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  1. The Semantic View, If Plausible, Is Syntactic.Hans Halvorson - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):475-478.
    Halvorson argues that the semantic view of theories leads to absurdities. Glymour shows how to inoculate the semantic view against Halvorson's criticisms, namely by making it into a syntactic view of theories. I argue that this modified semantic-syntactic view cannot do the philosophical work that the original "language-free" semantic view was supposed to do.
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  2. What Scientific Theories Could Not Be.Hans Halvorson - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (2):183-206.
    According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view -- if taken seriously as a formal explication -- leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are truly distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are truly equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one theory into another. The untenability of the semantic view -- as currently formulated -- threatens to (...)
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  3. More worries for Structural Realism: a dilemma from the relativized a priori.Milena Ivanova - manuscript
    I examine implications for structural realism of Michael Friedman’s view about relativized a priori principles. Friedman's argument implies that there is structural preservation of constitutive principles in theory change, which suggests that the structural realist should be committed to these principles, given that they satisfy her criterion of ontological commitment. Since these principles are not regarded as representing physical structure, I argue that a dilemma arises for the structural realist. Either a distinction between mathematical structures that represent and mathematical structures (...)
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  4. The Metaphysics of Invariance.David Schroeren - manuscript
    Fundamental physics contains an important link between properties of elementary particles and continuous symmetries of particle systems. For example, properties such as mass and spin are said to be 'associated' with specific continuous symmetries. -/- These 'associations' have played a key role in the discovery of various new particle kinds, but more importantly: they are thought to provide a deep insight into the nature of physical reality. The link between properties and symmetries has been said to call for a radical (...)
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  5. Survey of Structuralism in the Natural Sciences.Ioannis Votsis - manuscript
    This chapter traces the development of structural realism within the scientific realism debate and the wider current of structuralism that has swept the philosophy of the natural sciences in the twentieth century.1 The primary aim is to make perspicuous the many manifestations of structural realism and their underlying claims. Among other things, I will compare structural realism’s various manifestations in order to throw more light onto the relations between them. At the end of the chapter, I will identify the main (...)
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  6. Newman’s Objection is Dead; Long Live Newman’s Objection!Sebastian Lutz - 2017
    There are two ways of reading Newman’s objection to Russell’s structuralism. One assumes that according to Russell, our knowledge of a theory about the external world is captured by an existential generalization on all non-logical symbols of the theory. Under this reading, our knowledge amounts to a cardinality claim. Another reading assumes that our knowledge singles out a structure in Russell’s (and Newman’s) sense: a model theoretic structure that is determined up to isomorphism. Under this reading, our knowledge is far (...)
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  7. Points, particles and structural realism’.Oliver Pooley with Ian Gibson - manuscript
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  8. Mathematical structural realism.Author unknown - manuscript
    Forthcoming in A. Bokulich & P. Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Springer. Abstract: Epistemic structural realists have argued that we are in a better epistemic position with respect to the structural claims made by our theories than the non-structural claims. Critics have objected that we cannot make the structure/non-structure distinction precise. I respond that a focus on mathematical structure leads to a clearer understanding of this debate. Unfortunately for the structural realist, however, the contribution (...)
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  9. Reconciling Ontic Structural Realism and Ontological Emergence.João L. Cordovil, Gil C. Santos & John Symons - forthcoming - Foundations of Science:1-20.
    While ontic structural realism has been a central topic in contemporary philosophy of science, the relation between OSR and the concept of emergence has received little attention. We will argue that OSR is fully compatible with emergentism. The denial of ontological emergence requires additional assumptions that, strictly speaking, go beyond OSR. We call these physicalist closure assumptions. We will explain these assumptions and show that they are independent of the central commitments of OSR and inconsistent with its core goals. Recognizing (...)
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  10. What is matter? The fundamental ontology of atomism and structural realism.Michael Esfeld, Dirk-André Deckert & Andrea Oldofredi - forthcoming - In B. Lower and A. Ijjas (ed.), A guide to the philosophy of Cosmology. Oxford University Press.
    We set out a fundamental ontology of atomism in terms of matter points. While being most parsimonious, this ontology is able to match both classical and quantum mechanics, and it remains a viable option for any future theory of cosmology that goes beyond current quantum physics. The matter points are structurally individuated: all there is to them are the spatial relations in which they stand; neither a commitment to intrinsic properties nor to an absolute space is required. The spatial relations (...)
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  11. Duhem and scientific realism.Maryam Ghasemi Naraghi - forthcoming - Philosophical Investigations.
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  12. Structures, Objects and Causality.Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.) - forthcoming - Springer.
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  13. Truth and reality: How to be a scientific realist without believing scientific theories should be true.Angela Potochnik - forthcoming - In Kareem Khalifa, Insa Lawler & Elay Shech (eds.), Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences.
    Scientific realism is a thesis about the success of science. Most traditionally: science has been so successful at prediction and guiding action because its best theories are true (or approximately true or increasing in their degree of truth). If science is in the business of doing its best to generate true theories, then we should turn to those theories for explanatory knowledge, predictions, and guidance of our actions and decisions. Views that are popular in contemporary philosophy of science about scientific (...)
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  14. The Chemical Bond is a Real Pattern.Vanessa A. Seifert - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-47.
    There is a persisting debate about what chemical bonds are and whether they exist. I argue that chemical bonds are real patterns of interactions between subatomic particles. This proposal resolves the problems raised in the context of existing understandings of the chemical bond and provides a novel way to defend the reality of chemical bonds.
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  15. Stating structural realism: mathematics‐first approaches to physics and metaphysics.David Wallace - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    I respond to the frequent objection that structural realism fails to sharply state an alternative to the standard predicate-logic, object / property / relation, way of doing metaphysics. The approach I propose is based on what I call a ‘math-first’ approach to physical theories (close to the so-called ‘semantic view of theories') where the content of a physical theory is to be understood primarily in terms of its mathematical structure and the representational relations it bears to physical systems, rather than (...)
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  16. Operational theories as structural realism.Emily Adlam - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):99-111.
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  17. Towards a Structuralist Elimination of Properties.Valia Allori - 2022 - In Quantum Mechanics and Fundamentality: Naturalizing Quantum Theory between Scientific Realism and Ontological Indeterminacy. pp. 141-155.
    Scientific realists investigate the ontology of the world and explain the observed phenomena by using our best fundamental physical theories. These theories describe the behavior of fundamental objects in terms of their fundamental properties, which determine their behavior. This paper is the natural companion of another paper in which I propose an alternative to this traditional account of metaphysics, according to which fundamental objects have no other fundamental property than the one needed to specify their nature. In that paper I (...)
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  18. Metafysiikka valistuksena.Jani Hakkarainen - 2022 - In Hemmo Laiho (ed.), Valistuksen perinnöt: Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen kollokvion esitelmiä. Turku: University of Turku. pp. 37-48.
    Kirjoituksessa argumentoin, että metafysiikka on ollut valistusta, vaikka se edelleen kaipaa lisää valistumista, kun valistus ymmärretään avoimena prosessina, joka ei ole ajasta ja paikasta riippuvaista. Käsittelen ensin sitä, mitä metafysiikka ja valistus ovat. Sitten lausun länsimaisen metafysiikan historiasta hyvin lyhyesti. Päätän esseen argumentoimalla, että metafysiikka on valistunutta siinä mielessä, että klassisen substanssi-ominaisuus-skeeman sokeasta seuraamisesta on pitkälti päästy eroon. Metafysiikka kaipaa kuitenkin lisää valistusta ja kriittistä tarkastelua, jotta vapaudumme täysin kyseisen skeeman ja modernin predikaatti-logiikan johdatuksen aiheuttamasta kolmesta ongelmallisesta suositusta (tausta)oletuksesta: (1) (...)
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  19. Reality in Perspectives.Mahdi Khalili - 2022 - Dissertation, Vu University Amsterdam
    This dissertation is about human knowledge of reality. In particular, it argues that scientific knowledge is bounded by historically available instruments and theories; nevertheless, the use of several independent instruments and theories can provide access to the persistent potentialities of reality. The replicability of scientific observations and experiments allows us to obtain explorable evidence of robust entities and properties. The dissertation includes seven chapters. It also studies three cases – namely, Higgs bosons and hypothetical Ϝ-particles (section 2.4), the Ptolemaic and (...)
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  20. Objective Phenomenology.Andrew Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5).
    This paper examines the idea of objective phenomenology, or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn’t require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagnosing what makes any given phenomenal fact subjective. Then I defend the view that structural facts about experience are (...)
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  21. Structural losses, structural realism and the stability of Lie algebras.Jorge Manero - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 91 (C):28-40.
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  22. Relationism and the Problem of Order.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2022 - Acta Analytica:1-29.
    Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the Problem of Differential Application. (...)
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  23. An Inferential Response to the "Loss of Reality Objection" to Structural Empiricism.Franco Menares Paredes - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (3):539–558.
    This paper aims to meet an objection that has been raised against structural empiricism known as the “loss of reality objection.” I argue that an inferential approach to scientific representation allows the structural empiricist to account for the representation of phenomena by data models and ensures that such a representation is not arbitrary. By the notions of immersion, derivation, and interpretation, I show how data models are able to represent phenomena in a non-arbitrary manner. I conclude this paper with a (...)
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  24. Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism.Seungbae Park - 2022 - Metaphysica 23 (1):1-13.
    Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, (...)
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  25. Goals shape means: a pluralist response to the problem of formal representation in ontic structural realism.Agnieszka M. Proszewska - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-21.
    The aim of the paper is to assess the relative merits of two formal representations of structure, namely, set theory and category theory. The purpose is to articulate ontic structural realism. In turn, this will facilitate a discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of both concepts and will lead to a proposal for a pragmatics-based approach to the question of the choice of an appropriate framework. First, we present a case study from contemporary science—a comparison of the formulation of quantum (...)
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  26. A Case for Conservative Ontology Development in Scientific Metaphysics.Sahana Rajan - 2022 - Philosophical Inquiries 1 (10):9-24.
    Over the past decade, in contrast to the traditional analytic version of metaphysics, a brand of metaphysics that prioritizes collaboration and corroboration with sciences has emerged in the form of scientific metaphysics. While there has been a shift from the methodological dependence of analytic metaphysis on intuition, and conceptual analysis to the methodological preference for empirically-motivated metaphysical insights in scientific metaphysics, such a shift has not penetrated the foundational aims. Scientific metaphysics continues to probe the nature and structure of reality, (...)
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  27. How realist is informational structural realism?Billy Wheeler - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6).
    Informational structural realism offers a new way to understand the nature of the “structure” that structural realists claim our best scientific theories get right about the world. According to Luciano Floridi, who has given the most detailed formulation of ISR so far, this structure is composed of information representing binary differences. In this paper I assess whether ISR offers a good way to resolve the tension between the no miracle argument and the pessimistic meta-induction. With regards to this important motivation (...)
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  28. Inflating the social aspects of cognitive structural realism.Majid D. Beni - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-18.
    Inspired by Ronald Giere’s cognitive approach to scientific models, Cognitive Structural Realism has presented a naturalist account of scientific representation. CSR characterises the structure of theories in terms of cognitive structures. These are informational structures embodied in the brains of scientists. CSR accounts for scientific representation in terms of the dynamical relationship between the organism and its environment. The proposal has been criticised on account of its negligence of social aspects of scientific practice. The present paper aims to chart out (...)
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  29. Freeing Structural Realism from Model Theory.Neil Dewar - 2021 - In Elena Aladova, Pablo Barceló, Johan van Benthem, Gerald Berger, Katrin M. Dannert, Neil Dewar, Răzvan Diaconescu, Ivo Düntsch, Wojciech Dzik, M. Eyad Kurd-Misto, Giambattista Formica, Michèle Friend, Robert Goldblatt, Georg Gottlob, Erich Grädel, Robin Hirsch, Ian Hodkinson, Marcel Jackson, Peter Jipsen, Roger D. Maddux, J. B. Manchak, Ewa Orłowska, Andreas Pieris, Boris Plotkin, Tatjana Plotkin, Vaughan R. Pratt, Ian Pratt-Hartmann, Tarek Sayed Ahmed, James Owen Weatherall, Dag Westerståhl, James Wimberley, Krzysztof Wójtowicz & Christian Wüthrich (eds.), Hajnal Andréka and István Németi on Unity of Science: From Computing to Relativity Theory Through Algebraic Logic. Springer Verlag. pp. 363-382.
    Structural realists contend that the properties and relations in the world are more fundamental than the individuals. However, the standard model theory used to analyse the structure of logical theories can make it difficult to see how such an idea could be coherent or workable: for in that theory, properties and relations are constructed as sets of individuals. In this paper, I look at three ways in which structuralists might hope for an alternative: by appealing to predicate-functor logic, Tractarian geometry, (...)
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  30. Lucasian Microfoundations as a Form of Structural Realism.Peter Galbács - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (3):9-35.
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  31. History and the Contemporary Scientific Realism Debate.Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers - 2021 - In Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers (eds.), Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge from the History of Science. Oxford University Press.
  32. The Hole Argument, Manifold Substantivalism, and Ontic Structural Realism.Saeed Masoumi - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 15 (35):379-401.
    The hole argument has become one of the main issues in the philosophy of space-time after the article by Earman and Norton (1987), according to which a certain version of substantivalism (manifold substantivalism) cannot be defended because it brings about to a radical indeterminism. In this article, we try to show that, first, the naming of manifold substantivalism is not appropriate since as some philosophers have said, manifold points cannot be considered to have an independent identity. Second, with a commitment (...)
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  33. Underdetermination and Ontic Structural Realism.Saeed Masoumi - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 15 (37):1027-1051.
    One of the most important arguments against scientific realism is underdetermination, so realists should address the argument satisfactorily and give an appropriate response to it. Underdetermination divides into holist and contrastive forms; in this article, we will only deal with the contrastive form. By examining different responses, it will turn out that while they are successful in some cases, there are instances where responses are not satisfactory. Specifically, two formulations of Newtonian mechanics are examined and the examination reveals an important (...)
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  34. Dari Realisme Saintifik ke Realisme Struktural Ontik.Moh Gema Maulana - 2021 - Cogito: Jurnal Mahasiswa Filsafat 6 (1):31-50.
    Artikel ini memaparkan serta menganjurkan peralihan dari realisme saintifik yang memiliki karakter ontologi berorientasi objek ke realisme struktural ontik yang memiliki karakter ontologi berorientasi struktur. Argumen dari kedua pandangan tersebut akan ditunjukan kelemahannya dari pandangan yang pertama dan kemudian bagaimana realisme struktural ontik dapat menghindari kelemahan tersbut. Realisme saintifik memiliki kelemahan problem referensial yang diimplikasikan oleh tesis pesimisme induksi meta dan problem penentuan teori serta metafisik yang diimplikasikan oleh ketaktertentuan teori oleh evidens dan juga ketaktertentuan metafisik dalam menentukan status metafisik (...)
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  35. The Relativity of Theory by Moti Mizrahi: Reply by the Author.Moti Mizrahi - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 87 (C):173-174.
  36. Structural realism and generative linguistics.Ryan M. Nefdt - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3711-3737.
    Linguistics as a science has rapidly changed during the course of a relatively short period. The mathematical foundations of the science, however, present a different story below the surface. In this paper, I argue that due to the former, the seismic shifts in theory over the past 80 years opens linguistics up to the problem of pessimistic meta-induction or radical theory change. I further argue that, due to the latter, one current solution to this problem in the philosophy of science, (...)
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  37. Modal Empiricism: Interpreting Science Without Scientific Realism.Quentin Ruyant - 2021 - Springer International Publishing.
    This book proposes a novel position in the debate on scientific realism: Modal Empiricism. Modal empiricism is the view that the aim of science is to provide theories that correctly delimit, in a unified way, the range of experiences that are naturally possible given our position in the world. The view is associated with a pragmatic account of scientific representation and an original notion of situated modalities, together with an inductive epistemology for modalities. It purports to provide a faithful account (...)
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  38. A Metaphysics for Mathematical and Structural Realism.Adam InTae Gerard - 2020 - Stance 2 (1):75-89.
    The goal of this paper is to preserve realism in both ontology and truth for the philosophy of mathematics and science. It begins by arguing that scientific realism can only be attained given mathematical realism due to the indispensable nature of the latter to the prior. Ultimately, the paper argues for a position combining both Ontic Structural Realism and Ante Rem Structuralism, or what the author refers to as Strong Ontic Structural Realism, which has the potential to reconcile realism for (...)
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  39. Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism.David Glick - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):751-772.
    Ontic structural realism claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as ‘generalism’. According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, generalism is unable to (...)
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  40. What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science.Haktan Akcin - 2019 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 9 (9:3):597-608.
    I argue that the central conflict between epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism concerns whether it is possible to read off ontology from current fundamental science. Even if we assume that structures are metaphysically superior to objects, the possibility of reading off ontology from current fundamental science remains unjustified. I show that the conclusion as regards to the reading off ontology in the ontic version is already assumed in one of the premises; hence the argument begs the question. As (...)
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  41. Un mundo de estructuras: Simetrías Grupo-Teóricas desde el Realismo Infoestructural.Javier Anta - 2019 - Metatheoria 10 (1):1-11.
    Ontic Structural Realism, as pivotal position in philosophy of science and metaphysics, defends the idea that the world is ultimately constituted of real physical structures. French (2014) regards physical symmetries as the foundational structure of a world without objects. On the other hand, Ladyman and Ross (2007) hold that the world is essentially made of non-redundant informational structure. I argue in this paper that these two positions are by no means incompatible, for instance by interpreting French’s physical symmetries as real (...)
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  42. Pluralist structural realism: The best of both worlds?David Glick - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4145-4166.
    Worrall :99–124, 1989) famously claimed that structural realism is the best of both worlds; it enables one to endorse the best arguments for scientific realism and antirealism. In this paper, I argue that structural realism also enables one to combine two other seemingly inconsistent positions: realism and pluralism. Indeed, the very features which form the basis of the structural realist’s reply to the problem of theory change may be applied synchronically to allow for a pluralist structural realism. The resulting position (...)
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  43. Structural Realism or Modal Empiricism?Quentin Ruyant - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1051-1072.
    Structural realism has been suggested as the best compromise in the debate on scientific realism. It proposes that we should be realist about the relational structure of the world, not its nature. However, it faces an important objection, first raised by Newman against Russell: if relations are not qualified, then the position is either trivial or collapses into empiricism, but if relations are too strongly qualified, then it is no longer SR. A way to overcome this difficulty is to talk (...)
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  44. Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism.David J. Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (12):625-660.
    Cartesian arguments for global skepticism about the external world start from the premise that we cannot know that we are not in a Cartesian scenario such as an evil-demon scenario, and infer that because most of our empirical beliefs are false in such a scenario, these beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Veridicalist responses to global skepticism respond that arguments fail because in Cartesian scenarios, many or most of our empirical beliefs are true. Some veridicalist responses have been motivated using verificationism, (...)
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  45. Worrall zu Theorienunterbestimmtheit und Strukturenrealismus: Wirklich kein Problem?Holger Leerhoff - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):27-52.
    In the debate of scientific realism, the argument from underdetermination of theories by evidence is put forward by the anti-realist side. According to this argument, for any scientific theory rival theories can be found which are equally well supported by the evidence but incompatible with the original theory. Structural realism is a form of realism that limits the realistic belief in the existence of the entities and structures talked about in scientific theories: Only the structures of reality are relevant in (...)
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  46. On the Epistemological Potential of Worrall's Structural Realism.Federica Isabella Malfatti - 2018 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (VI):9-24.
    Structural realism à-la-Worrall is the view that inasmuch as our scientific theories provide us with (partially) adequate descriptions of an objective and independent reality, they do so by shedding light on the way this reality is in itself structured, and not on the so-called nature of existing objects. This position seems to imply that there is something about reality that lies beyond our grasp. I will reconstruct and shed new light onto Worrall’s position and show that, contrary to how it (...)
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  47. From ontic structural realism to metaphysical coherentism.Matteo Morganti - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-20.
    The present paper argues that the typical structuralist claims according to which invariances, symmetries and the like are fundamental – especially in physics – should not be understood in terms of physical relations being fundamental. Rather, they should be understood in terms of ‘metaphysical coherentism’ - the idea that object-like parts of reality exhibit symmetric relations of ontological dependence. The view is developed in some detail, in particular by showing that i) symmetric ontological dependence does not necessarily lead to uninformative (...)
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  48. Fundamentality and Ontological Minimality.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2018 - In Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure. Oxford University Press. pp. 237-253.
    In this chapter, a generic definition of fundamentality as an ontological minimality thesis is sought and its applicability examined. Most discussions of fundamentality are focused on a mereological understanding of the hierarchical structure of reality, which may be combined with an atomistic, object-oriented metaphysics. But recent work in structuralism, for instance, calls for an alternative understanding and it is not immediately clear that the conception of fundamentality at work in structuralism is commensurable with the mereological conception. However, it is proposed (...)
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  49. Inverse functionalism and the individuation of powers.David Yates - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4525-4550.
    In the pure powers ontology (PPO), basic physical properties have wholly dispositional essences. PPO has clear advantages over categoricalist ontologies, which suffer from familiar epistemological and metaphysical problems. However, opponents argue that because it contains no qualitative properties, PPO lacks the resources to individuate powers, and generates a regress. The challenge for those who take such arguments seriously is to introduce qualitative properties without reintroducing the problems that PPO was meant to solve. In this paper, I distinguish the core claim (...)
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  50. Reconstructing the upward path to structural realism.Majid Beni - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (3):393-409.
    In his Analysis of Matter, Russell advocated an epistemic form of Epistemic Structural Realism which held that our knowledge of the external world is structural. This approach has been criticised by M.H.A. Newman, 137–148, 1928) and Stathis Psillos, S13–S24, 2001). The paper aims to reconstruct Russell’s version of ESR, and defend its experimental and philosophical plausibility. The basic assumption is that without getting a viable experimental handle on the linkage between the structure of perceptions and causal structure of the stimuli, (...)
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