Although recent cognitive science and traditional phenomenology has placed great importance on first-person descriptions, exactly what this entails goes undefined. I will seek to answer what's involved in phenomenological description, with reference to Husserl. I define phenomenological description according to its genus and differentia. I compare description in the natural sciences with description in phenomenology. I discuss how the basic particulars for Husserlian phenomenological description stem from the intentional relation -- particularly the distinction between noesis and noema. I discuss the (...) pivotal role of reflection in phenomenological description. I further argue that a phenomenological description is more than a statement which utilizes the 'I-[verb]' template. The final section analyses the difficulties inherent in describing intersubjectivity and argues these difficulties may have influenced Husserl's early, descriptive account of this topic. (shrink)

This is a phenomenological description of the inner voice experience (IVE) that emerged from a phenomenological research of the IVEs of twenty ordinary people. Research on IVEs of ordinary people is thin. If inner voices are studied at all, they are studied from a psychological or religious perspective where phenomenology allows for a multi- disciplinary view of this human experience. This description of the actual lived experienced of hearing an inner voice emerged through an iterative phenomenological analysis following Van Manen (...) (1990). It contributes a much needed new perspective on the experience of hearing an inner voice and human nature. Included in this paper is a short overview of phenomenological thought as it pertains to the study of the IVE and. (shrink)

This paper deals with two theories Husserl worked out on imagery in order to see if the properties a phenomenological description ascribes to imagery are fit to give meaningful constraints upon theoretical models that guide empirical research. Husserlian descriptions and Kosslyn and colleagues models are hence compared as to their explanatory strategy and implications.

In this paper, we argue that a rich phenomenological description of ?sweet tension? is an important step to understanding how and why sport is a meaningful human endeavour. We introduce the phenomenological concepts of intersubjectivity and horizon and elaborate how they inform the study and understanding of human experience. In the process, we establish that intersubjectivity is always embodied, developing and ethically committed. Likewise, we establish that our horizons are experienced from an embodied, developing and ethically committed perspective that serves (...) as the possibility for new intersubjective engagement. What follows is a discussion of the explanatory role of intersubjectivity and horizon in elucidating experiences of sweet tension in and through sport. The phenomenological account of sweet tension provides insights into the significance of our sporting experiences. Indeed, taking phenomenology seriously represents a commitment to descriptively elucidate what makes such experiences of sport significant and why we long for them. Recognising that sweet tension is a form of intersubjective horizon opens up new avenues for addressing ethical issues in sport as well as in crafting well-balanced games. (shrink)

Islamic studies, as a discipline, are carried out according to various methodological commitments and hermeneutic presuppositions. This includes traditional conservative and apologetic perspectives, as well as Orientalist and revisionist, more or less historical-critical approaches to Islamic religious life. Interpretation of Islamic faith and practice is to be understood accordingly. Notwithstanding such methodological commitments, one can reasonably ask if and how a phenomenological clarification of ‘the Qur’an’ might add to this understanding. Phenomenological methods vary, in which case phenomenological description is dependent (...) on the methodological guideline adopted, e.g., that which follows Edmund Husserl or, alternatively, the approach offered by Martin Heidegger. This paper reviews these methodological issues with a view to illuminating an alternative comportment that sees the Qur’an as a phenomenon open to clarification, yet without commitment to epistemological or empirical methods of analysis. (shrink)

The article intends to explore the young Heidegger’s attempt to reconfigure Husserl’s methodological conception of phenomenology by analyzing his position towards description. Thus, we wish to show that, while first following Paul Natorp’s overt critique of phenomenology in its pretension of offering accurate descriptions of our lived experiences, Heidegger gradually came to give a new meaning to phenomenological description by reinterpreting both phenomenology’s understanding of intuition as well as that of its conceptual expression.

In Husserl's phenomenology, the phenomenological reduction only when the content can be expressed in language, and describe the time being, in order to study the phenomenon of cognitive achievement. The purpose of this paper is to discuss by "viewing" and the "expression" the general relationship between the phenomenological description to understand exactly why. Beginning of this first set out to clarify the text of Husserl's "intuitive" and "expression" of the general relationship. Then I will try to discuss the phenomenology of (...) visual expression and the relationship between phenomenology, Husserl of such relationships rarely considered. After discussion, you can expose the phenomenological description of the functionality expressed in metaphor. Finally, I will clear depicted in the ultimate and most profound phenomenological description, which is the ultimate goal of phenomenology. In Husserl's phenomenology, phenomenological cognition is to be accomplished only when what is seen in the phenomenological reduction becomes expressed in language and described. The aim of this paper is to understand what phenomenological description really is, by discussing the general relationship between 'seeing' and 'expressing'. The research begins with a clarification of the general relationship between 'intuition' and 'expression' as elucidated in Husserl's texts. The author will then try to discuss the relationship between phenomenological intuition and its expression, a relationship which Husserl scarcely considered . This discussion will lead to a revelation of the function of metaphorical expression in phenomenological description . Finally, the author will give a clear if paradoxical depiction of phenomenological description of the ultimate and deepest constituting dimension, which would be the final aim of phenomenology. (shrink)

Husserl and Frege on the analysis of the concept of number and primitive logical concepts.

In our society, where interest in Buddhist meditation is expanding enormously, numerous scientific studies are now conducted on the neurophysiological effects of meditation practices and on the neural correlates of meditative states. However, very few studies have been conducted on the experience associated with contemplative practice: what it is like to meditate -- from moment to moment, at different stages of practice -- remains almost invisible in contemporary contemplative science. Recently, 'micro-phenomenological' interview methods have been developed to help us become (...) aware of lived experience and describe it with rigour and precision. The present article presents the results of a pilot project1 aimed at applying these methods to the description of meditative experience. The first part of the article describes these methods and their adjustment for the investigation of meditative experience. The second part provides micro- phenomenological descriptions of two processes of which meditation practice enables the practitioner to become aware: the process of losing contact with the current situation and generation of virtual ones in 'mind-wandering' episodes, and the process of emergence of a thought. The third part of the article highlights the interest such descriptions may have for practitioners and for teachers of meditation, defines the status of these results, and outlines directions for further research. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 207 Seiten: 529-538.

In this paper, I will describe how Brentano was able to integrate descriptive philosophy and logical analysis fruitfully by pointing out Brentano’s concept of philosophy as a rigorous science. First I will clarify how Brentano attempted to turn philosophy into a rigorous descriptive science by applying scientific methods to philosophical questions. After spelling out the implications of such a descriptive understanding of philosophy, I will contrast this descriptive view of philosophy with a semantic-analytic understanding of philosophy (...) as proposed by Frege. After having thus set the stage I will argue that the current separation of philosophy into the seemingly antithetical strands of phenomenology and analytic philosophy may be seen as a consequence of how the term ‘rigorous science’ in ‘philosophy as a rigorous science’ is interpreted: Does a rigorous science grasp its object with as much exactitude as possible? Or is a science rigorous when its theories are expressed unambiguously, and their implications are drawn with precision? In the course of this investigation I will also point out how Brentano’s integrative use of descriptive philosophy and analysis can provide a suitable starting point for an equally successful integration of these methods in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Discusses the phenomenological foundations for qualitative research in psychology which operates out of the intersection of phenomenological philosophy, science, and psychology; challenges long-standing assumptions about the practice of grounding the science of psychology in empiricism and asserts that the broader philosophy of phenomenological theory of science permits more adequate psychological development"--Provided by publisher.

First published in France in 1936 as a journal article, The Transcendence of the Ego was one of Jean-Paul Sartre's earliest philosophical publications. When it appeared, Sartre was still largely unknown, working as a school teacher in provincial France and struggling to find a publisher for his most famous fictional work, Nausea . The Transcendence of the Ego is the outcome of Sartre's intense engagement with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. Here, as in many subsequent writings, (...) Sartre embraces Husserl's vision of phenomenology as the proper method for philosophy. But he argues that Husserl's conception of the self as an inner entity, 'behind' conscious experience is mistaken and phenomenologically unfounded. The Transcendence of the Ego offers a brilliant diagnosis of where Husserl went wrong, and a radical alternative account of the self as a product of consciousness, situated in the world. This essay introduces many of the themes central to Sartre's major work, Being and Nothingness : the nature of consciousness, the problem of self-knowledge, other minds, anguish. It demonstrates their presence and importance in Sartre's thinking from the very outset of his career. This fresh translation makes this classic work available again to students of Sartre, phenomenology, existentialism, and twentieth century philosophy. It includes a thorough and illuminating introduction by Sarah Richmond, placing Sartre's essay in its philosophical and historical context. (shrink)

The event of the pandemic that started in 2020 fed an affective phenomenon known as pandemic fatigue, medically near to “chronic fatigue syndrome”. Psychologi- cal explanation of the phenomenon provides a first approach that is enriched with phenomenological description and analysis of it as existential feeling in the present. This term stresses the bodily reference of the kind of existential moods displayed by Heidegger and contributes to a better description of the fatigue phenomenon relying on Levinas’ study. Present and profound (...) fatigue is therefore shown as a feeling of tiredness that ties existence to a no-being-possible or no-being-able for oneself to do what it was possible before, i.e. in the pre-pandemic past. Besides the description, phenomenological analysis of the bond between profound boredom —as studied by Heidegger— and pandemic existential fatigue stresses different levels in the ontological understanding of this last one and its harmful feature. (shrink)

‘I should like to show here that the Ego is neither formally or materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world.’ _Jean-Paul Sartre _ _The Transcendence of the Ego_ is one of Jean-Paul Sartre's earliest philosophical publications and essential for understanding the trajectory of his work as a whole. When it first appeared in France in 1937 Sartre was still largely unknown, working as a school teacher in a provincial French town. Attacking prevailing philosophical theories head on, Sartre offers (...) a brilliant and radical account of the self as a product of consciousness, situated in the world. He introduces many of the themes central to his major work, Being and Nothingness: the nature of consciousness, the problem of self-knowledge, other minds, and anguish. This translation includes a thorough and illuminating introduction by Sarah Richmond, placing Sartre's essay in its philosophical and historical context. _Jean-Paul Sartre_. The foremost French thinker and writer of the early post-war years. His books, which include _Being and Nothingness, Nausea, The Age of Reason _and _No Exit_ have exerted enormous influence in philosophy, literature, politics and drama. __. (shrink)

‘I should like to show here that the Ego is neither formally or materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world.’ _Jean-Paul Sartre _ _The Transcendence of the Ego_ is one of Jean-Paul Sartre's earliest philosophical publications and essential for understanding the trajectory of his work as a whole. When it first appeared in France in 1937 Sartre was still largely unknown, working as a school teacher in a provincial French town. Attacking prevailing philosophical theories head on, Sartre offers (...) a brilliant and radical account of the self as a product of consciousness, situated in the world. He introduces many of the themes central to his major work, Being and Nothingness: the nature of consciousness, the problem of self-knowledge, other minds, and anguish. This translation includes a thorough and illuminating introduction by Sarah Richmond, placing Sartre's essay in its philosophical and historical context. _Jean-Paul Sartre_. The foremost French thinker and writer of the early post-war years. His books, which include _Being and Nothingness, Nausea, The Age of Reason _and _No Exit_ have exerted enormous influence in philosophy, literature, politics and drama. __. (shrink)

Different approaches in this case, intended to clarify the problematic pages "phenomenological description", involves a review of the method, but not in sense of austere specialization.

This paper addresses the transformation of subjectivity in trauma by considering recent psychopathological research, especially in relation to the works of Judith Herman and Bessel van der Kolk. It...

Entry on the influence of Stumpf et Brentano on Husserl's early phenomenology during the Halle period.

Als Erkenntnistheorie der phänomenologischen Erkenntnis versteht sich die folgende Untersuchung als ein zentrales Stück der von Husserl geforderten Selbstkritik der phänomenologischen Erkenntnis. Ausgehend vom normalsprachlichen Wahrheitsbegriff und dessen Explikation soll die prinzipielle Möglichkeit wahrer phänomenologischer Beschreibungen durch Rückgang auf das Phänomen der Wahrheit ausgewiesen werden. Im Anschluss an Husserls Analysen der vorprädikativen Erfahrung wird die explizierende Betrachtung (in Abgrenzung zum prädikativen Urteil) als die eigentlich erkennende, nämlich die kategorialen Strukturen der Phänomene erfassende und offenlegende Leistung exponiert, die einerseits anschaulich begründete (...) prädikative Urteile allererst ermöglicht und andererseits diese bewahrheitet. Die vorprädikative Erfassung liegt dabei auch der kategorialen Anschauung als einer bereits prädikativen Leistung konstitutiv zugrunde. (shrink)

"Uprightness" was termed the "leitmotiv in the formation of the human organism" by Erwin Straus (1966, p. 139). He felt that without it the human being was certainly doomed to die. Yet, what happens with those who are deprived of their "uprightness" in either the literal or moral sense (as in "not to stoop to anything"), through becoming Dis-abled? Getting up, rising in opposition to the "other" (Allon) implies a moral dimension in the case of human Dis-ability which is tied (...) to the leitmotiv established by the upright posture of anthropos . The suggestion that there is a moral dimension to Disability is a radical notion in a culture whose health professionals have become very sensitive to any idea that suggests we are blaming those who through no fault of their own have become in some way disadvantaged as compared to the mainstream of society. Although the importance of rising in opposition to the world (Allon) was perhaps originally established upon the upright posture quite literally, because man is a sense-making and sense-giving creature, this primordial act which establishes our full humanity may itself be represented and re-enacted in a variety of ways which can and should become the central project of rehabilitation of the body, as opposed to the current emphasis on technique and technological innovation. It is in the changing physiognomy of the Dis-abled person's ruptured world that we may discover the phenomenological sense of Dis-ability. Keywords: Dis-Ability, Uprightness, Rehabilitation CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The author explains that his background was in experimental psychology but that he wanted to study the whole person and not fragmented psychological processes. He also desired a non-reductionistic method for studying humans. Fortunately he came across the work of Edmund Husserl and discovered in the latter’s thought a way of researching humans that met the criteria he was seeking. Eventually he developed a phenomenological method for researching humans in a psychological way based upon the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. (...) This article briefly describes the method. (shrink)

The recent move to naturalize phenomenology through a mathematical protocol is a significant advance in consciousness research. It enables a new and fruitful level of dialogue between the cognitive sciences and phenomenology of such a nuanced kind that it also prompts advancement in our phenomenological analyses. But precisely what is going on at this point of ‘dialogue’ between phenomenological descriptions and mathematical algorithms, the latter of which are based on dynamical systems theory? It will be shown that what is happening (...) is something more than a mere ‘passing of the baton’ from phenomenology to mathematics. For this sophisticated naturalization to prove a worthy endeavour it must produce more than just correlation, it must prove some form of interrelation to the extent that phenomenology is deterministic. But such interrelational and deterministic requirements are the start of a slippery slope, and it will be argued that this slope only loses more friction once a further demand of formal and precise descriptions is made of phenomenology. Such deterministic and formally precise demands misconstrue phenomenology’s ideal goal of a unification of genuine/originary reason and truth. Not a deductive and definitive discipline, phenomenology is rather from the outset descriptive and critical. Phenomenology’s descriptive beginnings will thus be employed as an essential barrier to the naturalization of phenomenology. (shrink)

How to think a unique and determinative turn in analytic philosophy of mind? To answer this question this article first presents an attempt to render clear that analytic phenomenology, by contrast with conceptions of phenomenology of the XXth century, beneficially dispenses with several methodological and conceptual assumptions that were assumed to be compulsory, as phenomenological reduction, a notion of synthesis, and a philosophical notion of the a priori. It then presents some eventual difficulties to the achievement of a phenomenological turn (...) within analytic philosophy, which are, the neglect of historicity, abstractionism, the acknowledgement of the place of language in our lives, and solipsism. It finally presents several demands that concern the felicity of contemporary analytic phenomenologies, namely, anti-abstractionism, fallibilism, attention to polyadic relations, and the integration of ecological and decolonial concerns of our cultures. (shrink)

Is phenomenology nothing else than descriptive psychology? In the first edition of his Logical Investigations (LI), Husserl conceived of phenomenology as a description and analysis of the experiences of knowledge, unequivocally stating that “phenomenology is descriptive psychology.” Most interestingly, although the first edition of the LI was the reference par excellence in phenomenology for the Munich phenomenologists, they remained suspicious of this characterisationof phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the reception of (...) class='Hi'>descriptive psychology among Munich phenomenologists and, at the same time, to offer a re-evaluation of their understanding of realist phenomenology. (shrink)

For the most part, attention occurs as a theme adjacent to much more topical and innovatingly operating acts: first, the intentional act, which represents a destitution of the abstract opposition between subject and object and which paves the way for a detailed analysis of our perceptive horizontal subjective life; second, the reductive act, specified in a psycho-phenomenological sense as a reflective conversion of the way I am looking at things; third, the genetic method understood as a genealogy of logic based (...) on our experiential affective pre-discursive world-life. In this respect, here are some of the leading questions of my investigation: What are the differences and the proximities between these methods and attentional activity? Why is the latter not put to the fore as a method? To what extent is this secondary part played by attention linked to the constitution of phenomenology as opposed to psychology (for which attention is a central theme), and what does it mean for the impossibility of phenomenology to freeing itself completely from psychology? (shrink)

RESUMEN La tesis central de este artículo es que la esclavitud es fenomenológicamente descriptible como reducción del esfuerzo a fuerza física, a través de la imposición de la imposibilidad, como fuente de reconocimiento del sí mismo en la derrota. El esclavo se reconoce desde la negación de lo posible para sí en el mundo. Expongo esta tesis en tres momentos principales, en la primera parte desarrollo el concepto de esfuerzo, con base en los análisis husserlianos de la constitución, expuestos en (...) Ideas II. En el segundo apartado expongo el modo en que el esfuerzo, como concreción de una voluntad egoica-encarnada, es reducido a fuerza fisica -productiva- mediante la alienación de las posibilidades del 'yo-puedo'. El correlato de este modo de constitución del cuerpo propio, en la enajenación de su poder, de lo posible para si, es un horizonte que se presenta para el yo en el modo de la clausura o la imposibilidad, desde la que yo se reconoce como derrotado, tema que trato en el último y tercer apartado. La descripción de la derrota pone de manifiesto la condición de la voluntad corporal como limite resistente ante la esclavitud. ABSTRACT The central thesis of this paper is that slavery is phenomenologically describable as a reduction of the effort to a physical force through the imposition of impossibility as a fountain of self-recognition of the ego in the defeat. The slave is constituted from the defeat of its egoic, personal, and concrete possibilities. I develop this thesis in three moments. First, I explore the effort concept on the phenomenological basis of Husserlian analyses of the constitution into Ideas II. In the second part, I describe how effort-as a concretion of an egoic-embodied will-is reduced to physical force-productive-in the slavery, though the alienation of the possibilities for de 'I-can'. The correlate of this way of constitution of the own body, in the alienation, is a horizon of possibilities are present for the ego in the canceled, or impossibility way in which the ego recognizes itself as defeated, issue of the third and last part. The description of the defeat manifests the condition of the embodied will as a resistant limit against slavery. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the meaning and value of the criticism that Stumpf address to Husserl's phenomenology in Ideas I. My presentation is divided into four parts: I briefly describe the relationship between Stumpf and the young Husserl during his stay in Halle (1886-1901); then I will comment Stumpf's remarks on the definition of Husserl's phenomenology as descriptive psychology in his Logical Investigations; in the third part, I examine Husserl's notice in section 86 of Ideas (...) I where he compares his own terminology to that of Stumpf; finally I comment on Stumpf's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology in his last book Erkenntnislehre. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to highlight the nature of the fundamental moments of phenomenological research, such as evidence and description, and the ambivalence of their relationship to each other. On the one hand, both evidence and description are related to Husserl’s attempt to ‘return to the things themselves’. Evidence is understood by the founder of phenomenology as a relation to an object in which the meaning of that object is given to us immediately in the object itself. Description, (...) on the other hand, avoids what is characteristic of any interpretation-oriented methodology: the ‘substitution’ of an explanatory reconstruction for the object under study. A certain discrepancy between phenomenological evidence and phenomenological description becomes apparent when we take into account the reception of the text in which the experience of the evidence is described. What is usually overlooked is that an experience whose content is the text being read is not an experience whose content is the phenomenon described in the text. This confusion leads to a turning away from ‘the things themselves’ and a restriction of phenomenology to the realm of texts. The way to avoid this deformation is through a phenomenological reduction, which must be carried out not only by the phenomenologist-researcher but also by the reader of the texts that provide a description of phenomenological experience. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss Barry Smith’s and Kevin Mulligan’s revision of Husserl’s phenomenology, starting from the fact that many Italian scholars seem to follow them in a sense, by dealing with phenomenology as a sort of a priori ontology. Therefore, I will first reconstruct Smith’s and Mulligan’s attempt and its objectives, then I will show how it is rooted in the school of Brentano and, in particular, in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, I will provide some arguments against this attempt (...) : first of all that it does not attain a better description of the world, secondly that phenomenology does the job of formal ontology better than the latter. (shrink)

What is phenomenology's contribution to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind? I am here concerned with this question, and in particular with phenomenology's contribution to what has come to be called the problem of consciousness. The problem of consciousness has constituted the focal point of classical phenomenology as well as the main problem, and indeed perhaps the stumbling block, of the philosophy of mind in the last two decades. Many philosophers of mind, for instance, Thomas Nagel, Ned Block, Owen (...) Flanagan, Colin McGinn and David Chalmers, have acknowledged the properly phenomenological character of this problem; Nagel is even willing to entrust the study of phenomenal consciousness to what he calls an “objective phenomenology.” Yet, the phenomenology to which these philosophers resort has little to do with the conceptual framework that was developed within the phenomenological tradition. They put forward an entity they term “phenomenal consciousness,” but only in the hope that it may be explained by means of the theories that currently prevail in the philosophy of mind or in cognitive sciences. (shrink)