About this topic
Summary Logical Pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. What this claim amounts to depends on a specification both of what a logic is and of what it means for a logic to be correct. One of the strongest and most controversial varieties of logical pluralism is the claim that there is more than one correct account of logical consequence, that is, that multiple distinct logics correctly capture the logical consequence relation of natural language.
Key works The recent flurry of interest in strong forms of logical pluralism was initiated by Beall & Restall 2000, in which Beall and Restall argue that there is no single logical consequence relation in natural language, and so no single correct logic. Beall & Restall 2005 further develops the argument. Carnap 1937 argues for pluralism on linguistic grounds: for Carnap, the correctness of logic is relative to the choice of language, and there is no neutral standpoint from which the choice of language can be made. Shapiro 2006 and Cook 2002 independently argue that we should understand logic as a modelling tool: if this is right, then it is certainly possible that there could be two equally good and incommensurable models of the same unitary phenomena. Field 2009 argues that very few forms of logical pluralism are both interesting and true, and Priest 2005 defends logical monism: the view that there is just one correct logic.
Introductions Cook 2010 Russell 2013
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185 found
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1 — 50 / 185
  1. Valuations.Jean-Louis Lenard - manuscript
    Is logic empirical? Is logic to be found in the world? Or is logic rather a convention, a product of conventions, part of the many rules that regulate the language game? Answers fall in either camp. We like the linguistic answer. In this paper, we want to analyze how a linguistic community would tackle the problem of developing a logic and show how the linguistic conventions adopted by the community determine the properties of the local logic. Then show how to (...)
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  2. Empty Logics.Federico Pailos - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-29.
    TS is a logic that has no valid inferences. But, could there be a logic without valid metainferences? We will introduce TSω, a logic without metainferential validities. Notwithstanding, TSω is not as empty—i.e., uninformative—as it gets, because it has many antivalidities. We will later introduce the two-standard logic [TSω, STω], a logic without validities and antivalidities. Nevertheless, [TSω, STω] is still informative, because it has many contingencies. The three-standard logic [\] that we will further introduce, has no validities, no antivalidities (...)
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  3. For Better and for Worse. Abstractionism, Good Company, and Pluralism.Andrea Sereni, Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani & Luca Zanetti - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-30.
    A thriving literature has developed over logical and mathematical pluralism – i.e. the views that several rival logical and mathematical theories can be equally correct. These have unfortunately grown separate; instead, they both could gain a great deal by a closer interaction. Our aim is thus to present some novel forms of abstractionist mathematical pluralism which can be modeled on parallel ways of substantiating logical pluralism. To do this, we start by discussing the Good Company Problem for neo-logicists recently raised (...)
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  4. Forthcoming.“Logic and Ontological Pluralism.”.Jason Turner - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic.
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  5. Arithmetic is Determinate.Zachary Goodsell - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (1):127-150.
    Orthodoxy holds that there is a determinate fact of the matter about every arithmetical claim. Little argument has been supplied in favour of orthodoxy, and work of Field, Warren and Waxman, and others suggests that the presumption in its favour is unjustified. This paper supports orthodoxy by establishing the determinacy of arithmetic in a well-motivated modal plural logic. Recasting this result in higher-order logic reveals that even the nominalist who thinks that there are only finitely many things should think that (...)
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  6. Logical Relativism Through Logical Contexts.Jonas R. Becker Arenhart - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):(A2)5-28.
    We advance an approach to logical contexts that grounds the claim that logic is a local matter: distinct contexts require distinct logics. The approach results from a concern about context individuation, and holds that a logic may be constitutive of a context or domain of application. We add a naturalistic component: distinct domains are more than mere technical curiosities; as intuitionistic mathematics testifies, some of the distinct forms of inference in different domains are actively pursued as legitimate fields of research (...)
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  7. Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists.J. W. Evershed - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (3):411-424.
    According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. According to many contemporary philosophers of logic, there is more than one correct logic. What is the relationship between these two strands of thought? This paper makes two claims. First, logic is doubly normative for reasoning because, in addition to constraining the combinations of beliefs that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by which we may form them. Second, given that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, a wide array of (...)
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  8. Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.
    I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to (...)
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  9. Logical Theory Revision Through Data Underdetermination: An Anti-Exceptionalist Exercise.Sanderson Molick - 2021 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 25 (1).
    The anti-exceptionalist debate brought into play the problem of what are the relevant data for logical theories and how such data affects the validities accepted by a logical theory. In the present paper, I depart from Laudan's reticulated model of science to analyze one aspect of this problem, namely of the role of logical data within the process of revision of logical theories. For this, I argue that the ubiquitous nature of logical data is responsible for the proliferation of several (...)
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  10. Should Pluralists Be Pluralists About Pluralism?Robert Passmann - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12663-12682.
    How many correct logics are there? Monists endorse that there is one, pluralists argue for many, and nihilists claim that there are none. Reasoning about these views requires a logic. That is the meta-logic. It turns out that there are some meta-logical challenges specifically for the pluralists. I will argue that these depend on an implicitly assumed absoluteness of correct logic. Pluralists can solve the challenges by giving up on this absoluteness and instead adopt contextualism about correct logic. This contextualism (...)
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  11. Basic Quasi-Boolean Expansions of Relevance Logics.Gemma Robles & José M. Méndez - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):727-754.
    The basic quasi-Boolean negation expansions of relevance logics included in Anderson and Belnap’s relevance logic R are defined. We consider two types of QB-negation: H-negation and D-negation. The former one is of paraintuitionistic or superintuitionistic character, the latter one, of dual intuitionistic nature in some sense. Logics endowed with H-negation are paracomplete; logics with D-negation are paraconsistent. All logics defined in the paper are given a Routley-Meyer ternary relational semantics.
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  12. A General Semantics for Logics of Affirmation and Negation.Fabien Schang - 2021 - Journal of Applied Logics - IfCoLoG Journal of Logics and Their Applications 8 (2):593-609.
    A general framework for translating various logical systems is presented, including a set of partial unary operators of affirmation and negation. Despite its usual reading, affirmation is not redundant in any domain of values and whenever it does not behave like a full mapping. After depicting the process of partial functions, a number of logics are translated through a variety of affirmations and a unique pair of negations. This relies upon two preconditions: a deconstruction of truth-values as ordered and structured (...)
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  13. Non-Boolean Classical Relevant Logics II: Classicality Through Truth-Constants.Tore Fjetland Øgaard - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):1-33.
    This paper gives an account of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria for an adequate theory of entailment. The criteria are grouped into three categories: criteria pertaining to modality, those pertaining to relevance, and those related to expressive strength. The leitmotif of both this paper and its prequel is the relevant legitimacy of disjunctive syllogism. Relevant logics are commonly held to be paraconsistent logics. It is shown in this paper, however, that both E and R can be extended to explosive logics (...)
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  14. The Collapse Argument Reconsidered.Hamid Alaeinejad & Morteza Hajhosseini - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):413-427.
    According to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic, and intuitionistic logic are all correct. On this version of logical pluralism, logic is considered to be normative, in the sense that someone who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bound to accept the conclusion. So-called collapse arguments are designed to show the incompatibility of the simultaneous acceptance of logical pluralism and the normativity of logic. Caret, however, by proposing logical contextualism, and Blake-Turner and (...)
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  15. Beyond Logical Pluralism and Logical Monism.Pavel Arazim - 2020 - Logica Universalis 14 (2):151-174.
    Logical pluralism as a thesis that more than one logic is correct seems very plausible for two basic reasons. First, there are so many logical systems on the market today. And it is unclear how we should decide which of them gets the logical rules right. On the other hand, logical monism as the opposite thesis still seems plausible, as well, because of normativity of logic. An approach which would manage to bring a synthesis of both logical pluralism and logical (...)
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  16. On the Very Idea of Choosing a Logic: The Role of the Background Logic.Jonas R. B. Arenhart & Sanderson Molick - 2020 - In Alexandre Costa-Leite (ed.), Abstract Consequence and Logics - Essays in Honor of Edélcio G. de Souza. London, UK: College Publications. pp. 267-286.
    Logical anti-exceptionalism is the view that logic is not special among the sciences. In particular, anti-exceptionalists claim that logical theory choice is effected on the same bases as any other theory choice procedure, i.e., by abduction, by weighting pros and cons of rival views, and by judging which theory scores best on a given set of parameters. In this paper, we first present the anti-exceptionalists favourite method for logical theory choice. After spotting on important features of the method, we discuss (...)
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  17. Pluralistic Perspectives on Logic: An Introduction.Colin R. Caret & Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4789-4800.
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  18. Making Sense of Logical Pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):433-454.
    The article is centered on the question of how best to understand the logical pluralism/logical monism debate. A number of suggestions are brought up and rejected on the ground that they re...
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  19. Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...)
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  20. Logic Isn’T Normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.
    Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and h...
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  21. Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):162–177.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L1 and L2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to φ, which is valid in L1 but invalid in L2. If you accept (...)
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  22. Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):411-432.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This very general characterization gives rise to a whole family of positions. I argue that not all of them are stable. The main argument in the paper is inspired by considerations known as the “collapse problem”, and it aims at the most popular form of logical pluralism advocated by JC Beall and Greg Restall. I argue that there is a more general argument available that challenges all variants (...)
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  23. Disagreement About Logic From a Pluralist Perspective.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3329-3350.
    Logical pluralism is commonly described as the view that there is more than one correct logic. It has been claimed that, in order for that view to be interesting, there has to be at least a potential for rivalry between the correct logics. This paper offers a detailed assessment of this suggestion. I argue that an interesting version of logical pluralism is hard, if not impossible, to achieve. I first outline an intuitive understanding of the notions of rivalry and correctness. (...)
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  24. Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic.Johan Benthem - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):571-601.
    We identify a pervasive contrast between implicit and explicit stances in logical analysis and system design. Implicit systems change received meanings of logical constants and sometimes also the notion of consequence, while explicit systems conservatively extend classical systems with new vocabulary. We illustrate the contrast for intuitionistic and epistemic logic, then take it further to information dynamics, default reasoning, and other areas, to show its wide scope. This gives a working understanding of the contrast, though we stop short of a (...)
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  25. Why Logical Pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.
    This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism. I hope to make this debate more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Any research program should be able to answer this question, but when faced with this task, many logical pluralists fall back on brute intuitions. This sets logical pluralism on a weak foundation and makes it seem as if nothing pressing is at stake in the debate. The (...)
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  26. DLEAC: A Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions.Massimiliano Carrara & Enrico Martino - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):379-388.
    This paper proposes a new dialetheic logic, a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions ), including classical logic as a particular case. In \, exclusivity is expressed via the speech acts of assuming and concluding. In the paper we adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox extended with a generalized notion of model and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion. The paper starts with an explanation of the adopted philosophical perspective, then (...)
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  27. Limiting Logical Pluralism.Suki Finn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4905-4923.
    In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation. I show this through a detailed analysis (...)
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  28. Is There a Neutral Metalanguage?Rea Golan - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4831-4858.
    Logical pluralists are committed to the idea of a neutral metalanguage, which serves as a framework for debates in logic. Two versions of this neutrality can be found in the literature: an agreed upon collection of inferences, and a metalanguage that is neutral as such. I discuss both versions and show that they are not immune to Quinean criticism, which builds on the notion of meaning. In particular, I show that the first version of neutrality is sub-optimal, and hard to (...)
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  29. A New Interpretation of Carnap’s Logical Pluralism.Teresa Kouri - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):305-314.
    Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism is often held to be one in which corresponding connectives in different logics have different meanings. This paper presents an alternative view of Carnap’s position, in which connectives can and do share their meaning in some contexts. This re-interpretation depends crucially on extending Carnap’s linguistic framework system to include meta-linguistic frameworks, those frameworks which we use to talk about linguistic frameworks. I provide an example that shows how this is possible, and give some textual evidence that (...)
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  30. The Later Wittgenstein’s Guide to Contradictions.Alessio Persichetti - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3783-3799.
    This paper portrays the later Wittgenstein’s conception of contradictions and his therapeutic approach to them. I will focus on and give relevance to the Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, plus the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. First, I will explain why Wittgenstein’s attitude towards contradictions is rooted in: a rejection of the debate about realism and anti-realism in mathematics; and Wittgenstein’s endorsement of logical pluralism. Then, I will explain Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach towards contradictions, and why it means that (...)
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  31. Radical Interpretation and Logical Pluralism.Piers Rawling - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):277-289.
    I examine Quine’s and Davidson’s arguments to the effect that classical logic is the one and only correct logic. This conclusion is drawn from their views on radical translation and interpretation, respectively. I focus on the latter, but I first address, independently, Quine’s argument to the effect that the ‘deviant’ logician, who departs from classical logic, is merely changing the subject. Regarding logical pluralism, the question is whether there is more than one correct logic. I argue that bivalence may be (...)
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  32. Translating Logical Terms.Stewart Shapiro - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):291-303.
    The is an old question over whether there is a substantial disagreement between advocates of different logics, as they simply attach different meanings to the crucial logical terminology. The purpose of this article is to revisit this old question in light a pluralism/relativism that regards the various logics as equally legitimate, in their own contexts. We thereby address the vexed notion of translation, as it occurs between mathematical theories. We articulate and defend a thesis that the notion of “same meaning” (...)
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  33. Logical Pluralism and Logical Normativity.Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is normative, it tells us something about how we ought to reason. If, as the pluralist would have it, there are several correct logics, those logics make incompatible recommendations as to how we ought to reason. But then which of these logics should we look to for normative guidance? I (...)
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  34. From Natural to Formal Language: A Case for Logical Pluralism.Pilar Terrés Villalonga - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):333-345.
    I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of the logical vocabulary. In particular, I argue that the apparent rivalry between classical and relevant logic can be resolved, given that both logics capture and formalize normative and legitimate senses of logical consequence: classical logic encodes “follows from” as truth preservation and captures the truth conditions of the logical constants, while relevant logic encodes a notion of “follows from” which, apart from preserving truth, avoids (...)
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  35. An Objection to Naturalism and Atheism From Logic.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2019 - In Graham Oppy (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Atheism and Philosophy. Malden: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 451-475.
    I proffer a success argument for classical logical consequence. I articulate in what sense that notion of consequence should be regarded as the privileged notion for metaphysical inquiry aimed at uncovering the fundamental nature of the world. Classical logic breeds necessitism. I use necessitism to produce problems for both ontological naturalism and atheism.
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  36. Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
    A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of scientific theories. I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a detailed case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more (...)
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  37. Against Logical Generalism.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4813-4830.
    The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong. We then outline an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which we call logical particularism.
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  38. The Simple Argument for Subclassical Logic.Jc Beall - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):30-54.
  39. Logical Pluralism Without the Normativity.Christopher Blake-Turner & Gillian Russell - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 20):1-19.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promising of which depends (...)
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  40. Pluralizm logiczny a relatywizm w logice.Bożena Czernecka-Rej - 2018 - Diametros 56:51-68.
    The aim of the article is to analyze the situation of contemporary logic with reference to the issue concerning connections between the pluralism of logical systems and relativism in logic. Accordingly, I seek answers to the following questions: Can the plurality of logic, more specifically, a large number and variety of systems constructed by logicians, be justified in a rational way? Does pluralism in logic imply the thesis of relativism? Is logical relativism in the contemporary philosophy of logic just a (...)
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  41. Pluralismo, Monismo e Relativismo Lógico.Diogo Dias - 2018 - Revista de Filosofia Moderna E Contemporânea 6 (2):21-36.
    Is there only one logic? Or are there several equally adequate logics? What does it mean, after all, that different logics can be equally adequate? And they would be adequate with respect to what?This article intends to analyze the different answers to these questions, that is, we will evaluate the central arguments of the debate between pluralism, relativism and logical monism. We will explain,on the one hand, the main assumptions of this discussion and, on the other hand, its philosophical ramifications. (...)
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  42. Quantifier Variance Dissolved.Suki Finn & Otávio Bueno - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:289-307.
    Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is not an (...)
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  43. Logical Pluralism From a Pragmatic Perspective.Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):578-591.
    This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of (...)
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  44. Connective Meaning in Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism.Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2018 - In Nathan Kellen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave. pp. 217-235.
    Jc Beall and Greg Restall (Logical Pluralism. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006) propose a logical pluralism where the corresponding connectives in each logic mean the same thing. They contrast this with a Carnapian pluralism, where different logics have corresponding connectives which do not share meanings. I will show that due to the manner in which connectives are given their meaning by Beall and Restall, relevant negation and intuitionistic negation cannot mean the same thing. Thus, their pluralism is at least partly Carnapian, (...)
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  45. Logical Normativity and Rational Agency—Reassessing Locke's Relation to Logic.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2018 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 56 (1):75-99.
    There is an exegetical quandary when it comes to interpreting Locke's relation to logic.On the one hand, over the last few decades a substantive amount of literature has been dedicated to explaining Locke's crucial role in the development of a new logic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Yolton names this new logic the "logic of ideas," while James Buickerood calls it "facultative logic."1 Either way, Locke's Essay is supposedly its "most outspoken specimen" or "culmination."2 Call this reading the (...)
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  46. Skeptics and Unruly Connectives: A Defence of and Amendment to the Non-Factualist Justification of Logic.Oliver Oxton - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo
    This thesis attempts to positively solve three problems in the foundations of logic. If logical connectives are defined by their introduction and elimination rules, then how might one prohibit the construction of dysfunctional rules, i.e. rules which let us infer anything from anything else? How might one be held accountable to the consequences of those logical rules that they accept in an argument? And, how might one who, for whatever reason, doubts those logical rules regularly taken for granted, be convinced (...)
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  47. Logical Nihilism: Could There Be No Logic?Gillian Russell - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):308-324.
    Logical monists and pluralists disagree about how many correct logics there are; the monists say there is just one, the pluralists that there are more. Could it turn out that both are wrong, and that there is no logic at all?
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  48. Change of Logic, Change of Meaning.Jared Warren - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):421-442.
    Some philosophers have argued that putative logical disagreements aren't really disagreements at all since when you change your logic you thereby change the meanings of your logical constants. According to this picture classical logicians and intuitionists don't really disagree, they just mean different things by terms like “not” and “or”. Quine gave an infamous “translation argument” for this view. Here I clarify the change of logic, change of meaning (CLCM) thesis, examine and find fault with Quine's translation argument for the (...)
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  49. Pluralisms in Truth and Logic.Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland and Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This edited volume brings together 18 state-of-the art essays on pluralism about truth and logic. Parts I and II are dedicated to respectively truth pluralism and logical pluralism, and Part III to their interconnections. Some contributors challenge pluralism, arguing that the nature of truth or logic is uniform. The majority of contributors, however, defend pluralism, articulate novel versions of the view, or contribute to fundamental debates internal to the pluralist camp. The volume will be of interest to truth theorists and (...)
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  50. How Do Logics Explain?Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):157-167.
    Anti-exceptionalists about logic maintain that it is continuous with the empirical sciences. Taking anti-exceptionalism for granted, we argue that traditional approaches to explanation are inadequate in the case of logic. We argue that Andrea Woody's functional analysis of explanation is a better fit with logical practice and accounts better for the explanatory role of logical theories.
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