About this topic
Summary Logical Pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. What this claim amounts to depends on a specification both of what a logic is and of what it means for a logic to be correct. One of the strongest and most controversial varieties of logical pluralism is the claim that there is more than one correct account of logical consequence, that is, that multiple distinct logics correctly capture the logical consequence relation of natural language.
Key works The recent flurry of interest in strong forms of logical pluralism was initiated by Beall & Restall 2000, in which Beall and Restall argue that there is no single logical consequence relation in natural language, and so no single correct logic. Beall & Restall 2005 further develops the argument. Carnap 1937 argues for pluralism on linguistic grounds: for Carnap, the correctness of logic is relative to the choice of language, and there is no neutral standpoint from which the choice of language can be made. Shapiro 2006 and Cook 2002 independently argue that we should understand logic as a modelling tool: if this is right, then it is certainly possible that there could be two equally good and incommensurable models of the same unitary phenomena. Field 2009 argues that very few forms of logical pluralism are both interesting and true, and Priest 2006 defends logical monism: the view that there is just one correct logic.
Introductions Cook 2010 Russell 2013
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205 found
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  1. Valuations.Jean-Louis Lenard - manuscript
    Is logic empirical? Is logic to be found in the world? Or is logic rather a convention, a product of conventions, part of the many rules that regulate the language game? Answers fall in either camp. We like the linguistic answer. In this paper, we want to analyze how a linguistic community would tackle the problem of developing a logic and show how the linguistic conventions adopted by the community determine the properties of the local logic. Then show how to (...)
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  2. What is Logical Monism?Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian (eds.), Normative Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Logical monism is the view that there is ‘One True Logic’. This is the default position, against which pluralists react. If there were not ‘One True Logic’, it is hard to see how there could be one true theory of anything. A theory is closed under a logic! But what is logical monism? In this article, I consider semantic, logical, modal, scientific, and metaphysical proposals. I argue that, on no ‘factualist’ analysis (according to which ‘there is One True Logic’ expresses (...)
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  3. Observation and Intuition.Justin Clarke-Doane & Avner Ash - forthcoming - In Carolin Antos, Neil Barton & Venturi Giorgio (eds.), Palgrave Companion to the Philosophy of Set Theory.
    The motivating question of this paper is: ‘How are our beliefs in the theorems of mathematics justified?’ This is distinguished from the question ‘How are our mathematical beliefs reliably true?’ We examine an influential answer, outlined by Russell, championed by Gödel, and developed by those searching for new axioms to settle undecidables, that our mathematical beliefs are justified by ‘intuitions’, as our scientific beliefs are justified by observations. On this view, axioms are analogous to laws of nature. They are postulated (...)
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  4. How to Adopt a Logic.Daniel Cohnitz & Carlo Nicolai - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    What is commonly referred to as the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the idea that the principles of logic can be rationally revised. The argument is based on a reconstruction of unpublished work by Saul Kripke. As the reconstruction has it, Kripke extends the scope of Willard van Orman Quine's regress argument against conventionalism to the possibility of adopting new logical principles. In this paper we want to discuss the scope of this challenge. Are all revisions of logic subject (...)
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  5. Does Logic Have a History at All?Jens Lemanski - forthcoming - Foundations of Science:1-23.
    To believe that logic has no history might at first seem peculiar today. But since the early 20th century, this position has been repeatedly conflated with logical monism of Kantian provenance. This logical monism asserts that only one logic is authoritative, thereby rendering all other research in the field marginal and negating the possibility of acknowledging a history of logic. In this paper, I will show how this and many related issues have developed, and that they are founded on only (...)
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  6. The Contribution of Logic to Epistemic Injustice.Franci Mangraviti - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    While much has been said on the connection between dominant rationality standards and systemic oppression, the specific role of logic in supporting epistemic injustice has not received much explicit attention. In this paper I highlight several ways in which it is possible for logic – as a discipline, as a particular system and as a gloss for rational common sense – to be implicated in epistemic injustice. Concrete examples are given for testimonial, content-based, hermeneutical and contributory injustices. I conclude by (...)
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  7. The collapse of logical contextualism.Timo Meier - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The most serious objection to Beall and Restall’s case-based logical pluralism is the so-called collapse argument. According to the collapse argument, logical pluralism is not genuinely pluralistic and collapses into a single privileged relation of logical consequence. In response, Caret offered an account of logical contextualism that supposedly maintains the merits of Beall and Restall’s case-based logical pluralism while circumventing the collapse argument. In this paper, I first point out a gap in the collapse argument in that it does not (...)
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  8. Logical Pluralism and Paradoxical Assertions in the Philosophy of Religion.Noah Friedman-Biglin & Anand Jayprakash Vaidya - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 19 (1):e12956.
    Many authors show how useful logic can be as a tool for building theories that can account for problems in the philosophy of religion, such as paradoxical assertions. As a consequence, one's philosophy of logic is crucial as well, since it determines which logics, from the set of available and constructible logics, one can use to build a theory. In this paper, we present the relatively recent debate between logical pluralism and monism because the positions in this debate determine which (...)
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  9. No cause for collapse.Dustin Gooßens & Andrew Tedder - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-19.
    We investigate a hitherto under-considered avenue of response for the logical pluralist to collapse worries. In particular, we note that standard forms of the collapse arguments seem to require significantorder-theoreticassumptions, namely that the collection of admissible logics for the pluralist should be closed undermeetsandjoins. We consider some reasons for rejecting this assumption, noting someprima facieplausible constraints on the class of admissible logics which would lead a pluralist admitting those logics to resist such closure conditions.
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  10. Rethinking inconsistent mathematics.Franci Mangraviti - 2023 - Dissertation, Ruhr University Bochum
    This dissertation has two main goals. The first is to provide a practice-based analysis of the field of inconsistent mathematics: what motivates it? what role does logic have in it? what distinguishes it from classical mathematics? is it alternative or revolutionary? The second goal is to introduce and defend a new conception of inconsistent mathematics - queer incomaths - as a particularly effective answer to feminist critiques of classical logic and mathematics. This sets the stage for a genuine revolution in (...)
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  11. For Better and for Worse. Abstractionism, Good Company, and Pluralism.Andrea Sereni, Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani & Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (1):268-297.
    A thriving literature has developed over logical and mathematical pluralism – i.e. the views that several rival logical and mathematical theories can be equally correct. These have unfortunately grown separate; instead, they both could gain a great deal by a closer interaction. Our aim is thus to present some novel forms of abstractionist mathematical pluralism which can be modeled on parallel ways of substantiating logical pluralism (also in connection with logical anti-exceptionalism). To do this, we start by discussing the Good (...)
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  12. Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence.Erik Stei - 2023 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This is not necessarily a controversial claim but in its most exciting formulations, pluralism extends to logics that have typically been considered rival accounts of logical consequence – to logics, that is, which adopt seemingly contradictory views about basic logical laws or argument forms. The logical pluralist challenges the philosophical orthodoxy that an argument is either deductively valid or invalid by claiming that there is more than one (...)
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  13. Mathematics and Metaphilosophy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This book discusses the problem of mathematical knowledge, and its broader philosophical ramifications. It argues that the challenge to explain the (defeasible) justification of our mathematical beliefs (‘the justificatory challenge’), arises insofar as disagreement over axioms bottoms out in disagreement over intuitions. And it argues that the challenge to explain their reliability (‘the reliability challenge’), arises to the extent that we could have easily had different beliefs. The book shows that mathematical facts are not, in general, empirically accessible, contra Quine, (...)
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  14. Configurations of Pluralisms. Navigating Polyphony and Diversity in Philosophy and Beyond.Machiel Keestra - 2022 - In Keith Stenning & Martin Stokhof (eds.), Rules, Regularities, Randomness. Festschrift for Michiel van Lambalgen. Amsterdam: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation. pp. 87-99.
    In western philosophy and beyond, a tension between pluralism and monism has sparked many developments and debates. Pluralism of norms, of forms of knowledge, of aesthetic and moral values, of interests etc. has often been pitted against monism. Monism usually implies a hierarchical order of such norms etc. After having traced the origin of this tension between pluralism and monism in ancient tragedy and philosophy, I’m asking in this article whether a rejection of monism and embrace of pluralism necessarily raises (...)
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  15. Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems.Diego Tajer & Camillo Fiore - 2022 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 31:1-26.
    Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: “different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions”. The aim of this paper is to study the prospect of (...)
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  16. Is There a Logic to «Erinnerung»?Giacomo Turbanti - 2022 - Iride 35 (95):161-172.
    In his reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Robert Brandom offers an interpretation of the Hegel’s notion of Erinnerung as a retrospective rational recollection of the process of determination of conceptual contents. This paper argues that this recollection is essential for the account of representation in Brandom’s normative pragmatics, but it is not obvious how such an operation could be made explicit in his inferential semantics. Finally, some consequences are discussed of this potential problem in the structure of normative inferentialism.
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  17. Logical Relativism Through Logical Contexts.Jonas R. Becker Arenhart - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):(A2)5-28.
    We advance an approach to logical contexts that grounds the claim that logic is a local matter: distinct contexts require distinct logics. The approach results from a concern about context individuation, and holds that a logic may be constitutive of a context or domain of application. We add a naturalistic component: distinct domains are more than mere technical curiosities; as intuitionistic mathematics testifies, some of the distinct forms of inference in different domains are actively pursued as legitimate fields of research (...)
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  18. Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4099-4118.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. A key objection to logical pluralism is that it collapses into monism. The core of the Collapse Objection is that only the pluralist’s strongest logic does any genuine normative work; since a logic must do genuine normative work, this means that the pluralist is really a monist, who is committed to her strongest logic being the one true logic. This paper considers a neglected question in the collapse (...)
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  19. Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists.J. W. Evershed - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (3):411-424.
    According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. According to many contemporary philosophers of logic, there is more than one correct logic. What is the relationship between these two strands of thought? This paper makes two claims. First, logic is doubly normative for reasoning because, in addition to constraining the combinations of beliefs that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by which we may form them. Second, given that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, a wide array of (...)
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  20. Otto Neurath and Ludwig von Mises. Philosophy, Politics, and Economics in Viennese Late Enlightenment.Alexander Linsbichler - 2021 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 14 (2).
    Logical empiricism and the Austrian School of economics are two of the internationally most influential intellectual movements with Viennese roots. By and large independently of each other, both have been subject to detailed historical and philosophical investigations for the last two dec-ades. However, in spite of numerous connections and interactions be-tween the two groups, their relationship has captured surprisingly sparse attention. My dissertation focuses on the many-faceted juxtaposition of two supposedly antagonistic championsof Viennese Late Enlightenment: logical empiricist Otto Neurath and (...)
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  21. Logical theory revision through data underdetermination: an anti-exceptionalist exercise.Sanderson Molick - 2021 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 25 (1).
    The anti-exceptionalist debate brought into play the problem of what are the relevant data for logical theories and how such data affects the validities accepted by a logical theory. In the present paper, I depart from Laudan's reticulated model of science to analyze one aspect of this problem, namely of the role of logical data within the process of revision of logical theories. For this, I argue that the ubiquitous nature of logical data is responsible for the proliferation of several (...)
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  22. Empty Logics.Federico Pailos - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (6):1387-1415.
    _T__S_ is a logic that has no valid inferences. But, could there be a logic without valid metainferences? We will introduce _T__S_ _ω_, a logic without metainferential validities. Notwithstanding, _T__S_ _ω_ is not as empty—i.e., uninformative—as it gets, because it has many antivalidities. We will later introduce the two-standard logic [_T__S_ _ω_, _S__T_ _ω_ ], a logic without validities and antivalidities. Nevertheless, [_T__S_ _ω_, _S__T_ _ω_ ] is still informative, because it has many contingencies. The three-standard logic [ \(\mathbf {TS}_{\omega (...)
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  23. Should pluralists be pluralists about pluralism?Robert Passmann - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12663-12682.
    How many correct logics are there? Monists endorse that there is one, pluralists argue for many, and nihilists claim that there are none. Reasoning about these views requires a logic. That is the meta-logic. It turns out that there are some meta-logical challenges specifically for the pluralists. I will argue that these depend on an implicitly assumed absoluteness of correct logic. Pluralists can solve the challenges by giving up on this absoluteness and instead adopt contextualism about correct logic. This contextualism (...)
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  24. Logical Expressivism and Pluralism.Giacomo Turbanti - 2021 - In Giacomo Turbanti & Luca Bellotti (eds.), Fourth Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology. Pisa: ETS. pp. 183-202.
    This paper explores some of the assumptions orienting the debate about logical pluralism. I argue that these assumptions are grounded in the truth-conditional character of the semantic metavocabularies in which the debate is conducted. Then, I suggest an expressivist strategy to reinterpret the pluralist claim that there are different logics and I show how the expressive role of logical vocabularies can be equally well characterized by means of different expressive resources not involving the notion of truth.
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  25. Non-Boolean classical relevant logics II: Classicality through truth-constants.Tore Fjetland Øgaard - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):1-33.
    This paper gives an account of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria for an adequate theory of entailment. The criteria are grouped into three categories: criteria pertaining to modality, those pertaining to relevance, and those related to expressive strength. The leitmotif of both this paper and its prequel is the relevant legitimacy of disjunctive syllogism. Relevant logics are commonly held to be paraconsistent logics. It is shown in this paper, however, that both E and R can be extended to explosive logics (...)
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  26. The Collapse Argument Reconsidered.Hamid Alaeinejad & Morteza Hajhosseini - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):413-427.
    According to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic, and intuitionistic logic are all correct. On this version of logical pluralism, logic is considered to be normative, in the sense that someone who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bound to accept the conclusion. So-called collapse arguments are designed to show the incompatibility of the simultaneous acceptance of logical pluralism and the normativity of logic. Caret, however, by proposing logical contextualism, and Blake-Turner and (...)
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  27. Beyond Logical Pluralism and Logical Monism.Pavel Arazim - 2020 - Logica Universalis 14 (2):151-174.
    Logical pluralism as a thesis that more than one logic is correct seems very plausible for two basic reasons. First, there are so many logical systems on the market today. And it is unclear how we should decide which of them gets the logical rules right. On the other hand, logical monism as the opposite thesis still seems plausible, as well, because of normativity of logic. An approach which would manage to bring a synthesis of both logical pluralism and logical (...)
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  28. On the very idea of choosing a logic: the role of the background logic.Jonas R. B. Arenhart & Sanderson Molick - 2020 - In Alexandre Costa-Leite (ed.), Abstract Consequence and Logics - Essays in Honor of Edélcio G. de Souza. London, UK: College Publications. pp. 267-286.
    Logical anti-exceptionalism is the view that logic is not special among the sciences. In particular, anti-exceptionalists claim that logical theory choice is effected on the same bases as any other theory choice procedure, i.e., by abduction, by weighting pros and cons of rival views, and by judging which theory scores best on a given set of parameters. In this paper, we first present the anti-exceptionalists favourite method for logical theory choice. After spotting on important features of the method, we discuss (...)
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  29. Pluralistic perspectives on logic: an introduction.Colin R. Caret & Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4789-4800.
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  30. Making sense of logical pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):433-454.
    The article is centered on the question of how best to understand the logical pluralism/logical monism debate. A number of suggestions are brought up and rejected on the ground that they re...
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  31. Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.
    I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to (...)
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  32. Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...)
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  33. Logic isn’t normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.
    Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and h...
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  34. Rivalry, normativity, and the collapse of logical pluralism.Erik Stei - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):411-432.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This very general characterization gives rise to a whole family of positions. I argue that not all of them are stable. The main argument in the paper is inspired by considerations known as the “collapse problem”, and it aims at the most popular form of logical pluralism advocated by JC Beall and Greg Restall. I argue that there is a more general argument available that challenges all variants (...)
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  35. Disagreement about logic from a pluralist perspective.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3329-3350.
    Logical pluralism is commonly described as the view that there is more than one correct logic. It has been claimed that, in order for that view to be interesting, there has to be at least a potential for rivalry between the correct logics. This paper offers a detailed assessment of this suggestion. I argue that an interesting version of logical pluralism is hard, if not impossible, to achieve. I first outline an intuitive understanding of the notions of rivalry and correctness. (...)
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  36. Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):162–177.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L1 and L2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to φ, which is valid in L1 but invalid in L2. If you accept (...)
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  37. Las Lógicas Mixtas como escape al Problema del Colapso y al Desafío de Quine.Joaquín Santiago Toranzo Calderón - 2020 - Análisis Filosófico 40 (2):247-272.
    En este trabajo presentaré una forma de evitar los problemas más recurrentes en cierta versión del pluralismo lógico, aquella que defiende que incluso considerando un lenguaje fijo existen múltiples sistemas lógicos legítimos. Para ello, será necesario considerar los puntos de partida del programa pluralista y explicitar los problemas que de ellos surgen, principalmente el Desafío de Quine y el Problema del Colapso. Luego, propondré una modificación respecto de lo que se entiende por consecuencia lógica, para poder considerar una familia de (...)
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  38. Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic.Johan Benthem - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):571-601.
    We identify a pervasive contrast between implicit and explicit stances in logical analysis and system design. Implicit systems change received meanings of logical constants and sometimes also the notion of consequence, while explicit systems conservatively extend classical systems with new vocabulary. We illustrate the contrast for intuitionistic and epistemic logic, then take it further to information dynamics, default reasoning, and other areas, to show its wide scope. This gives a working understanding of the contrast, though we stop short of a (...)
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  39. Why logical pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.
    This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism. I hope to make this debate more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Any research program should be able to answer this question, but when faced with this task, many logical pluralists fall back on brute intuitions. This sets logical pluralism on a weak foundation and makes it seem as if nothing pressing is at stake in the debate. The (...)
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  40. DLEAC: A Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions.Massimiliano Carrara & Enrico Martino - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):379-388.
    This paper proposes a new dialetheic logic, a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions ), including classical logic as a particular case. In \, exclusivity is expressed via the speech acts of assuming and concluding. In the paper we adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox extended with a generalized notion of model and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion. The paper starts with an explanation of the adopted philosophical perspective, then (...)
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  41. Limiting logical pluralism.Suki Finn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4905-4923.
    In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation. I show this through a detailed analysis (...)
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  42. Is there a neutral metalanguage?Rea Golan - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4831-4858.
    Logical pluralists are committed to the idea of a neutral metalanguage, which serves as a framework for debates in logic. Two versions of this neutrality can be found in the literature: an agreed upon collection of inferences, and a metalanguage that is neutral as such. I discuss both versions and show that they are not immune to Quinean criticism, which builds on the notion of meaning. In particular, I show that the first version of neutrality is sub-optimal, and hard to (...)
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  43. A New Interpretation of Carnap’s Logical Pluralism.Teresa Kouri - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):305-314.
    Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism is often held to be one in which corresponding connectives in different logics have different meanings. This paper presents an alternative view of Carnap’s position, in which connectives can and do share their meaning in some contexts. This re-interpretation depends crucially on extending Carnap’s linguistic framework system to include meta-linguistic frameworks, those frameworks which we use to talk about linguistic frameworks. I provide an example that shows how this is possible, and give some textual evidence that (...)
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  44. Radical Interpretation and Logical Pluralism.Piers Rawling - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):277-289.
    I examine Quine’s and Davidson’s arguments to the effect that classical logic is the one and only correct logic. This conclusion is drawn from their views on radical translation and interpretation, respectively. I focus on the latter, but I first address, independently, Quine’s argument to the effect that the ‘deviant’ logician, who departs from classical logic, is merely changing the subject. Regarding logical pluralism, the question is whether there is more than one correct logic. I argue that bivalence may be (...)
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  45. Translating Logical Terms.Stewart Shapiro - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):291-303.
    The is an old question over whether there is a substantial disagreement between advocates of different logics, as they simply attach different meanings to the crucial logical terminology. The purpose of this article is to revisit this old question in light a pluralism/relativism that regards the various logics as equally legitimate, in their own contexts. We thereby address the vexed notion of translation, as it occurs between mathematical theories. We articulate and defend a thesis that the notion of “same meaning” (...)
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  46. Logical Pluralism and Logical Normativity.Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is normative, it tells us something about how we ought to reason. If, as the pluralist would have it, there are several correct logics, those logics make incompatible recommendations as to how we ought to reason. But then which of these logics should we look to for normative guidance? I (...)
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  47. From Natural to Formal Language: A Case for Logical Pluralism.Pilar Terrés Villalonga - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):333-345.
    I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of the logical vocabulary. In particular, I argue that the apparent rivalry between classical and relevant logic can be resolved, given that both logics capture and formalize normative and legitimate senses of logical consequence: classical logic encodes “follows from” as truth preservation and captures the truth conditions of the logical constants, while relevant logic encodes a notion of “follows from” which, apart from preserving truth, avoids (...)
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  48. An Objection to Naturalism and Atheism from Logic.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2019 - In Graham Oppy (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Atheism and Philosophy. Malden: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 451-475.
    I proffer a success argument for classical logical consequence. I articulate in what sense that notion of consequence should be regarded as the privileged notion for metaphysical inquiry aimed at uncovering the fundamental nature of the world. Classical logic breeds necessitism. I use necessitism to produce problems for both ontological naturalism and atheism.
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  49. Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
    A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of scientific theories. I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a detailed case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more (...)
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  50. Against logical generalism.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4813-4830.
    The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong. We then outline an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which we call logical particularism.
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