Where does the notion of free will come from? How and when did it develop, and what did that development involve? In Michael Frede's radically new account of the history of this idea, the notion of a free will emerged from powerful assumptions about the relation between divine providence, correctness of individual choice, and self-enslavement due to incorrect choice. Anchoring his discussion in Stoicism, Frede begins with Aristotle--who, he argues, had no notion of a free will--and ends with Augustine. Frede (...) shows that Augustine, far from originating the idea, derived most of his thinking about it from the Stoicism developed by Epictetus. (shrink)
These five essays began a debate about the nature and scope of ancient scepticism which has transformed our understanding of what scepticism originally was. Together they provide a vigorous and highly stimulating introduction to the thought of the original sceptics, and shed new light on its relation to sceptical arguments in modern philosophy.
"This volume presents stimulating and provocative work on how the history of philosophy is done and how it should be done, by Michael Frede, a pre-eminent figure in ancient philosophy until his early death in 2007. His Nellie Wallace lectures are published here accompanied by three related articles."--Publisher.
This book, a collection of specially written essays by leading international scholars, reexamines ancient ideas of reason and rationality. The application of changing notions of rationality down the ages has led to consistent misinterpretation of standard ancient philosophical texts: the distinguished contributors here redress the balance, clarifying how the great thinkers of antiquity themselves conceived of rationality.
Distinguished experts from a range of disciplines with a common interest in late antiquity probe the apparent paradox of pagan monotheism and reach a better understanding of the historical roots of Christianity.
A distinguished group of scholars of ancient philosophy here presents a systematic study of the twelfth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Book Lambda, which can be regarded as a self-standing treatise on substance, has been attracting particular attention in recent years, and was chosen as the focus of the fourteenth Symposium Aristotelicum, from which this volume is derived.
This paper elucidates Aristotle’s conception of thinking in two stages. First, the paper examines the passages in which Aristotle criticizes his Presocratic predecessors for failing to understand what thinking is. The examination shows that Aristotle took his earlier predecessors to assimilate thinking to being sensible and both to perceiving , largely because they do not realize that thinking has a distinctive feature which makes it radically different from both being sensible and perceiving. Second, the paper examines the passages in which (...) Aristotle explains what the distinctive feature of thinking is. It is shown that the distinctive feature of thinking is that it is discriminative of intelligible features, and these are unchanging items of reality inaccessible to senses, called ‘forms’ or ‘universals’. The upshot of the paper is that Aristotle, in contrast to Plato, does not believe that we are born with the ability to think, but rather that we acquire it in the course of our cognitive development. (shrink)
The Seventh Platonic Letter describes Plato's attempts to turn the ruler of Sicily, Dionysius II, into a philosopher ruler along the lines of the Republic. It explains why Plato turned from politics to philosophy in his youth and how he then tried to apply his ideas to actual politics later on. It also sets out his views about language, writing and philosophy. But is it genuine? Scholars have debated the issue for centuries. The origin of this book was a seminar (...) given in Oxford in 2001 by Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede, two of the most eminent scholars of ancient philosophy in recent decades. They question the authenticity of the letter head-on by showing how its philosophical content conflicts with what we find in the Platonic dialogues. They also reflect on the question of why the Letter was written, whether as an attempt to exculpate Plato from the charge of meddling in politics, or as an attempt to portray, through literary means, the ways in which human weakness and emotions can lead to disasters in political life. (shrink)
This paper investigates Aristotle’s account of the origins of philosophy in Met. A.3-10. To appreciate it as a guide to our understanding of the beginnings of philosophy, it is crucial to see that this account relies on the preceding account of wisdom understood as theoretical knowledge of things in terms of their principles and causes. Since there is a highest form of wisdom, which involves knowledge of the ultimate principles of what there is, there is also a philosophy which aims (...) at this sort of knowledge, that is philosophy in the primary sense of the word, i.e. metaphysics. Aristotle’s account in Met. A 3-10, the paper claims, is an introduction into such philosophy. The primary aim of the account is to show that philosophy is indeed a matter of explaining things in terms of principles or causes, of which there are exactly four types. Aristotle’s account of the origins of philosophy is thus a story of the progressive discovery of these four types of explanation, starting with Thales’ use of explanation in terms of matter. The crucial development in this story comes with the insight that reality is not exhausted by the sensible world, more specifically that there are immaterial substances which make the sensible world intelligible, which necessitated explanation in terms of form and purpose. (shrink)
This paper investigates Aristotle’s account of the origins of philosophy in Met. A.3-10. To appreciate it as a guide to our understanding of the beginnings of philosophy, it is crucial to see that this account relies on the preceding account of wisdom understood as theoretical knowledge of things in terms of their principles and causes. Since there is a highest form of wisdom, which involves knowledge of the ultimate principles of what there is, there is also a philosophy which aims (...) at this sort of knowledge, that is philosophy in the primary sense of the word, i.e. metaphysics. Aristotle’s account in Met. A 3-10, the paper claims, is an introduction into such philosophy. The primary aim of the account is to show that philosophy is indeed a matter of explaining things in terms of principles or causes, of which there are exactly four types. Aristotle’s account of the origins of philosophy is thus a story of the progressive discovery of these four types of explanation, starting with Thales’ use of explanation in terms of matter. The crucial development in this story comes with the insight that reality is not exhausted by the sensible world, more specifically that there are immaterial substances which make the sensible world intelligible, which necessitated explanation in terms of form and purpose. (shrink)
The paper sets out to give in broad outline a comprehensive interpretation of some features of the Derveni text. In some important issues, this text should be seen in the context of the fourth century, rather than the late fifth century. Unfortunately, this 4th c. BCE literature has disappeared almost without a trace, the best characterization of this literature we have is in Plato’s polemical descriptions, most particularly, the one he puts forth as a refutation of different forms of atheism (...) in Laws X.Although on some issues the Derveni author holds theses similar to the ones criticized by Plato, on his physical exegesis of the Orphic poem the world is the result of the teleological action of the divine intellect. Moreover, it is part of this very order that it is providential, and that within this providential order human beings have their place and are provided for. Moreover, the order that Zeus brings about is not only a wise and providential physical order, but also a just order which is maintained by Zeus in such a way that every wrong is set right.Setting out the stages of the teleological activity of the divine intellect, during which the divinity bears different names, the paper closes with some considerations about the extent of the Derveni text, suggesting that it may well be plausible to assume that the author’s text could come to an end on a single roll. (shrink)
