The present paper aims to validate our research on human–humanoid interaction (HHI) using the minimalist humanoid robot Telenoid. We conducted the human–robot interaction test with 142 young people who had no prior interaction experience with this robot. The main goal is the analysis of the two social dimensions (‘‘Perception’’ and ‘‘Believability’’) useful for increasing the natural behaviour between users and Telenoid.Weadministered our custom questionnaire to human subjects in association with a well defined experimental setting (‘‘ordinary and goal-guided task’’). A thorough (...) analysis of the questionnaires has been carried out and reliability and internal consistency in correlation between the multiple items has been calculated. Our experimental results show that the perceptual behaviour and believability, as implicit social competences, could improve the meaningfulness and the natural-like sense of human–humanoid interaction in everyday life task-driven activities. Telenoid is perceived as an autonomous cooperative agent for a shared environment by human beings. (shrink)

Kültürleri ve inanışları farklı insanların etkileşimi üzerinde gelişen turizm, özellikle ekonomik getirileri nedeniyle pek çok yerel ve ulusal yönetici tarafından öncelikli sektörler arasında değerlendirilmektedir. Ancak, turizm gelişimi ekonomik unsurların ötesinde çevresel ve sosyo-kültürel pek çok etki de oluşturmaktadır. Söz konusu etkilerin yerel halk tarafından algılanışında etkin olan pek çok unsur incelenmiş olmakla birlikte dindarlığın etkisi çok az araştırılmıştır. Bu kapsamda, toplumsal ve bireysel düşünce ve davranışlar üzerinde önemli bir etken olan dindarlık hususunun turizmin sosyo-kültürel etkilerinin algılanışında etkin olup olmadığının incelendiği (...) bu çalışma, alanyazına katkı sunabilecek boyuttadır. Çalışma kapsamında nicel araştırma yöntemlerinden anket tekniği benimsenmiş olup veri, Muğla Menteşe ilçesinde ikamet eden 528 bireyden elde edilmiştir. Çok değişkenli istatistik analiz yöntemlerinden yararlanılarak açıklayıcı ve doğrulayıcı faktör analizleri ile yol analizi uygulanmıştır. Sonuçlar, dindarlık algısı arttıkça olumsuz sosyo-kültürel etkilerin daha kuvvetli algılandığını ancak dindarlık ile olumlu sosyo-kültürel etkilerin algılanışı arasında bağlantı bulunmadığını vurgulamaktadır. Bu sonuçlar, turizm planlaması ve gelişimini sürecinde yerel halkın inançlarının da göz önünde bulundurulmasının gerekliliğini işaret etmektedir. Özet: İnsanların aynı değerler etrafında toplanmalarını ve grup halinde hareket etmelerini sağlayan inanç sistemi veya toplumda birlikte yaşayan bireylerin ilişki ve sorumluluklarını belirlemek için düzenlenmiş inanç, uygulama, ritüel ve semboller sistemi olarak tanımlanabilecek olan din, en yaygın ve etkili sosyal kurumlardan olmasının ötesinde hem birey hem de toplumların tutumlarını, değerlerini ve davranışlarını etkilemesi nedeniyle, özellikle son yıllarda, sıklıkla incelenmektedir. Bireylerin dini bir gruba veya kurallara bağlılık dereceleri olarak tanımlanabilecek dindarlık ise dinsel öğelerin bir kişinin yaşamı üzerindeki etkinliğini ifade etmek için kullanılmaktadır. Tıp, antropoloji, psikoloji, sosyoloji gibi bilim dallarında yapılan çalışmalarda dindarlık ile mutluluk ve bedensel / ruhsal sağlık arasında genellikle olumlu bir ilişki olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Turizm alanında yapılan çalışmalarda ise, din, yoğunlukla inanç turizmi veya turistlerin tercihleri üzerindeki etkisi kapsamında ele alınmış ve dini turizmin planlanması ve kutsal alanların yönetimi, turizmin dini bölgelerdeki etkileri, hacıların seyahat motivasyonu ve seyahat şekilleri ile turistlerin dini ihtiyaçları gibi konulara odaklanılmıştır. Kültürleri ve inanışları farklı insanların etkileşimi üzerinde gelişen turizm, özellikle ekonomik getirileri nedeniyle pek çok yerel ve ulusal yönetici tarafından öncelikli sektörler arasında değerlendirilmektedir. Turizm gelişimi ekonomik unsurların ötesinde çevresel ve sosyo-kültürel pek çok etki de oluşturmaktadır. Yerel halk, turizmin gelişmesi ve sürdürülebilirliği açısından önem arz etmekte olup yerel halkın turizmin etkilerine yönelik algıları sıklıkla araştırılan konular arasında yer almaktadır. Topluma ve/veya mekâna aidiyet duygusu, destinasyonun ve/veya turizm sektörünün gelişim düzeyi, turizmin ekonomi içindeki önemi, destinasyonun turizme ekonomik bağımlılığı, turizm sektöründe istihdam edilmek gibi ekonomik unsurlar veya sosyo-demografik özellikler gibi pek çok değişkenin yerel halkın turizm algısındaki etkileri incelenmiş olmakla birlikte dindarlığın etkisi çok az araştırılmıştır. Yapılan çalışmalarda, özellikle dini bölgelerde yaşayan yerel halk ve çoğunlukla din adamlarının algıları araştırılmıştır. Sonuçlar, yerel halkın bölgeye dini amaçlarla gelen ziyaretçiler (hacılar) ile turistleri ayırdığını ve hacıların turistlere oranla daha fazla kabul gördüğünü vurgulamaktadır. Ayrıca, turistlerin alanın ve yapıların kutsallığını, güvenliğini, dekorunu tehdit ettiği ve turistlerin taleplerinin dini uygulamalara zarar verdiği algısının yaygın olduğu, hatta turizmin kendi kültürleri ve dinleri için tehdit olarak görüldüğü tespit edilmiştir. Kutsal alanlar dışında kalan turizm destinasyonlarında ikamet eden yerel halkın görüşlerinin araştırıldığı çalışma ise çok daha azdır. Alanyazın taraması ile bu kapsamda sadece bir çalışma bulunulabilmiştir. İran’daki iki turizm destinasyonunda yerel halkın turizmin sosyo-kültürel sonuçlarına yönelik algılarında dindarlığın etkisinin incelendiği çalışma ile sosyo-kültürel etkilerin algılanışı ile dindarlık arasında pozitif bir ilişki bulunduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu kapsamda, dindarlık hususunun turizmin sosyo-kültürel etkilerinin algılanışında etkin olup olmadığının incelendiği bu çalışma, alanyazına katkı sunabilecek boyuttadır. Çalışma kapsamında nicel araştırma yöntemlerinden anket tekniği benimsenmiştir. Ekonomik kaygıların katılımcıların görüşlerini etkilemesinin önüne geçilmesi amacıyla, Bodrum, Fethiye ve Marmaris gibi Türkiye’nin önemli turizm destinasyonlarına coğrafi olarak uzak olmamakla birlikte turizm gelişiminin sınırlı olduğu için tercih edilen Menteşe (Muğla) ilçesinde ikamet eden 528 bireyden elde edilen veriler iki aşamada analiz edilmiştir. İlk aşamada, kullanılan soru formu değişik çalışmalardan yararlanarak oluşturulduğu için ölçeklerin güvenirliğini test etmek üzere Güvenirlik Analizi ve yapısal geçerliliğini sınamak üzere Açıklayıcı Faktör Analizi (AFA) uygulanmıştır. Cronbach Alpha (α) değeri, sosyo-kültürel etkilere yönelik 22 ifade bütününde 0,907; her bir faktöre yönelik sırasıyla 0,941; 0,813 ve 0,772; Dindarlık ölçeğine yönelik ise 0,728 olarak hesaplanmış olup araştırmada kullanılan ölçeklerin güvenilir olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Sosyo-kültürel etkilere yönelik ifadelerin varyansın %64,413’ini açıklayacak şekilde 3 faktörlü bir yapı altında birleştiği, üç ifadeden oluşan dindarlık ölçeğinin ise tek faktöre yüklendiği ve varyansın %64,845’ini açıkladığı tespit edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla analiz için kullanılan yapının iyi derecede geçerli olduğu anlaşılmıştır. İkinci aşamada, AFA ile belirlenen faktörlerin çalışma kapsamında oluşturulan modele uygunluğunu test edebilmek için Doğrulayıcı Faktör Analizi (DFA) ve ölçüm modeli ile gizli değişkenler arasındaki ilişkiyi belirlemek ve kavramsal model ile verilerin uyup uymadığını değerlendirmek için Yapısal Eşitlik Model gerçekleştirilmiştir. DFA analizi sonucunda, bütün faktör yüklerinin 0,4’ün üzerinde olduğu ve uyum indekslerinin (x 2 /df, RMSEA, CFI, NFI ve GFI) hem DFA hem de yapısal eşitlik modelinde eşik değerleri aştığı görülmüştür. Dolayısıyla, faktör yapılarının ve çalışmada sınanan modelin uygun olduğu ve sosyo-kültürel etkilerin algılanması ile dindarlık arasında ilişki olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Çalışma sonuçları dindarlık ile turizmin olumsuz sosyo-kültürel etkilerinin algılanışı arasında bir ilişki bulunduğunu ancak turizmin olumlu kültürel etkilerinin algılanışında dindarlığın bir etkisinin bulunmadığını ortaya koymuştur. Dindarlık ile muhafazakârlık arasında kuvvetli bir ilişki bulunduğu göz önüne alındığında öngörülebilecek bir sonuç olduğu belirtilebilir. Ancak, Zamani-Farahani – Musa (2012) çalışmasında dindarlık ile sosyo-kültürel etkilerin algılanışı arasında olumlu etki bulunduğu sonucuna ulaşılmış olmasının destinasyonları ziyaret eden turistlerin profillerindeki ve sayılarındaki farklılıktan kaynaklandığı öngörülmektedir. İlk çalışmada ziyaretçilerin çoğu aynı din ve kültüre mensup kişilerden oluşuyorken, çalışma alanında turistlerin yarısına yakın kısmını farklı din ve kültüre sahip olanlar oluşturmaktadır. Çalışma sonuçları doğrultusunda turizm planlama ve uygulama süreçlerinde, yerel halkın dini inanışlarının, dikkate alınması ve dini inanışlara uygun adımların atılmasının veya yapılacak uygulamaların dini inanışlarına aykırı olmadığının anlatılmasının gerekli olduğu söylenebilir. Ayrıca, turizmin yerel dini inanışlara aykırı sonuçlar doğurmayacak (ya da bu tür sonuçları en aza indirgeyecek) şekilde gelişimine yönelik kararlar alınması gerekmektedir. Kitle turizminin (özellikle deniz–kum–güneş) geliştiği popüler destinasyonlara yakın olmakla birlikte ekonomik olarak turizm ile yoğun bir bağlantının bulunmadığı bir alanda gerçekleştirilen bu çalışmanın sonuçları kesitseldir. Diğer bir ifadeyle sonuçlar çalışma alanı ve hatta katılımcılar ile sınırlıdır. Gelecek çalışmalarda farklı turizm türü ve turist profiline sahip yerleşimlere odaklanabilir. Ayrıca, sonuçların ekonomik olarak turizme bağımlı destinasyonlarda da sınanması gereklidir. (shrink)

_Phenomenology of Perception: Theories and Experimental Evidence_ presents an interpretation of phenomenology as a set of commitments to discover the immanent grammar of perception by reviewing arguments and experimental results that are still important today for psychology and the cognitive sciences.

_Phenomenology of Perception: Theories and Experimental Evidence_ presents an interpretation of phenomenology as a set of commitments to discover the immanent grammar of perception by reviewing arguments and experimental results that are still important today for psychology and the cognitive sciences.

In this theoretical paper, the claim is defended that phenomenology of perception can be integrated into vision science. Different versions of theoretical and experimental phenomenology are presented to specify a minimal set of commitments. It is claimed that the phenomenological research into perception, be it delivered in the form of conceptual analysis or of experimental research, satisfies the epistemological and methodological substantive features of these commitments. As an empirical case for the contribution that the integration of phenomenology into vision science (...) could bring about, the paper presents a received view in the visual neurosciences and the objections against its elementarwise and reductionist stance. The relationships among models and mechanisms are discussed. It is argued that models endowed with linking propositions with phenomenological contents can provide the conceptual case for the integration of phenomenology into vision science to be carried out. (shrink)

Introduzione La formulazione dell’espressione neuroestetica è consensualmente attribuita a Semir Zeki, per il quale essa designa il progetto di elaborare una teoria neurobiologica dell’esperienza estetica. Come si realizza però concretamente questo progetto? Esistono problemi di metodo specifici per la neuroestetica? Nell’ambito del medesimo progetto, è possibile individuare approcci diversi allo studio dell’esperienza estetica? Inoltre, quali aspetti dell’esperienza estetica sono di solito o...

In this paper the relationship between phenomenology of perception and synthetic phenomenology is discussed. Synthetic phenomenology is presented on the basis of the issues in A.I. and Robotics that required to address the question of what enables artificial agents to have phenomenal access to the environment. Phenomenology of perception is construed as a theory with autonomous structure and domain, which can be embedded in a philosophical as well as a scientific theory. Two attempts at specifying the phenomenal content of artificial (...) agents are discussed. Concepts and experimental evidence on the independence of perception and the coordination of motion and appearances are set out to submit that phenomenology of perception makes a contribution to synthetic phenomenology. (shrink)

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, journalism in the United States changed. Journalistic norms of objectivity and distance opened to a participatory mode of reporting. A communitarian journalism emerged in which journalists became "at one" with their subjects as they lived the story they were reporting. Chiara Lubich of Italy presents a philosophical foundation for this journalistic approach, proposing "unity" as the ethic that should guide mass media communicators. In this essay I review Lubich's moral perspective and consider (...) its implications for media ethics. (shrink)

Questo articolo si concentra sul problema del rapporto tra fenomenologia e psicologia della percezione. Nella prima parte presenterò alcuni assunti di fondo che qualificano le ricerche sulla percezione nel campo della fenomenologia teorica e in quella della cosiddetta fenomenologia sperimentale. Successivamente intendo approfondire l’analisi, considerando il concetto specifico di percezione impiegato da Husserl nella sua fenomenologia e un concetto più lasco di percezione compatibile con la prospettiva psicologica per gettar luce sulla possibilità di un approccio integrato, mirante a unificare le (...) analisi fenomenologiche e psicologiche nel pieno rispetto delle loro proprie specificità. Nella parte finale del testo cercherò di presentare alcuni elementi che accomunano l’analisi husserliana della percezione e le ricerche sulla percezione sviluppate da una prospettiva psicologica da Paolo Bozzi e Cesare Musatti. (shrink)

The research Lucia Pizzo Russo carried out all over her academic and scientific career is focussed on a the following idea: human mind and behaviour make up a cognitive device from whose complexity stems an evolutionary advantage. Hence, the psychological study of mind should take into account all those cognitive functions that underlie man’s ability of perceiving structures and affordances in the visual world as much as of solving problems, where perception and thought deeply interact, and of giving shape to (...) representations, be they artistic forms or scientific theories. But for an adequate psychological account to obtain that complexity must be traded off against the assumption that mind and behaviour are a psychophysical unity. That means that cognition does imply a neurobiological basis, and at the same time that a phenomenological stance is required just as that instanced by Gestalt psychology. In this interview a picture of a piece of life is meant to be given as it goes along with a research whose reference are issues in psychology, psychology of arts and such figures as Brandi, Piaget, Gombrich, Arnheim, Bozzi. (shrink)

Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. (...) Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end. (shrink)

There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. The best explanation, I suggest, is (...) that aesthetic appreciation is something like a game. When we play a game, we try to win. But often, winning isn’t the point; playing is. Aesthetic appreciation involves the same flipped motivational structure: we aim at the goal of correctness, but having correct judgments isn’t the point. The point is the engaged process of interpreting, investigating, and exploring the aesthetic object. Deferring to aesthetic testimony, then, makes the same mistake as looking up the answer to a puzzle, rather than solving it for oneself. The shortcut defeats the whole point. This suggests a new account of aesthetic value: the engagement account. The primary value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation lies in the process of trying to generate correct judgments, and not in having correct judgments. -/- *There is an audio version available: look for the Soundcloud link, below.*. (shrink)

I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...) for evaluating experts, which makes our expert dependences particularly risky. -/- Some have argued that cognitive islands lead to the complete unusability of expert testimony: that anybody who needs expert advice on a cognitive island will be entirely unable to find it. I argue against this radical form of pessimism, but propose a more moderate alternative. I demonstrate that we have some resources for finding experts on cognitive islands, but that cognitive islands leave us vulnerable to an epistemic trap which I will call runaway echo chambers. In a runaway echo chamber, our inexpertise may lead us to pick out bad experts, which will simply reinforce our mistaken beliefs and sensibilities. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

We offer an account of the generic use of the term “porn”, as seen in recent usages such as “food porn” and “real estate porn”. We offer a definition adapted from earlier accounts of sexual pornography. On our account, a representation is used as generic porn when it is engaged with primarily for the sake of a gratifying reaction, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with the represented content. We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of generic (...) porn by using it to isolate a new type of such porn: moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn is representations of moral outrage, engaged with primarily for the sake of the resulting gratification, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with morally outrageous content. Moral outrage porn is dangerous because it encourages the instrumentalization of one’s empirical and moral beliefs, manipulating their content for the sake of gratification. Finally, we suggest that when using porn is wrong, it is often wrong because it instrumentalizes what ought not to be instrumentalized. (shrink)

Attempts to introduce Gestalt theory into the realm of visual neuroscience are discussed on both theoretical and experimental grounds. To define the framework in which these proposals can be defended, this paper outlines the characteristics of a standard model, which qualifies as a received view in the visual neurosciences, and of the research into natural images statistics. The objections to the standard model and the main questions of the natural images research are presented. On these grounds, this paper defends the (...) view that Gestalt psychology and experimental phenomenology provide a contribution to the research into perception by the construction of phenomenological models for an ecologically meaningful interpretation of the empirical evidence and the hypothetical constructs of the natural image research within the visual neuroscience. A formal framework for the phenomenological models is proposed, wherein Gestalt theoretical principles and empirical evidence are represented in terms of topological properties and relationships, which account for the order and structures that make the environment accessible to observers at a relevant behavioural level. It is finally argued that these models allow us to evaluate the principles and the empirical evidence of various natures which are integrated from different fields into the research into perception, and in particular into visual neurosciences. (shrink)

This paper deals with two theories Husserl worked out on imagery in order to see if the properties a phenomenological description ascribes to imagery are fit to give meaningful constraints upon theoretical models that guide empirical research. Husserlian descriptions and Kosslyn and colleagues models are hence compared as to their explanatory strategy and implications.

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

Some issues heavily debated in perception sciences are presented: the explanatory gap and the experience measurement problem. The experimental phenomenology is said to provide substantive contribution to settle controversy over the phenome- nological adequacy of perception theory and models. An interpretation of experi- mental phenomenology as explanation of the perceptual manifold, and definition of relation varieties to eventually map onto other perception sciences’ domains is sketched.

This paper tries to sketch what phenomenological constraints for Neurosciences would be looking like. It maintains that such an adequate phenomenological description as that provided by Gestalt psychology is a condition for the Neurosciences to account for every-day experience opf the world. The explanatory gap in Cognitive sciences is discussed with reference to Jackendoff, Prinz, and Köhler.

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that although all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, there are often differences in the value of lives. According to Regan, lives that have the highest value are lives which have more possible sources of satisfaction. Regan claims that the highest source of satisfaction, which is available to only rational beings, is the satisfaction associated with thinking impartially about moral choices. Since rational beings can bring impartial reasons to bear on decision making, (...) Regan maintains that they have an additional possible source of satisfaction that nonrational beings do not have and, consequently, the lives of rational beings turn out to have greater value.. (shrink)

What is a game? What are we doing when we play a game? What is the value of playing games? Several different philosophical subdisciplines have attempted to answer these questions using very distinctive frameworks. Some have approached games as something like a text, deploying theoretical frameworks from the study of narrative, fiction, and rhetoric to interrogate games for their representational content. Others have approached games as artworks and asked questions about the authorship of games, about the ontology of the work (...) and its performance. Yet others, from the philosophy of sport, have focused on normative issues of fairness, rule application, and competition. The primary purpose of this article is to provide an overview of several different philosophical approaches to games and, hopefully, demonstrate the relevance and value of the different approaches to each other. Early academic attempts to cope with games tried to treat games as a subtype of narrative and to interpret games exactly as one might interpret a static, linear narrative. A faction of game studies, self-described as “ludologists,” argued that games were a substantially novel form and could not be treated with traditional tools for narrative analysis. In traditional narrative, an audience is told and interprets the story, where in a game, the player enacts and creates the story. Since that early debate, theorists have attempted to offer more nuanced accounts of how games might achieve similar ends to more traditional texts. For example, games might be seen as a novel type of fiction, which uses interactive techniques to achieve immersion in a fictional world. Alternately, games might be seen as a new way to represent causal systems, and so a new way to criticize social and political entities. Work from contemporary analytic philosophy of art has, on the other hand, asked questions whether games could be artworks and, if so, what kind. Much of this debate has concerned the precise nature of the artwork, and the relationship between the artist and the audience. Some have claimed that the audience is a cocreator of the artwork, and so games are a uniquely unfinished and cooperative art form. Others have claimed that, instead, the audience does not help create the artwork; rather, interacting with the artwork is how an audience member appreciates the artist's finished production. Other streams of work have focused less on the game as a text or work, and more on game play as a kind of activity. One common view is that game play occurs in a “magic circle.” Inside the magic circle, players take on new roles, follow different rules, and actions have different meanings. Actions inside the magic circle do not have their usual consequences for the rest of life. Enemies of the magic circle view have claimed that the view ignores the deep integration of game life from ordinary life and point to gambling, gold farming, and the status effects of sports. Philosophers of sport, on the other hand, have approached games with an entirely different framework. This has lead into investigations about the normative nature of games—what guides the applications of rules and how those rules might be applied, interpreted, or even changed. Furthermore, they have investigated games as social practices and as forms of life. (shrink)

Анотація. У статті проаналізовані досягнення Соціального Вчительства Католицької Церкви, репрезентовані працями Лева ХІІІ, Пія ХІ, Пія ХІІ, Івана Павла ІІ, що розкривають змістовні характеристики поняття «принцип субсидіарності», його роль і значення в системі християнських цінностей. Принцип субсидіарності робить можливими такі взаємовідносини в соціальному житті, коли спільнота вищого порядку не втручається у внутрішнє життя спільноти нижчого порядку, перебираючи на себе належні тій функції; заради спільного добра, спільного блага вона надає їй у разі потреби підтримку й допомогу, узгоджуючи у такий спосіб її (...) взаємодію з іншими соціальними структурами. Принцип субсидіарності скеровує соціальну практику на утвердження спільного блага в людському співтоваристві. Поширення і застосування принципу субсидіарності протистоїть небезпеці «одержавлення» суспільства та найзагрозливіших проявів колективізму, обмежує абсолютизацію влади, бюрократизацію державних і соціокультурних структур, стає одним із гарантів дотримання прав і свобод громадян своєї країни. (shrink)

The study of the social implications of human enhancement is an interdisciplinary work that draws from the fields of political science, sociology, philosophy, and bioethics, among others. It is also a complex and rapidly evolving subject that raises important questions about the potential benefits and risks of these technologies, as well as how society should govern and regulate their development and use. -/- An in-depth exploration of current and future human enhancement technologies,this book delves into the specifics of current and (...) emerging human enhancement technologies, such as cognitive enhancers, brain-computer interfaces, and genetic engineering, discussing the state of the art, the limitations and also the technological developments that one can expect in the future and how they can be regulated and used responsibly. -/- A comprehensive examination of the political and ethical implications of human enhancement An interdisciplinary work, bringing together leading scholars in the field An in-depth exploration of current and future human enhancement technologies. (shrink)

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. (...) I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

The research Lucia Pizzo Russo carried out all over her academic and scientific career is focussed on a the following idea: human mind and behaviour make up a cognitive device from whose complexity stems an evolutionary advantage. Hence, the psychological study of mind should take into account all those cognitive functions that underlie man’s ability of perceiving structures and affordances in the visual world as much as of solving problems, where perception and thought deeply interact, and of giving shape to (...) representations, be they artistic forms or scientific theories. But for an adequate psychological account to obtain that complexity must be traded off against the assumption that mind and behaviour are a psychophysical unity. That means that cognition does imply a neurobiological basis, and at the same time that a phenomenological stance is required just as that instanced by Gestalt psychology. In this interview a picture of a piece of life is meant to be given as it goes along with a research whose reference are issues in psychology, psychology of arts and such figures as Brandi, Piaget, Gombrich, Arnheim, Bozzi. (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

Recent discussions in the just war literature suggest that soldiers have a duty to assume certain risks in order to protect the lives of all innocent civilians. I challenge this principle of risk by arguing that it is justified neither as a principle that guides the conduct of combat soldiers, nor as a principle that guides commanders in the US military. I demonstrate that the principle of risk fails on the first account because it requires soldiers both to violate their (...) strict duty of obedience and loyalty and to exceed their special obligations to protect their fellow comrades, the state, the state's constituents and other protected civilians. I then illustrate that the principle of risk fails on the second account since it conflicts with the commander's primary obligation to protect and promote the welfare and lives of his or her soldiers. I conclude by arguing that we cannot reasonably expect soldiers and commanders to adhere to the principle of risk until there is a radical, institutional-level transformation of militaristic goals, values, strategies, policies, warrior codes and expectations of service members in the US Armed Forces. (shrink)

Монографія "Функціональність релігії: український контекст".

Twitter makes conversation into something like a game. It scores our communication, giving us vivid and quantified feedback, via Likes, Retweets, and Follower counts. But this gamification doesn’t just increase our motivation to communicate; it changes the very nature of the activity. Games are more satisfying than ordinary life precisely because game-goals are simpler, cleaner, and easier to apply. Twitter is thrilling precisely because its goals have been artificially clarified and narrowed. When we buy into Twitter’s gamification, then our values (...) shift from the complex and pluralistic values of communication, to the narrower quest for popularity and virality. Twitter’s gamification bears some resemblance with the phenomena of echo chambers and moral outrage porn. In all these phenomena, we are instrumentalizing our ends for hedonistic reasons. We have shifted our aims in an activity, not because the new aims are more valuable, but in exchange for extra pleasure. (shrink)

This classic and controversial book examines the roots of the idea of virtue, diagnoses the reasons for its absence in modern life, and proposes a path for its recovery.

The Statesman is Plato's neglected political work, but it is crucial for an understanding of the development of his political thinking. In some respects it continues themes from the Republic, particularly the importance of knowledge as entitlement to rule. But there are also changes: Plato has dropped the ambitious metaphysical synthesis of the Republic, changed his view of the moral psychology of the citizen, and revised his position on the role of law and institutions. In its presentation of the statesman's (...) expertise, the Statesman modifies, as well as defending in original ways, this central theme of the Republic. (shrink)

The feeling of clarity can be dangerously seductive. It is the feeling associated with understanding things. And we use that feeling, in the rough-and-tumble of daily life, as a signal that we have investigated a matter sufficiently. The sense of clarity functions as a thought-terminating heuristic. In that case, our use of clarity creates significant cognitive vulnerability, which hostile forces can try to exploit. If an epistemic manipulator can imbue a belief system with an exaggerated sense of clarity, then they (...) can induce us to terminate our inquiries too early — before we spot the flaws in the system. How might the sense of clarity be faked? Let’s first consider the object of imitation: genuine understanding. Genuine understanding grants cognitive facility. When we understand something, we categorize its aspects more easily; we see more connections between its disparate elements; we can generate new explanations; and we can communicate our understanding. In order to encourage us to accept a system of thought, then, an epistemic manipulator will want the system to provide its users with an exaggerated sensation of cognitive facility. The system should provide its users with the feeling that they can easily and powerfully create categorizations, generate explanations, and communicate their understanding. And manipulators have a significant advantage in imbuing their systems with a pleasurable sense of clarity, since they are freed from the burdens of accuracy and reliability. I offer two case studies of seductively clear systems: conspiracy theories; and the standardized, quantified value systems of bureaucracies. (shrink)

This edition of Martin Ostwald's revised version of J. B. Skemp's 1952 translation of _Statesman_ includes a new selected bibliography, as well as Ostwald's interpretive introduction, which traces the evolution in Plato's political philosophy from _Republic_ to _Statesman to Laws_--from philosopher-king to royal statesman.

This book presents an up-to-date, unified treatment of research in bounded arithmetic and complexity of propositional logic, with emphasis on independence proofs and lower bound proofs. The author discusses the deep connections between logic and complexity theory and lists a number of intriguing open problems. An introduction to the basics of logic and complexity theory is followed by discussion of important results in propositional proof systems and systems of bounded arithmetic. More advanced topics are then treated, including polynomial simulations and (...) conservativity results, various witnessing theorems, the translation of bounded formulas (and their proofs) into propositional ones, the method of random partial restrictions and its applications, direct independence proofs, complete systems of partial relations, lower bounds to the size of constant-depth propositional proofs, the method of Boolean valuations, the issue of hard tautologies and optimal proof systems, combinatorics and complexity theory within bounded arithmetic, and relations to complexity issues of predicate calculus. Students and researchers in mathematical logic and complexity theory will find this comprehensive treatment an excellent guide to this expanding interdisciplinary area. (shrink)