This study is about Brentano’s criticism of a version of phenomenalism that he calls “mental monism” and which he attributes to positivist philosophers such as Ernst Mach and John Stuart Mill. I am interested in Brentano’s criticism of Mill’s version of mental monism based on the idea of “permanent possibilities of sensation.” Brentano claims that this form of monism is characterized by the identification of the class of physical phenomena with that of mental phenomena, and it commits itself to a (...) form of idealism. Brentano argues instead for a form of indirect or hypothetical realism based on intentional correlations. (shrink)

This paper is about the topic of psychologism in the work of Kazimierz Twardowski and my aim is to revisit this important issue in light of recent publications from, and on Twardowski’s works. I will first examine the genesis of psychologism in the young Twardowski’s work; secondly, I will examine Twardowski’s picture theory of meaning and Husserl’s criticism in Logical Investigations; the third part is about Twardowski’s recognition and criticism of his psychologism in his lectures on the psychology of thinking; (...) the fourth and fifth parts provide an overview of Twardowski’s paper “Actions and Products” while the sixth part addresses the psychologism issue in the last part of this paper through the delineation of psychology and the humanities. I shall conclude this study with a brief assessment of Twardowski’s solution to psychologism. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to highlight Carl Stumpf's contributions to philosophy and to assess some of the aspects of his work. This book brings together several specialists of Stumpf and the school of Franz Brentano, and includes fourteen original studies (in English and German) on the various aspects of Stumpf's philosophy, and some of his unpublished writings. This book is divided into four sections, and also includes a general introduction on the reception and actuality of Stumpf's philosophy. The (...) first section examines the historical sources of his philosophy, the second examines some of the central themes of his work and the third examines his relationship to other philosophers. The fourth section consists of notes taken by Husserl during Stumpf's lectures on metaphysics in Halle, Stumpf's introduction to the edition of his correspondence with Brentano, which he prepared in 1929, and some important letters pertaining to this correspondence. This book also provides a comprehensive bibliography of Stumpf's works. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the meaning and value of the criticism that Stumpf address to Husserl's phenomenology in Ideas I. My presentation is divided into four parts: I briefly describe the relationship between Stumpf and the young Husserl during his stay in Halle (1886-1901); then I will comment Stumpf's remarks on the definition of Husserl's phenomenology as descriptive psychology in his Logical Investigations; in the third part, I examine Husserl's notice in section 86 of Ideas I (...) where he compares his own terminology to that of Stumpf; finally I comment on Stumpf's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology in his last book Erkenntnislehre. (shrink)

My aim in this study is to show that the philosophical program elaborated by Brentano in his Psychology is largely indebted to the research conducted by Brentano on British empiricism and Comte's positive philosophy at Würzburg. This research represents the starting point of, and backdrop to, the project for philosophy as science, which is at the heart of his Psychology, and sheds new light on the philosophical stakes of many debates he leads in that work. Furthermore, Brentano's research informs us (...) about his philosophical preoccupations during the Würzburg period, and simultaneously provide us with a new perspective on the evolution of his thought from his habilitation at Würzburg in 1866 to his arrival in Vienna in 1874. In this study, I propose to examine some of the factors that motivated Brentano's interest in Comte's philosophy and to evaluate the influence that the latter exerted on Brentano's thought during the Würzburg period and beyond. (shrink)

Franz Brentano’s impact on the philosophy of his time and on 20th-century philosophy is considerable. The “sharp dialectician” (Freud) and “genial master” (Husserl) influenced philosophers of various allegiances, being acknowledged not only as the “grandfather of phenomenology” (Ryle) but also as an analytic philosopher “in the best sense of this term” (Chisholm). The fourteen new essays gathered together in this volume give an insight in three core issues of Brentano’s philosophy: consciousness (sect.1), intentionality (sect. 2) and ontology and metaphysics (sect. (...) 3). Two further sections of the volume deal with the posterity of his philoso¬phy: in section 4, the legacy of his account of sense perception and feeling is discussed, while the history of Brentano’s unpublished manuscripts is discussed in section 5. This section also presents an edition of a manuscript from 1899 on relations, along with the letters from Brentano to Marty which discuss this manuscript. The last part of section 5 contains the text of a public lecture given by Brentano on the laws of inference. (shrink)

Mon objectif dans cette étude est de montrer l'influence que la philosophie positive d'Auguste Comte a exercée sur la pensée du jeune Brentano durant la période de Würzburg (1866-1874). J'examine d'abord quelques-uns des facteurs qui ont amené Brentano à s'intéresser à la philosophie de Comte et je résume, dans un deuxième temps, les grandes lignes de l'article de Brentano sur Comte dont la version française est reproduite dans ce numéro. Dans la troisième partie de cette étude, je commente brièvement quelques (...) passages de la Psychologie d'un point de vue empirique où Brentano discute de thèmes comtiens. Je conclue cette étude par quelques remarques sur les traces laissées par le positivisme de Comte dans l'œuvre de Brentano. (shrink)

How do we reconcile Husserl’s repeated criticism of Mach’s phenomenalism almost everywhere in his work with the leading role that Husserl seems to attribute to Mach in the genesis of his own phenomenology? To answer this question, we shall examine, first, the narrow relation that Husserl establishes between his phenomenological method and Mach’s descriptivism. Second, we shall examine two aspects of Husserl’s criticism of Mach: the first concerns phenomenalism and Mach’s doctrine of elements, while the second concerns the principle of (...) economy of thought, which Husserl closely associates with a form of psychologism in his Logical Investigations . Our working hypothesis is that the apparent contradictory comments of Husserl regarding Mach’s positivism can be partially explained by the double status he confers to his own phenomenology—as a philosophical program radically opposed to positivism, and as a method akin to Mach’s descriptivism. (shrink)

This article addresses the recent reception of Franz Brentano's writings on consciousness. I am particularly interested in the connection established between Brentano's theory of consciousness and higher-order theories of consciousness and, more specifically, the theory proposed by David Rosenthal. My working hypothesis is that despite the many similarities that can be established with Rosenthal's philosophy of mind, Brentano's theory of consciousness differs in many respects from higher-order theories of consciousness and avoids most of the criticisms generally directed to them. This (...) article is divided into eight parts. The first two sections expound the basic outline of Rosenthal's theory, and the third summarizes the principal objections that Rosenthal addresses to Brentano, which I, then, examine in sections 4 and 5. In sections 6 and 7, I discuss Brentano's principle of the unity of consciousness, and in section 8, I consider the scope of the changes that Brentano brings to his theory of consciousness in his later writings, which follow the 1874 publication of Psychology. I then draw the conclusion that Brentano's theory rests on a view of intransitive and intrinsic self-consciousness. (shrink)

Study of the controversy between Franz Brentano and his student Carl Stumpf on emotions and sense-feelings. The issue is whether the pleasure that provides an object such as a work of art is intentional, as it is the case in Brentano's theory in which it is closely related to the class of emotions (love and hate), or merely phenomenal as Stumpf wants it. The paper is divided into two parts : I first examine several aspects of the relationship between Stumpf (...) and Brentano and I evaluate in the second part whether Stumpf's deviations from several theses of Brentano's descriptive psychology, namely on emotions and sense-feelings, challenge his commitment to Brentano's program in philosophy. (shrink)

Entry on the influence of Stumpf et Brentano on Husserl's early phenomenology during the Halle period.

This study is a commentary on Carl Stumpf's evaluation of Husserl's phenomenology as presented in the Logical Investigations and the first book of Ideas. I first examine Stumpf's reception of the version of phenomenology that Husserl presented in the Logical Investigations and I then look at §§ 85-86 of Ideas I, in which Husserl seeks to demarcate his "pure" phenomenology from that of Stumpf. In the third section, I analyze the criticism that Stumpf, in § 13 of his book Erkenntnislehre, (...) directs toward to the new version of phenomenology that Husserl develops in Ideas I, and in the fourth, I summarize the Spinozist interpretation of the noetico-noematical correlations that Stumpf proposes in his two studies on Spinoza. The last section addresses Husserl's self-criticism regarding the Cartesian aproach to the reduction in Ideas I and the parallelism that the late Husserl establishes between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology. I try to show that the version of phenomenology that Husserl develops during the Freiburg period anticipates in many respects Stumpf's criticism and partly confirms the latter's diagnosis of the version of phenomenology advocated in Ideas I. (shrink)

This study attempts to situate Carl Stumpf's theory of emotions with regard to that of his teacher, Franz Brentano, and to the sensualist theory of William James. We will argue that Stumpf's theory can be considered an attempt to reconcile James's sensualism, which emphasizes the role of bodily feelings, with what we will call, for the purposes of this study, Brentano's intentionalism, which conceives of emotions as intentional states. Stumpf claims that James's sensory feelings and Brentano's affective intentional states are (...) two sides of the same coin in that they constitute two essential ingredients of a full-fledged theory of emotions. The question is whether Stumpf's ecumenism avoids the objections that he himself raises against James's and Brentano's theories. The paper is divided into four parts: the first part presents Stumpf's classification of psychical functions; the second part presents his criticism of James's theory of emotions; the third part is a summary of Stumpf's complex debate with Brentano on emotions and sensory feelings; the last part examines Stumpf's attempt to incorporate into his theory of affects the phenomenological and intentional aspects of emotions. I conclude with a note on the unity of consciousness. (shrink)

Sont réunies dans cet ouvrage six études des principaux représentants de ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler « l’école de Brentano ». Les « Souvenirs de Franz Brentano » de Carl Stumpf et Edmund Husserl, décrivent sa vie et son activité philosophique de ses débuts à Würzburg jusqu’à son couronnement à Vienne. Les quatre autres études sont des contributions importantes des étudiants de Brentano à la philosophie. L’étude d’Ehrenfels, « Sur les “qualités de forme” », fondatrice de la psychologie de la (...) forme, est aussi une référence incontournable pour Meinong, dont nous traduisons ici « Sur les objets d’ordre supérieur et leur rapport à la perception interne », où il met en place les idées à la base de sa théorie de l’objet. La cinquième étude, « Fonctions et formations » de Twardowski, propose une analyse originale de la relation entre les actes (fonctions) et leurs contenus (formations). Enfin, « Sur le rapport entre la grammaire et la logique » d’Anton Marty, emblématique de la philosophie du langage brentanienne, vient clore cet ouvrage que nous avons introduit par « Le legs de Brentano », une étude présentant les grandes lignes du programme philosophique de Brentano, la généalogie de son « école » ainsi que quelques-uns des débats suscités par les textes reproduits ici. (shrink)

Reply to eight critical reviews of my paper "Franz Brentano and Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness" in the same issue of the journal Argumentos.

My working hypothesis is based on the project of a theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre) at the very beginning of the Prolegomena and it consists in conceiving this theory of science as the program which insures their cohesion to the whole of the Investigations in this work. In order to test this hypothesis, I will first examine the different steps which led to the project of a theory of science in the pre-phenomenological period. I will secondly expound the guidelines of the (...) theory of science, insisting in particular on its relation to pure logic. In the third section, I will attempt to define the function of the theory of knowledge and of phenomenology in such a programme. I will conclude with some remarks on the fate of this theory of science after the Logical Investigations. Most of Husserl’s allusions to the theory of science, be it in his lecture notes, the manuscripts that were written after 1901 or other works published during Husserl’s lifetime, seem to suggest that the theory of science kept on assuming the very role it was playing in Husserl’s seminal work: the theory of science provides its basis to Husserl’s philosophical agenda. (shrink)

This study aims to account for the reception of the philosophy of Carl Stumpf since the turn of the twenty-first century and to emphasize the actuality of some of the aspects of his philosophy. The present text is subdivided into several sections, each corresponding to one of the main topics discussed in the recent literature on the work of Stumpf. In the first section, I try to show, using his classification of sciences, that Stumpf's empirical work is driven by a (...) unitary philosophical program. I then examine the ramifications of this program in several areas of philosophy that have been the subject of recent commentaries and publications. I begin with the commentaries on the recent publication of Stumpf's thesis on mathematical axioms, which stress Stumpf's contribution to the philosophy of mathematics and to theory of knowledge, and more specifically to the debate on logical psychologism that Frege and Husserl will address a few years later. I conclude this section by examining the second of two major themes in the work of Stumpf that have been the subject of several recent studies, namely, on the one hand, logic and the nature of states of affairs and, on the other hand, Stumpf's contribution to the mind-body problem and to the topic of relations. The third section is divided into two parts. In the first one, I try to briefly account for the vast literature on Stumpf's contribution to psychology understood broadly enough as to include his work on the psychology of sound, Gestalt psychology, animal psychology and the psychology of child development. I provide, in the second part of this section, a summary of his studies in the area of aesthetics and musicology in general, i.e. his contribution to the history of music and its origins, to ethnomusicology, and to acoustics. Although this study does not aim at being exhaustive, it provides an overview of the important aspects of Stumpf's contribution to philosophy. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage vise à délimiter le champ d'investigation de la philosophie de l'esprit. Il comprend huit chapitres. Le premier, le plus général, se veut une première délimitation du champ d'investigation de la philosophie de l'esprit à l'aide de ses trois concepts clés: l'intentionnalité, la rationalité et la conscience. Le chapitre suivant se veut une réflexion plus générale sur les motivations philosophiques qui commandent des jugements si opposés sur le statut ontologique et épistémologique de la psychologie du sens commun. Le chapitre (...) IV dresse un tableau de ces différents programmes et des grands courants de la philosophie de l'esprit, en commençant par le behaviorisme, le physicalisme, le fonctionnalisme et le connexionnisme. Les trois chapitres suivants porteront sur les problèmes et débats liés à la naturalisation des trois propriétés principales de l'esprit, des trois problèmes principaux de la philosophie de l'esprit, soit les concepts d'intentionnalité, de rationalité et de conscience. Le chapitre V porte, d'une part, sur la nature de l'intentionnalité et les différents concepts de directionnalité (aboutness) que l'on retrouve actuellement en philosophie de l'esprit ; d'autre part, il s'agira pour nous de décrire et de classer les différents programmes de naturalisation de l'intentionnalité. Le chapitre six est ouvre de nouvelles perpectives en ce qu'il porte sur la nature de la rationalité et sur les différentes tentatives et arguments en faveur de sa naturalisation. Le chapitre VII s'attaque au problème central de la philosophie de l'esprit, à savoir la conscience. (shrink)

Commentaires sur le débat nativisme-empirisme au XIXe siècle et la théorie des signes locaux de Lotze.

A substantial introduction to Stumpf's work in philosophy and science.

This study examines the place of the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna (1888-1938) in the evolution of the history of philosophy in Austria up to the establishment of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will examine three aspects of the relationship between the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle and the Philosophical Society which has been emphasized by several historians of the Vienna Circle: the first aspect concerns the theory of a first Vienna Circle formed mainly by H. (...) Hahn, P. Frank and O. Neurath; the second aspect is the contention that the missing link between the Vienna Circle and the Bolzano tradition in Austria is Alois Höfler, a student of Brentano and Meinong; I will finally examine the link they established between the annexation of the Philosophical Society to the Kant-Gesellschaft in 1927 and the founding of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will argue that this institution played a key role in the history of philosophy in Austria and is partly responsible for the formation of the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

Introduction to a series of unpublished letters from Brentano and Stumpf.

This study seeks to trace the boundaries of the sign in the phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl. The approach adopted here is largely historical and has no other ambition that to identify those questions that pertain to the sign and have been of interest for phenomenology. The article is divided in four parts : the first examines an essay from 1890 entitled Semiotik and situates it in the context of the young Husserl's work in the philosophy of mathematics ; the (...) second part concerns the first section of the Logical Investigations ; the third one seeks to account for the changes that testify to the evolution of Husserl's thinking regarding the sign between the Logical Investigations (1900-01) and "Origins of Geometry" (1936) ; the last part considers the contribution of post-Husserlian phenomenology, from Martin Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty and beyond, to semiotics. -/- Résumé. Notre étude vise à délimiter l'espace dans lequel la question du signe s'est posée à la tradition phénoménologique depuis Edmund Husserl. Cette étude est largement historique et elle n'a d'autres ambitions que d'identifier certains aspects de la question du signe qui ont suscité l'intérêt de la phénoménologie. Elle se divise en quatre parties : dans la première, nous examinons le texte de 1890 intitulé Semiotik en le situant dans le contexte des recherches du jeune Husserl sur la philosophie des mathématiques ; la deuxième section est principalement consacrée à l'étude de la première des Recherches logiques ; la troisième partie vise à rendre compte des chan-gements qui ont marqué l'évolution de la pensée de Husserl sur le signe, des Recher-ches logiques (1900/1) à "Origine de la géométrie" (1936) ; finalement, nous esquis-serons à grands traits la contribution de la phénoménologie post-husserlienne à la sémiotique, de Martin Heidegger à Maurice Merleau-Ponty, et au-delà. (shrink)

Introduction à l'ouvrage: À l'École de Brentano, Paris, Vrin, 2007.

The twelve original studies collected in this volume examine different aspects of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations. They are authored by scholars and specialists internationally recognized for their expertise in the fields of phenomenology, logic, history of philosophy and philosophy of mind. They approach Husserl's groundwork from different angles and perspectives and shed new light on a number of issues such as meaning, intentionality, ontology, logic, etc. They also explore questions such as the place of the Logical Investigations within the whole (...) of Husserl's work, its sources in 19th century philosophy and in particular in the philosophical work of Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, its reception amongst the so-called members of the Munich Circle and its influence on contemporary philosophy. In short, this volume constitutes a "companion" to Husserl's Logical Investigations. (shrink)

In defining his phenomenology as descriptive psychology in the introduction to the first edition of his Logical Investigations 1, Husserl suggests that the field study of his phenomenology as his methodology are very close to that of Brentano’s psychology, and that the research in the book somehow contributes to Brentano’s philosophical program, one of whose main axes is psychology or philosophy of mind.

Introduction aux études regroupées dans le numéro thématique de la revue Philosophiques intitulé « Perspectives sur la phénoménologie et Pintentionnalité ».

Cette étude a pour double objectif de retracer quelques éléments cartésiens dans la philosophie de Brentano et d'évaluer sa théorie de la conscience à la lumière des débats actuels dans la philosophie de l'esprit contemporaine. Les deux premières parties de cette étude évaluent la dette de Brentano à l'endroit de la philosophie de Descartes. Dans la première, je montre que Descartes est associé à plusieurs principes fondamentaux de la psychologie de Brentano, tandis que dans la deuxième, je propose une interprétation (...) de l'inexistence intentionnelle de Brentano à l'aide de la distinction cartésienne entre ens formale et ens objectivum. La troisième partie est un commentaire critique de l'évaluation par D. Rosenthal de la théorie de la conscience de Brentano dans sa Psychologie. Je m'intéresse plus particulièrement à la distinction que fait Rosenthal entre une conception aristotélicienne et une conception cartésienne de la conscience et me demande sous laquelle de ces deux catégories se range la théorie de Brentano. Dans la dernière partie, j'évalue la portée de quelques-unes des modifications importantes que Brentano fait subir à sa psychologie et à sa théorie de la conscience dans ses derniers travaux et j'avance l'hypothèse que ses positions sur la substance pensante et la conscience de soi le rapprochent encore davantage de Descartes. (shrink)

The volume is divided into four sections, each section being prefaced by a specific introduction.

Je m'intéresse ici à la question de savoir ce qu’il y a de descriptif dans la phénoménologie et ce qu’il y a de phénoménologique dans l’usage de la notion de description dans la philosophie contemporaine. Pour répondre à cette question, je retrace, dans un premier temps, les origines de la notion de psychologie descriptive au dix-neuvième siècle et j’identifie ensuite quelques-uns des traits caractéristiques du concept husserlien de description; dans un deuxième temps, j’examinerai quelques aspects du concept de description tel (...) qu’on l’utilise dans la tradition analytique depuis le dernier Wittgenstein en portant une attention particulière à la question de savoir s’il recoupe ou non le concept husserlien; dans la troisième partie, j’esquisse rapidement le problème de la conscience dans la perspective d’un fossé de l’explication et j’examine brièvement la question de savoir si et à quelle condition la phénoménologie descriptive peut y apporter sa contribution. (shrink)

On the Stumpf-Lotze debate on the theory of local signs.

One of the questions raised by the conference’s topic, in particular the relationship between the self and the other, a matter much discussed since Merleau-Ponty’s death, is the question of husserlian phenomenology’s cartesianism. Some believe that despite his reservations towards cartesianism, Husserl never disavowed his commitment to the Cartesian program of a first philosophy.

Cette étude porte sur la place qui revient à la Société philosophique de l’Université de Vienne dans l’évolution de l’histoire de la philosophie en Autriche jusqu’à la formation du Cercle de Vienne en 1929. Nous examinerons plus particulièrement trois aspects de la relation entre le Cercle de Vienne et la Société philosophique qui ont fait l’objet de plusieurs études par les historiens de l’empirisme logique : le premier aspect concerne la thèse d’un proto-Cercle de Vienne formé principalement par H. Hahn, (...) P. Frank et O. Neurath ; le deuxième aspect porte sur la thèse suivant laquelle le chaînon manquant entre le Cercle de Vienne et la tradition bolzanienne en Autriche est l’étudiant de Brentano et de Meinong, A. Höfler ; nous examinerons enfin le lien établi par plusieurs historiens entre l’annexion de la Société philosophique à la Kant-Gesellschaft en 1927 et la fondation du Cercle de Vienne en 1929. Nous voudrions montrer que cette institution a joué un rôle clé dans l’histoire de la philosophie en Autriche et qu’elle est en partie responsable de la formation du Cercle de Vienne.This study examines the place of the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna in the evolution of the history of philosophy in Austria up to the formation of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will examine three aspects of the relationship between the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle and the Philosophical Society, which has been emphasized by several historians of the Vienna Circle : the first aspect concerns the theory of a first Vienna Circle formed mainly by H. Hahn, P. Frank and O. Neurath ; the second aspect is the contention that the missing link between the Vienna Circle and the Bolzano tradition in Austria is Alois Höfler, a student of Brentano and Meinong ; I will finally examine the link they established between the annexation of the Philosophical Society to the Kant-Gesellschaft in 1927 and the founding of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will argue that this institution played a key role in the history of philosophy in Austria and is partly responsible for the formation of the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

Il s'agit d'une version courte, en portugais, de mon étude "Deux thèses de Brentano sur la conscience". Je propose une relecture des textes principaux de Franz Brentano sur la conscience. Mon point de départ est la formulation de deux thèses sur la conscience que Brentano avance au tout début du deuxième chapitre du deuxième livre de sa Psychologie et qui constituent le fondement de sa théorie des objets primaires et des objets secondaires. Mon hypothèse de travail s’appuie sur le principe (...) de l’unité de la conscience qui représente la clé à la plupart des problèmes que l’on associe généralement à la théorie de la conscience de Brentano. J’examine trois de ces problèmes dans la deuxième partie de cette étude, à savoir les problèmes de la duplication, de la régression et de la complexité. Dans la dernière partie de cette étude, je propose une analyse du principe de l’unité de la conscience qui tient compte des écrits de Brentano après la publication de sa Psychologie en 1874 et j’évalue, en conclusion, la portée des changements que Brentano apporte à sa théorie de la conscience dans ses écrits publiés à titre posthume. (shrink)

This presentation aims to clarify the historical and theoretical background of the studies included in this issue of Philosophiques, which focus on the work of Husserl during the period of Halle . After a brief description of Husserl’s early years of apprenticeship in philosophy between 1876 and his studies with Brentano in Vienna, I identify several steps that marked the development of his philosophy from his arrival in Halle to the publication of the Logical Investigations : his studies under the (...) direction of C. Stumpf, the publication of the first volume of Philosophy of Arithmetic, the researches belonging to the project of the second volume of this work, the abandonment of this project and the development of the phenomenology of the Logical Investigations. The last part of this paper is an examination of the philosophical issues underlying the disputatio on D. W. Smith’s recent book on Husserl’s philosophy. (shrink)

Examen critique du débat opposant Jean-Luc Marion et Dominique Janicaud sur le destin de ls phénoménologie.

Examen, dans les cours de Marbourg de Heidegger, des thèmes suivants: a) La « critique » par Heidegger de la phénoménologie husserlienne ; b) Le noème husserlien et les deux dogmes de la théorie traditionnelle de l'intentionnalité ; c) L'aptitude de la théorie husserlienne de l'intentionnalité à rendre compte de la dimension, de l'agir sous-jacente au Dasein; d) finalement, nous examinerons les relations complexes qu'entretiennent les concepts d'intentionnalité et de transcendance.

This book is a short presentation of the life, thought and work of Franz Brentano. The first part of the book is a biography of Brentano, the second is a description of the ramifications of Brentano's philosophical program, and the third section offers a succinct description of his main works and of his Nachlaß. Résumé: Cet opuscule est une présentation sommaire de la vie, de la pensée et de l'œuvre de Franz Brentano. L'ouvrage est divisé en trois parties. La première (...) partie est une courte présentation de la vie intellectuelle de Brentano, la deuxième est une description des ramifications et de l'unité de son programme philosophique original et très diversifié, et la troisième propose une description succincte de ses principaux ouvrages et de son Nachlaß. L'ouvrage contient également une bibliographie thématique. (shrink)

Les études colligées dans le présent ouvrage ont pour objet les Recherches logiques de Edmund Husserl. La plupart de ces études sont issues du colloque "Les Recherches logiques d'Edmund Husserl, origines et postérité de la phénoménologie (1900/1)" qui a eu lieu à Montréal au mois de mai 2001. Le prétexte à cet événement était de marquer le centenaire de la publication de l'ouvrage séminal de la phénoménologie par une réflexion sur sa signification actuelle, ses origines et sa postérité. L'ouvrage contient (...) douze études qui examinent divers aspects des Recherches logiques de Husserl. (shrink)

On nous a habitué, dans les études husserliennes, à traiter de la ques tion du rapport de la phénoménologie des Recherches logiques à Brentano dans la perspective de la critique que Husserl adresse à la théorie immanen tiste de l’intentionnalité dans cet ouvrage*. Mais cette perspective laisse dans l’ombre un enjeu fondamental de la question qui sous-tend les discussions de Husserl dans la § 15 de la cinquième Recherche et dans l’Appendice au deuxième volume de l’ouvrage, à savoir ce que (...) j’appellerai par commodité la thèse du caractère coextensif de la conscience, de l’inten tionnalité et de la pensée. Je voudrais montrer que la critique que Husserl adresse à cette thèse s’appuie sur la distinction introduite dans ses premiers travaux à Halle entre les actes et les contenus sensibles ou contenus pri maires, plus précisément entre deux classes au sein de l’expérience sensible, la première correspondant aux phénomènes psychiques de Brentano, l’autre, qui n’est pas intention nelle, correspond à ce qu’il est maintenant convenu d’appeler la conscience ou l’expérience phénoménale. Pour ce faire, j’exami nerai la critique de la théorie de la perception de Brentano (uniquement celle de sa Psychologie de 1874) dans la première édition des Recherches logiques ainsi que dans un traité sur la perception publié récemment sous le titre de « Abhandlung über Wahrnehmung von 1898 » qui était vraisemblablement destiné à la deuxième série des Re cherches logiques. (shrink)

Introduction au numéro spécial de la Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger en hommage au centenaire de la mort de Franz Brentano.

This paper is mainly about Brentano’s commentaries on Ernst Mach in his lectures “Contemporary philosophical questions” which he held one year before he left Austria. I will first identify the main sources of Brentano’s interests in Comte’s and J. S. Mill’s positivism during his Würzburg period. The second section provides a short overview of Brentano’s 1893-1894 lectures and his criticism of Comte, Kirchhoff, and Mill. The next sections bear on Brentano’s criticism of Mach’s monism and Brentano’s argument against the reduction (...) of the mental based on his theory of intentionality. The last section is about Brentano’s proposal to replace the identity relation in Mach’s theory of elements by that of intentional correlation. I conclude with a remark on the history of philosophy in Austria. (shrink)

This paper is mainly about Brentano’s commentaries on Ernst Mach in his lectures “Contemporary philosophical questions” which he held one year before he left Austria. I will first identify the main sources of Brentano’s early interests in positivism during his Würzburg period. The second section provides a short overview of Brentano’s 1893– 1894 lectures and his criticism of Comte, Kirchhoff, and Mill. The next sections bear on Brentano’s criticism of Mach’s monism and Brentano’s argument against the reduction of the mental (...) based on his theory of intentionality. The last section is about Brentano’s proposal to replace the identity relation in Mach’s theory of elements by that of intentional correlation. I conclude with a remark on the history of philosophy in Austria. (shrink)

This bibliography of Stumpf’s publications is the most comprehensive to date. It relies in part on the bibliography published by Stumpf in his autobiography (Stumpf 1924), which is incomplete and does not include his publications after 1924. In addition to the works of Stumpf published during his lifetime or posthumously, we indicate the translations of his works in several languages and some of the syllabus and lecture notes of his students that are available in different institutions.