Laughter:. Scientific Investigation. By Robert R. Provine. 2000. New York: Viking. $24.95 (cloth).

The paper deals with the approaches to researching music from the scientific perspective. It is argued that the scientific literature concerning music contains two different methodological approaches which significantly determine the range of possible conclusions to be reached by the research. The approach „from the outside“ investigates music by automatically applying to music the more general conclusions concerning human cognition and other capacities and behaviors. Thus, this approach omits music’s internal factors. In contrast, the approach „from within“ consists (...) in empirically investigating reactions to music, capacities necessary for its understanding, performing, etc., and their relationships with the reactions and capacities outside the domain of music. The paper shows that, even though the scientific research of music is still in the beginning stage, the approach from within enables more complete explanations concerning music, due to taking into account a larger number of factors relevant for philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of music. (shrink)

Already in the ‘classical’ Greek culture a partition of the ‘sciences’ was recognized and established either by considering their different aim, or their different subject matter. This was the first appearance of ‘territories’ in science which, however, did not entail a differentiation in the cognitive approach. A new model of science was introduced in the age of Renaissance with the Galilean revolution based on the proposal to delimit the inquiry to the behavior of physical bodies and, moreover, by considering only (...) a restricted amount of their properties. This delimitation of ‘territory’ was accompanied by a significant novelty in the admitted tools of inquiry, that were concentrated in the use of mathematical descriptions and the adoption of the experimental method. By means of these tools a display of mappings was developed during a couple of centuries, thanks to which the different ‘sub-territories’ of physics were investigated by using the methods originally proposed for mechanics. This was a reductionist program whose aim was that of overcoming the partition in territories and recover the unitary totality at least of the physical world. The failure of this program at the end of the 19th century was interpreted by certain philosophers as the evidence that science is unable to offer a reliable knowledge of reality. This pessimistic view can be avoided by recognizing that science is constituted by a rich variety of ‘territories’, that is, of really distinct disciplines each having its own domain of objects which is also its specific ‘conceptual space’. Within this conceptual space several scientific theories are proposed offering different ways of mapping the territory. Both moments rely upon the presence of operational procedures that are essential for linking the maps with the territories and justify a realistic conception of science. (shrink)

It is widely stated that a hypothesis is necessary to the execution of a scientific investigation. However, the dogmatic acceptance of this, as of every other proposition, is to be condemned until its implications have been adequately explored.It is the writer's view that hypotheses are not prerequisite to every study which contributes to organized and systematic knowledge of the observable world. It is also concluded that the recognition of a problem requiring a solution or a question deserving an (...) answer is a step that must be taken in every sort of systematic study, and, therefore, that a problem is a more important characteristic of scientific method than a hypothesis. (shrink)

This two-volume work, first published in 1843, was John Stuart Mill's first major book. It reinvented the modern study of logic and laid the foundations for his later work in the areas of political economy, women's rights and representative government. In clear, systematic prose, Mill (1806–73) disentangles syllogistic logic from its origins in Aristotle and scholasticism and grounds it instead in processes of inductive reasoning. An important attempt at integrating empiricism within a more general theory of human knowledge, the work (...) constitutes essential reading for anyone seeking a full understanding of Mill's thought. Volume 1 contains Mill's introduction, which elaborates upon his definition of logic as 'not the science of Belief, but the science of Proof, or Evidence'. It also features discussions of the central components of logical reasoning - propositions and syllogisms - in relation to Mill's theories of inductive reasoning and experimental method. (shrink)

An empirical law or evidence which supports a theory tends to have the greatest scientific value when it seemed improbable before it was investigated. Evidence which falsifies a theory tends to have the greatest value when it seemed probable that the investigation would confirm the theory. A scientist who wishes to optimize his contribution to knowledge probably will investigate most frequently hypotheses which seem neither very probable nor very improbable of being confirmed. This strategy leads neither to a (...) maximum number of confirmations of a theory, nor to a set of tests which are maximally severe. (shrink)

This two-volume work, first published in 1843, was John Stuart Mill's first major book. It reinvented the modern study of logic and laid the foundations for his later work in the areas of political economy, women's rights and representative government. In clear, systematic prose, Mill disentangles syllogistic logic from its origins in Aristotle and scholasticism and grounds it instead in processes of inductive reasoning. An important attempt at integrating empiricism within a more general theory of human knowledge, the work constitutes (...) essential reading for anyone seeking a full understanding of Mill's thought. Continuing the discussion of induction, Volume 2 concludes with Book VI, 'On the Logic of the Moral Sciences', in which Mill applies empirical reasoning to human behaviour. A crucial early formulation of his thinking regarding free will and necessity, this book establishes the centrality of 'the social science' to Mill's philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that there are important but hitherto unnoticed similarities between key figures of the Vienna Circle and early defenders of sociology of knowledge. The similarities regard their stance on potential implications of the study of science for political and societal issues. I argue that notably Otto Neurath and Karl Mannheim are concerned with proposing a genuine political philosophy of science that is remarkably different from today’s emerging interest in the relation between science and society in philosophy (...) of science. (shrink)

In many scientific fields, today’s practices of empirical enquiry rely heavily on the production of images that display the investigated phenomena. And while scientific images of phenomena have been important for a long time, what is striking now is that scientists have found ways to visualize such widely different types of phenomena. In the past twenty or thirty years, we have become accustomed to seeing images of galaxies, of cells, of the human brain but also of blood flow (...) or of turbulent fluids. This success in making images relies first on the set of imaging devices that have flourished in the twentieth century, instruments such as radio-telescopes, electronic microscopes, MRI and many more. Without these... (shrink)

This paper argues that Heidegger's phenomenology of boredom in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (1983) could be a promising addition to the ‘toolbox’ of scientists investigating conscious experience. We describe Heidegger's methodological principles and show how he applies these in describing three forms of boredom. Each form is shown to have two structural moments – being held in limbo and being left empty – as well as a characteristic relation to passing the time. In our conclusion, we (...) suggest specific ways in which Heidegger's phenomenological description can be used in scientific investigations of boredom. (shrink)

Modern methodology furnishes two partly competitive and partly complementary views on structure of the development of scientific investigation. According to the first view the development of science consists in enlargement of the set of empirical theorems; according to the other it consists, rather, in the narrowing of the set of possible theoretical hypotheses. A particular kind of assertion is associated with each of these views. The first is associated with the relation of assertion expressed in the statement: “the (...) state α of scientific investigationB forces us to accept the statement Τ”. The other view is associated with the relation of assertion expressed in the statement: “the state α of scientific investigationB admits the acceptance of the statement Τ”. Under a suitable definition of forcing we obtain the conclusion that intuitionistic logic is the class of only those formulas which we are forced to accept by every state of every scientific investigation. The notion of admission under a certain definition analogically leads to intuitionistic logic; on the other hand in the case of another, more natural definition, it leads to justification of a certain system of strict implication which is stronger than Lewis’ system S4 and which overlaps system S5.It can be said that assuming quite a natural definition of admission this system contains only those formulas the acceptance of which is admitted by every state of every scientific investigation. (shrink)

Kant's theory of judgment establishes the conceptual framework for understanding the subtle relationships between the experimental scientist, the modern instrument, and nature's atomic particles. The principle of purposiveness which governs judgment has also a role in implicitly guiding modern experimental science. In Part 1 we explore Kant's philosophy of science as he shows how knowledge of material nature and unobservable entities is possible. In Part 2 we examine the way in which Kant's treatment of judgment, with its operating principle of (...) purposiveness, enters into his critical project and underlies the possibility of rational science. In Part 3 we show that the centrality given to judgment in Kant's conception of science provides philosophical insight into the investigation of atomic substances in modern chemistry. (shrink)

This two-volume work, first published in 1843, was John Stuart Mill's first major book. It reinvented the modern study of logic and laid the foundations for his later work in the areas of political economy, women's rights and representative government. In clear, systematic prose, Mill disentangles syllogistic logic from its origins in Aristotle and scholasticism and grounds it instead in processes of inductive reasoning. An important attempt at integrating empiricism within a more general theory of human knowledge, the work constitutes (...) essential reading for anyone seeking a full understanding of Mill's thought. Continuing the discussion of induction, Volume 2 concludes with Book VI, 'On the Logic of the Moral Sciences', in which Mill applies empirical reasoning to human behaviour. A crucial early formulation of his thinking regarding free will and necessity, this book establishes the centrality of 'the social science' to Mill's philosophy. (shrink)

The paper presents a brief outline of Michał Heller’s programme of theology of science, with specific attention to its collocation and critical role with respect to both theology and science. The former consideration is based on a third domain of truths (Hans Urs von Balthasar), while the latter is inspired by Józef Tischner’s presentation of religious thinking. Theology of science as such will be described with reference to Larry Laudan’s approach, considered here as a very useful and pragmatic tool for (...) the description of basic concepts of this theology. (shrink)

The Problemata physica has long been neglected. The essays in this collection do much to remedy this, and provide insights into the nature of philosophical inquiry in the Lyceum during Aristotle’s life and in the years following his death.

Combining philosophical and historical scholarship, the articles in this volume focus on scientific concepts, rather than theories, as units of analysis. They thereby contribute to a growing literature about the role of concepts in scientific research. The authors are particularly interested in exploring the dynamics of research; they investigate the ways in which scientists form and use concepts, rather than in what the concepts themselves represent. The fields treated range from mathematics to virology and genetics, from nuclear physics (...) to psychology, from technology to present-day neural engineering. The volume contains articles by Vassi Kindi, Miles MacLeod, Ingo Brigandt, Friedrich Steinle, Dirk Schlimm, Theodore Arabatzis, Uljana Feest, Corinne Bloch, Mieke Boon, Nancy Nersessian, and Hanne Andersen. (shrink)

This two-volume work, first published in 1843, was John Stuart Mill's first major book. It reinvented the modern study of logic and laid the foundations for his later work in the areas of political economy, women's rights and representative government. In clear, systematic prose, Mill disentangles syllogistic logic from its origins in Aristotle and scholasticism and grounds it instead in processes of inductive reasoning. An important attempt at integrating empiricism within a more general theory of human knowledge, the work constitutes (...) essential reading for anyone seeking a full understanding of Mill's thought. Volume 1 contains Mill's introduction, which elaborates upon his definition of logic as 'not the science of Belief, but the science of Proof, or Evidence'. It also features discussions of the central components of logical reasoning - propositions and syllogisms - in relation to Mill's theories of inductive reasoning and experimental method. (shrink)

This two-volume work, first published in 1843, was John Stuart Mill's first major book. It reinvented the modern study of logic and laid the foundations for his later work in the areas of political economy, women's rights and representative government. In clear, systematic prose, Mill disentangles syllogistic logic from its origins in Aristotle and scholasticism and grounds it instead in processes of inductive reasoning. An important attempt at integrating empiricism within a more general theory of human knowledge, the work constitutes (...) essential reading for anyone seeking a full understanding of Mill's thought. Volume 1 contains Mill's introduction, which elaborates upon his definition of logic as 'not the science of Belief, but the science of Proof, or Evidence'. It also discusses methods of logical reasoning - propositions and syllogisms. Volume 2 contains 'On the Logic of the Moral Sciences', in which Mills applies empirical reasoning to human behaviour. (shrink)

We argue that the societal consequences of the scientific realism debate, in the context of science-to-public communication are often overlooked and careful theorizing about it needs further empirical groundwork. As such, we conducted a survey experiment with 130 academics (from physics, chemistry, and biology) and 137 science communicators. We provided them with an 11-item questionnaire probing their views of scientific realism and related concepts. Contra theoretical expectations, we find that (a) science communicators are generally more inclined towards (...) class='Hi'>scientific antirealism when compared to scientists in the same academic fields, though both groups show an inclination towards realism and (b) academics who engage in more theoretical work are not less (or more) realist than experimentalists. Lastly, (c), we fail to find differences with respect to selective realism but find that science communicators are significantly less epistemically voluntarist compared to their academic counterparts. Overall, our results provide first empirical evidence on the views of scientists and science communicators on scientific realism, with some results running contra to the theoretical expectations, opening up new empirical and theoretical research directions. (shrink)

My dissertation is on scientific phenomena, their characterization, and their role in scientific inquiry. I focus on three questions. First, what do characterizations of scientific phenomena represent? To answer this, I investigate what it means to characterize a phenomenon, as opposed to describing the results of individual studies. Second, how do researchers develop these characterizations? This question relates to the logic of discovery: I examine how researchers use existing theories and methods to explore systems, search for phenomena, (...) and develop representations of them. Third, how do researchers evaluate these characterizations? This question relates to the logic of justification: I investigate how empirical findings serve as defeasible evidence for the characterizations of phenomena, and in light of what evidence we should accept, suspend judgment about, or reject them. (shrink)

The Division of Investigative Oversight within the U.S. Office of Research Integrity (ORI) is responsible for conducting oversight review of institutional inquiries and investigations of possible research misconduct. It is also responsible for determining whether Public Health Service findings of research misconduct are warranted. Although ORI findings rely primarily on the scope and quality of the institution’s analyses and determinations, ORI often has been able to strengthen the original findings by employing a variety of analytical methods, often computer based. Although (...) ORI does not conduct inquiries or investigations, it has broad authority to provide assistance to institutions at all stages of their reviews of allegations. This assistance can range from providing advice on best practices, to legal assistance, to suggestions for how best to investigate specific allegations. When asked, ORI can also conduct certain forensic analyses, such as a statistical examination of questioned digits or a simple examination of a questioned figure in Photoshop. ORI will not provide opinions or render judgment on such analyses while the institution is still conducting its investigation. Such analyses can be done without knowing much else about the case. (shrink)

Little is known about how researchers view ethically salient aspects of human studies. As part of a National Institutes of Mental Health-funded study, the authors performed a confidential written survey to assess the attitudes, views, and experiences of researchers with institutional review board approved protocols at the University of New Mexico. A total of 363 researchers (57% response rate) participated. Investigators overall held favorable views of general ethical aspects of research and ethics-based safeguards, and they identified a positive role of (...) ethics training. Investigators with more experience encountering ethical problems (p < .001), more ethics training (p = .001), and a PhD or MD/PhD (p = .003) held more favorable general ethical perspectives. Women investigators (p < .03), nonphysician investigators (p < .001), those whose training had been helpful in resolving ethical dilemmas (p = .006), and those for whom spirituality is important (p = .008) more strongly endorsed ethical safeguards. Investigators perceive the scientific and ethical aspects of their work as valuable and linked, and they affirm the role of safeguards in human studies. Formal ethics preparation and training initiatives were also viewed positively by investigators. (shrink)

Since the practice turn, the role technologies play in the production of scientific knowledge has become a prominent topic in science studies. Much existing scholarship, however, either limits technology to merely mechanical instrumentation or uses the term for a wide variety of items. This article argues that technologies in scientific practice can be understood as a result of past scientific knowledge becoming sedimented in materials, like model organisms, synthetic reagents or mechanical instruments, through the routine use of (...) these materials in subsequent research practice. The proposed theoretical interpretation of technology is examined through a case where a model organism—Drosophila melanogaster—acted as a technology for investigating a contested biological effect of a mechanical instrument: Hermann J. Muller’s experiments on X-ray mutagenicity in the 1920s. The article reconstructs how Muller employed two synthetic Drosophila stocks as tests for measuring X-rays’ capacity to cause genetic aberration. It argues that past scientific knowledge sedimented in the Drosophila stocks influenced Muller’s perception of X-ray-induced mutation. It further describes how Muller’s concept of X-ray mutagenicity sedimented through the adoption of X-ray machines as a ready-made resource for producing mutants by other geneticists, for instance George Beadle and Edward Tatum in their experiments on Neurospora crassa, despite ongoing disputes surrounding Muller’s conclusions. Technological sedimentation is proposed as a potential explanation why sedimentation and disputation may often coexist in the history of science. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I examine a view called ‘Epistemic Structural Realism’, which holds that we can, at best, have knowledge of the structure of the physical world. Put crudely, we can know physical objects only to the extent that they are nodes in a structure. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, I argue that, given certain minimal assumptions, epistemic structural realism provides a viable and reasonable scientific realist position that is less vulnerable to anti-realist arguments than any of its (...) rivals. (shrink)

Recognizing the necessary social aspects of scientific knowledge leads to a serious shift in the analysis of science. Whereas until recently the study of scientific knowledge in terms of its social qualities began with its logical structure, today the primary focuses of analysis are the human brain, the material carrier of computer programs, the economic relations in the society of commodity production, and so forth. All of this is not science, but is involved in the production of new (...) knowledge. The boundary between the spiritual and the material, between the scientific and nonscientific is blurred. To study this phenomenon, the vector of research shifts: social qualities are not sought in scientific knowledge, but the external world of non-science exhibits signs of the presence of the spiritual in the form of emerging scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Both science and philosophy are interested in questions of ontology- questions about what exists and what these things are like. Science and philosophy, however, seem like very different ways of investigating the world, so how should one proceed? Some defer to the sciences, conceived as something apart from philosophy, and others to metaphysics, conceived as something apart from science, for certain kinds of answers. This book contends that these sorts of deference are misconceived. A compelling account of ontology must appreciate (...) the ways in which the sciences incorporate metaphysical assumptions and arguments. At the same time, it must pay careful attention to how observation, experience, and the empirical dimensions of science are related to what may be viewed as defensible philosophical theorizing about ontology. The promise of an effectively naturalized metaphysics is to encourage beliefs that are formed in ways that do justice to scientific theorizing, modeling, and experimentation. But even armed with such a view, there is no one, uniquely rational way to draw lines between domains of ontology that are suitable for belief, and ones in which it would be better to suspend belief instead. In crucial respects, ontology is in the eye of the beholder: it is Informed by underlying commitments with implications for the limits of inquiry, which inevitably vary across rational inquirers. As a result, the proper scope of ontology is subject to a striking form of voluntary choice, yielding a new and transformative conception of scientific ontology. (shrink)

This paper deals with calibration in scientific practices which investigate relatively well-understood natural phenomena by means of already standardized instrumental devices. Calibration is a crucial topic, since it conditions the reliability of instrumental procedures in science. Yet although important, calibration is a relatively neglected topic. We think more attention should be devoted to calibration. The paper attempts to take a step in this direction. The aims are two-fold: (1) to characterize calibration in a relatively simple kind of scientific (...) practices; (2) to provide conceptual and taxonomic tools of broader scope that help to get a better understanding of calibration in more complex cases and other kinds of scientific practices. For this purpose, we first provide indications for why a conceptual framework is needed. Second, a bibliographic survey of works dealing with calibration is attempted. Third, we introduce different tools to enable a better understanding of calibration. Fourth, we turn to the elaboration of what we call a “simple exemplar” of calibration, illustrated through the case of the calibration of an equal-arm balance. Fifth, the tools previously introduced, and the framework of the simple exemplar, are applied to a more complex case of calibration: calibration procedures in X-ray experiments. This serves to show the work accomplished by the simple exemplar and to emphasize features of more complex cases of calibration. Eventually, we revisit and specify the nature, status, scope and value of the proposed framework. (shrink)