Nature of Science, Misc

This article is devoted to define and characterize ‘Science’ as a discipline by the fundamental principles of scientific investigation. In particular, we propose and argue that ‘Science’ be defined by a set of principles / criteria which underlies scientific- investigation. We argue that this set must include the following principles: (1) Rationality, (2) Objectivity (3) Universality, (4) Internal Consistency, (5) Uniqueness, (6) Reproducibility, (7) The Principle of Falsification, (8) Simplicity and Elegance and (9) Experimental Observation and Verification. We elaborate, through (...) illustrative examples, the justification of the above set of criteria. `Scientific temper’ essentially means the cultivation of these principles, as attitudes / value-system adopted as “ways of life”. We discuss the relevance of the inculcation of scientific temper in the modern context. Finally, the scope and limitations of the scientific method are highlighted and an attempt is made to dispel several misconceptions and myths associated with Science and scientists. (shrink)

This paper deals with the following questions: What features of modern natural science are responsible for the fact that, of all forms of science, this form is technologically exploitable? The three notions: concept of nature, epistemic ideal, and experiment, suggest the most important components of my answer. I will argue, first, that only the peculiar interplay of the modern concept of nature with an epistemic ideal attuned to it can cast experiment in the specific, highly central role it plays in (...) the pursuit of knowledge about nature. It will then become clear that the form of science in which experiment plays such a role will, necessarily, prove technologically exploitable. (shrink)

The term ‘scientism’ has not attracted consensus about its meaning or about its scope of application. In this paper, we consider Mizrahi’s suggestion to distinguish ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ scientism, and the consequences this distinction may have for philosophical methodology. While we side with Mizrahi that his definitions help advance the debate, by avoiding verbal dispute and focussing on questions of method, we also have concerns about his proposal as it defends a hierarchy of knowledge production. Mizrahi’s position is that Weak (...) Scientism should be adopted, stating that “of all the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge is the best knowledge”. This version of scientism, however, has consequences for philosophical methodology. In particular, if one conceives of philosophy as an a priori discipline and holds Weak Scientism, the introduction of empirical methods in philosophy may threaten its very essence or soul. In this chapter, we will defend the move to adopt empirical methods in philosophy and argue that, rather than threatening its essence or soul, these methods put philosophy in a better position to contribute to knowledge production, an endeavor shared with the sciences, and in a very interdisciplinary spirit. Our point of disagreement with Mizrahi is that we should avoid any hierarchy of knowledge, and instead focus on what each perspective -- scientific, philosophical, historical, or other -- can contribute to understanding phenomena. (shrink)

Scientism has more notoriety than history proper for it has been identified with “positivism”, “reductionism”, “materialism” or “Marxism”, or even held responsible for the enforcement of science at the expense of other human affairs. The idea that scientific research yields the best possible knowledge lies at the very definition of “scientism”. However, even when science has shown a considerable amount of theoretical and practical successes, a rational confidence put on it as a mean for solving any factual problem has been (...) denounced as illegitimate, defective, or dogmatic. Thereby, after revisiting the varieties of the meaning of scientism, I argue for a reasonable defense of scientism against some of its prevailing criticisms. Hence, it will be sustained that science is the most reliable approach for attaining knowledge without detriment of other valuable human activities insofar these do not address factual or cognitive questions nor are at odds with a scientific worldview. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada öğrencilerin bilimle tanışmasında anahtar rol oynayan sınıf öğretmenlerinin ve geleceğin sınıf öğretmeni olan sınıf öğretmeni adaylarının bilimin doğasına yönelik görüşlerinin ve bilim-sözde bilim ayrımı inanışlarının incelenmesi ve değişkenler açısından değerlendirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Araştırmanın çalışma grubu Orta Karadeniz Bölgesi’nde yer alan bir ilin merkez ilçesinde yer alan 344 sınıf öğretmeni ve bu ilde sınıf öğretmenliği bölümünde öğrenim gören 240 öğrenci olarak belirlenmiş, gönüllülük esasına dayalı olarak 172 öğretmen ve 136 öğretmen adayından veri toplanmıştır. Bu araştırmada veriler ‘Sözde-Bilim İnanış Ölçeği’ ve (...) ‘Bilimin Doğası İnanışları Ölçeği’ kullanılarak elde edilmiştir. Konunun farklı değişkenler açısından değerlendirilmesi amacıyla ölçekler dışında ‘Kişisel Bilgi Formu’ kullanılmıştır. Özcan ve Turgut (2014) tarafından geliştirilen ‘Bilimin Doğası İnanışları Ölçeği’ 7 faktör ve 37 sorudan oluşmaktadır. Ölçekle ilgili yapılan analizlerde ölçeğin güvenirlik katsayısı 0,70 olarak bulunmuştur. Ölçek yetişkin grubu için hazırlandığından faktör analizi yeniden yapılmamıştır. Çetinkaya ve Taşar (2018) tarafından geliştirilen ‘Sözde-Bilim İnanış Ölçeği’ 3 faktör ve 21 sorudan oluşmaktadır. Ölçek ortaokul öğrencileri için hazırlandığından ve bu çalışmada da yetişkin grubu ile uygulama yapıldığından faktör analizi yeniden yapılmıştır. (shrink)

Bu makalede, bilim felsefecisi kimliğiyle tanınan Thomas Kuhn’un eğitim ve özellikle fen eğitimi alanındaki görüşlerine değinilmektedir. Fen eğitimi, bilim, bilimin doğası ve bilim uygulamaları hakkında düşünceler geliştirmeye odaklanarak fen öğrenimi için gerekli olan beceri ve anlayışın geliştirilmesini amaçlamaktadır. Fen eğitiminin temel amaçlarından biri bilimin gerçek doğasının tespit edilmesi ve bu doğrultuda bir eğitim modelinin belirlenmesidir. Bu çerçevede Kuhn’un bilim tarihine yönelik incelemeleri neticesinde ileri sürdüğü paradigma kavramı bilimin doğası ve fen eğitimi konusundaki görüşlerin değişimine yol açmıştır. Kuhn açısından fen eğitimi (...) yürürlükteki bilim yapma tarzının temelinde yatan paradigma ve öğretilerinin bilim insanlarına ve öğrencilere aktarılması sürecidir, bu nedenle fen eğitimi yalnızca olağan bilim döneminde mümkündür. Kuhn’un eğitim modeli, mevcut paradigmayla ilişkili olarak karşılaşılan bulmaca ya da sorunları çeşitli örneklerden hareketle tekrar tekrar çözmeye çalışan öğrenciler aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilir. Kuhn’un olağan bilimin sınırları içerisinde kalarak değerlendirdiği fen eğitimi anlayışı eleştirel düşünceyi engellediği iddiasıyla Karl Popper, John Watkins ve Richard Bailey tarafından katı, tutucu, dogmatik ve endoktrinasyonu vurgulayan bir eğitim anlayışı olarak görülmektedir. Bu çerçevede makalede, öncelikli olarak Kuhn’un bilimin doğası ve bilimin gelişim tarzına yönelik belirlemeleri doğrultusunda fen eğitimine yönelik düşünceleri ve bu düşüncelerin eğitim alanındaki yansımaları incelenmektedir. Ardından, Kuhn’un fen eğitimi üzerine görüşlerinin iddia edildiği gibi dogmatik bir yapıda olmadığı, endoktrinasyonu ya da zorla öğretimi vurgulamadığı, bu tür yorumların radikal bir yaklaşımdan öteye gidemediği ileri sürülmektedir. Son olarak makalede, Kuhn’un fen eğitimi anlayışının yalnızca bir durum tespiti ya da bir fen eğitimi tasviri olarak değerlendirilmesi gerektiği düşüncesi ön plana çıkarılmaktadır. -/- In this article, Thomas Kuhn’s impact, who is known as a philosopher of science, on science education are mentioned. Science education aims to develop the skills and understanding necessary for science learning, with a focus on developing ideas about science and the nature of science. One of the main purposes of science education is to determine the true nature of science and to determine an education model in this direction. In this context, the concept of paradigm, which Kuhn put forward as a result of his studies on the history of science, has led to a change in views on the nature of science and science education. For Kuhn, science education is the process of conveying the paradigm underlying the current way of doing science to scientists and students because science education is possible only in the normal science period. Kuhn’s educational model is carried out through students who repeatedly try to solve puzzles or problems encountered in relation to the current paradigm. Kuhn’s understanding of science education is seen by Karl Popper, John Watkins and Richard Bailey as a rigid, conservative, dogmatic and indoctrinational education approach with the claim that it prevents critical thinking. In this context, the article primarily examines Kuhn’s thoughts on science education and the reflections of these thoughts in the field of education. Then, it is argued that Kuhn’s views on science education are not dogmatic as claimed, he does not emphasize indoctrination, and that such interpretations cannot go beyond a radical approach. Finally, in the article, it is emphasized that Kuhn’s understanding of science education should be evaluated only as a description of science education. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada; bilim, sözdebilim ayrımına yönelik tasarlanan öğretim etkinliklerinin, 7. sınıf öğrencilerinin sözdebilimsel inançlarına ve eleştirel düşünme becerilerine etkisini araştırmak ayrıca hangi bilimsellik ve hatalı bilimsellik ölçütlerine sahip olduklarını belirlemek amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaçlar doğrultusunda araştırmanının modeli iç içe karma desen olarak belirlenmiştir. Çalışma, 2018-2019 eğitim öğretim yılının ikinci döneminde, Kocaeli ili Başiskele ilçesinde bulunan bir devlet ortaokulunda gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışmanın nicel kısmında bir deney (n=29) ve bir kontrol (n=30) grubu olmak üzere 59 öğrenci, nitel kısmında ise deney grubunda bulunan 29 öğrenci (...) bulunmaktadır. On hafta süren araştırmada deney grubunda; farklı sözdebilimsel içerikler yer alan bilim, sözde–bilim ayrımı bağlamında hazırlanan etkinlikler ile öğretim gerçekleştirilmiş, kontrol grubundaysa mevcut öğretim programında öngörülen etkinliklerle ders işlenmiştir. Çalışmaların tamamı seçmeli bilim uygulamaları derslerinde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Veri toplama aracı olarak; Sözdebilim İnanç Ölçeği, Eleştirel Düşünme ölçekleri Takımı ve araştırmacı tarafından geliştirilen öğrenci görüşme formları kullanılmıştır. Verilerin analizinde, karışık ölçümler için iki yönlü varyans analizi ve içerik analizi kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca veri analizlerinde, SPSS 18.0 paket programı ve Nvivo 12 nitel veri analizi programından yararlanılmıştır. Araştırmanın bulgularına göre, 7. sınıf öğrencilerinin eleştirel düşünme becerileri orta, sözdebilimsel inançları yüksektir. Tasarlanan öğretim etkinlikleri öğrencilerin eleştirel düşünme becerilerini arttırmış, sözdebilimsel inançlarını azaltmıştır. Öğrenci görüşlerinde tespit edilen hatalı bilimsellik ölçütleri, mantığa bürüme, etkililik, bilimsel kavramlar içerme, otoriteye dayanma, kaynak içerme, geçmişten gelen bilgi ve çoğunluk görüşüdür. Öğrenci görüşlerinde tespit edilen bilimsellik ölçütleri ise ölçütleri kanıtlanabilirlik, test edilebilirlik, tutarlılık, tekrarlanabilirlik, bilim dünyasının desteği, mantığa aykırılık ve kasıtlı bilimsel jargondur. Yapılan sözdebilimsel içerikli etkinlikler arasında öğrencilerin en fazla hataya düştükleri etkinlikler astroloji ve antik astronot kuramı olmuştur. (shrink)

This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (...) (false) dilemma and self‐referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail. (shrink)

Book review of Paul Feyerabend's "Philosophy of Nature". || Reseña del libro "Philosophy of Nature", escrito por Paul Feyerabend.

James Prescott Joule’s (1818–1889) bicentenary took place in 2018 and commemorated by the IDTC with a Symposium—‘James Joule’s Bicentenary: Scientific and Pedagogical Issues Concerning Energy Conservation’—at the European Society for the History of Science (ESHS & BSHS), 14th–17th September, 2018, in London. This symposium had three main objectives: It aimed specifically to celebrate James Joule’s achievements considering the most recent historiographical works with a particular focus on the principle of conservation of energy; It served the purpose of discussing the scientific (...) and pedagogical issues related to heat, energy and work and how they are presented in textbooks and worked out in classrooms; It also provided discussions on the present situation of teaching and learning science through the use of History of Science, both in K-12 and college level with an emphasis on energy and related concepts. In the following, the Introduction of this Special Issue on Joule is presented. (shrink)

Я даю подробный обзор "Внешние границы разума" Носон Янофски с единой точки зрения Витгенштейна и эволюционной психологии. Я указываю, что трудности с такими вопросами, как парадокс в языке и математике, неполнота, несоответствие, вычислительность, мозг и вселенная, как компьютеры и т.д., все это возникает из-за неспособности внимательно посмотреть на наше использование языка в соответствующем контексте и, следовательно, неспособность отделить вопросы научного факта от вопросов о том, как работает язык. Я обсуждаю взгляды Витгенштейна на неполноту, последовательность и несоответствие и нерешающость и работу (...) Вольперта на пределы вычислений. Подводя итог: Вселенная согласно Бруклин---Хорошая Наука, не так хорошая философия. Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл" второй ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих сочинений могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - Философия, психология, наука, религия и политика на обреченной планете - Статьи и обзоры 2006-2019 3-й ed (2019) и suicidal утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке 4-й ed (2019) th и другие. (shrink)

The paper deals primarily with the standard question in what exactly, according to Husserl, consists the crisis of the European sciences. In the literature so far, there have been two tendencies on this question, one focusing on the loss of the sciences’ meaningfulness for life, the other emphasizing the inadequacy of their scientificity. Instead of arguing for one of these two options or for some sort of combination of both, another interpretation of this topic will be suggested. The focus will (...) be on Husserl’s notion of historicity and its connection with the concept of life-world. It will be argued that it is the historical detachment of sciences from ideas and consequently the sphere of meaning altogether which lies at the core of their ill state. On this basis, it will show that Husserl’s approach to science in Crisis is actually double. For one, it is an attempt to supplement science with a philosophical justification. The other is a historical de-construction of scientific objectivism as a misleading metaphysical claim concerning the lived world. This second, historical approach is developed exclusively in the Crisis. However, it does bring out questions leading to rethinking the meaning and goals of transcendental phenomenology itself. (shrink)

This peer-reviewed philosophy of science book examines the scope, purpose and methodology of science, and areas of the universe, reality and knowledge that lay beyond its scope. Science itself and scientists themselves say that there are important areas, topics and questions, including within and about science, that cannot be answered and often even addressed by science’s tools of sensory observation, empirical testing and logic.

This volume offers a broad, philosophical discussion on mechanical explanations. Coverage ranges from historical approaches and general questions to physics and higher-level sciences . The contributors also consider the topics of complexity, emergence, and reduction. Mechanistic explanations detail how certain properties of a whole stem from the causal activities of its parts. This kind of explanation is in particular employed in explanatory models of the behavior of complex systems. Often used in biology and neuroscience, mechanistic explanation models have been often (...) overlooked in the philosophy of physics. The authors correct this surprising neglect. They trace these models back to their origins in physics. The papers present a comprehensive historical, methodological, and problem-oriented investigation. The contributors also investigate the conditions for using models of mechanistic explanations in physics. The last papers make the bridge from physics to economics, the theory of complex systems and computer science . This book will appeal to graduate students and researchers with an interest in the philosophy of science, scientific explanation, complex systems, models of explanation in physics higher level sciences, and causal mechanisms in science. (shrink)

Het meest succesvolle denken over de natuur vind je in de natuurwetenschappen. Filosofie wordt wel eens omschreven als denken over denken. In het handboek Over wetenschappelijk denken behandelen we het denken over het wetenschappelijk denken. Dat maakt van dit boek zowel een algemene inleiding in de wijsbegeerte als meer in het bijzonder een inleiding tot de wetenschapsfilosofie. Eerst gaan we in dit handboek dieper in op de natuurfilosofische revolutie in het antieke Griekenland. De mythische verklaringen van natuurfenomenen zoals regenbogen moesten (...) toen plaats maken voor natuurfilosofische verklaringen die beroep doen op zuiver fysische oorzaken, zoals gekleurde wolken. Vervolgens komt de natuurwetenschappelijke revolutie aan bod. Het filosofisch denken over de natuur en het Aristotelische wereldbeeld worden op hun beurt verdrongen door de moderne natuurwetenschap en astronomie van Copernicus, Kepler, Galilei, Newton en Lavoisier. Zowel de oude Grieken als moderne filosofen en natuurwetenschappers zoals Bacon en Newton dachten niet alleen over de natuur na, maar ook over de manier waarop het best over de natuur wordt nagedacht. Wetenschappelijke redeneervormen zoals deductie, inductie en abductie hebben daarin een prominente plaats. Elk van deze redeneervormen en ook logica en waarschijnlijkheid bekijken we van naderbij. De observatie van een enkele zwarte zwaan (cover) volstaat om te deduceren dat niet alle zwanen wit zijn, ook als we door talloze vroegere observaties van witte zwanen inductief hadden afgeleid dat het waarschijnlijk is dat alle zwanen wit zijn. Zo komen we tot reflectie op wat wetenschap nu eigenlijk is en hoe we wetenschap kunnen onderscheiden van pseudowetenschap. (shrink)

The Theory of Relativity has been portrayed as a theory that redefined the way we look at the cosmos, enabling us to unlock the reality we live in. Its proponents are constantly reminding us of how Einstein managed to reveal the true nature of the universe with his groundbreaking theory, which has been proved multiple times until now. Yet, philosophy of science teaches us that no theory has any privileged connection with what we call reality per se. The role of (...) science is to formulate models of the cosmos we see and not to try to interpret or reveal reality. This paper tries to show how this holds true even for the famous relativity theory, by showing specific objections to the connection of the theory with the Holy Grail of philosophers. By analyzing various subjects related to the theory, from the twins’ paradox to the GPS satellites, this paper illustrates that relativity is much less connected to reality than what we would like to think. At the end, what Einstein’s theory provides is nothing more than a way to formalize the interactions of the world but without being able to make any claims whatsoever regarding the ‘reality’ of its conclusions. (shrink)

This article focuses on two developments in nineteenth-century (philosophy of) social science: Moritz Lazarus’s and Heymann Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie and Georg Simmel’s early sociology of knowledge. The article defends the following theses. First, Lazarus and Steinthal wavered between a “strong” and a “weak” program for Völkerpsychologie. Ingredients for the strong program included methodological neutrality and symmetry; causal explanation of beliefs based on causal laws; a focus on groups, interests, tradition, culture, or materiality; determinism; and a self-referential model of social institutions. Second, (...) elements of the weak program were the blurring of explanatory and normative interests, an emphasis on freedom of the will, and antirelativism and antimaterialism. Third, later research projects keeping the label “Völkerpsychologie” followed the weak program. Fourth, in the 1880s and 1890s, Simmel tried to build on some of the elements of the strong program. Finally, and fifth, part of the explanation for why Simmel did not succeed in his attempt had to do with the social-political situation of German academia around 1900. (shrink)

वह लेख के पहले समूह के लिए हम कैसे व्यवहार है कि काफी सैद्धांतिक भ्रम से मुक्त है में कुछ अंतर्दृष्टि देने का प्रयास. अगले तीन समूहों में मैं एक स्थायी दुनिया को रोकने के प्रमुख भ्रम के तीन पर टिप्पणी - प्रौद्योगिकी, धर्म और pol(सहकारी समूह)। लोगों का मानना है कि समाज उनके द्वारा बचाया जा सकता है, तो मैं क्यों यह छोटे लेख और प्रसिद्ध लेखकों द्वारा हाल ही में पुस्तकों की समीक्षा के माध्यम से संभावना नहीं है (...) के रूप में पुस्तक के बाकी में कुछ सुझाव प्रदान करते हैं. -/- अमेरिका और दुनिया अत्यधिक जनसंख्या वृद्धि से पतन की प्रक्रिया में हैं, पिछली सदी के लिए यह सबसे अधिक है और अब यह सब 3 दुनिया के लोगों की वजह से. संसाधनों की खपत और 4 अरब से अधिक ca. 2100 के अलावा औद्योगिक सभ्यता पतन औरएक चौंका देने वालापैमाने पर भुखमरी, रोग, हिंसा और युद्ध बाहर लाना होगा. अरबों मर जाएगा और परमाणु युद्ध सब कुछ है, लेकिन कुछ है। अमेरिका में यह बेहद बड़े पैमाने पर आव्रजन और आप्रवासी प्रजनन द्वारा त्वरित किया जा रहा है, डेमोcracy द्वारा संभव बनाया दुरुपयोग के साथसंयुक्त. भ्रष्ट मानव प्रकृति inexorably अपराध और गरीबी का एक दुःस्वप्न में लोकतंत्र और विविधता के सपने बदल जाता है. पतन का मूल कारण हमारे सहज मनोविज्ञान की अक्षमताको आधुनिक दुनिया के अनुकूल है, जो लोगों को unrelat एड व्यक्तियों के इलाज के लिए की ओर जाता है जैसे कि वे आमहितों था. यह, बुनियादी जीव विज्ञान और मनोविज्ञान की अज्ञानता के अलावा, आंशिक रूप से शिक्षित जो लोकतांत्रिक समाज को नियंत्रित करने के सामाजिक इंजीनियरिंग भ्रम की ओर जाता है. बहुत कम लोग समझते हैं कि अगर आप किसी और को नुकसान पहुँचाने में आपकी मदद करते हैं, तो मुफ्त दोपहर का भोजन नहीं होता और हर एक वस्तु का उपभोग करने से धरती की मरम्मत से परे नष्ट हो जाती है। नतीजतन, हर जगह सामाजिक नीतियां unsustainable हैं और स्वार्थ पर कड़े नियंत्रण के बिना एक के बाद एक सभी समाज अराजकता या तानाशाही में गिर जाएगी. नाटकीय और तत्काल परिवर्तन के बिना, वहाँ अमेरिका, या किसी भी देश है कि एक लोकतांत्रिक प्रणाली के बाद के पतन को रोकने के लिए कोई उम्मीद नहीं है. इसलिए मेरा निबंध "लोकतंत्र द्वारा आत्महत्या". अब यह भी स्पष्ट है कि चीनपर शासन करने वाले सात समाजपथ विश्व युद्ध 3 जीत रहेहैं, और इसलिए उन पर मेरा अंतिम निबंध। केवल बड़ा खतरा आर्टिफिशियल इंटेलिजेंस है जो मैं पिछले पैराग्राफ में संक्षेप पर टिप्पणी है. (shrink)

Hoyningen-Huene develops an account of what science is, distinguishing it from common sense. According to Hoyningen-Huene, the key distinguishing feature is that science is more systematic. He identifies nine ways in which science is more systematic than common sense. I compare Hoyningen-Huene’s view to a view I refer to as the “Continuity Thesis.” The Continuity Thesis states that scientific knowledge is just an extension of common sense. This thesis is associated with Quine, Planck, and others. I argue that Hoyningen-Huene ultimately (...) rejects the Continuity Thesis, and I present further evidence to show that the Continuity Thesis is false. I also argue that it is the systematicity of science that ultimately grounds the epistemic authority of science. Hoyningen-Huene thus draws attention to an important feature of science that explains the place of science in contemporary society. (shrink)

Algunos críticos de la ciencia afirman que es sólo un punto de vista entre otros, sin alguna autoridad epistémica especial. No obstante, en este artículo se defiende que la idea de que la investigación científica involucra una perspectiva o punto de vista no impone una restricción a su ideal de objetividad. Primero se presentan algunas aclaraciones sobre la noción de punto de vista, luego se atiende al concepto de objetividad científica, y por último se enfrentan algunos desafíos que se desprenden (...) de la noción de punto de vista y amenazan rasgos de la objetividad científica vinculados con su autoridad epistémica. -/- Some critics of science claim that it is only a point of view among others, lacking any special epistemic authority. However, this paper contends that conceiving scientific inquiry as something that involves a perspective or a point of view does not pose a constraint on its ideal of objectivity. We first put forward some clarifications on the notion of point of view, followed by some observations on scientific objectivity; finally, we face some of the challenges that rise from the notion of point of view and threaten features of scientific objectivity tied to its epistemic authority.]. (shrink)

This article considers Helmholtz’s relation to philosophy, including Fichte’s philosophy. Recent interpreters find Fichtean influence on Helmholtz, especially concerning the role of voluntary movement in distinguishing subject from object, or “I” from “not-I.” After examining Helmholtz’s statements about Fichte, the article describes Fichte’s ego-doctrine and asks whether Helmholtz could accept it into his sensory psychology. He could not accept Fichte’s core position, that an intrinsically active I intellectually intuits its own activity and posits the not-I as limiting and determining that (...) activity, because that account requires cognitive abilities that conflict with Helmholtz’s claim that the development of spatial perception relies primarily on associative memory and involves no direct awareness of the ego’s activity as such. Helmholtz would have known various accounts of the distinction between subject and object, or self and world, from sensory physiology, including associative accounts invoking voluntary motor movements and accounts describing checks on the perceiver’s activity. Some of the accounts cite Fichte on the I and not-I, but most do not, and none adopt Fichte’s Idealism. Finally, the article examines Helmholtz’s relation to metaphysics, finding that in all periods he rejected Fichtean Idealism and that the modest metaphysics of his mature period is a version of structural realism. (shrink)

Bernard Wills (2018) joins Christopher Brown (2017, 2018) in criticizing my defense of Weak Scientism (Mizrahi 2017a, 2017b, 2018a). Unfortunately, it seems that Wills did not read my latest defense of Weak Scientism carefully, nor does he cite any of the other papers in my exchange with Brown.

In his latest attack, even though he claims to be a practitioner of “close reading” (Wills 2018b, 34), it appears that Wills still has not bothered to read the paper in which I defend the thesis he seeks to attack (Mizrahi 2017a), or any of the papers in my exchange with Brown (Mizrahi 2017b; 2018a), as evidenced by the fact that he does not cite them at all. This explains why Wills completely misunderstands Weak Scientism and the arguments for the (...) quantitative superiority (in terms of research output and research impact) as well as qualitative superiority (in terms of explanatory, predictive, and instrumental success) of scientific knowledge over non-scientific knowledge. (shrink)

In my (2017a), I defend a view I call Weak Scientism, which is the view that knowledge produced by scientific disciplines is better than knowledge produced by non-scientific disciplines. Scientific knowledge can be said to be quantitatively better than non-scientific knowledge insofar as scientific disciplines produce more impactful knowledge–in the form of scholarly publications–than non-scientific disciplines (as measured by research output and research impact). Scientific knowledge can be said to be qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge insofar as such knowledge is (...) explanatorily, instrumentally, and predictively more successful than non-scientific knowledge. Brown (2017a) raises several objections against my defense of Weak Scientism and I have replied to his objections (Mizrahi 2017b), thereby showing again that Weak Scientism is a defensible view. Since then, Brown (2017b) has reiterated his objections in another reply on SERRC. In this paper, I respond to Brown's objections, thereby showing once more that Weak Scientism is a defensible view. (shrink)

A critical account of Russell's understanding of the relationship between science and religion.

The geosciences include a wide spectrum of disciplines ranging from paleontology to climate science, and involve studies of a vast range of spatial and temporal scales, from the deep-time history of microbial life to the future of a system no less immense and complex than the entire Earth. Modeling is thus a central and indispensable tool across the geosciences. Here, we review both the history and current state of model-based inquiry in the geosciences. Research in these fields makes use of (...) a wide variety of models, such as conceptual, physical, and numerical models, and more specifically cellular automata, artificial neural networks, agent-based models, coupled models, and hierarchical models. We note the increasing demands to incorporate biological and social systems into geoscience modeling, challenging the traditional boundaries of these fields. Understanding and articulating the many different sources of scientific uncertainty – and finding tools and methods to address them – has been at the forefront of most research in geoscience modeling. We discuss not only structuralmodel uncertainties, parameter uncertainties, and solution uncertainties, but also the diverse sources of uncertainty arising from the complex nature of geoscience systems themselves. Without an examination of the geosciences, our philosophies of science and our understanding of the nature of model-based science are incomplete. (shrink)

Both science and philosophy are interested in questions of ontology- questions about what exists and what these things are like. Science and philosophy, however, seem like very different ways of investigating the world, so how should one proceed? Some defer to the sciences, conceived as something apart from philosophy, and others to metaphysics, conceived as something apart from science, for certain kinds of answers. This book contends that these sorts of deference are misconceived. A compelling account of ontology must appreciate (...) the ways in which the sciences incorporate metaphysical assumptions and arguments. At the same time, it must pay careful attention to how observation, experience, and the empirical dimensions of science are related to what may be viewed as defensible philosophical theorizing about ontology. The promise of an effectively naturalized metaphysics is to encourage beliefs that are formed in ways that do justice to scientific theorizing, modeling, and experimentation. But even armed with such a view, there is no one, uniquely rational way to draw lines between domains of ontology that are suitable for belief, and ones in which it would be better to suspend belief instead. In crucial respects, ontology is in the eye of the beholder: it is Informed by underlying commitments with implications for the limits of inquiry, which inevitably vary across rational inquirers. As a result, the proper scope of ontology is subject to a striking form of voluntary choice, yielding a new and transformative conception of scientific ontology. (shrink)

Some strongly empiricist views of scientific knowledge advocate a rejection of metaphysics. On such views, scientific knowledge is described strictly in terms of knowledge of the observable world, demarcated by human sensory abilities, and no metaphysical considerations need arise. This paper argues that even these views require some recourse to metaphysics in order to derive knowledge from experience. Central here is the notion of metaphysical inference, which admits of different “magnitudes”, thus generating a spectrum of putative knowledge with more substantially (...) empirical beliefs at one end, and more metaphysically imbued beliefs at the other. Given that metaphysical inference is required even concerning knowledge of the observable, the empiricist hope of avoiding metaphysics altogether is futile: knowledge of the observable simply involves metaphysical inferences that are of smaller magnitudes than others. Metaphysical inferences are required not only to distinguish veridical from non-veridical experience and to determine the quality of empirical information, but also in order to explain how we construct experience (through categorizations and classifications of objects, events, processes, and properties), how we extrapolate from empirical evidence to generalize about observable phenomena, and how we use this evidence to test and confirm hypotheses and theories. (shrink)

The paper explicates the stages of the author’s philosophical evolution in the light of Kopnin’s ideas and heritage. Starting from Kopnin’s understanding of dialectical materialism, the author has stated that category transformations of physics has opened from conceptualization of immutability to mutability and then to interaction, evolvement and emergence. He has connected the problem of physical cognition universals with an elaboration of the specific system of tools and methods of identifying, individuating and distinguishing objects from a scientific theory domain. The (...) role of vacuum conception and the idea of existence (actual and potential, observable and nonobservable, virtual and hidden) types were analyzed. In collaboration with S.Crymski heuristic and regulative functions of categories of substance, world as a whole as well as postulates of relativity and absoluteness, and anthropic and self-development principles were singled out. Elaborating Kopnin’s view of scientific theories as a practically effective and relatively true mapping of their domains, the author in collaboration with M. Burgin have originated the unified structure-nominative reconstruction (model) of scientific theory as a knowledge system. According to it, every scientific knowledge system includes hierarchically organized and complex subsystems that partially and separately have been studied by standard, structuralist, operationalist, problem-solving, axiological and other directions of the current philosophy of science. 1) The logico-linguistic subsystem represents and normalizes by means of different, including mathematical, languages and normalizes and logical calculi the knowledge available on objects under study. 2) The model-representing subsystem comprises peculiar to the knowledge system ways of their modeling and understanding. 3) The pragmatic-procedural subsystem contains general and unique to the knowledge system operations, methods, procedures, algorithms and programs. 4) From the viewpoint of the problem-heuristic subsystem, the knowledge system is a unique way of setting and resolving questions, problems, puzzles and tasks of cognition of objects into question. It also includes various heuristics and estimations (truth, consistency, beauty, efficacy, adequacy, heuristicity etc) of components and structures of the knowledge system. 5) The subsystem of links fixes interrelations between above-mentioned components, structures and subsystems of the knowledge system. The structure-nominative reconstruction has been used in the philosophical and comparative case-studies of mathematical, physical, economic, legal, political, pedagogical, social, and sociological theories. It has enlarged the collection of knowledge structures, connected, for instance, with a multitude of theoreticity levels and with an application of numerous mathematical languages. It has deepened the comprehension of relations between the main directions of current philosophy of science. They are interpreted as dealing mainly with isolated subsystems of scientific theory. This reconstruction has disclosed a variety of undetected knowledge structures, associated also, for instance, with principles of symmetry and supersymmetry and with laws of various levels and degrees. In cooperation with the physicist Olexander Gabovich the modified structure-nominative reconstruction is in the processes of development and justification. Ideas and concepts were also in the center of Kopnin’s cognitive activity. The author has suggested and elaborated the triplet model of concepts. According to it, any scientific concept is a dependent on cognitive situation, dynamical, multifunctional state of scientist’s thinking, and available knowledge system. A concept is modeled as being consisted from three interrelated structures. 1) The concept base characterizes objects falling under a concept as well as their properties and relations. In terms of volume and content the logical modeling reveals partially only the concept base. 2) The concept representing part includes structures and means (names, statements, abstract properties, quantitative values of object properties and relations, mathematical equations and their systems, theoretical models etc.) of object representation in the appropriate knowledge system. 3) The linkage unites a structures and procedures that connect components from the abovementioned structures. The partial cases of the triplet model are logical, information, two-tired, standard, exemplar, prototype, knowledge-dependent and other concept models. It has introduced the triplet classification that comprises several hundreds of concept types. Different kinds of fuzziness are distinguished. Even the most precise and exact concepts are fuzzy in some triplet aspect. The notions of relations between real scientific concepts are essentially extended. For example, the definition and strict analysis of such relations between concepts as formalization, quantification, mathematization, generalization, fuzzification, and various kinds of identity are proposed. The concepts «PLANET» and «ELEMENTARY PARTICLE» and some of their metamorphoses were analyzed in triplet terms. The Kopnin’s methodology and epistemology of cognition was being used for creating conception of the philosophy of law as elaborating of understanding, justification, estimating and criticizing legal system. The basic information on the major directions in current Western philosophy of law (legal realism, feminism, criticism, postmodernism, economical analysis of law etc.) is firstly introduced to the Ukrainian audience. The classification of more than fifty directions in modern legal philosophy is suggested. Some results of historical, linguistic, scientometric and philosophic-legal studies of the present state of Ukrainian academic science are given. (shrink)

Descartes développe, dans ses Principes de la Philosophie, les principes fondateurs de son système construit sur l’identification de la matière à l’espace. L’analyse de ses principes nous invite à repenser le rôle de la métaphysique dans la constitution de la science et permet aussi de comprendre comment les concepts de matière, substance, espace, étendue géométrique, mouvement, infini et vide sont devenus les questions centrales de la science du XVIIe siècle.

Science is the study of our world, as it is in its messy reality. Nonetheless, science requires idealization to function—if we are to attempt to understand the world, we have to find ways to reduce its complexity. Idealization and the Aims of Science shows just how crucial idealization is to science and why it matters. Beginning with the acknowledgment of our status as limited human agents trying to make sense of an exceedingly complex world, Angela Potochnik moves on to explain (...) how science aims to depict and make use of causal patterns—a project that makes essential use of idealization. She offers case studies from a number of branches of science to demonstrate the ubiquity of idealization, shows how causal patterns are used to develop scientific explanations, and describes how the necessarily imperfect connection between science and truth leads to researchers’ values influencing their findings. The resulting book is a tour de force, a synthesis of the study of idealization that also offers countless new insights and avenues for future exploration. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher contains eleven chapters on the work of noted philosopher Philip Kitcher, whose work is known for its broad range and insightfulness. Topics covered include philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of religion. Each of the chapters is followed by a reply from Kitcher himself. This first significant edited volume devoted to examining Kitcher's work is an essential reference for anyone interested in understanding this important philosopher.

The problem of the limits of science — of the “barriers” and the “confines” — requires a new analysis, which is the task of this book. The issue is considered from the perspective of science as a human activity.

Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn argue that to be scientific is to be testable, to be falsifiable, and most nearly to do normal science, respectively. I argue that to be scientific is largely to be interactive, offering some examples from science to show that the ideas from different fields of science interact with one another. The results of the interactions are that hypotheses become more plausible, new phenomena are explained and predicted, we understand phenomena from a new perspective, and our worldview (...) becomes simpler. I also argue that given that the interactions are impressive features of science, astrology and religion would be regarded as science, provided that there are similar interactions in those enterprises. (shrink)

In biology—as in other scientific fields—there is a lively opposition between big and small science projects. In this commentary, I try to contextualize this opposition in the field of biomedicine, and I argue that, at least in this context, big science projects should come first.

Science lessons using inquiry only or history of science with inquiry were used for explicit reflective nature of science instruction for second-, third-, and fourth-grade students randomly assigned to receive one of the treatments. Students in both groups improved in their understanding of creative NOS, tentative NOS, empirical NOS, and subjective NOS as measured using VNOS-D as pre- and post-test surveys. Social and cultural context of science was not accessible for the students. Students in second, third, and fourth grades were (...) able to attain adequate views of empirical NOS, the role of observation and inference, creative and imaginative NOS, and subjective NOS. Students were not able to express adequate views of socially and culturally embedded NOS. Most gains in NOS eroded by the next school year, except for tentative NOS for both groups and creative NOS for the inquiry group. (shrink)

In recent years, disagreement as a philosophical topic has started to attract considerable attention, giving rise to rich debates not only on the logical nature of disagreement but also on specifically political and religious forms of it. Moreover, in some recent documents of the Catholic Church, we see corresponding attempts at understanding religious pluralism, dialogue among religions, and doctrinal tensions that sometimes arise within various parts of the Church itself. In such debates, many assume that the realm of the humanities (...) is clearly distinct from that of the natural sciences and, as a consequence, the dynamics of disagreement within the two realms is distinct as well. This paper challenges this assumption. Sociological studies of science are undermining the idea of a strict dichotomy between the dynamics of disagreement within the sciences and that within other areas of inquiry. Engaging in comparative methodology, this paper critically evaluates the dynamics of ecclesial disagreement and the associated idea of doctrinal authority by comparing them with what happens in the sciences. (shrink)

The purpose of this writing is to propose a frame of view, a form as the eternal world element, that is compatible with paradox within the history of ideas, modern discovery as they confront one another. Under special consideration are problems of representation of phenomena, life, the cosmos as the rational facility of mind confronts the physical/perceptual, and itself. Current topics in pursuit are near as diverse and numbered as are the possibilities for a world composed strictly of uniqueness able (...) to fill infinite space; it is assumed that not all of the paths chosen in contemporary pursuits will produce coherent determinations in an appropriate frame able to accommodate a world of nominals in motion, containing motion, and is commensurate with basic physical law and the propagation of form, change from within. Intended as a potential guiding post for the aim of reason seeking to select, define and capture topics, chosen as special examples are the works of logistician/mathematician Lewis Carroll as he presents a paradox of actuality verses the reality of perception in Alice in Wonderland, the theory of relativity of Albert Einstein as he fails to elaborate a mathematics to communicate an inertial frame of reference, and the reconstruction ideas of Jacques Derrida as he refers for contrast with the scientific world view constructed of dualisms, monisms that are conceived to have no opposites. Supporting discussion is evolved from the works of Bertrand Russell, Erwin Schrodinger, Jurgen Habermas, Bronislaw Malinowski, Michel Foucault. (shrink)

For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for (...) aim-oriented empiricism are subjected to critical scrutiny. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that science, understood as pure research, ought not to be affected by non-epistemic values and thus to defend the traditional ideal of value-free science. First, we will trace the distinction between science and technology, arguing that science should be identified with pure research and that any non-epistemic concern should be di­rected toward technology and technological research. Second, we will examine different kinds of values and the roles they can play in scientific research (...) to argue that science understood as pure research is mostly and in any case ought to be value-free. Third, we will consider and dismiss some widespread arguments that aim to defend, especially at a normative level, the inevitable value-ladenness of science. Finally, we will briefly return to the connections among science, technology, and values. (shrink)

Some philosophers have recently argued that contrary to the traditional view, good scientific theories can in fact be logically inconsistent. The literature is now full of case-studies that are taken to support this claim. I will argue however that as of yet no-one has managed to articulate a philosophically interesting view about the role of logically inconsistent theories in science that genuinely goes against tradition, is plausibly true, and is supported by any of the case studies usually given.

Historians of twentieth-century science have been systematically ignoring some of the subject’s richest sources and most exciting stories; this has left us with a body of work that is necessarily lopsided and that can be self-reinforcing in its insistence on certain features of “modern” science as uniquely dominant or significant after 1900. Methods, concepts, research questions, research areas, and resources that have been routinely and productively used by historians of science immersed in earlier centuries appear to drop out of our (...) toolkits when we turn to the twentieth century. This essay highlights one neglected area—human physiology studied in the field—and points to other topics where asking questions appropriate to natural history or “museum” ways of knowing might cast a completely new light on scientific practices and knowledge production. (shrink)