Lombardo and Bell have translated this important early dialogue on virtue, wisdom, and the nature of Sophistic teaching into an idiom remarkable for its liveliness and subtlety.

Where does the notion of free will come from? How and when did it develop, and what did that development involve? In Michael Frede's radically new account of the history of this idea, the notion of a free will emerged from powerful assumptions about the relation between divine providence, correctness of individual choice, and self-enslavement due to incorrect choice. Anchoring his discussion in Stoicism, Frede begins with Aristotle--who, he argues, had no notion of a free will--and ends with (...) Augustine. Frede shows that Augustine, far from originating the idea, derived most of his thinking about it from the Stoicism developed by Epictetus. (shrink)

Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 13.1 (2005) 5-19 [Access article in PDF] Didactology as a Field of Theory and Research in Music Education Frede V. Nielsen Danish University of Education, Copenhagen Two problem areas which both concern the question of music pedagogy as a field of theory and research are addressed in this paper. The first one concerns the question of the normative and prescriptive versus the descriptive (...) and analytical aspects of music pedagogy. The second is about the theory of and the criteria for the selection of content in music education. In order to address these problems it is necessary to formulate certain preconditions, each of which comprises important distinctions. Preconditions and Problem Areas German pedagogical tradition features the term Didaktik, and when the area in question is placed in relation to an educational subject, such as music, the word and the concept of Fachdidaktik (subject-oriented Didaktik) arises. In Scandinavian countries corresponding concepts can be found.1Two features of the German concept of Didaktik should be emphasized. First, it denotes both the theory and science and the planning and decision-making of teaching and learning. Thus it refers to the theoretically oriented as well [End Page 5] as the practically directed concerns in pedagogy. Second, from the point of view of disciplines, Didaktik is part of the discipline of pedagogy, but there are diverging conceptions and theories of how it is to be delimited in relation to other subsections of pedagogy (such as teaching methodology). Roughly speaking, there exists a narrow or specific conception of Didaktik, which is first and foremost concerned with the question of the content, aim, and rationale of teaching and learning, together with the criteria for the selection of content, and a wide conception, according to which practically all problems regarding teaching and learning are viewed as didaktisch (including questions of teaching methods, forms of organization, and the choice of media).Significant arguments can be put forward in favor of the specific concept of Didaktik because it provides the opportunity (and actually the compulsion) to focus distinctly and separately on the fundamental issue of educational content and its selection. From this specific point of view, Didaktik can be defined as dealing with the theory and science, together with planning and decision-making, about the rationale, aim, and content of teaching and learning. The most central didactic question may then be formulated in this way: What is essential to learn, and therefore to teach, and why? In the present context it is important to note that this definition comprises both a descriptive/analytical and a prescriptive/normative determination of Didaktik. Hence arises the first of the problem areas I intend to address in greater detail, that is, the question of the normative and prescriptive character of pedagogy versus its descriptive, analytical, and scientific standing (in the present case that part of pedagogy which I have termed Didaktik).Several types of high-level rationale for the selection of teaching/learning content can be established. For general education in a subject like music (yet with application to other subjects as well) I have formulated four such types, which I also refer to as paradigms.2 Here I use the word "didactics" in the sense of the German Didaktik. The first type I call "basic subject didactics" in which the point of departure is the subject itself and its structure, in our case the subject of music. There is more on this point below. The second type is "ethno-didactics" in which the point of departure is pupil culture and the everyday experience of the pupils or criteria arising out of current local culture. It represents a micro-cultural position in post-modern style. The third type is "challenge didactics" in which the point of departure is the great social problems, such as environmental issues, global North-South relations, conditions of democracy, or for that matter terrorism. This position may be said to have a macro-cultural, problem-oriented, and inter-disciplinary bias. A theory of social criticism is a frequent theoretical anchoring point... (shrink)

"This volume presents stimulating and provocative work on how the history of philosophy is done and how it should be done, by Michael Frede, a pre-eminent figure in ancient philosophy until his early death in 2007. His Nellie Wallace lectures are published here accompanied by three related articles."--Publisher.

The relation between music pedagogy as a field of research and the practice of music education is characterized as a continuum ranging from remoteness through cooperation to full integration. A typology is drawn up (the where the relation is separate, co-operative, integrated,or parallel). All these types of relationship are considered necessary. The distinctive task of music pedagogical research is to question, explore, and develop issues, conditions, and potentialities within the practice of music education by rendering them accessible to consciousness and (...) conceptual thought in verbal terms. Consequently, it has to do its utmost not to degenerate into ideology. The role of teacher education is discussed. Examples show how research may matter to practical music teaching and learning. An overall conclusion is that the relationship in question should be marked by closeness and distance at the same time in order to ensure relevance as well as quality and integrity. (shrink)

THE CLAIM that even Plato could not say everything at once nor could have thought or worked out everything at once is, of course, a platitude. It is generally acknowledged that there is development in Plato's thought. But what the development is, is still a much fought-over question. For in spite of all scholarly efforts this intriguing question cannot be regarded as settled in a satisfactory way. This is due not only to the fact that we all look at Plato (...) through different eyes. There are just too many unknowns: We do not know when the dialogues were written nor in what order. We do not know what Plato himself regarded as the result of each of the dialogues nor how they are supposed to hang together. We do not know to what extent Plato himself is in agreement with what he lets Socrates say--or any of his partners. Nor do we always know what, precisely, the text itself says. And we do not know when Plato put the dialogues into the form in which they have come down to us. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Pleasure as a Good Aristotle on Pleasure Limitations and Drawbacks The Coherence of Aristotle's Treatment of Pleasure and Pain Conclusions Notes Reference.

This book, a collection of specially written essays by leading international scholars, reexamines ancient ideas of reason and rationality. The application of changing notions of rationality down the ages has led to consistent misinterpretation of standard ancient philosophical texts: the distinguished contributors here redress the balance, clarifying how the great thinkers of antiquity themselves conceived of rationality.

The philosophers and scholars of the Hellenistic world laid the foundations upon which the Western tradition based analytical grammar, linguistics, philosophy of language, and other disciplines probing the nature and origin of human communication. Building on the pioneering work of Plato and Aristotle, these thinkers developed a wide range of theories about the nature and origin of language which reflected broader philosophical commitments. In this collection of nine essays, a team of distinguished scholars examines the philosophies of language developed by, (...) among others, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, and Lucretius. They probe the early thinkers' philosophical adequacy and their impact on later theorists. With discussions ranging from the Stoics on the origin of language to the theories of language in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the collection will be of interest to students of philosophy and of language in the classical period and beyond. (shrink)

Phantasia is viewed as a unified concept in Aristotle. When the metaphoric meaning of ‘phantisizing’ is excluded, the causal account for all imagination is the same: all phantasiai are motions in the soul caused by sense-perceptions. These are sensory images or imprints that can exist independently from their original source. Their history may be different, and their character and value may vary. Aristotle’s insistence on their sensory nature indicates that he saw them as a unitary phenomenon in the soul, as (...) sensory appearances. (shrink)

This essay explores Aristotle’s conception of the soul. Aristotle believes that natural objects and their behaviour cannot be fully understood in terms of their material constituents and their properties, but have to be explained in terms of their essence or nature. Souls are simply a particular kind of essence or nature, namely the essence or nature of animal bodies. Doing justice to physical or natural phenomena requires the notion of a form or nature. Once this notion is allowed, it is (...) strong enough to account for all that one would want a soul to account for – life, the things living objects do, and even the so-called affections of the soul. (shrink)