History: Pleasure

of (from Studies in the History of Ethics).

According to Schopenhauer’s compensation argument for pessimism, the non-existence of the world is preferable to its existence because no goods can ever compensate for the mere existence of evil. Standard interpretations take this argument to be based on Schopenhauer’s thesis that all goods are merely the negation of evils, from which they assume it follows that the apparent goods in life are in fact empty and without value. This article develops a non-standard variant of the standard interpretation, which accepts the (...) relevance of the negativity thesis but rejects that the argument assumes that life’s goods are all empty and valueless. Instead, it argues that whatever value negative goods might possess, they do not have the kind of value to compensate for positive evils. This involves additional development of the negativity thesis and a defence of it against objections from Byron Simmons (2021). (shrink)

Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading (...) helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. Happiness is a cognitive process (akin to a mood), constituted fundamentally out of pleasure, which is grounded in increases in a substance’s power. A rational substance will sustain its happiness so long as it is more powerful than it is weak, and it is engaging in activities that increase its power. (shrink)

In this vast and ambitious tome, Michael Nylan aims to "trace the evolution of pleasure theories in early China over the course of a millennium and a half", roughly from 400 BCE to 1100 CE. This involves dissecting the discourse surrounding a single graph, le 樂, which Nylan translates as pleasure, and actively distinguishes from other states such as happiness and joy. Nylan understands such pleasure as "deeper satisfactions" realized in long-term commitments and often relational in nature. In texts, pleasure (...) is often associated with "objects of consequence" such as intimate friends, Heaven, graceful and charismatic acts and family profession or heritage (p.... (shrink)

David Wootton has written an engaging book about the emergence of the theory that all human action is self-interested and that believes societies should be structured in ways that satisfy our “insa...

In both the Laches (191d-e) and the Laws (1.633c-d, 1.634a-b, and 1. 635d), Plato has his protagonist defend the claim that courage (andreia) is not simply a matter of resisting pain and fear but about overcoming pleasure and desire as well. In this paper, I argue that Plato took the expansive view of courage seriously and that there are several reasons why we should too.

Aristotle repeatedly qualifies the pleasure of courageous actions relative to other kinds of virtuous actions. This article argues that the pleasure of courageous actions is qualified because virtuous activity and its pleasure is dependent upon external conditions, and the external conditions of courageous actions are particularly constraining. The article shows that Curzer’s explanation of the qualified pleasure of courageous actions by the presence of pain violates Aristotle’s commitment to virtuous actions as being pleasant by their nature.

What is the role of pleasure in Chinese intellectual traditions? Do Chinese thinkers shun all desire for pleasure? Contrary to received opinion, The Chinese Pleasure Book illustrates and argues that early Chinese thinkers across traditions, from the fourth century BCE to the eleventh century CE, all assume that pleasure-seeking and pleasure-taking are part of the human condition and that it is right to engage in such actions. The volume is an ambitious project and Nylan has done a superb job.

In the first two books of De finibus, Cicero deals with the Epicurean view of the final goal of life. This philosophical discussion, which is preceded by a rhetorical proem that stands on itself, is framed as a dialogue between Torquatus, who defends the Epicurean position, Cicero, who attacks it, and Triarius, who confines himself to a few critical interventions. If philosophy starts in wonder, according to the celebrated passage from Plato's Theaetetus, the company meets this criterion admirably well, for (...) the actual discussion starts with Torquatus’ surprise about Cicero's aversion to the Epicurean view. He even suggests that this aversion has nothing to do with a fundamental disapproval of Epicurus’ doctrines but that it should rather be sought in stylistic concerns. (shrink)

In Book 9 of Plato's Republic we find three proofs for the claim that the just person is happier than the unjust person. Curiously, Socrates does not seem to consider these arguments to be coequal when he announces the third and final proof as ‘the greatest and most decisive of the overthrows’. This remark raises a couple of related questions for the interpreter. Whatever precise sense we give to μέγιστον and κυριώτατον in this passage, Socrates is clearly appealing to an (...) argumentative standard of some kind, and claiming that his final argument alone meets this standard. But what precise standard is Socrates invoking here? And given that the first two arguments of Book 9 fall short of this standard, why does he not simply leap directly to the third, most decisive proof? (shrink)

This paper addresses two interpretive puzzles in Plato’s Philebus. The first concerns the claim, endorsed by both interlocutors, that the most godlike of lives is a pleasureless life of pure thinking. This appears to run afoul of the verdict of the earlier so-called ‘Choice of Lives’ argument that a mixed life is superior to either of its ‘pure’ rivals. A second concerns Socrates’ discussion of false pleasure, in which he appears to be guilty of rank equivocation. I argue that we (...) can solve both puzzles by attributing to Plato an account of pleasure as a species of intentional attitude. (shrink)

[This is the penultimate version, please send me an email for the final version]. Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of a satisfied experiential-desire (...) account. (shrink)

Plato’s nephew Speusippus has been widely accepted as the historical person behind the mask of the anti-hedonists in Phlb. 42b–44c. This hypothesis is supported by, inter alia, the link between Socrates’ char- acterization of them as δυσχερεῖς and the frequent references of δυσχέρεια as ἀπορία to Speusippus in Aristotle’s Metaphysics MN. This study argues against assigning any privileged status to Speusippus in the assimilation of δυσχέρεια with ἀπορία. Instead, based on a comprehensive survey of how δυσχερ- words were used in (...) classical antiquity, the semantic shift of δυσχέρεια can be explained in an alternative way. (shrink)

This study seeks to update and expand the models of mind and consciousness that Ferdinand de Saussure conceived for the appreciation of linguistic signs. As a response to his theorization of the dual essence of language, this study proposes a theorization of pleasure and understanding deriving from our engagement with daunting situations in nature and culture. To begin with, the author discusses current neuroimaging findings that reveal how we may gain from low-arousal emotions. Certain benefits have been recognized that increase (...) the pleasure and delight we may obtain through conscientious mental work rather than via instincts and preferences. Thus, in this context, the Saussurean network of differences is seen to be capable of generating motivated neural links that function to adjust our viewpoints. Further, in light of Adolphe Pictet’s mingling of philosophical aesthetics and linguistics, this study corrects a misapplication of another Saussurean model in appreciating the Kantian notions of imagination and the sublime. Instead of judging this model as a revelation of one single ideal viewpoint, Pictet’s approach invites us to appreciate it as the functioning of a rigorous yet practical mind that is capable of devising multiple and useful perspectives. Notions of the sublime, the ugly and the beautiful are therefore equated as legitimate viewpoints that we should draw on so as to survive dealing with daunting situations in nature and culture. Finally, this study unifies and fortifies the Saussurean models through aligning them with a phenomenological approach to our memories, sensations and perceptions. Such integration empowers our imagination and confidence while we are widening our horizons to invent larger contexts for our objects of inquiry. All in all, the author cherishes the Saussurean models as a combination of the linguistic, the aesthetic and the moral laws that altogether sharpen our way of devising rationales that may boost the wellbeing of the community. (shrink)

The main aims of this article are to demonstrate the presence of two physiological conceptions of pleasure in the Hippocratic Corpus, pointing out the differences between them and conjecturing about the reverberation of one of them in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias. We can find in texts of Greek medicine a description of pleasure produced during sexual intercourse and another related to the occurrence of pleasure during nourishment. However, the second account, unlike the first one, is strongly marked by the notion of (...) pleasure as replenishment. Identifying a physiological conception of pleasure featured by a process of filling in the Hippocratic Corpus is relevant because a very similar conception seems to be taken as starting point by Plato in his reflections on pleasure. (shrink)

The main aims of this article are to demonstrate the presence of two physiological conceptions of pleasure in the Hippocratic Corpus, pointing out the differences between them and conjecturing about the reverberation of one of them in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias. We can find in texts of Greek medicine a description of pleasure produced during sexual intercourse and another related to the occurrence of pleasure during nourishment. However, the second account, unlike the first one, is strongly marked by the notion of (...) pleasure as replenishment. Identifying a physiological conception of pleasure featured by a process of filling in the Hippocratic Corpus is relevant because a very similar conception seems to be taken as starting point by Plato in his reflections on pleasure. (shrink)

Philosophical thinking about pleasure today, especially in the context of normative ethics, is deeply influenced by the concept’s function within Bentham’s and Mill’s Utilitarianism, according to which the moral quality of any action depends on its tendency to “maximize pleasure” and “minimize pain”. According to Mill’s own philosophy of science and language, the content and function of “pleasure” is determined by its role in scientific induction, specifically within the associationist psychological theory Mill shares with his father, James Mill. Pleasures, it (...) turns out, are a quality of sensations with inductive links to other mental states, the power to explain actions, and the potential for being physiologically explained. The semantic content of “pleasure” as a general name, and thus the content of the moral precepts set up by Mill’s Principle of Utility, must be thought of as responsive to inductive progress in associationist psychology, ethology and the neurosciences. (shrink)

So just what Dante scorns as unworthy alike of heaven and hell, Botticelli accepts, that middle world in which men take no side in great conflicts, and decide no great causes, and make great refusals.In what follows, I examine a notion of desire that, I shall claim, is implicit in Immanuel Kant's theorization of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment.1 At first, this undertaking is likely to seem misguided. After all, Kant grounds his attempt to provide an a priori (...) foundation for judgment on the tripartite distinction between the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire. Only the second of the three pertains to aesthetic judgment; and it... (shrink)

In various and sundry works, Farabi and Avicenna turn to art, its objectivity, and miscellaneous functions. In their writings, art’s aims and functions become pronounced; however, art’s goals and applications can be deduced from their theory of imagination. The power of imagination can depict the sensory forms, imaginary forma, as well as intelligible truths. The ultimate goal of the individuals vs. society is to provide the public with intelligible happiness; however, entertainment, wonder, and pleasure are reckoned as acceptable benefits of (...) art. While Avicenna explicitly mentions wonder, Farabi doesn’t examine the case on its own merits. The other properties are identified for both philosophers. Being first objective of artist activities, final happiness allows entertainment and pleasure just enough of pausing for breathes so as to take pains toward the ultimate cheeriness. As well, while Farabi underlines entertainment, Avicenna doesn’t focus on the issue. (shrink)

In the Critique of Judgment Kant repeatedly points out that it is only the pleasure of taste that reveals to us the need to introduce a third faculty of the mind with its own a priori principle. In order to elucidate this claim I discuss two general principles about pleasure that Kant presents, the transcendental definition of pleasure from § 10 and the principle from the Introduction that connects pleasure with the achievement of an aim. Precursors of these principles had (...) been employed by Kant and others in empirical psychology. But how can such principles of empirical psychology be transferred to transcendental philosophy? I suggest that Kant accomplishes this by deriving the connection of pleasure with achievement of an aim from the transcendental definition and the assumption that faculties have interests. I finally reconstruct § 11 as a ‘regressive argument’ from the peculiarities of the pleasure of taste to the need to acknowledge a new faculty. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics X.5, Aristotle gives a series of arguments for the claim that pleasures differ from one another in kind in accordance with the differences in kind among the activities they arise in connection with. I develop an interpretation of these arguments based on an interpretation of his theory of pleasure (which I have defended elsewhere) according to which pleasure is the perfection of perfect activity. In the course of developing this interpretation, I reconstruct Aristotle’s phenomenology of pleasure, arguing (...) that while he denies that all pleasures share any given phenomenal element, he does think that all pleasures have a common phenomenal structure. Finally, I argue that Aristotle’s view that pleasures differ in kind does not imply that they cannot be compared in pleasantness. (shrink)

In the Philebus Socrates presents his division of the kinds of pleasures and pains to an interlocutor who confesses himself incapable of employing the dialectical method of division that this task ideally requires and is committed to defending a hedonist theory of value. These two features of his interlocutor affect the way in which Socrates presents his accounts of pleasure and pain. The philosophical reader needs to rethink the accounts of pleasure and pain to produce an account that is free (...) from these limitations. In this paper I sketch the outlines of such an account, based on material that Socrates provides throughout the dialogue. I argue that there are two fundamental, mutually irreducible types of pain and pleasure: those produced by the disruption and restoration of a natural harmony, and those involving the representation of oneself as in a good or bad state. I then produce an account of pleasure and pain as such, which applies to both of these types: pleasure and pain are the cognition of oneself as in a good or bad state. (shrink)

Why do we choose agent X and not Y to be our friend? I examine aspects of Aristotle’s theories of virtuous friendship and pleasure to answer this question. Specifically, I argue that pleasure is connected to the good, and has two fundamental functions for Aristotle: 1) it is a judgment of value, and 2) it accompanies good activity. Furthermore, I show that the pleasure from the good plays an instrumental role in the friendship among virtuous agents. In particular, it is (...) a motivating coefficient in the choice of friends, among virtu-ous agents. Against a more traditional reading of Aristotle on friendship such as Nehamas, I argue that although virtue is sufficient for friendship, it is not, for Aristotle, determinant of the choice of friends. The variety of virtue which agents display gives rise to different experiences of pleasure in other agents who are themselves varyingly good between them, and acts differentially on them as an attraction. This reveals a richness of both choice and variety in the Aristotelian theory of virtuous friendship, as opposed to the monotone account of friendship that has been attributed to his ethical theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJacques Lacan studied Chinese classics and received much inspiration from Zhuangzi. This paper concentrates on the comparative study of morality in those two thinkers from three connecting levels, namely, nature as the source of ethical codes, reason as the means to arrive at the ethical state, and pleasure as the ultimate purpose of morality. The investigation into the topic is enlightening for posthuman morality. Zhuangzi’s idea of the poetics of oneness inspires the Lacanian concept of the Real and ushers us (...) into a new territory to rethink animal rights. (shrink)

This paper considers Freud's 1920 text, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in light of Jacques Derrida's critical commentary on it in The Post Card. Against the deconstructive reading that highlights the performative aspects of Freud's speculative remarks, David-Ménard reads Freud's theory of the death drive as an epistemological and experimental hypothesis necessary for giving an account of the complexity and diversity of the clinical phenomenon of repetition in psychoanalysis. Though the death drive never appears locatable as such in the various examples (...) given by Freud, it is nonetheless accessible in the constellation of differences produced by traumatic dreams, children's games, etc. (shrink)

Pleasure is a long-discussed issue in philosophy, because it is the result of soul and its powers which are discussed in philosophy. Therefore, such philosophers as Aristotle, Farabi, Avicenna, and Mulla Sadra have discussed it extensively in their writings. In his various works, Avicenna has scrutinized the problem of pleasure. Having referred to one type of pleasure special for each human power, he regards the apprehension of absolute good as the most delightful thing for intellective soul, which should be achieved (...) by removing and overcoming its obstacles, including soul’s negligence over its. (shrink)

Applying analytical and descriptive approaches, this inquiry reveals the relationship between the meaning of life and the role of pleasure in achieving it Ibn Sina presents well-being as something which is desired for- itself and end for-itself and believes that well-being is a necessary and sufficient condition for a meaningful life. In his view, there is a deep relation between meaning and pleasure. Pleasure is the direct and innate perception of individual perceptual faculty to what in his/her view is good (...) and perfect. The Ibn Sina’s psychology has a direct impact on well-being and pleasure topics. He, in regarding perceptual faculty of the psyche, intends different levels for well-being and pleasure which among them, intellectual or spiritual pleasures has a more important role to achieve meaning. Moreover, between psyche faculties, only the intellectual or spiritual faculty is immortal. This faculty, also, determines the ultimate well-being and pleasure in the hereafter. Ibn Sina seemingly believes that intellectual or spiritual pleasure is a necessary and sufficient condition for achieving meaning. Thus, looking for intellectual pleasures is the same as seeking well-being and meaning of life. (shrink)

the philebus is a puzzling dialogue, both for the substantive views it puts forward,1 and for the unexpected twists and turns of the discussion. Commentators frequently complain about the dialogue's lack of unity, due to its many apparently unnecessary digressions and interruptions.2 The discussion of the so-called 'divine method' seems to be one of the worst offenders on this score, for it is described and exemplified at length, only to be set aside as unnecessary shortly afterwards.I argue that the divine (...) method plays a vital role in the subsequent examination and evaluation of pleasure and knowledge. I focus in particular on the application of the divine method to pleasure, since the method is... (shrink)

The Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads characterize the life of the saṃnyāsin as devoid of earthly pleasures. At the same time, these and other texts record confusion and suspicion toward those who would pursue such a life, and disbelief that such severe austerity could be required. To many, the saṃnyāsin seems to forsake the good life in forsaking earthly pleasures. I call this the ‘Precluded Pleasures Objection’ to the saṃnyāsin ideal. A number of replies to the Precluded Pleasures Objection might be drawn from (...) the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads themselves. The first points out that the saṃnyāsin ideal is typically reserved for members of the twice-born classes, and perhaps only brāhmaṇa men, who have reached relative... (shrink)

Near the end of the Protagoras there is a famous argument in which Socrates appears to deny the possibility of weakness of will. The passage is part of a longer examination of whether virtue can be taught and of the unity of the virtues. Socrates and Protagoras discuss whether it makes sense to say, as people commonly do, that they sometimes choose to do things they know are not best for them because they are “overcome by pleasure.” Supposedly “the many” (...) hold that the good is pleasure, and that one chooses what is less good because it is most pleasant. Socrates takes Protagoras through a kind of elenctic examination that purports to show that the many’s claim to being overcome by pleasure in akrasia is absurd or ridiculous. They can’t really do what they claim to do, choose the less good for the more good; thus, and the claim that they do is a misdescription of what really happens. People act in these cases due to ignorance of what is truly the most good. In order to prevent people from choosing things that are not best for them, or to save them, Socrates says that what is needed is an art or science of measurement. In this paper I want to focus on the idea of such an art or science of measurement. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the famous passage toward the end of the Protagoras often referred to as containing the argument against the possibility of akrasia or weakness of will, where Socrates sets out a hedonistic position and on its basis argues against the possibility of being overcome by pleasure. The article explores the function of the hedonistic position in the philosophical argumentation of the dialogue. To this purpose, it traces the repeated emphasis in the text that the hedonistic thesis (...) is a premise in the argument against the weakness of will as well as in the argument that an art of measurement will be the salvation of our life. Displaying how the text likewise underlines that this premise is accepted by Protagoras on behalf of the many, the author maintains that these arguments are not plausibly read as supporting Socrates’ own views and that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, Socrates is not denying the possibility of akrasia or of being overcome by pleasure. The article seeks to show how Socrates’ arguments function collectively as a reductio ad absurdum of the hedonistic thesis itself. Underpinning the interpretation with reference to details of the dramatic exchange between Protagoras and Socrates, and pointing to parallels with the Theaetetus and thePhaedrus, the article further argues that Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras in this part of the dialogue aims at exposing the position of the sophist as both untenable and laughable: The art of measuring pleasure and pain is neither a virtue nor does it involve the knowledge needed to discover what the good is. (shrink)

© British Society of Aesthetics 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society of Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] interpretations of Kant’s ethics have tended to foreground its more humane characteristics, stressing the prominence of emotion, habituation and virtue, distancing us from the harsh and mechanical Kant of legend.1 At the same time there has been increasing interest among aestheticians in the moral significance of the aesthetic and in the role it may (...) play in moral development. The Possibility of Culture, a study of the role Kant ascribed to aesthetic experience in fostering the development of moral character, is thus timely and welcome. Murray draws upon texts not traditionally considered in studies of Kant’s aesthetics, especially the Anthropology and the Doctrine of Virtue, while placing relatively little emphasis on the well-worked questions surrounding the justification of judgements of... (shrink)

Feeling, for any animal, is a faculty of comparing objects or representations with regard to whether they promote its vital powers or hinder them. But whereas these comparisons presuppose a species-concept in non-rational animals, nature has not equipped the human being with a universal principle or life-form that would determine what agrees or disagrees with it. As humans, we must determine our mode of life for ourselves. Contrary to other interpretations, I argue that this places the human capacity for pleasure (...) and displeasure outside of nature and in a realm of spirit. (shrink)

This paper considers how Plato can account for the fact that pain features prominently in the intellectual pleasures of philosophers, given that in his view pleasures mixed with pain are ontologically deficient and inferior to ‘pure,’ painless pleasures. After ruling out the view that Plato does not believe intellectual pleasures are actually painful, I argue that he provides a coherent and overlooked account of pleasure in the Phaedrus, where purity does not factor into the philosopher’s judgment of pleasures at all; (...) what matters instead is the extent to which a given pleasure fosters the philosophical life. I show that to argue, as James Warren has recently done, that Plato thinks intellectual pleasures are not per se painful is less successful than the Phaedrus account at explaining philosophers’ lived experiences of pleasure, which often involve pain. (shrink)

I argue for a new reading of Kant's claim that respect is the moral incentive; this reading accommodates the central insights of the affectivist and intellectualist readings of respect, while avoiding shortcomings of each. I show that within Kant's ethical system, the feeling of respect should be understood as paradigmatic of a kind of pleasure, pleasure in the moral. The motivational power of respect arises from its nature as pleasurable feeling, but the feeling does not directly motivate individual dutiful actions. (...) Rather, the feeling is motivational in the sense that, after an agent has acted in a morally good way, the pleasure that results from that action contributes to the cultivation of virtue in the agent and, consequently, morally good actions in the future. Understanding the feeling of respect to be moral pleasure not only gives us insight into how finite rational beings develop virtue, but also a new way of understanding respect as an incentive. (shrink)

This volume investigates the reasons why Plotinus, a philosopher inspired by Plato, made critical use of Epicurean philosophy. Eminent scholars show that some fundamental Epicurean conceptions pertaining to ethics, physics, epistemology and theology are drawn upon in the Enneads to discuss crucial notions such as pleasure and happiness, providence and fate, matter and the role of sense perception, intuition and intellectual evidence in relation to the process of knowledge acquisition. By focusing on the meaning of these terms in Epicureanism, Plotinus (...) deploys sophisticated methods of comparative analysis and argumentative procedures that ultimately lead him to approach certain aspects of Epicurus' philosophy as a benchmark for his own theories and to accept, reject or discredit the positions of authors of his own day. At the same time, these discussions reveal what aspects of Epicurean philosophy were still perceived to be of vital relevance in the third century AD. (shrink)

Focuses on the theories of the Epicureans and Cyrenaics in light of Plato's and Aristotle's criticisms of hedonism. Closes with a brief discussion of how the Pyrrhonian skeptical conception of the telos compares to the Epicureans'.