Summary |
Local debunking arguments in metaphysics allege that, for some putative type of metaphysical phenomenon F, there is a complete etiological explanation of our reasons for believing that there are Fs that does not involve the mind-independent existence of the Fs themselves. Once we realize this, the local debunker alleges, our F-beliefs thereby lose whatever initial justification they may have enjoyed. Belief about composite material objects, abstract objects, modal facts, temporal facts, causation, grounding facts, essence, consciousness, and race and gender facts have all been the targets of local debunking arguments. Global debunking arguments target our justification for engaging in any sort of metaphysical or ontological theorizing at all. For example, some global debunkers argue that empirical results from experimental philosophy demonstrate that a priori intuition, which is arguably the basis for most contemporary metaphysical theorizing, is systematically unreliable. |