Structural Realism

I examine implications for structural realism of Michael Friedman’s view about relativized a priori principles. Friedman's argument implies that there is structural preservation of constitutive principles in theory change, which suggests that the structural realist should be committed to these principles, given that they satisfy her criterion of ontological commitment. Since these principles are not regarded as representing physical structure, I argue that a dilemma arises for the structural realist. Either a distinction between mathematical structures that represent and mathematical structures (...) that do not represent needs to be drawn, in order to block the structural realist from ontologically committing to relativized a priori principles, or the structural realist must ontologically commit to relativized a priori principles. Due to the dynamical nature of relativized a priori principles, the first option is untenable. The second option reveals implications for structural realism but also problems for Friedman's view. (shrink)

There are two ways of reading Newman’s objection to Russell’s structuralism. One assumes that according to Russell, our knowledge of a theory about the external world is captured by an existential generalization on all non-logical symbols of the theory. Under this reading, our knowledge amounts to a cardinality claim. Another reading assumes that our knowledge singles out a structure in Russell’s (and Newman’s) sense: a model theoretic structure that is determined up to isomorphism. Under this reading, our knowledge is far (...) from trivial, for it amounts to knowledge of the structure of the relations between objects, but not their identity. Newman’s objection is then but an expression of structural realism. Since therefore the content of theories is described by classes of structures closed under isomorphism, the most natural description of a theory in structural realism is syntactic. (shrink)

Fundamental physics contains an important link between properties of elementary particles and continuous symmetries of particle systems. For example, properties such as mass and spin are said to be 'associated' with specific continuous symmetries. -/- These 'associations' have played a key role in the discovery of various new particle kinds, but more importantly: they are thought to provide a deep insight into the nature of physical reality. The link between properties and symmetries has been said to call for a radical (...) revision of perceived metaphysical orthodoxy. However, if we are to use claims about an 'association' between properties and symmetries in the articulation of metaphysical views, we first need to develop a sufficiently precise understanding of the content of these claims. The goal of this paper is to do just that. (shrink)

This chapter traces the development of structural realism within the scientific realism debate and the wider current of structuralism that has swept the philosophy of the natural sciences in the twentieth century.1 The primary aim is to make perspicuous the many manifestations of structural realism and their underlying claims. Among other things, I will compare structural realism’s various manifestations in order to throw more light onto the relations between them. At the end of the chapter, I will identify the main (...) objections raised against the epistemic form of structural realism. This last task will pave the way for the evaluation of the structural realist answer to the main epistemological question, an evaluation that will be central to the rest of this dissertation. (shrink)

*Presented at the Western Canadian Philosophical Association Conference 2019 at the University of Lethbridge in Lethbridge, Alberta.* -/- This paper discusses some issues that arise when applying structural realism to biology. I begin by reviewing Katherine Brading’s version of structural realism with a hierarchy with proliferation of models.1 I then attempt to apply Brading’s structural realism to a biological example. This biological example suggests an issue with the use of shared structure. In response, I suggest the use of relevant relations (...) instead of shared structure. I then discuss Steven French’s use of eliminativist ontic structural realism in biology. Additionally, I consider John Dupré and Maureen A. O’Malley’s discussion of metagenomics and claim that biological entities are better described as self-sustaining biological processes.2 These metagenomic insights suggest an eliminativist view is preferable in biology. I conclude with an attempt to combine Brading’s and French’s approaches into an eliminativist relevant relationalism that retains the structuralist flavor and is applicable to the fluid, constantly changing entities found in biology. -/- 1. Katherine Brading, “Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality,” chap. 3 in Scientific Structuralism, ed. Alisa Bokulich and Peter Bokulich, vol. 281, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011), 43–65, isbn: 9789048195978, doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9597-8_3. 2. John Dupré and Maureen A. O’Malley, “Metagenomics and biological ontology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (2007): 84. (shrink)

Forthcoming in A. Bokulich & P. Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Springer. Abstract: Epistemic structural realists have argued that we are in a better epistemic position with respect to the structural claims made by our theories than the non-structural claims. Critics have objected that we cannot make the structure/non-structure distinction precise. I respond that a focus on mathematical structure leads to a clearer understanding of this debate. Unfortunately for the structural realist, however, the contribution (...) that mathematics makes to scientific representation undermines any general confidence we might have in the structural claims made by our theories. Thinking about the role of mathematics in science may also complicate other versions of realism. (shrink)

Recently, metaphysical coherentism has been propounded as an alternative to metaphysical foundationalism and infinitism. The view replaces the picture of reality as a hierarchy of levels with that of a network of objects or facts standing in symmetric or, more generally, cyclic relations of metaphysical dependence. This paper defends the orthodox picture of a well-founded hierarchy against the claimed superiority of coherentism. First, it will be argued that alleged theoretical advantages of coherentism do not hold up to scrutiny. Secondly, examples (...) that are claimed to support coherentism are either misdescribed as involving metaphysical interdependence, or foundationalist treatments fare at least as good and often better than coherentist interpretations. Thirdly, a similar diagnosis applies to a recently proposed coherentist interpretation of quantum entanglement. The more general diagnosis is that claims of metaphysical dependence are convincing only if there is a detailed account of how one item metaphysically explains another. While foundationalists can resort to various specific explanatory relations, coherentism seems to be incapable of providing detailed explanations. (shrink)

We set out a fundamental ontology of atomism in terms of matter points. While being most parsimonious, this ontology is able to match both classical and quantum mechanics, and it remains a viable option for any future theory of cosmology that goes beyond current quantum physics. The matter points are structurally individuated: all there is to them are the spatial relations in which they stand; neither a commitment to intrinsic properties nor to an absolute space is required. The spatial relations (...) change. All that is needed to capture change is a dynamical structure, namely dynamical relations as expressed in terms of the dynamical parameters of a physical theory. (shrink)

Three accounts of effective realism (ER) have been advanced to solve three problems for scientific realism: Fraser and Vickers (forthcoming) develop a version of ER about non-relativistic quantum mechanics that they argue is compatible with all the main realist versions (‘interpretations’) of quantum mechanics avoiding the problem of underdetermination among them; Williams (2019) and Fraser (2020b) propose ER about quantum field theory as a response to the problems facing realist interpretations; Robertson and Wilson (forthcoming) propose ER to deal with the (...) dubious ontological status of the entities belonging to superseded theories. This paper argues for the unification of these proposals based on realism about modal structure and the idea of scale relativity of ontology developed by ontic structural realists. This solves problems some or all the accounts of ER face, especially that of making explicit in what way they are realist. Furthermore, we respond to a recent critique that has been raised against the ontic structural realist account of quantum mechanics that we employ. (shrink)

Scientific realism is a thesis about the success of science. Most traditionally: science has been so successful at prediction and guiding action because its best theories are true (or approximately true or increasing in their degree of truth). If science is in the business of doing its best to generate true theories, then we should turn to those theories for explanatory knowledge, predictions, and guidance of our actions and decisions. Views that are popular in contemporary philosophy of science about scientific (...) modeling and the centrality of idealization create several challenges for this traditional form of scientific realism. Yet the basic idea behind scientific realism that science has been and will continue to be epistemically successful is deeply appealing. This chapter explores the challenges posed by idealization and scientific modeling to motivate a scientific realism fully divorced from the idea that science is in the business of generating true theories. On the resulting view, the objects of scientific knowledge are causal patterns, so this knowledge only ever provides partial, simplified accounts of a complex reality. This variety of selective realism better accommodates the nature of our present-day scientific successes and offers an interpretation of scientific progress that resists the antirealist’s pessimism. (shrink)

There is a persisting debate about what chemical bonds are and whether they exist. I argue that chemical bonds are real patterns of interactions between subatomic particles. This proposal resolves the problems raised in the context of existing understandings of the chemical bond and provides a novel way to defend the reality of chemical bonds.

Ontic structural realism constitutes a promising take on scientific realism, one that avoids the well‐known issues that realist stances have with underdetermination and theory change. In its most radical versions, ontic structural realism proposes a type of eliminativism about theoretical entities, ascribing ontological commitment only to the structures, and not to the objects appearing in our theories. More moderate versions of ontic structural realism have also been proposed, allowing for ‘thin’ objects in the ontology. This work connects these takes on (...) structural realism with the independent notion that there are two categorically different kinds of scientific theories, namely those that deal with interactions and those that deal with structural constraints – what are known as interaction and framework theories, respectively. By taking this classification seriously, one can arrive at a selective version of ontic structural realism which is better adapted to our scientific knowledge, in which eliminativist ontic structural realism constitutes a natural fit to framework theories, whereas the moderate version is connected to interaction theories. (shrink)

While ontic structural realism (OSR) has been a central topic in contemporary philosophy of science, the relation between OSR and the concept of emergence has received little attention. We will argue that OSR is fully compatible with emergentism. The denial of ontological emergence requires additional assumptions that, strictly speaking, go beyond OSR. We call these _physicalist closure assumptions._ We will explain these assumptions and show that they are independent of the central commitments of OSR and inconsistent with its core goals. (...) Recognizing the compatibility of OSR and ontological emergence may contribute to the solution of ontological puzzles in physics while offering new ways to achieve the goals that advocates of OSR set for their view. (shrink)

I flesh out the sense in which the informational approach to interpreting quantum mechanics, as defended by Pitowsky and Bub and lately by a number of other authors, is (neo-)Bohrian. I argue that on this approach, quantum mechanics represents what Bohr called a “natural generalisation of the ordinary causal description” in the sense that the idea (which philosophers of science like Stein have argued for on the grounds of practical and epistemic necessity) that understanding a theory as a theory of (...) physics requires that one be able to “schematise the observer” within it is elevated in quantum mechanics to the level of a postulate in the sense that interpreting the outcome of a measurement interaction, as providing us with information about the world, requires as a matter of principle, the specification of a schematic representation of an observer in the form of a ‘Boolean frame’—the Boolean algebra representing the yes-or-no questions associated with a given observable representative of a given experimental context. I argue that the approach’s central concern is with the methodological question of how to assign physical properties to what one takes to be a system in a given experimental context, rather than the metaphysical question of what a given state vector represents independently of any context, and I show how the quantum generalisation of the concept of an open system may be used to assuage Einstein’s complaint that the orthodox approach to quantum mechanics runs afoul of the supposedly fundamental methodological requirement to the effect that one must always be able, according to Einstein, to treat spatially separated systems as isolated from one another. (shrink)

Devising an appropriate formal framework for structural realism has long been an issue in the development of this position. Décio Krause has suggested that quasi-set theory might offer such a framework and here I explore that possibility in the context of so-called ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ forms of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR). However, although the central claims of the former can indeed be captured by quasi-set theory, I argue that these claims cannot bear the metaphysical weight placed upon them and conclude (...) that the search for an appropriate formal framework for OSR remains open.Over the past 35 years or so, structural realism has become one of the dominant positions in the realism-antirealism debate. As is now well-known, it broadly divides into two versions: epistemic structural realism, which, also broadly, states that all that we can know, is structure (Worrall, 1989); and ontic structural realism (OSR), which insists that all that there is, is structure (Ladyman, 1998). One of the questions that is most often asked about this position (asked so often in fact that I’m not going to bother with any citations here!) is the following: What is this structure that we are supposed to be realists about? As I’ve pointed out in what might be seen as a companion piece to this paper, it is remarkable that critics of this view never seem to bother to ask the same question of their own, ‘object-oriented’ stance (French, forthcoming-a, hopefully). It is almost as if they think that the notion of ‘object’ is so metaphysically transparent that no such question needs to be asked of it (reader, it isn’t and it does!). In that other paper I adopted the ‘toolbox’ view of the relationship between science and metaphysics, according to which the latter can be thought of as providing various devices and frameworks with which the theories of the former can be furnished (see French & McKenzie, 2012). (shrink)

Among scientific realists and anti-realists, there is a well-known, perennial dispute about the reality and knowability of unobservable objects. This dispute is also present among structural realists, who all agree that science gives us genuine knowledge of structure at the unobservable level (however that structure may be understood). Ontic structural realists reduce or eliminate the ontological role of objects, while epistemic structural realists argue that objects do or might exist but are unknowable. In part because ontic structural realism has some (...) evidence from quantum mechanics and the consequent underdetermination of the metaphysics of objects in its favor, the majority of contemporary structural realists adopt that view. In contrast, I argue that epistemic structural realism is a highly compelling view, particularly in the form that remains agnostic about unobservable objects. This view can remain consistent with the empirical data from quantum mechanics, can give a satisfactory account of the metaphysics of structure, and can distinguish itself from other extant versions of realism. I provide two arguments in favor of agnosticism about objects, the first of which argues that suspending belief is consistent with the impetus of naturalized metaphysics, and the second of which argues that agnosticism about objects is a rational response to reflection on the limits and aims of science. Thus, I show that agnostic epistemic structural realism is a defensible and compelling view in the philosophy of science that demands more attention in the literature. (shrink)

The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well‐known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that (...) we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful. (shrink)

El presente trabajo busca poner al frente y cuestionar uno de los supuestos que incorporan las formalizaciones de García de la Sienra, a saber, que las teorías han de ser reconstruidas de acuerdo con la visión semántica. Caracteriza brevemente las visiones sintáctica y semántica exponiendo el debate entre el enfoque sintáctico y el semántico. Se trata de enfoques distintos que facilitan el estudio de las teorías ante ciertos problemas filosóficos. Habrá problemas y niveles de análisis para los que una visión (...) será apropiada y otros en los que resulte muy limitada. (shrink)

What is a language? What do scientific grammars tell us about the structure of individual languages and human language in general? What kind of science is linguistics? These and other questions are the subject of Ryan M. Nefdt's Language, Science, and Structure. -/- Linguistics presents a unique and challenging subject matter for the philosophy of science. As a special science, its formalisation and naturalisation inspired what many consider to be a scientific revolution in the study of mind and language. Yet (...) radical internal theory change, multiple competing frameworks, and issues of modelling and realism have largely gone unaddressed in the field. Nefdt develops a structural realist perspective on the philosophy of linguistics which aims to confront the aforementioned topics in new ways while expanding the outlook toward new scientific connections and novel philosophical insights. On this view, languages are real patterns which emerge from complex biological systems. Nefdt's exploration of this novel view will be especially valuable to those working in formal and computational linguistics, cognitive science, and the philosophies of science, mathematics, and language. (shrink)

Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the Problem of Differential Application. (...) I also examine four main existing strategies to solve it. In Section 3, I develop my argument. The first step consists in arguing that—among those strategies—relationism can only accept directionalism. The second step consists in arguing that directionalism is affected by a serious problem: the Problem of Converses. I also show that relationists who embrace directionalism cannot solve this problem. In Section 4, I introduce and rebut several strategies on behalf of relationists to cope with my argument. In Section 5, I briefly draw some conclusions. (shrink)

Scientific realists investigate the ontology of the world and explain the observed phenomena by using our best fundamental physical theories. These theories describe the behavior of fundamental objects in terms of their fundamental properties, which determine their behavior. This paper is the natural companion of another paper in which I propose an alternative to this traditional account of metaphysics, according to which fundamental objects have no other fundamental property than the one needed to specify their nature. In that paper I (...) argue that my view fares better than the traditional metaphysics both in the classical and in the quantum domain. In this paper I compare my view to structuralism. After discussing how my proposal shares many motivations with structuralism, I argue in which ways I think it is superior. (shrink)

Kirjoituksessa argumentoin, että metafysiikka on ollut valistusta, vaikka se edelleen kaipaa lisää valistumista, kun valistus ymmärretään avoimena prosessina, joka ei ole ajasta ja paikasta riippuvaista. Käsittelen ensin sitä, mitä metafysiikka ja valistus ovat. Sitten lausun länsimaisen metafysiikan historiasta hyvin lyhyesti. Päätän esseen argumentoimalla, että metafysiikka on valistunutta siinä mielessä, että klassisen substanssi-ominaisuus-skeeman sokeasta seuraamisesta on pitkälti päästy eroon. Metafysiikka kaipaa kuitenkin lisää valistusta ja kriittistä tarkastelua, jotta vapaudumme täysin kyseisen skeeman ja modernin predikaatti-logiikan johdatuksen aiheuttamasta kolmesta ongelmallisesta suositusta (tausta)oletuksesta: (1) (...) perustavat partikulaariset yksilöoliot ovat (periaatteessa) laskettavia, (2) ne eivät ole relationaalisia ja (3) ominaisuudet ovat ontologisesti riippuvaisia kantajistaan. (shrink)

This dissertation is about human knowledge of reality. In particular, it argues that scientific knowledge is bounded by historically available instruments and theories; nevertheless, the use of several independent instruments and theories can provide access to the persistent potentialities of reality. The replicability of scientific observations and experiments allows us to obtain explorable evidence of robust entities and properties. The dissertation includes seven chapters. It also studies three cases – namely, Higgs bosons and hypothetical Ϝ-particles (section 2.4), the Ptolemaic and (...) Kepler model of the planets (section 6.7), and the special theory of relativity (chapter 7). -/- Chapter 1 is the introduction of the dissertation. Chapter 2 clarifies the notion of the real on the basis of two concepts: persistence and resistance. These concepts enable me to explain my ontological belief in the real potentialities of human-independent things and the implications of this view for the perceptual and epistemological levels of discussion. On the basis of the concept of “overlapping perspectives”, chapter 3 argues that entity realism and perspectivism are complementary. That is, an entity that manifests itself through several experimental/observational methods is something real, but our knowledge of its nature is perspectival. Critically studying the recent views of entity realism, chapter 4 extends the discussion of entity realism and provides a criterion for the reality of property tokens. Chapter 5, in contrast, develops the perspectival aspects of my view on the basis of the phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches to the philosophy of science. This chapter also elaborates my view of empirical evidence, as briefly expressed in sections 2.5 and 4.5. Chapter 6 concerns diachronic theoretical perspectives. It first explains my view of progress, according to which current perspectives are broader than past ones. Second, it argues that the successful explanations and predictions of abandoned theories can be accounted for from our currently acceptable perspectives. The case study of Ptolemaic astronomy supports the argument of this chapter. Chapter 7 serves as the conclusion of the dissertation by applying the central themes of the previous chapters to the case study of special relativity theory. I interpret frame-dependent properties, such as length and time duration, and the constancy of the speed of light according to realist perspectivism. (shrink)

This paper examines the idea of objective phenomenology, or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn’t require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagnosing what makes any given phenomenal fact subjective. Then I defend the view that structural facts about experience are (...) objective. I also argue that structural facts about experience, despite being objective, nevertheless still give rise to an explanatory gap. (shrink)

This paper aims to meet an objection that has been raised against structural empiricism known as the “loss of reality objection.” I argue that an inferential approach to scientific representation allows the structural empiricist to account for the representation of phenomena by data models and ensures that such a representation is not arbitrary. By the notions of immersion, derivation, and interpretation, I show how data models are able to represent phenomena in a non-arbitrary manner. I conclude this paper with a (...) programmatic outline of a view that arises from the theses defended throughout the article and that I would like to call “semantic structuralism.”. (shrink)

Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, (...) we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to assess the relative merits of two formal representations of structure, namely, set theory and category theory. The purpose is to articulate ontic structural realism. In turn, this will facilitate a discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of both concepts and will lead to a proposal for a pragmatics-based approach to the question of the choice of an appropriate framework. First, we present a case study from contemporary science—a comparison of the formulation of quantum (...) mechanics in the language of Hilbert spaces and abstract C* algebras. It is then shown how the method of structural representation can be determined based on the pragmatics of goal-oriented research, not a dogmatic choice. We investigate a hypothesis stating that the use of the interplay between the powers of abstraction and detail of different representational methods results in adopting a pluralistic, as opposed to standard, unificatory, perspective on the role of structural representation in OSR. (shrink)

Over the past decade, in contrast to the traditional analytic version of metaphysics, a brand of metaphysics that prioritizes collaboration and corroboration with sciences has emerged in the form of scientific metaphysics. While there has been a shift from the methodological dependence of analytic metaphysis on intuition, and conceptual analysis to the methodological preference for empirically-motivated metaphysical insights in scientific metaphysics, such a shift has not penetrated the foundational aims. Scientific metaphysics continues to probe the nature and structure of reality, (...) much like its analytic counterpart and in this process, develops ontologies. Broadly two kinds of ontologies are furnished - global metaphysical ontologies and local scientific ontologies. In this paper, I highlight the challenges with developing such ontologies in scientific metaphysics. With Ladyman-Ross’ Information Theoretic Structural Realism as a case in point, I contest that the former suffers from representational indeterminacy and redundancy. Further, I note the possibility that eventually, local scientific ontologies might be replaced by scientific theories and in such a scenario, the former are best conceived as interim metaphysical supports for the latter. (shrink)

I respond to the frequent objection that structural realism fails to sharply state an alternative to the standard predicate-logic, object / property / relation, way of doing metaphysics. The approach I propose is based on what I call a ‘math-first’ approach to physical theories (close to the so-called ‘semantic view of theories') where the content of a physical theory is to be understood primarily in terms of its mathematical structure and the representational relations it bears to physical systems, rather than (...) as a collection of sentences that attempt to make true claims about those systems (a ‘language-first’ approach). I argue that adopting the math-first approach already amounts to a form of structural realism, and that the choice between epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism is then a choice between a language-first and math-first view of metaphysics; I then explore the status of objects (and properties and relations) in fundamental and non-fundamental physics for both versions of math-first structural realism. (shrink)

Informational structural realism (ISR) offers a new way to understand the nature of the “structure” that structural realists claim our best scientific theories get right about the world. According to Luciano Floridi, who has given the most detailed formulation of ISR so far, this structure is composed of information representing binary differences. In this paper I assess whether ISR offers a good way to resolve the tension between the no miracle argument (often taken to support scientific realism) and the pessimistic (...) meta-induction (often taken to support antirealism). With regards to this important motivation for structural realism, I shall argue that ISR faces insurmountable difficulties. However, I agree that interpreting “structure” in terms of information can be profitable for the realist. Instead, I offer a new version of ISR that borrows from algorithmic information theory. As a result, a more realist version of ISR is provided. (shrink)

Inspired by Ronald Giere’s cognitive approach to scientific models, Cognitive Structural Realism has presented a naturalist account of scientific representation. CSR characterises the structure of theories in terms of cognitive structures. These are informational structures embodied in the brains of scientists. CSR accounts for scientific representation in terms of the dynamical relationship between the organism and its environment. The proposal has been criticised on account of its negligence of social aspects of scientific practice. The present paper aims to chart out (...) a reply to the objection. It shows that cognitive structures do not need to be put inside the brains of single individuals. Cognitive structures are redefined as extended structures in distributed cognitive systems under Free Energy Principle. (shrink)

Structural realists contend that the properties and relations in the world are more fundamental than the individuals. However, the standard model theory used to analyse the structure of logical theories can make it difficult to see how such an idea could be coherent or workable: for in that theory, properties and relations are constructed as sets of individuals. In this paper, I look at three ways in which structuralists might hope for an alternative: by appealing to predicate-functor logic, Tractarian geometry, (...) or cylindric algebras. I argue that the first two are problematic, but that the third is promising. (shrink)

The hole argument has become one of the main issues in the philosophy of space-time after the article by Earman and Norton (1987), according to which a certain version of substantivalism (manifold substantivalism) cannot be defended because it brings about to a radical indeterminism. In this article, we try to show that, first, the naming of manifold substantivalism is not appropriate since as some philosophers have said, manifold points cannot be considered to have an independent identity. Second, with a commitment (...) to ontic structural realism, it is possible to offer a proper understanding of manifold substantivalism, which according to the hole argument, does not lead to the radical indeterminism. As a result, the hole argument does not arise, simply. Thus, the last point is that the fact that structural realism is able to solve the problem of the hole argument can itself be seen as considerable evidence in favor of this philosophical position, and thus, the degree of its confirmation goes up. (shrink)

One of the most important arguments against scientific realism is underdetermination, so realists should address the argument satisfactorily and give an appropriate response to it. Underdetermination divides into holist and contrastive forms; in this article, we will only deal with the contrastive form. By examining different responses, it will turn out that while they are successful in some cases, there are instances where responses are not satisfactory. Specifically, two formulations of Newtonian mechanics are examined and the examination reveals an important (...) instance of underdetermination that cannot be accounted for by most responses. We argue that the appropriate option is ontic structural realism that can resolve the underdetermination. We also should emphasize that ontic structural realism is empirical and a posteriori, meaning that the truth of its claim must be examined on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

Artikel ini memaparkan serta menganjurkan peralihan dari realisme saintifik yang memiliki karakter ontologi berorientasi objek ke realisme struktural ontik yang memiliki karakter ontologi berorientasi struktur. Argumen dari kedua pandangan tersebut akan ditunjukan kelemahannya dari pandangan yang pertama dan kemudian bagaimana realisme struktural ontik dapat menghindari kelemahan tersbut. Realisme saintifik memiliki kelemahan problem referensial yang diimplikasikan oleh tesis pesimisme induksi meta dan problem penentuan teori serta metafisik yang diimplikasikan oleh ketaktertentuan teori oleh evidens dan juga ketaktertentuan metafisik dalam menentukan status metafisik (...) objek dalam domain kuantum. (shrink)

I’m grateful to Aleta Quinn and Studies in History and Philosophy of Science for hosting this book forum for my book, The Relativity of Theory (Springer, 2020). I’m also grateful to Margaret Greta Turnbull and Joseph Martin for their commentaries. In what follows, I address their comments as I understand them.

Linguistics as a science has rapidly changed during the course of a relatively short period. The mathematical foundations of the science, however, present a different story below the surface. In this paper, I argue that due to the former, the seismic shifts in theory over the past 80 years opens linguistics up to the problem of pessimistic meta-induction or radical theory change. I further argue that, due to the latter, one current solution to this problem in the philosophy of science, (...) namely structural realism :403–424, 1998; French in Proc Aristot Soc 106:167–185, 2006), should be viewed as especially enticing for linguists, as their field is a largely structural enterprise. I discuss particular historical instances of theory change in generative syntax before investigating two views on the nature of structural properties and eventually proposing an approach in terms of invariance :162–186, 2015) as a grounding for structural realism in the history and philosophy of linguistics. (shrink)

This book proposes a novel position in the debate on scientific realism: Modal Empiricism. Modal empiricism is the view that the aim of science is to provide theories that correctly delimit, in a unified way, the range of experiences that are naturally possible given our position in the world. The view is associated with a pragmatic account of scientific representation and an original notion of situated modalities, together with an inductive epistemology for modalities. It purports to provide a faithful account (...) of scientific practice and of its impressive achievements, and defuses the main motivations for scientific realism. More generally, Modal Empiricism purports to be the precise articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science. This book is of interest to any philosopher involved in the debate on scientific realism, or interested in how to properly understand the content, aim and achievements of science. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to preserve realism in both ontology and truth for the philosophy of mathematics and science. It begins by arguing that scientific realism can only be attained given mathematical realism due to the indispensable nature of the latter to the prior. Ultimately, the paper argues for a position combining both Ontic Structural Realism and Ante Rem Structuralism, or what the author refers to as Strong Ontic Structural Realism, which has the potential to reconcile realism for (...) both science and mathematics. The paper goes on to claims that this theory does not succumb to the same traditional epistemological problems, which have damaged the credibility of its predecessors. (shrink)

Ontic structural realism claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as ‘generalism’. According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, generalism is unable to (...) capture the two main motivations for OSR. I suggest instead that OSR should be construed as a meta-metaphysical position. 1Introduction 2Motivations 2.1Theory change 2.2Permutation invariance 3Metaphysics 4Generalism 4.1Quantifier generalism 4.2Algebraic generalism 5Why Generalism Is Not Ontic Structural Realism 6Ontic Structural Realism as Meta-metaphysics 7Conclusion. (shrink)

I argue that the central conflict between epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism concerns whether it is possible to read off ontology from current fundamental science. Even if we assume that structures are metaphysically superior to objects, the possibility of reading off ontology from current fundamental science remains unjustified. I show that the conclusion as regards to the reading off ontology in the ontic version is already assumed in one of the premises; hence the argument begs the question. As (...) a result, the problem of ontological discontinuity implied in the pessimistic meta-induction argument remains intact in ontic structural realism. (shrink)

Ontic Structural Realism, as pivotal position in philosophy of science and metaphysics, defends the idea that the world is ultimately constituted of real physical structures. French (2014) regards physical symmetries as the foundational structure of a world without objects. On the other hand, Ladyman and Ross (2007) hold that the world is essentially made of non-redundant informational structure. I argue in this paper that these two positions are by no means incompatible, for instance by interpreting French’s physical symmetries as real (...) structures both encompassing and compressing every piece of information (Kolmogorov complexity) within the world. (shrink)

Worrall :99–124, 1989) famously claimed that structural realism is the best of both worlds; it enables one to endorse the best arguments for scientific realism and antirealism. In this paper, I argue that structural realism also enables one to combine two other seemingly inconsistent positions: realism and pluralism. Indeed, the very features which form the basis of the structural realist’s reply to the problem of theory change may be applied synchronically to allow for a pluralist structural realism. The resulting position (...) incorporates a robust variety of scientific pluralism unavailable to the traditional realist and thereby allows the structural realist to take seriously the pluralism apparent in scientific practice. (shrink)