perspectives, and we also show how their metaphysical ideas have found some continuity in the studies of some Catholic philosophers. (shrink)

We compare the medieval projects of commentaries and disputations with the modern projects of formal ontology and of mathematics.

The aim of this paper is to present a constructive solution to Frege's puzzle (largely limited to the mathematical context) based on type theory. Two ways in which an equality statement may be said to have cognitive significance are distinguished. One concerns the mode of presentation of the equality, the other its mode of proof. Frege's distinction between sense and reference, which emphasizes the former aspect, cannot adequately explain the cognitive significance of equality statements unless a clear identity criterion for (...) senses is provided. It is argued that providing a solution based on proofs is more satisfactory from the standpoint of constructive semantics. (shrink)

In a series of papers Ladyman and Presnell raise an interesting challenge of providing a pre-mathematical justification for homotopy type theory. In response, they propose what they claim to be an informal semantics for homotopy type theory where types and terms are regarded as mathematical concepts. The aim of this paper is to raise some issues which need to be resolved for the successful development of their types-as-concepts interpretation.

We present an elementary system of axioms for the geometry of Minkowski spacetime. It strikes a balance between a simple and streamlined set of axioms and the attempt to give a direct formalization in first-order logic of the standard account of Minkowski spacetime in [Maudlin 2012] and [Malament, unpublished]. It is intended for future use in the formalization of physical theories in Minkowski spacetime. The choice of primitives is in the spirit of [Tarski 1959]: a predicate of betwenness and a (...) four place predicate to compare the square of the relativistic intervals. Minkowski spacetime is described as a four dimensional ‘vector space’ that can be decomposed everywhere into a spacelike hyperplane - which obeys the Euclidean axioms in [Tarski and Givant, 1999] - and an orthogonal timelike line. The length of other ‘vectors’ are calculated according to Pythagora’s theorem. We conclude with a Representation Theorem relating models of our system that satisfy second order continuity to the mathematical structure called ‘Minkowski spacetime’ in physics textbooks. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that applying the methods of data science to “the problem of whether mathematical explanations occur within mathematics itself” (Mancosu 2018) might be a fruitful way to shed new light on the problem. By carefully selecting indicator words for explanation and justification, and then systematically searching for these indicators in databases of scholarly works in mathematics, we can get an idea of how mathematicians use these terms in mathematical practice and with what frequency. The results of (...) this empirical study suggest that mathematical explanations do occur in research articles published in mathematics journals, as indicated by the occurrence of explanation indicators. When compared with the use of justification indicators, however, the data suggest that justifications occur much more frequently than explanations in scholarly mathematical practice. The results also suggest that justificatory proofs occur much more frequently than explanatory proofs, thus suggesting that proof may be playing a larger justificatory role than an explanatory role in scholarly mathematical practice. (shrink)

Since the publication of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein’s interpreters have endeavored to reconcile his general constructivist/anti-realist attitude towards mathematics with his confessed anti-revisionary philosophy. In this article, the author revisits the issue and presents a solution. The basic idea consists in exploring the fact that the so-called “non-constructive results” could be interpreted so that they do not appear non-constructive at all. The author substantiates this solution by showing how the translation of mathematical results, given by the (...) possibility of translation between logics, can be seen as a tool for partially implementing the solution Wittgenstein had in mind. (shrink)

'गोडेल के रास्ते' में तीन प्रख्यात वैज्ञानिकों ने अनिर्णय, अपूर्णता, यादृच्छिकता, गणनाऔरता और परासंगति जैसे मुद्दों पर चर्चा की। मैं Wittgensteinian दृष्टिकोण से इन मुद्दों दृष्टिकोण है कि वहाँ दो बुनियादी मुद्दों जो पूरी तरह से अलग समाधान है. वहाँ वैज्ञानिक या अनुभवजन्य मुद्दों, जो दुनिया के बारे में तथ्य है कि अवलोकन और दार्शनिक मुद्दों की जांच की जरूरत है के रूप में कैसे भाषा intelligibly इस्तेमाल किया जा सकता है (जो गणित और तर्क में कुछ सवाल शामिल हैं), (...) जो की जरूरत है एकटी कैसे हम वास्तव में विशेष संदर्भों में शब्दों का उपयोग देख कर फैसला किया. जब हम जो भाषा खेल हम खेल रहे हैं के बारे में स्पष्ट हो, इन विषयों को किसी भी अन्य की तरह साधारण वैज्ञानिक और गणितीय सवाल देखा जाता है. है Wittgenstein अंतर्दृष्टि शायद ही कभी बराबर किया गया है और कभी नहीं पार कर रहे हैं और के रूप में आज के रूप में प्रासंगिक हैं के रूप में वे 80 साल पहले थे जब वह ब्लू और ब्राउन पुस्तकें हुक्म दिया. अपनी असफलताओं के बावजूद-वास्तव में एक समाप्त पुस्तक के बजाय नोटों की एक श्रृंखला-यह इन तीन प्रसिद्ध विद्वानों के काम का एक अनूठा स्रोत है जो आधे से अधिक सदी से भौतिकी, गणित और दर्शन के खून बह रहा किनारों पर काम कर रहे हैं। दा कोस्टा और डोरिया Wolpert द्वारा उद्धृत कर रहे हैं (नीचे देखें या Wolpert पर मेरे लेख और Yanofsky 'कारण की बाहरी सीमा' की मेरी समीक्षा) के बाद से वे सार्वभौमिक गणना पर लिखा था, और उनके कई उपलब्धियों के बीच, दा कोस्टा में अग्रणी है paraconsistency. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

Último sermão da Igreja do naturalismo fundamentalista pelo pastor Hofstadter. Como o seu muito mais famoso (ou infame por seus erros filosóficos implacáveis) Godel, Escher, Bach, ele tem uma plausibilidade superficial, mas se se compreende que este é um cientificismo desenfreado que mistura questões científicas reais com os filosóficos (ou seja, o somente as edições reais são que jogos da língua nós devemos jogar) então quase todo seu interesse desaparece. Eu forneci um quadro para análise baseada na psicologia evolutiva e (...) no trabalho de Wittgenstein (desde que atualizado em meus escritos mais recentes). Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd (2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no século 21 6a Ed (2020), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. "Pode ser justamente perguntado qual a importância que a prova de Gödel tem para o nosso trabalho. Para um pedaço de matemática não pode resolver problemas do tipo que nos incomoda. --A resposta é que a situação, em que tal prova nos traz, é do nosso interesse. "O que devemos dizer agora?" -Esse é o nosso tema. No entanto, estranho soa, minha tarefa, tanto quanto diz respeito à prova de Gödel parece meramente consistir em deixar claro que tal proposição como: "suponha que isso poderia ser provado" significa em matemática. " Wittgenstein "observações sobre as fundações da matemática" p337 (1956) (escrito em 1937). "Meus teoremas só mostram que a mecanização da matemática, ou seja, a eliminação da mente e de entidades abstratas, é impossível, se alguém quiser ter uma base satisfatória e um sistema de matemática. Eu não tenho provado que existem questões matemáticas que são indecidíveis para a mente humana, mas só que não há nenhuma máquina (ou formalismo cego) que pode decidir todas as questões número-teórico, (mesmo de um tipo muito especial).... Não é a própria estrutura dos sistemas dedutivos que está a ser ameaçado com um demolir, mas apenas uma certa interpretação do mesmo, ou seja, a sua interpretação como um formalismo cego. " Gödel "obras coletadas" Vol. 5, p 176-177. (2003) "Toda inferência tem lugar a priori. Os acontecimentos do futuro não podem ser inferidos a partir do presente. A superstição é a crença no nexo causal. A liberdade da vontade consiste no fato de que as ações futuras não podem ser conhecidas agora. Só podíamos conhecê-los se a causalidade fosse uma necessidade interior, como a da dedução lógica. --A conexão do conhecimento e do que é sabido é aquela da necessidade lógica. ("A sabe que p é o caso" é sem sentido se p é um tautologia.) Se do fato que uma proposição é óbvia a nós, não segue que é verdadeiro, a seguir o obviedade não é nenhuma justificação para a crença em sua verdade. " TLP 5,133--5,1363 . (shrink)

This book explores the results of applying empirical methods to the philosophy of logic and mathematics. Much of the work that has earned experimental philosophy a prominent place in twenty-first century philosophy is concerned with ethics or epistemology. But, as this book shows, empirical methods are just as much at home in logic and the philosophy of mathematics. -/- Chapters demonstrate and discuss the applicability of a wide range of empirical methods including experiments, surveys, interviews, and data-mining. Distinct themes emerge (...) that reflect recent developments in the field, such as issues concerning the logic of conditionals and the role played by visual elements in some mathematical proofs. -/- Featuring leading figures from experimental philosophy and the fields of philosophy of logic and mathematics, this collection reveals that empirical work in these disciplines has been quietly thriving for some time and stresses the importance of collaboration between philosophers and researchers in mathematics education and mathematical cognition. (shrink)

(ENG) The paper examines the first attempts put forward in ancient Greek to build a method for scientific discovery and how they have been progressively neglected. -/- (ITA) L'articolo esamina i primi tentativi effettuati nell'antica grecia di costruire un metodo della scoperta scientifica, e analizza le ragioni che hanno portato al suo progessivo abbandono.

K. Marx’s 200th jubilee coincides with the celebration of the 85 years from the first publication of his “Mathematical Manuscripts” in 1933. Its editor, Sofia Alexandrovna Yanovskaya (1896–1966), was a renowned Soviet mathematician, whose significant studies on the foundations of mathematics and mathematical logic, as well as on the history and philosophy of mathematics are unduly neglected nowadays. Yanovskaya, as a militant Marxist, was actively engaged in the ideological confrontation with idealism and its influence on modern mathematics and their interpretation. (...) Concomitantly, she was one of the pioneers of mathematical logic in the Soviet Union, in an era of fierce disputes on its compatibility with Marxist philosophy. Yanovskaya managed to embrace in an originally Marxist spirit the contemporary level of logico-philosophical research of her time. Due to her highly esteemed status within Soviet academia, she became one of the most significant pillars for the culmination of modern mathematics in the Soviet Union. In this paper, I attempt to trace the influence of the complex socio-cultural context of the first decades of the Soviet Union on Yanovskaya’s work. Among the several issues I discuss, her encounter with L. Wittgenstein is striking. (shrink)

It is often said that ‘every logical truth is obvious’ (Quine 1970: 82), that the ‘axioms and rules of logic are true in an obvious way’ (Murawski 2014: 87), or that ‘logic is a theory of the obvious’ (Sher 1999: 207). In this chapter, I set out to test empirically how the idea that logic is obvious is reflected in the scholarly work of logicians and philosophers of logic. My approach is data-driven. That is to say, I propose that systematically (...) searching for patterns of usage in databases of scholarly works, such as JSTOR, can provide new insights into the ways in which the idea that logic is obvious is reflected in logical and philosophical practice, i.e., in the arguments that logicians and philosophers of logic actually make in their published work. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason are disparate scientific physical or mathematical issues having little or nothing in common. I suggest that they are largely standard philosophical problems (i.e., language games) which were mostly resolved by Wittgenstein over 80years ago. -/- “What we are ‘tempted to say’ in such a case is, of course, not philosophy, but it is its raw material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is (...) inclined to say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.” Wittgenstein PI 234 -/- "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." Wittgenstein -/- I provide a brief summary of some of the major findings of two of the most eminent students of behavior of modern times, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything, but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. -/- I dissect some writings of a few of the major commentators on these issues from a Wittgensteinian viewpoint in the framework of the modern perspective of the two systems of thought (popularized as ‘thinking fast, thinking slow’), employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. I show that this is a powerful heuristic for describing the true nature of these putative scientific, physical or mathematical issues which are really best approached as standard philosophical problems of how language is to be used (language games in Wittgenstein’s terminology). -/- It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic System 1 actions or reflexes. (shrink)

En ' Godel’s Way ', tres eminentes científicos discuten temas como la indecisión, la incompleta, la aleatoriedad, la computabilidad y la paraconsistencia. Me acerco a estas cuestiones desde el punto de vista de Wittgensteinian de que hay dos cuestiones básicas que tienen soluciones completamente diferentes. Existen las cuestiones científicas o empíricas, que son hechos sobre el mundo que necesitan ser investigados observacionalmente y cuestiones filosóficas en cuanto a cómo el lenguaje se puede utilizar inteligiblemente (que incluyen ciertas preguntas en matemáticas (...) y lógica), que necesitan decidirse por unt cómo realmente usar palabras en contextos concretos. Cuando tenemos claro sobre qué juego de idiomas estamos jugando, estos temas son vistos como preguntas científicas y matemáticas ordinarias como cualquier otra. Las percepciones de Wittgenstein rara vez se han igualado y nunca superado y son tan pertinentes hoy como lo fueron hace 80 años cuando dictó los libros azul y marrón. A pesar de sus fallas — realmente una serie de notas en lugar de un libro terminado —, esta es una fuente única de la obra de estos tres eruditos famosos que han estado trabajando en los bordes sangrantes de la física, las matemáticas y la filosofía durante más de medio siglo. Da Costa y Doria son citados por Wolpert (ver abajo o mis artículos sobre Wolpert y mi reseña de ' los límites de la razón ' de Yanofsky) desde que escribieron en el cómputo universal, y entre sus muchos logros, da Costa es pionera en paraconsistencia. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Entender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía y Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein,. (shrink)

Eu dou uma revisão detalhada de "os limites exteriores da razão" por Noson Yanofsky de uma perspectiva unificada de Wittgenstein e psicologia evolutiva. Eu indico que a dificuldade com tais questões como paradoxo na linguagem e matemática, incompletude, undecidabilidade, computabilidade, o cérebro eo universo como computadores, etc., todos surgem a partir da falta de olhar atentamente para o nosso uso da linguagem no apropriado contexto e, consequentemente, a falta de separar questões de fato científico a partir de questões de como (...) a linguagem funciona. Discuto os pontos de vista de Wittgenstein sobre incompletude, paraconsistência e indecidabilidade e o trabalho de Wolpert sobre os limites para a computação. Para resumir: o universo de acordo com o Brooklyn---boa ciência, não tão boa filosofia. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

Último sermón de la iglesia del naturalismo fundamentalista por el pastor Hofstadter. Al igual que su mucho más famoso (o infame por sus incesantemente errores filosóficos) trabajo Godel, Escher, Bach, tiene una plausibilidad superficial, pero si se entiende que se trata de un científico rampante que mezcla problemas científicos reales con los filosóficos (es decir, el sólo los problemas reales son los juegos de idiomas que debemos jugar) entonces casi todo su interés desaparece. Proporciono un marco para el análisis basado (...) en la psicología evolutiva y el trabajo de Wittgenstein (ya actualizado en mis escritos más recientes). Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Entender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía y Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky y otras. (shrink)

Doy una revisión detallada de ' los límites externos de la razón ' por Noson Yanofsky desde una perspectiva unificada de Wittgenstein y la psicología evolutiva. Yo indiqué que la dificultad con cuestiones como la paradoja en el lenguaje y las matemáticas, la incompletitud, la indeterminación, la computabilidad, el cerebro y el universo como ordenadores, etc., surgen de la falta de mirada cuidadosa a nuestro uso del lenguaje en el adecuado contexto y, por tanto, el Error al separar los problemas (...) de hecho científico de las cuestiones de cómo funciona el lenguaje. Discuto las opiniones de Wittgenstein sobre la incompletitud, la paracoherencia y la indecisión y el trabajo de Wolpert en los límites de la computación. Resumiendo: el universo según Brooklyn---buena ciencia, no tan buena filosofía. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Entender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía y Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky. (shrink)

Em "Godel's Way", três cientistas eminentes discutem questões como a undecidability, incompletude, aleatoriedade, computabilidade e paraconsistência. Eu abordar estas questões do ponto de vista Wittgensteinian que existem duas questões básicas que têm soluções completamente diferentes. Há as questões científicas ou empíricas, que são fatos sobre o mundo que precisam ser investigados observacionalmente e questões filosóficas sobre como a linguagem pode ser usada inteligìvelmente (que incluem certas questões em matemática e lógica), que precisam ser decidido por olhar uma como nós realmente (...) usar palavras em contextos específicos. Quando nós começ claros sobre que jogo da língua nós estamos jogando, estes tópicos são vistos para ser perguntas científicas e matemáticas ordinárias como qualquer outro. As idéias de Wittgenstein raramente foram igualadas e nunca ultrapassaram e são tão pertinentes hoje como eram 80 anos atrás, quando ele ditou os livros azul e marrom. Apesar de suas falhas-realmente uma série de notas em vez de um livro acabado-esta é uma fonte única do trabalho destes três estudiosos famosos que têm trabalhado nas bordas sangrantes da física, matemática e filosofia por mais de meio século. Da costa e Doria são citados por Wolpert (veja abaixo ou meus artigos sobre Wolpert e minha revisão de Yanofsky ' s "os limites exteriores da razão") desde que escreveu sobre a computação universal, e entre suas muitas realizações, da costa é um pioneiro em a paraconsistência. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

This volume collects nine essays that investigate the work of Gottlob Frege. The contributors address Frege’s work in relation to literature and fiction (Dichtung), the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), and science (Wissenschaft). Overall, the essays consider internal connections between different aspects of Frege’s work while acknowledging the importance of its philosophical context. There are also further common strands between the papers, such as the relation between Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches to philosophical investigations, the relation between Frege and Kant, and the place of (...) Frege’s work in the philosophical landscape more generally. The volume is therefore of direct relevance to several current debates in philosophy in general, in addition to Frege and Wittgenstein research in particular. Even though Frege’s great significance for contemporary philosophy is not disputed, the question of how we are to understand the character and aims of his project is debated. The debate has a starting point in Frege’s specific conception of logic. The volume elucidates this conception as well as the relation between natural language and the Begriffsschrift. It will help philosophers, researchers, and students better understand the nuances of this great thinker. By extension, it will also help readers seeking to understand Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical difficulties and his struggle to find an apt form of presentation for his philosophical investigations. (shrink)

Albert Lautman (b. 1908–1944) was a philosopher of mathematics whose views on mathematical reality and on the philosophy of mathematics parted with the dominant tendencies of mathematical epistemology of the time. Lautman considered the role of philosophy, and of the philosopher, in relation to mathematics to be quite specific. He writes that: ‘in the development of mathematics, a reality is asserted that mathematical philosophy has as a function to recognize and describe’ (Lautman 2011, 87). He goes on to characterize this (...) reality as an ‘ideal reality’ that ‘governs’ the development of mathematics. The relation between mathematical problems as they arise in the historical development of mathematics and the solutions that are provided to these problems by mathematicians, in the form of new mathematical theories, definitions or axioms, are governed by a what Lautman characterises as a dialectics of mathematics. The aim of this paper is to give an account of this Lautmanian dialectic and of how it can be understood to govern the development of solutions to mathematical problems. (shrink)

We argue that two powerful error-theoretic concepts provide a general framework that satisfactorily accounts for key aspects of the explanation of physical patterns. This method gives an objective criterion to determine which mathematical models in a class of neighboring models are just as good as the exact one. The method also emphasizes that abstraction is essential for explanation and provides a precise conceptual framework that determines whether a given abstraction is explanatorily relevant and justified. Hence, it increases our epistemological understanding (...) of how one should go about reconstructing scientific practices by making clear that, at a fundamental level, a key aspect of mathematical modeling consists in exactly solving nearby problems. (shrink)

The Simulation Hypothesis proposes that all of reality, including the earth and the universe, is in fact an artificial simulation, analogous to a computer simulation, and as such our reality is an illusion. In this essay I describe a method for programming mass, length, time and charge (MLTA) as geometrical objects derived from the formula for a virtual electron; $f_e = 4\pi^2r^3$ ($r = 2^6 3 \pi^2 \alpha \Omega^5$) where the fine structure constant $\alpha$ = 137.03599... and $\Omega$ = 2.00713494... (...) are mathematical constants and the MLTA geometries are; M = (1), T = ($2\pi$), L = ($2\pi^2\Omega^2$), A = ($4\pi \Omega)^3/\alpha$. As objects they are independent of any set of units and also of any numbering system, terrestrial or alien. As the geometries are interrelated according to $f_e$, we can replace designations such as ($kg, m, s, A$) with a rule set; mass = $u^{15}$, length = $u^{-13}$, time = $u^{-30}$, ampere = $u^{3}$. The formula $f_e$ is unit-less ($u^0$) and combines these geometries in the following ratio M$^9$T$^{11}$/L$^{15}$ and (AL)$^3$/T, as such these ratio are unit-less. To translate MLTA to their respective SI Planck units requires an additional 2 unit-dependent scalars. We may thereby derive the CODATA 2014 physical constants via the 2 (fixed) mathematical constants ($\alpha, \Omega$), 2 dimensioned scalars and the rule set $u$. As all constants can be defined geometrically, the least precise constants ($G, h, e, m_e, k_B$...) can also be solved via the most precise ($c, \mu_0, R_\infty, \alpha$), numerical precision then limited by the precision of the fine structure constant $\alpha$. (shrink)

The simulation hypothesis proposes that all of reality is an artificial simulation. In this article I describe a simulation model that derives Planck level units as geometrical forms from a virtual (dimensionless) electron formula $f_e$ that is constructed from 2 unit-less mathematical constants; the fine structure constant $\alpha$ and $\Omega$ = 2.00713494... ($f_e = 4\pi^2r^3, r = 2^6 3 \pi^2 \alpha \Omega^5$). The mass, space, time, charge units are embedded in $f_e$ according to these ratio; ${M^9T^{11}/L^{15}} = (AL)^3/T$ (units = (...) 1), giving mass M=1, time T=$2\pi$, length L=$2\pi^2\Omega^2$, ampere A = $(4\pi \Omega)^3/\alpha$. We can thus for example create as much mass M as we wish but with the proviso that we create an equivalent space L and time T to balance the above. The 5 SI units $kg, m, s, A, K$ are derived from a single unit u = sqrt(velocity/mass) that also defines the relationships between the SI units; kg = $u^{15}$, m = $u^{-13}$, s = $u^{-30}$, A = $u^{3}$, $k_B = u^{29}$. To convert MLTA from the above $\alpha, \Omega$ geometries to their respective SI Planck unit numerical values (and thus solve the dimensioned physical constants $G, h, e, c, m_e, k_B$) requires an additional 2 unit-dependent scalars. Results are consistent with CODATA 2014. The rationale for the virtual electron was derived using the sqrt of momentum P and a black-hole electron model as a function of magnetic-monopoles AL (ampere-meters) and time T. (shrink)

This volume contains thirteen papers that were presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Mathematics/Société canadienne d’histoire et de philosophie des mathématiques, which was held at Ryerson University in Toronto. It showcases rigorously reviewed modern scholarship on an interesting variety of topics in the history and philosophy of mathematics from Ancient Greece to the twentieth century. -/- A series of chapters all set in the eighteenth century consider topics such as John Marsh’s (...) techniques for the computation of decimal fractions, Euler’s efforts to compute the surface area of scalene cones, a little-known work by John Playfair on the practical aspects of mathematics, and Monge’s use of descriptive geometry. -/- After a brief stop in the nineteenth century to consider the culture of research mathematics in 1860s Prussia, the book moves into the twentieth century with an examination of the historical context within which the Axiom of Choice was developed and a paper discussing Anatoly Vlasov’s adaptation of the Boltzmann equation to ionized gases. The remaining chapters deal with the philosophy of twentieth-century mathematics through topics such as an historically informed discussion of finitism and its limits; a reexamination of Mary Leng’s defenses of mathematical fictionalism through an alternative, anti-realist approach to mathematics; and a look at the reasons that mathematicians select specific problems to pursue. -/- Written by leading scholars in the field, these papers are accessible to not only mathematicians and students of the history and philosophy of mathematics, but also anyone with a general interest in mathematics. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to investigate the roles of commutative diagrams (CDs) in a specific mathematical domain, and to unveil the reasons underlying their effectiveness as a mathematical notation; this will be done through a case study. It will be shown that CDs do not depict spatial relations, but represent mathematical structures. CDs will be interpreted as a hybrid notation that goes beyond the traditional bipartition of mathematical representations into diagrammatic and linguistic. It will be argued that one (...) of the reasons why CDs form a good notation is that they are highly mathematically tractable: experts can obtain valid results by ‘calculating’ with CDs. These calculations, take the form of ‘diagram chases’. In order to draw inferences, experts move algebraic elements around the diagrams. It will be argued that these diagrams are dynamic. It is thanks to their dynamicity that CDs can externalize the relevant reasoning and allow experts to draw conclusions directly by manipulating them. Lastly, it will be shown that CDs play essential roles in the context of proof as well as in other phases of the mathematical enterprise, such as discovery and conjecture formation. (shrink)

New Translation of Henri Poincaré's Science and Hypothesis, including new material and editorial commentary. New Introduction by David J. Stump.

This work takes off with the clear intention of weaving a single anti-foundationalist narrative that will connect the later Wittgenstein’s views on ‘ordinary’ language with those on the ‘specialist’ regime of mathematical language. Some popular notions about his later views—those that confuse his idea of indeterminacy with mere ambiguity, or read him as substituting sociological or physiological foundations for the classical ones, or brand his anti-foundationalism as a form of relativism—are all addressed within this single thematic unity. This book avoids (...) the intensely detailed analyses of technical issues as much as possible, attempting to steer such issues towards epistemological enquiries into the nature of mathematical cognition - creating overall a style of narrative where the philosophy of mathematics will be merged with philosophies of logic, psychology and action in an immaculate whole. However, what the author has attempted to achieve against the official foundations of mathematics, in an extremely general and non-technical manner, may hopefully be extended to the standard technical issues of mathematics by experts on the subject. Overall, this book can be used by all readers across all disciplines. It encourages problematising the ‘obvious’ and takes an incisive interest in what constitute the conditions of possibility of language and mathematics. (shrink)

Rigid designators designate whatever they do in all possible worlds. Mathematical definite descriptions are usually considered paradigmatic examples of such expressions. The main aim of the present paper is to challenge this view. It is argued that mathematical definite descriptions cannot be rigid in the same sense as ordinary empirical definite descriptions because—assuming that mathematical facts are not determined by goings on in possible worlds—mathematical descriptions designate whatever they do independently of possible worlds. Nevertheless, there is a widespread practice of (...) treating mathematical definite descriptions as rigid. Apart from this, there might be theoretical reasons for admitting that they are rigid in some sense. The second part of the paper suggests a way out. Borrowing from ideas proposed by Kit Fine, it develops and defends an extended notion of rigidity, which can be applied to mathematical definite descriptions. Importantly, this notion is fully compatible with the claim that mathematical facts are independent of possible worlds. (shrink)

This volume represents the beginning of a new stage of research in interpreting Kurt Gödel’s philosophy in relation to his scientific work. It is more than a collection of essays on Gödel. It is in fact the product of a long enduring international collaboration on Kurt Gödel’s Philosophical Notebooks (Max Phil). New and significant material has been made accessible to a group of experts, on which they rely for their articles. In addition to this, Gödel’s Nachlass is presented anew by (...) the current state of research and the corpus of Gödel’s Philosophical Notebooks (Max Phil) is described in its entirety for the first time in its details. The volume is sub-divided into three parts. The fist part is dedicated to descriptions of the Gödel Nachlass that is to be found in The Shelby White and Leon Levy Archives Center des Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. This part starts with an updated overview on Kurt Gödel’s Nachlass by the current state of research and is followed by a detailed description of Gödel’s Philosophical Notebooks (Max Phil). The second part is dedicated by several Gödel scholars to the close reading of single remarks in the Max Phil. And the third part of this volume unites a variety of papers by experts in Gödel studies, logic, and Leibniz as well as by some enthusiasts for Gödel. These papers are nearly all written for this volume. (shrink)