We are witnessing increasing use of the Internet, particular social media, to criticize (perceived or actual) moral failings and misdemeanors. This phenomenon of so-called ‘online public shaming’ could provide a powerful tool for reinforcing valuable social norms. But it also threatens unwarranted and severe punishments meted out by online mobs. This paper analyses the dangers associated with the informal enforcement of norms, drawing on Locke, but also highlights its promise, drawing on recent discussions of social norms. We then consider two (...) crucial conditions that online public shaming must meet in order to be justifiable: proportionality and accountability. We argue that these requirements are in fact frequently violated, rendering most cases of online public shaming unjustified. While the use of online public shaming against others’ vices has some apparent virtues, it is currently rarely justified, given its own vices. (shrink)

How David Hume and Adam Smith forged a new way of thinking about the modern state What is the modern state? Conspicuously undertheorized in recent political theory, this question persistently animated the best minds of the Enlightenment. Recovering David Hume and Adam Smith's long-underappreciated contributions to the history of political thought, The Opinion of Mankind considers how, following Thomas Hobbes's epochal intervention in the mid-seventeenth century, subsequent thinkers grappled with explaining how the state came into being, what it fundamentally might (...) be, and how it could claim rightful authority over those subject to its power. Hobbes has cast a long shadow over Western political thought, particularly regarding the theory of the state. This book shows how Hume and Smith, the two leading lights of the Scottish Enlightenment, forged an alternative way of thinking about the organization of modern politics. They did this in part by going back to the foundations: rejecting Hobbes's vision of human nature and his arguements about our capacity to form stable societies over time. In turn, this was harnessed to a deep reconceptualization of how to think philosophically about politics in a secular world. The result was an emphasis on the "opinion of mankind," the necessary psychological basis of all political organization. Demonstrating how Hume and Smith broke away from Hobbesian state theory, The Opinion of Mankind also suggests ways in which these thinkers might shape how we think about politics today, and in turn how we might construct better political theory. (shrink)

How David Hume and Adam Smith forged a new way of thinking about the modern state What is the modern state? Conspicuously undertheorized in recent political theory, this question persistently animated the best minds of the Enlightenment. Recovering David Hume and Adam Smith's long-underappreciated contributions to the history of political thought, The Opinion of Mankind considers how, following Thomas Hobbes's epochal intervention in the mid-seventeenth century, subsequent thinkers grappled with explaining how the state came into being, what it fundamentally might (...) be, and how it could claim rightful authority over those subject to its power. Hobbes has cast a long shadow over Western political thought, particularly regarding the theory of the state. This book shows how Hume and Smith, the two leading lights of the Scottish Enlightenment, forged an alternative way of thinking about the organization of modern politics. They did this in part by going back to the foundations: rejecting Hobbes's vision of human nature and his arguements about our capacity to form stable societies over time. In turn, this was harnessed to a deep reconceptualization of how to think philosophically about politics in a secular world. The result was an emphasis on the "opinion of mankind," the necessary psychological basis of all political organization. Demonstrating how Hume and Smith broke away from Hobbesian state theory, The Opinion of Mankind also suggests ways in which these thinkers might shape how we think about politics today, and in turn how we might construct better political theory. (shrink)

People often reason about omissions. One line of research shows that people can distinguish between the semantics of omissive causes and omissive enabling conditions: for instance, not flunking out of college enabled you (but didn’t cause you) to graduate. Another line of work shows that people rely on the normative status of omissive events in inferring their causal role: if the outcome came about because the omission violated some norm, reasoners are more likely to select that omission as a cause. (...) We designed a novel paradigm that tests how norms interact with the semantics of omissive enabling conditions. The paradigm concerns the circuitry of a mechanical device that plays music. Two experiments used the paradigm to stipulate norms and present a distinct set of possibilities to participants. Participants chose which causal verb best described the operations of the machine. The studies revealed that participants’ responses are best predicted by their tendency to consider the semantics of omissive relations. In contrast, norms had little to no effect in participants’ responses. We conclude by marshaling the evidence and considering what role norms may play in people’s understanding of omissions. (shrink)

Sovereignty and strategic autonomy are felt to be at risk today, being threatened by the forces of rising international tensions, disruptive digital transformations and explosive growth of cybersecurity incidents. The combination of AI and cybersecurity is at the sharp edge of this development and raises many ethical questions and dilemmas. In this commentary, I analyse how we can understand the ethics of AI and cybersecurity in relation to sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The analysis is followed by policy recommendations, some of (...) which may appear to be controversial, such as the strategic use of ethics. I conclude with a reflection on underlying concepts as an invitation for further research. The goal is to inspire policy-makers, academics and business strategists in their work, and to be an input for public debate. (shrink)

Abstract3′ untranslated regions (3′ UTRs) of mRNAs have many functions, including mRNA processing and transport, translational regulation, and mRNA degradation and stability. These different functions require cis‐elements in 3′ UTRs that can be either sequence motifs or RNA structures. Here we review the role of secondary structures in the functioning of 3′ UTRs and discuss some of the trans‐acting factors that interact with these secondary structures in eukaryotic organisms. We propose potential participation of 3′‐UTR secondary structures in cytoplasmic polyadenylation in (...) the model organism Drosophila melanogaster. Because the secondary structures of 3′ UTRs are essential for post‐transcriptional regulation of gene expression, their disruption leads to a wide range of disorders, including cancer and cardiovascular diseases. Trans‐acting factors, such as STAU1 and nucleolin, which interact with 3′‐UTR secondary structures of target transcripts, influence the pathogenesis of neurodegenerative diseases and tumor metastasis, suggesting that they are possible therapeutic targets. (shrink)

L'actualité des Chiens de garde, nous aurions préféré ne pas en éprouver la robuste fraîcheur. Nous aurions aimé qu'un même côté de la barricade cessât de réunir penseurs de métier et bâtisseurs de ruines. Nous aurions voulu que la dissidence fût devenue à ce point contagieuse que l'invocation de Nizan au sursaut et à la résistance en parût presque inutile. Car nous continuons à vouloir un autre monde. L'entreprise nous dépasse? Notre insuffisance épuise notre persévérance? Souvenons-nous alors de ce passage (...) par lequel Sartre a résumé l'appel aux armes de son vieux camarade : "Il peut dire aux uns : vous mourez de modestie, osez désirer, soyez insatiables, ne rougissez pas de vouloir la lune : il nous la faut. Et aux autres : dirigez votre rage sur ceux qui l'ont provoquée, n'essayez pas d'échapper à votre mal, cherchez ses causes et cassez-les." Serge Hamili Extrait de la préface. (shrink)

Like Plato, Protagoras held that young children learn virtue from fine examples in poetry. Unlike Plato, Protagoras taught adults by correcting the diction of poets. In this paper I ask what his standard of correctness might be, and what benefit he intended his students to take from exercises in correction. If his standard of correctness is truth, then he may intend his students to learn by questioning the content of poems; that would be suggestive of Plato’s program in Republic III. (...) But his standard is more likely to be the accurate use of language; in that case he would intend his students to learn to express their thoughts clearly enough that their audience would understand what they were saying. That standard would be independent of the truth of what they are saying; and that would be a precursor to modern techniques by which we try to teach speaking and writing. Truth is not so easy to escape, however, and we shall see that Protagoras’ exercise must assume that the poet is trying to tell the truth. (shrink)

The paper explores Śaṅkara's position on autonomous consciousness, or cit, as the fundamental reality. As such, cit transcends subject/object duality, and Śaṅkara holds that consciousness is ultimately nirviṣayaka or non-intentional. I compare and contrast the Advaita view with the contemporary Phenomenological account, wherein consciousness is held to be essentially intentional, so that consciousness is always of or about some object or content, and where consciousness without an object is deemed conceptually impossible.

Adriaan van Roomen published an outline of what he called a Mathesis Universalis in 1597. This earned him a well-deserved place in the history of early modern ideas about a universal mathematics which was intended to encompass both geometry and arithmetic and to provide general rules valid for operations involving numbers, geometrical magnitudes, and all other quantities amenable to measurement and calculation. ‘Mathesis Universalis’ (MU) became the most common (though not the only) term for mathematical theories developed with that aim. (...) At some time around 1600 van Roomen composed a new version of his MU, considerably different from the earlier one. This second version was never effectively published and it has not been discussed in detail in the secondary literature before. The text has, however, survived and the two versions are presented and compared in the present article. Sections 1–6 are about the first version of van Roomen’s MU the occasion of its publication (a controversy about Archimedes’ treatise on the circle, Sect. 2), its conceptual context (Sect. 3), its structure (with an overview of its definitions, axioms, and theorems) and its dependence on Clavius’ use of numbers in dealing with both rational and irrational ratios (Sect. 4), the geometrical interpretation of arithmetical operations multiplication and division (Sect. 5), and an analysis of its content in modern terms. In his second version of a MU van Roomen took algebra into account, inspired by Viète’s early treatises; he planned to publish it as part of a new edition of Al-Khwarizmi’s treatise on algebra (Sect. 7). Section 8 describes the conceptual background and the difficulties involved in the merging of algebra and geometry; Sect. 9 summarizes and analyzes the definitions, axioms and theorems of the second version, noting the differences with the first version and tracing the influence of Viète. Section 10 deals with the influence of van Roomen on later discussions of MU, and briefly sketches Descartes’ ideas about MU as expressed in the latter’s Regulae. (shrink)

Paul M. Pietroski presents an ambitious new account of human languages as generative procedures that respect substantive constraints. He argues that meanings are neither concepts nor extensions, and sentences do not have truth conditions; meanings are composable instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort.

Volume 2, Issue 4, December 2018, Page 355-364.

Cuando ahora las formas de hacer historia materializan una multiplicidad de grafías, y el giro reflexivo y el giro historiográfico nos permiten idear las historias de las teorías de la historia en una posibilidad más, en este ensayo se presenta un deseo, una promesa cuya llave de acceso precisa saber lo que pretende la locución arqueoescritura. Esbozos y trazas de la teoría de la historia en cuestión: ¿qué cabe esperar en las escrituras diferidas de la arqueoescritura? Escrituras equívocas en clave (...) derridiana de la teoría de la historia como historiografía. Una posibilidad imposible aplazada. Escrituras para examinar la metafísica de la presencia en la historiografía, conscientes de que no podrán formular una teoría de la historia en la única firma derridiana, porque lo real se resiste a ser domado e incorporado al impar filosófico derridiano. (shrink)

In a belief ascription like ‘Sam believes that Hesperus rises in the evening’, the complementizer ‘that’ is a device for referring to the sense of the embedded sentence. On this Fregean view, substitutivity of co‐referential terms need not preserve truth. This accounts for the opacity of propositional attitude ascriptions, while preserving what Davidson called semantic innocence.

The proposed account of causation, in terms of explanation, does not sleight the mind‐independence of causal relations. The relevant notion of explanation is objective, even if facts are taken to be abstract Fregean ‘modes of presenting’ events. Causation remains a natural, and often perceptible relation between spatiotemporal particulars. But we must resist empiricist conceptions of causation.

Nederlandse wijsbegeerte.--Fichte, Schelling, Hegel en hun kring.

I. Grundprobleme. 2. Aufl. 1898.--II. Das Weib. 1897.--III. Gut und Böse. 1900.

The idea of artificial intelligence implies the existence of a form of intelligence that is “natural,” or at least not artificial. The problem is that intelligence, whether “natural” or “artificial,” is not well defined: it is hard to say what, exactly, is or constitutes intelligence. This difficulty makes it impossible to measure human intelligence against artificial intelligence on a unique scale. It does not, however, prevent us from comparing them; rather, it changes the sense and meaning of such comparisons. Comparing (...) artificial intelligence with human intelligence could allow us to understand both forms better. This paper thus aims to compare and distinguish these two forms of intelligence, focusing on three issues: forms of embodiment, autonomy and judgment. Doing so, I argue, should enable us to have a better view of the promises and limitations of present-day artificial intelligence, along with its benefits and dangers and the place we should make for it in our culture and society. (shrink)

John Calvin drew from patristic authors in a selective manner. His preference for the theological perspectives of Augustine is readily evident. Nevertheless, while he resonated with the doctrine of Augustine, he touted the interpretive and homiletic labors of John Chrysostom. Even though Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion critiqued Chrysostom’s understanding of grace and free will, the Antiochene bishop is the most frequently referenced patristic author within Calvin’s commentaries. Calvin composed a preface to a projected edition of Chrysostom’s homilies (Praefatio (...) in Chrysostomi Homilias). This preface argued for the necessity of reaching the general public with secondary aids along with the scriptures, explained Calvin’s esteem for Chrysostom’s homilies above other patristic texts, and acknowledged the theological dissimilarities that separated his views from Chrysostom’s. The Praefatio’s assessments reveal Calvin’s own hermeneutical, pastoral, and theological priorities. Calvin’s evaluations of Chrysostom and the other fathers are a window into his own interpretive concerns, homiletical aims, and dogmatic emphases. (shrink)

Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.

[This is a paper that was originally written in 2017 and doesn't represent Silva's current thinking about the relation between belief and degrees of confidence. See On Believing and Being Convinced for more.] Can there be knowledge and rational belief in the absence of a rational degree of confidence? Yes, and cases of "mistuned knowledge" demonstrate this. In this paper we leverage this normative possibility in support of advancing our understanding of the metaphysical relation between belief and credence. It is (...) generally assumed that a Lockean metaphysics of belief that reduces outright belief to degrees of confidence would immediately effect a unification of coarse-grained epistemology of belief with fine-grained epistemology of confidence. Scott Sturgeon has suggested that the unification is effected by understanding the relation between outright belief and confidence as an instance of the determinable-determinate relation. But determination of belief by confidence would not by itself yield the result that norms for confidence carry over to norms for outright belief unless belief and high confidence are token identical. We argue that this token-identity thesis is incompatible with the neglected phenomenon of “mistuned knowledge”—knowledge and rational belief in the absence of rational confidence. We contend that there are genuine cases of mistuned knowledge and that, therefore, epistemological unification must forego token identity of belief and high confidence. We show how partial epistemological unification can be secured given determination of outright belief by degrees of confidence even without token-identity. Finally, we suggest a direction for the pursuit of thoroughgoing epistemological unification. (shrink)

Gilbert and colleagues point out the discrepancy between the limited empirical data illustrating changes in personality following implantation of deep brain stimulating electrodes and the vast number of conceptual neuroethics papers implying that these changes are widespread, deleterious, and clinically significant. Their findings are reminiscent of C. P. Snow’s essay on the divide between the two cultures of the humanities and the sciences. This division in the literature raises significant ethical concerns surrounding unjustified fear of personality changes in the context (...) of DBS and negative perceptions of clinician-scientists engaged in DBS. These concerns have real world implications for funding future innovative, DBS trials aimed to reduce suffering as well as hampering true interdisciplinary scholarship. We argue that the philosophical tradition of pragmatism and the value it places on empirical inquiry, experiential knowledge, and inter-disciplinary scholarship – reflecting diverse ways of knowing – provides a framework to start to address the important questions Gilbert and colleagues raise. In particular, we highlight the importance of expert clinician knowledge in contributing to the neuroethical questions raised by Gilbert and colleagues. Finally, we provide illustrative examples of some of our interdisciplinary empirical research that demonstrate the iterative cycle of inquiry characteristic of pragmatism in which conceptual neuroethics questions have led to empirical studies whose results then raise additional conceptual questions that give rise to new empirical studies in a way that highlights the contributions of the humanities and the sciences. (shrink)

De Marco and colleagues claim that the standard account of invasiveness as commonly encountered ‘…does not capture all uses of the term in relation to medical interventions1 ’. This is open to challenge. Their first example is ‘non-invasive prenatal testing’. Because it involves puncturing the skin to obtain blood, De Marco et al take this as an example of how an incision or insertion is not sufficient to make an intervention invasive; here is a procedure that involves an incision, but (...) it is regarded as non-invasive. However, this ignores the context, and the term should really be understood in reference to the fetus. It is hard to believe healthcare professionals regard taking blood to measure, for example, ferritin levels as invasive but taking blood to look for fragments of fetal DNA as not. If anyone uses the term thinking it is not invasive to the mother, the solution would be to call it invasive, not redefine what is invasive. De Marco and colleagues’ second example is describing electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) as invasive. However, this is not borne out by their referenced papers. The first cited source is about non-invasive brain stimulation2 and only contains a single sentence about ECT. This sentence may suggest that their view is that ECT …. (shrink)