"Discusses the phenomenological foundations for qualitative research in psychology which operates out of the intersection of phenomenological philosophy, science, and psychology; challenges long-standing assumptions about the practice of grounding the science of psychology in empiricism and asserts that the broader philosophy of phenomenological theory of science permits more adequate psychological development"--Provided by publisher.

This article points out the criteria necessary in order for a qualitative scientific method to qualify itself as phenomenological in a descriptive Husserlian sense. One would have to employ description within the attitude of the phenomenological reduction, and seek the most invariant meanings for a context. The results of this analysis are used to critique an article by Klein and Westcott , that presents a typology of the development of the phenomenological psychological method.

The author explains that his background was in experimental psychology but that he wanted to study the whole person and not fragmented psychological processes. He also desired a non-reductionistic method for studying humans. Fortunately he came across the work of Edmund Husserl and discovered in the latter’s thought a way of researching humans that met the criteria he was seeking. Eventually he developed a phenomenological method for researching humans in a psychological way based upon the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. (...) This article briefly describes the method. (shrink)

In adapting Husserl’s philosophical phenomenological method to conduct research in psychology I included Husserl’s two methodical steps, the epochē and the reduction, as part of the scientific procedure. Zahavi objected to my use of those steps. This article is a response to his objections and it is a reaffirmation of the necessity of the epochē and reduction for Husserlian phenomenological psychological research. A description of Husserl’s acknowledged types of psychology and a description of his transcendental phenomenology are also presented along (...) with two outlines of how Husserlian phenomenological research could be conducted. (shrink)

In this article the phenomonelogical approach to qualitative research is compared with certain other qualitative approaches following other paradigms. The thesis is that a deepened understanding of phenomenological philosophy can provide the alternative framework that many of these authors have been seeking. The comparison with other approaches is made in terms of theoretical and methodical consistency. Theoretically, the argument is that the situation known as "mixed discourse" exists because practitioners have not sufficiently freed themselves from the criteria and practices of (...) traditional paradigms in which most qualitative researchers have been trained. The shift from the collection of numerical data to linguistic data takes place without appropriate shift in theoretical context. This state of affairs should be overcome in order to strengthen qualitative research. On the other hand, many qualitative researchers carry on practices that seem to be analogous to phenomenological prescriptions which are explicitly usually misunderstood or resisted when stated directly and generically. Thus, greater theoretical clarity and consistency as well as deeper reflection or better utilization of imaginative possibilities still seem to be called for in order to bring better theoretical conceptualization and more consistent practices to qualitative research. (shrink)

Phenomenology is a philosophy and it will always remain one. However, philosophies are also foundations for sciences and thus far in the West some form of empiricism or other has been the primary foundation for all sciences. Phenomenological philosophy has been developing for about a century now and is mature enough to serve as a basis for a science, especially the human sciences. This article articulates how phenomenological philosophy can serve as a foundation for the science of phenomenological psychology and (...) it indicates how its key concepts are better able to clarify and develop a proper understanding of human reality in a rigorous scientific way. (shrink)

Recently, a book was published, the sole purpose of which was to discourage researchers from using the scientific phenomenological method. The author had previously been critical of nurses who had used the scientific phenomenological method but in the new book he goes after the originators of different methods of scientific phenomenological research and attempts to criticize them severely. In this review I defend only the scientific phenomenological method that is strictly based upon the thought of Edmund Husserl. Given the entirely (...) negative project of only critiquing phenomenologically grounded scientific research, one would expect the author to be sensitive to the cautions historians and philosophers of science speak about when one attempts to criticize concepts and procedures that belong to a different research community. Paley, an empiricist, uses empirical criteria to criticize phenomenological work.Moreover, given the entirely negative project of critiquing phenomenologically grounded scientific research one would expect the author to be knowledgeable about phenomenology and the innovative research practices used by a new research community. However, the author has only a thin, superficial understanding of phenomenology. One gets the impression that he only reads phenomenology in order to critique it. He displays an outsider’s understanding of it which means that his criticisms of it are faulty because he does not know how to think and dwell within the phenomenological framework; he does not understand “discovery-oriented” research and he keeps judging such research according to criteria from the “context of verification” perspective which are the wrong criteria for “discovery-oriented” research; he denigrates and reduces nursing research strategies because he interprets them to be based on pragmatic motivations only. He does not even grant that nurses can have authentic scientific motivations for seeking phenomenologically based methods; he uses unfair rhetorical strategies in the sense that he uses strategies himself that he criticizes when others use them. The review below documents what has been summarized here. (shrink)

In the contemporary scene, psychological researchers seeking alternative research strategies are turning increasingly toward interpretation theory. However, other strategies are also available, and one of these is descriptive science. Descriptive practices as the basis for the clarification of meanings have received less emphasis because of several epistemological assumptions about meaning that have appeared in the literature of interpretive science. Based upon the work of contemporary transcendental philosophers, especially J. N. Mohanty, this article argues that a descriptive scientific perspective can respond (...) to some of the hermeneutic arguments about meaning and that solid findings can be established descriptively. It is argued that both description and interpretation are legitimate but that they are tied to different conditions and interests. (shrink)

Empiricism had dominated scientific activities for about three centuries but beginning with the 20th Century a new philosophy, phenomenology, began to develop and certain scientists who conducted research with humans began to turn to phenomenology as the basis for their scientific work rather than empiricism. What was known as the Utrecht School in Holland just after World War II, psychologists at Duquesne University during mid-twentieth century, pedagogists in Canada at about the same time and nurses later in the twentieth century (...) all began to base their research on phenomenological philosophical principles rather than on empiricism. Certain philosophers criticized the approach of these scientists and offered their own praxis based directly on phenomenological philosophy. However, one of the members of the Duquesne University’s group strongly criticized the evaluation of his approach by the philosophers and demonstrated the significant errors of their criticism. The psychologist then clarified his scientific phenomenological approach toward psychological phenomena and emphasized the role of the phenomenological epoche’ and reduction for Husserlian scientific phenomenology. (shrink)

This article is a response to Jonathan Smith’s attempted rebuttal to the accusations I had made that Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis’s methodical procedures did not meet generally accepted scientific criteria. Each of Smith’s defenses was carefully examined and found to be lacking. IPA’s claim to have roots in contemporary phenomenological philosophy was found to be seriously deficient and its claim that it has a basis in hermeneutics was superficial. IPA’s hesitation to proclaim fixed methods makes the possibility of replication of IPA (...) studies impossible and thus it makes the fulfillment of an important scientific criterion impossible. Its claim that its findings are subjective fails to meet the important scientific criterion of objectivity or even intersubjectivity. Consequently, the claims that I made in my original article were basically sustained and repeated. (shrink)

David Katz was an experimental psychologist who worked in the early years of psychology as an independent science. He performed many experiments on color vision and touch by means of what he called the “phenomenological method.” He claimed to have learned the method by attending Husserl’s lectures on phenomenological philosophy while the latter was teaching at Göttingen. However the method that Katz actually used was “description with an attitude of disciplined naiveté”. Consequently, while such a method was known as “phenomenological” (...) at the time Katz was working, the nomenclature reflects a historically dated meaning of phenomenology and not the sense of phenomenological method that Husserl developed later in his career. Katz’s method was actually qualitative and empirical. It was not phenomenological according to Husserl’s complete, mature philosophy. (shrink)

While it is heartening to see that more researchers in the field of the social sciences are using some version of the phenomenological method, it is also disappointing to see that very often some of the steps employed do not follow phenomenological logic. In this paper, several dissertations are reviewed in order to point out some of the difficulties that are encountered in attempting to use some version of the phenomenological method. Difficulties encountered centred on the phenomenological reduction, the use (...) of imaginative variation and the feedback to subjects. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 8, Edition 1 May 2008. (shrink)

In an earlier article, Edwards tried to establish that the Duquesne Phenomenological Research Method was simply a particular type of Case Study research method and he also reproached users of the DPRM for not developing theory. This article rebuts both of Edwards's theses. DPRM is radically different from CSRM in logic and in execution and the article demonstrates that the development of theory is not at all the intent of DPRM. The basic difficulty is that Edwards attempts to understand DPRM (...) from an empirical philosophical perspective whereas a phenomenological philosophical perspective is required to understand DPRM correctly. (shrink)

Historically, when psychology broke away from a philosophical mode of scholarship it strove to become a natural science. This meant that it largely imitated the concepts and practices of the natural sciences which included the use of abstract terms to designate many of its phenomena with the consequence that psychology is often more abstract and generic than it ought to be. Husserl has emphasized the role of the life-world as the ultimate basis of all knowledge and a serious consideration of (...) its role implies that psychology’s manner of labeling its phenomena should be less abstract and closer to the way the phenomena are experienced in the lifeworld. If so, this means that psychology’s primary data should be physiognomies or the expressive characteristics intrinsic to objects and situations. However, the complexities involved in the perception of physiognomies create difficulties for the practice of science. It is suggested that certain Husserlian phenomenological contributions concerning categorial modes of experiencing could be helpful in meeting scientific criteria. (shrink)

It seems that many qualitative researchers have still not contextualized the role of validity in qualitative analysis.This article enumerates three factors that must be taken into account: The philosophy of science within which one works, the discipline to which one belongs, and the subfield of specialization that one pursues. Most researchers have encountered the question of validity within the context of empirical science, but validity does not have the same role within a phenomenological philosophy of science. Within the discipline of (...) psychology, certain subfields ignore the validity issue for good reasons and other subfields specialize in developing strategies for validity. This article analyzes the reasons that the specialty of "test construction" focuses so strongly on validity issues and concludes that phenomenological qualitative research is not at all similar to the situation one finds in test construction. Rather, phenomenological qualitative research is closer to experimental situations and so the validity issue is not as pressing as is often supposed. The article ends with two different Husserlian perspectives on a theory of knowledge. (shrink)

J.H. van den Berg was a member of the Utrecht school of phenomenology that flourished in Holland during the 1950s and early 1960s. He was a psychiatrist who had a private practice and he taught at the University of Leiden. Along with other members of the Utrecht school, not all of whom were psychiatrists, he was among the first to apply the insights drawn from existential-phenomenological philosophy to psychology and psychiatry. As with the philosophers, he emphasized that subjectivity was engaged (...) with the world and its activities had to be described. He emphasized that insights into experience as lived, or the phenomenal level, was what was critical for psychologists to understand. (shrink)

Four research strategies currently employed by mainstream psychologists in researching the experiences and behaviors of human subjects are criticized for diminishing the presence of subjectivity. Two perspectives that tend to exaggerate subjectivity are also criticized. A balanced approach to subjectivity is offered that: acknowledges a theoretical perspective that recognizes that there are invisible or nonsensorial characteristics of subjectivity that have to be theoretically appropriated, and that emphasizes the intersubjective dimension as being critical for properly assessing a balanced approach to human (...) subjectivity. A subject-dependent perspective that can efface its own interests is the attitude that is required for the achievement of objectivity. (shrink)

A description of the founding of the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology and some of its vicissitudes during its first 25 years are described. Some of the difficulties the journal experienced are correlated with the minority status of phenomenological psychology in the world of psychology at large. Several factors are hypothesized to be the basis of Phenomenology's little impact on mainstream psychology: intrinsic difficulties in comprehending phenomenological philosophy, the fact that phenomenological psychology has not yet sufficiently diflerentiated itself from phenomenological philosophy; (...) and mainstream psychology's clear non-openness to approaches that seem different to its established values. (shrink)

In this article two different descriptive, qualitative analytic perspectives applied to the area of learning are compared, demonstrating, in part, that normal science in qualitative research can be conducted. The two perspectives are phenomenography and phenomenology and the comparison is between the different perspectives themselves and the results they produce. Phenomenography is basically an empirical approach that developed more from practice than theory and the phenomenological scientific approach used is a particularization of the Husserlian philosophical phenomenological method, as its practice (...) is claimed to be consistent with phenomenological criteria at the level of scientific application. There is a certain convergence in the findings of the two approaches but the level of analysis actually performed by each perspective made a direct comparison of the findings difficult. (shrink)

Whenever one reads internal histories of psychology what is covered is the establishment of a lab by Wundt in 1879 as the initiating act and then the breakaway movements of the 20th Century are discussed: Behaviorism, Gestalt Theory, Psychoanalysis, and most recently the Cognitive revival. However, Aron Gurwitsch described a perspective noted by Cassirer and first developed by Malebranche, which dates the founding of psychology at the same time as that of physics in the 17th Century. This external perspective shows (...) the dependency of psychology upon the concepts, methods and procedures of physics and the natural sciences in general up until the present time. Gurwitsch argues that this approach has blocked the growth of psychology and has assured its status as a minor science. He argued that the everyday Lifeworld achievements of subjectivity are the true subject matter of psychology and that a phenomenological approach to subjectivity could give psychology the authenticity it has been forever seeking but never finding as a naturalistic science. Some clarifying thoughts concerning this phenomenologically grounded psychology are offered, especially the role of desire. The assumption of an external perspective toward the history of psychology fostered the insights about psychology’s scientific role. (shrink)

The study of the moral sense was neglected for a long time in psychology until recently when Kohlberg, following the work of Piaget, constructed a scale for studying moral judgments. In this article the more scientific and empirical approach to the moral sense is questioned and an argument is made that a qualitative approach would yield more meaningful results. The work of Coles is cited as one example of a qualitative approach, and this article suggests a phenomenological approach. Five brief (...) descriptions describing learning, resentment, decision-making, and the experience of autonomy were used for both analyses of the moral sense and psychological concomitants. The results indicate that the moral sense is a meaning that refers to an "ought" and that the awakening of the moral sense is frequently associated with negative emotions or feelings. (shrink)

The phenomenology-psychology dialogue has been taking place for over 100 years now and it is still not clear how the two disciplines relate to each other. Part of the problem is that both disciplines have developed complexly with competing, not easily integratable perspectives. In this article the Husserlian phenomenological perspective is adopted and Husserl’s understanding of how phenomenology can help psychology is clarified. Then the usage of phenomenology within the historical scientific tradition of psychology is examined to see the senses (...) of phenomenology that were employed in that tradition. The German literature of psychology between the founding of the discipline and the beginning of the Nazi regime indicates quite clearly that the phenomenological perspective was part of the mainstream psychology of that era. The article ends by listing four difficult challenges that have to be met if a viable psychology based upon Husserlian phenomenology is to be possible. (shrink)

L’autore presenta lo sviluppo del proprio metodo a partire dal background psicologico sperimentale da cui proviene e dal quale ha preso le distanze, a partire dal desiderio di studiare l’essere umano con un approccio globale, un metodo scientifico non frammentario. L’incontro con la filosofia di Edmund Husserl ha connotato questo suo percorso, in essa egli ha scoperto un approccio che rendesse possibile la ricerca sui fenomeni umani proprio con i criteri che andava inseguendo. Il metodo di ricerca che ha quindi (...) elaborato si basa sul lavoro di Husserl e di Merleau-Ponty. L’articolo descrive brevemente questo metodo.The author explains that his background was in experimental psychology but that he wanted to study the whole person and not fragmented psychological processes. He also desired a non-reductionistic method for studying humans. Fortunately he came across the work of Edmund Husserl and discovered in the latter’s thought a way of researching humans that met the criteria he was seeking. Eventually he developed a phenomenological method for researching humans in a psychological way based upon the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. This article briefly describes the method. (shrink)