Abstract

Modern methodology furnishes two partly competitive and partly complementary views on structure of the development of scientific investigation. According to the first view the development of science consists in enlargement of the set of empirical theorems; according to the other it consists, rather, in the narrowing of the set of possible theoretical hypotheses. A particular kind of assertion is associated with each of these views. The first is associated with the relation of assertion expressed in the statement: “the state α of scientific investigationB forces us to accept the statement Τ”. The other view is associated with the relation of assertion expressed in the statement: “the state α of scientific investigationB admits the acceptance of the statement Τ”. Under a suitable definition of forcing we obtain the conclusion that intuitionistic logic is the class of only those formulas which we are forced to accept by every state of every scientific investigation. The notion of admission under a certain definition analogically leads to intuitionistic logic; on the other hand in the case of another, more natural definition, it leads to justification of a certain system of strict implication which is stronger than Lewis’ system S4 and which overlaps system S5.It can be said that assuming quite a natural definition of admission this system contains only those formulas the acceptance of which is admitted by every state of every scientific investigation