Perception and Phenomenology

The Buddhist philosophical investigation of the elements of existence and/or experience (or dharmas) provides the basis on which Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their followers deliberate on such topics as the ontological status of external objects and the epistemic import of perceptual states of cognitive awareness. In this essay I will argue that the Buddhist epistemologists, insofar as they accord perception a privileged epistemic status, share a common ground with phenomenologists in the tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, who contend that perception is (...) best understood as bearing intentional content. On this phenomenological account of intentionality, to perceive an object (or to have a perceptual experience) is to apprehend an intentional relation: whether the object intended in perception (the one the perception is of) is real is less important than how it is intended. Indeed, the central feature of intentionality is that it reveals the co-constitutive nature of perception and that which is perceived; as such, it discloses the world rather than attempting to establish a relationship to a discrete, ‘external’ world. I will begin by offering an overview of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's account of perception and intentionality, focusing on the epistemic role of svasaṃvitti ("self-awareness," "self-cognition") as a dual aspect cognition. Then, I will briefly discuss three dominant accounts of the relation between perception and phenomenal content in contemporary philosophy (drawing from the work of Dennett, Dreyfus, O'Regan and Noë, and Zahavi, among others). Finally, I will offer several reasons why the Buddhist epistemologists, along with Western phenomenologists, are justified in asserting that direct perception opens up a domain of phenomenal experience that is prior to our conceptualizing and theorizing about it. (shrink)

In this paper the relationship between phenomenology of perception and synthetic phenomenology is discussed. Synthetic phenomenology is presented on the basis of the issues in A.I. and Robotics that required to address the question of what enables artificial agents to have phenomenal access to the environment. Phenomenology of perception is construed as a theory with autonomous structure and domain, which can be embedded in a philosophical as well as a scientific theory. Two attempts at specifying the phenomenal content of artificial (...) agents are discussed. Concepts and experimental evidence on the independence of perception and the coordination of motion and appearances are set out to submit that phenomenology of perception makes a contribution to synthetic phenomenology. (shrink)

Some recent surveys of the modern philosophical debate over the existence of non-conceptual perceptual content have concluded that the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual representations is largely terminological. To remedy this terminological impasse, Robert Hanna and Monima Chadha claim that non-conceptualists must defend an essentialist view of non-conceptual content, according to which perceptual states have representational content whose structure and psychological function are necessarily distinct from that of conceptual states. Hanna and Chadha additionally suggest that non-conceptualists should go “back to (...) Kant” to find the most defensible version of an essentialist content non-conceptualism. I propose instead that non-conceptualists go back even further to the seventh-century Indian Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, so that they may not only find historical precedent for an essentialist content view, but also some better arguments in its favor. This essay reconstructs Dharmakīrti's essentialist non-conceptualism about the contents of conscious sensory representations and the refined theory of conceptualization that it presupposes. In particular, I examine his arguments from the proprietary phenomenology of sensory experience, the cognitive encapsulation of sensory processing, as well as the iconic format of sensory representations, and assess the strength of these arguments relative to their modern counterparts. (shrink)

It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterizes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn’t make (...) phenomenological predictions of the required sort. So, as a result, opponents must resign themselves to attacking specific incarnations of naïve realism, or approach matters quite differently. (shrink)

If I am aware that p, say, that it is raining, is it the case that I must be aware that I am aware that p? Does introspective or object-awareness entail the apprehension of mental states as being of some kind or another: self-monitoring or intentional? That is, are cognitive events implicitly self-aware or is “self-awareness” just another term for metacognition? Not surprisingly, intuitions on the matter vary widely. This paper proposes a novel solution to this classical debate by reframing (...) the problem of self-knowledge in terms of the relation between phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge. Concepts of consciousness such as “introspective awareness” and “reflexive self-awareness” are grounded in phenomenal experiences rather than physical events and processes. As such they yield a different kind of self-knowledge than what can be gained by applying externalist conceptual schemas to understanding the mind. I argue that Dharmakīrti’s theory of content can be seen as endorsing the efficacy of phenomenal experience as a vehicle for self-knowledge. (shrink)

This work proposes that pain meets the requirements of being characterized as a secondary quality, as it covers, like a color, a determined extension. The argument seeks to establish a literal pain-color analogy through an inquiry into the intensity and location of the pain. From the classic intensity/location relationship reported by patients with acute appendicitis, three degrees of pain are distinguished: mild, moderate, and severe. The objective is only achieved by examining the Body's extensional determinations (primary quality) insofar as each (...) of these degrees of pain covers three particular measures. Once these three measures have been explored according to the perforation process (tissue damage), the work ends by identifying pain as a transcendent moment. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to provide a phenomenological inquiry into those acts and processes of consciousness that constitute the perceptual world in which we live,—the real world familiar to us in every-day life and to which the physical sciences and their theoretical explanations refer. When using the term “phenomenology”, the author always has in view the body of philosophical theories (and also methods) developed by Edmund Husserl. The overall program of phenomenology may be said to be...

With Jan Degenaar and Kevin O’Regan’s (D&O) critique of (what they call) ‘autopoietic enactivism’ as point of departure, this article seeks to revisit, refine, and develop phenomenology’s significance for the enactive view. Arguing that D&O’s ‘sensorimotor theory’ fails to do justice to perceptual meaning, the article unfolds by (1) connecting this meaning to the notion of enaction as a meaningful co-definition of perceiver and perceived, (2) recounting phenomenological reasons for conceiving of the perceiving subject as a living body, and (3) (...) showing how the phenomenological perspective does a better job at fulfilling D&O’s requirement for grounding notions of mentality in ‘outer’ criteria than they do. The picture that thus emerges is one of perceptual meaning as an integration of lived, living, and behavioral aspects – a structure of behavior that cannot be captured by appeal to sensorimotor capacities alone but that is adequately illuminated by the enactive notion of adaptive autonomy. (shrink)

I present the new realist philosophy by Jocelyn Benoist, in particular, his solution to the problem of the explanatory gap in the philosophy of mind.

This article is based on Gibson’s “experimental phenomenology” and ecological perspective. It aims to develop Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “incarnate” by relating it to the more general concept of “illusion” in order to apply it to digital environments and immersive virtual realities. First of all, we should clarify, from a phenomenological point of view, the notion of “world.” Although the concept of “world” is closely linked to that of “reality,” it cannot be superimposed on it. We will analyze this distinction by (...) focusing on specific cases of optical-geometric illusions and their ontological and epistemological implications. We will then extend them from the natural to the digital world. (shrink)

Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no—and there cannot be—perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist claim. In this paper (...) I discuss three different answers to these counterexamples, all of them are found wanting. I offer a novel solution, taking into account some crucial findings of the contemporary debate about imagination and modality. I argue that this new solution is capable of fully vindicating Husserl’s essentialist claim. Finally, I reconstruct Husserl’s own way to treat such counterexamples, in order to showcase the notion of modality Husserlian phenomenology relies on. I argue for the hitherto widely underappreciated point that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot appeal to strictly absolute modality but that the kind of modality in Husserlian phenomenology is conditional on the facticity that we have the transcendental structure we do in fact have. (shrink)

Effort and the feeling of effort play important roles in many theoretical discussions, from perception to self-control and free will, from the nature of ownership to the nature of desert and achievement. A crucial, overlooked distinction within the philosophical and scientific literatures is the distinction between theories that seek to explain effort and theories that seek to explain the feeling of effort. Lacking a clear distinction between these two phenomena makes the literature hard to navigate. To advance in the unification (...) and development of this area, this article provides an overview of the main theories of the nature of effort and the nature of the feeling of effort, and then discusses how efforts and their feelings are related. Two key takeaways emerge. First, there is widespread agreement that efforts are goal-directed actions. Second, one of the main philosophical issues to be decided is whether feelings of effort should be defined by reference to efforts (effort-first approach), or whether efforts are defined by reference to the feeling of effort (feeling-first approach). (shrink)

Introduction: Maintaining patient dignity in a caregiving environment is one of the most important moral responsibilities for caregivers. Nonetheless, there are vulnerable groups, specifically teenagers, who in their final stages of life are prone to their dignity being threatened. Moreover, dignity is an abstract concept and there is no studies done on teenagers’ dignity in the final stages of life available in Iran.Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe the caregivers’ experiences regarding teenagers’ dignity in the final stages (...) of life.Research design: This study is a descriptive phenomenological qualitative research project. The data was collected using deep individual and semi-structured interviews as well as taking notes. The Colaizzi analysis method was used to analyze the data.Participants and research context: 22 caregivers working with teenagers in the final stages of life in a public health centers in Iran who had the criteria to enter the study were selected using a purposeful sampling method and invited to join the study from August 2018 to June 2019. The sampling continued until data saturation.Findings: The findings of the present study were presented in the form of three main themes including “private,” “respecting individual identity,” and “attention to teenagers’ needs” and an additional eight categories.Ethical Considerations: The study’s protocol was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Shiraz University of Medical Sciences and all ethical principles were followed throughout the study.Discussion and conclusion: Based on the present study from the caregivers’ point of view, teenagers in their final stages of life required to be cared for and taught in an environment that their privacy was maintained and their individual identity was respected as well as getting attention from the caregivers and companions. In such situations, the teenagers felt calm and their dignity was maintained; therefore, providing a cultural, professional, and organizational setting where all the components of maintaining dignity in teenagers are supported and prioritized is necessary. (shrink)

¿Cuál es la diferencia entre los sentidos de la vista y el tacto si las propiedades espaciales que perciben estos sentidos son, al parecer, las mismas? ¿Cuál es la diferencia entre ver y tocar formas? Este es el tema del artículo “Sight and touch” (1992) de Michael Martin. En este breve texto, es mi propósito concentrarme en algunos desarrollos de Martin sobre el sentido del tacto y poner esos desarrollos en relación con dos experiencias táctiles particulares. La idea principal en (...) la que quiero concentrarme es la del contraste interno-externo como la característica de la conciencia corporal que “proporciona lo que necesitamos para un sentido del tacto” (Martin 1992 203). Las experiencias táctiles particulares con las que quiero relacionar esta idea son la de la ingesta de alimentos y el estar anestesiado. Pretendo ver si estas experiencias pueden constituir algún tipo de objeción a dicho contraste interno-externo. // What is the difference between the senses of sight and touch, if the spatial properties perceived by these senses are apparently the same ones? What is the difference between seeing and touching shapes? This is the subject matter of Michael Martin’s article “Sight and touch” (1992). In this short text, my purpose is to focus on some of Martin’s developments on the sense of touch, and to put those developments in relation with two tactile experiences. The main idea I want to focus on is that of the inner-outer contrast as the characteristic of body consciousness that “provides what we need for a sense of touch” (Martin 1992 203). The tactile experiences with which I want to relate this idea are those of food intake and being anesthetized. I try to see if these experiences can constitute some objection to this inner-outer contrast. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 4, Page 520-530, July 2022.

Gibson defined affordances as action possibilities directly offered to an animal by the environment. Ambitiously, affordances are meant to show the inadequacy of the subjective-objective dichotomy in the study of cognition. Armed with similar concerns, some neo-Gibsonians recently thought of affordances as latent dispositions existing independently of individual organisms or whole species. It is no coincidence that critics had, on several occasions, objected that this theoretical stance dramatically neglects the role of the perceiver in the emergence of affordances. In this (...) paper, we provide a phenomenological characterization of the perceiver’s role in affordance perception. Specifically, we borrow from Husserlian phenomenology to characterize two features of affordance perception that can enrich our understanding of the individual’s engagement with the environment, namely, its affective and temporal aspects. Taking an everyday activity such as rock climbing as a case example, we show that phenomenological investigations, if not misinterpreted as mere introspection, can represent an ally for ecological psychologists. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the inherent temporal orientation of fear, a matter on which philosophers seem to have contrasting opinions. According to some, fear is inherently present-oriented; others instead maintain that it is inherently future-oriented or that it has no inherent temporal orientation at all. Despite the differences, however, all these views seem to understand fear’s temporal orientation as one-dimensional—that is, as uniquely determined by the represented temporal location of the intentional object of fear. By contrast, we present a (...) view that introduces a two-dimensional account of fear’s temporal orientation. On such a view, we can say that fear is inherently future-oriented, independently of its being about something in the present or in the future. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 755-777, June 2022.

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 755-777, June 2022.

In this paper, I provide an account of the spatiality of olfactory experiences in terms of topological properties. I argue that thinking of olfactory experiences as making the subject aware of topological properties enables us to address popular objections against the spatiality of smells, and it makes sense of everyday spatial olfactory phenomenology better than its competitors. I argue for this latter claim on the basis of reflection on thought experiments familiar from the philosophical literature on olfaction, as well as (...) on the basis of some empirical data about the localization of smells. I conclude by suggesting how the naïve‐topology framework could be applied in debates about the spatiality of other types of experiences. (shrink)

This paper investigates the nature of emotional experience in relation to the senses, and it defends the thesis that emotional experience is partly non-sensory. In §1 I introduce my reader to the debate. I reconstruct a position I call ‘restrictivism’ and motivate it as part of a reductive approach to mind’s place in nature. Drawing on intuitive but insightful remarks on the nature of sensation from Plato, I map out the conditions under which the restrictivist thesis is both substantive and (...) plausible. I then present two arguments against it. The first argument, which I lay out in §2, draws on recent empirical results in emotion research to show that restrictivism cannot be reconciled with the possibility of knowledge of one’s own emotional state by acquaintance. The second argument, which I present in §3, individuates a claim on which most contemporary theories of emotional valence converge and uses it to demonstrate that restrictivism has a false implication: it must deny that valence is experientially felt. (shrink)

ABSTRACT As a culture-specific phenomenon, academic dishonesty remains an under-researched domain. The purpose of this study was to voice teachers’ perceptions of: the influential factors contributing to AD, the consequences of AD for the quality of teacher–student relationships, and the specific strategies for regulating TSR. Using a qualitative phenomenological design, we attempted to present a detailed description of teachers’ lived experiences regarding the above aims. The participants were English language and Mathematics teachers with different personal and professional characteristics working in (...) public high schools of Iran. Data was collected through intensive semi-structured interviewing and analyzed by a five-step approach applied to phenomenology in psychological research. Data analysis revealed three general themes regarding teachers’ perceptions with several components. We found that the lack of attention and intrinsic motivation were the prominent perceived factors with consequences for TSR. Also, personal talk and active supervision were the common techniques that teachers utilized with students who commit AD to manage and control the TSR quality. The results were discussed with reference to teachers’ academic discipline, gender, and teaching experience. (shrink)

-/- In Kafka's work there are many examples of metamorphic instances. Die Verwandlung is obviously the first case that we are used to know as a real metamorphic example. However, it is not the only one, for examples Odradek, but also the way Kafka describes the encounter between characters or the characteristics of some of them (Das Schloss). The paper tries to conceptualize the metamorphosis through a distinction between two forms: (1) metamorphosis or transformation that allows us to know from (...) where what is transformed comes (start) and where it arrives (arrival); (2) becoming that shows a tension between two different conditions or that not allows us to grasp something because of his intangibility. All this will be examined using the monumental work of Deleuze and Guattari and a phenomenology of metamorphosis developed by Conci. (shrink)

I suoni e le immagini sembrano appartenere a due forme dell’esperienza profondamente distinte. Due registri sensoriali antitetici cui corrispondono due fenomeni accostabili, ma mai completamente unibili. Eppure si ricorre spesso all’espressione immagine sonora, che cosa si intende precisamente? Esiste un punto in cui i suoni e le immagini si appartengono reciprocamente? Può un’immagine risuonare e un suono essere anche un’immagine? Il testo cerca di rispondere a questi quesiti scavando e intarsiando una concettualizzazione dell’immagine sonora attraverso un dialogo con la semiotica, (...) la fenomenologia e la filosofia dell’arte. Arricchendosi di una riflessione sul rapporto con il pensiero, l’indagine sull’immagine sonora si declina in tre momenti distinti: il suono con un fondamento d’immagine in cui l’elemento fondante è dato dalla presenza dell’immagine nel suono; il suono e l’immagine che si equivalgono orizzontalmente fondendosi l’uno con l’altra; l’immagine con un fondamento sonoro, in cui si rintracciano presenze sonore nell’immagine visiva. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to provide a phenomenological inquiry into those acts and processes of consciousness that constitute the perceptual world in which we live,—the real world familiar to us in every-day life and to which the physical sciences and their theoretical explanations refer. When using the term “phenomenology”, the author always has in view the body of philosophical theories developed by Edmund Husserl. The overall program of phenomenology may be said to be...

This research was done with the aim of explaining the dimensions and components of teacher's philosophy, based on the lived experiences of excellent teachers. The type of research is applied in terms of purpose and qualitative in terms of approach, and the phenomenological method was used to achieve the purpose of the research. The research community included all the teachers of Saqqez city in the academic year of 99-400, and 14 teachers, including 6 male and 8 female teachers, were selected (...) among the best teachers. The research data was obtained through semi-structured in-depth interviews and the interviews continued until reaching theoretical saturation. Data analysis was done using the seven-step Colaizzi method and by using thematic coding, central codes from open codes and selected codes from central codes were inferred and classified based on the findings of the research from a total of 190 concepts. From the interviews, 81 concepts related to teacher's philosophy in the form of 12 components or core codes (transformative, empathetic, discoverer of the student's mind and ability, holistic and deep-thinking, encouraging in-depth observation and promoting questioning, critical spirit, tolerance, the agent and promoter of human values, the agent's moral model, the perception of the physical space, the creator of the effective learning environment, the student's perception of the world) and 9 dimensions or selected code (A model of innovation, full of human emotions, discoverer of the student's ability, an objective example of comprehensiveness, a scientist and a critical agent, patient, moral value-oriented, a scholar of time and place, has been in the world and interacts with the student) were categorized that by putting these dimensions and components together, a comprehensive description of the teachers' perception of the phenomenon The subject of investigation is obtained. (shrink)

This dissertation is about human knowledge of reality. In particular, it argues that scientific knowledge is bounded by historically available instruments and theories; nevertheless, the use of several independent instruments and theories can provide access to the persistent potentialities of reality. The replicability of scientific observations and experiments allows us to obtain explorable evidence of robust entities and properties. The dissertation includes seven chapters. It also studies three cases – namely, Higgs bosons and hypothetical Ϝ-particles (section 2.4), the Ptolemaic and (...) Kepler model of the planets (section 6.7), and the special theory of relativity (chapter 7). -/- Chapter 1 is the introduction of the dissertation. Chapter 2 clarifies the notion of the real on the basis of two concepts: persistence and resistance. These concepts enable me to explain my ontological belief in the real potentialities of human-independent things and the implications of this view for the perceptual and epistemological levels of discussion. On the basis of the concept of “overlapping perspectives”, chapter 3 argues that entity realism and perspectivism are complementary. That is, an entity that manifests itself through several experimental/observational methods is something real, but our knowledge of its nature is perspectival. Critically studying the recent views of entity realism, chapter 4 extends the discussion of entity realism and provides a criterion for the reality of property tokens. Chapter 5, in contrast, develops the perspectival aspects of my view on the basis of the phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches to the philosophy of science. This chapter also elaborates my view of empirical evidence, as briefly expressed in sections 2.5 and 4.5. Chapter 6 concerns diachronic theoretical perspectives. It first explains my view of progress, according to which current perspectives are broader than past ones. Second, it argues that the successful explanations and predictions of abandoned theories can be accounted for from our currently acceptable perspectives. The case study of Ptolemaic astronomy supports the argument of this chapter. Chapter 7 serves as the conclusion of the dissertation by applying the central themes of the previous chapters to the case study of special relativity theory. I interpret frame-dependent properties, such as length and time duration, and the constancy of the speed of light according to realist perspectivism. (shrink)

The relationship between the phenomenology of imagination and the phenomenology of memory is an interestingly complicated one. On the one hand, there seem to be important similarities between the two, and there are even occasions in which we mistake an imagining for a memory or vice versa. On the other hand, there seem to be important differences between the two, and we can typically tell them apart. This paper explores various attempts to delineate a phenomenological marker differentiating imagination and memory, (...) with a special focus on two proposed markers that have generated considerable philosophical discussion: the feeling of pastness and the feeling of familiarity. As we will find, neither of them proves to be up to the task at hand. However, by way of a deeper exploration of the feeling of familiarity, we are able to tease out some important morals for efforts to differentiate imagination and memory on phenomenological grounds and, more generally, for efforts to engage in a descriptive phenomenological enterprise. (shrink)

Both introspection and empirical studies suggest that visual attention can affect the phenomenology of our visual experience. However, the exact character of such effects is far from clear. My aim in this chapter is to spell out the main difficulties involved in attempting to achieve a clearer view of these effects, and to make some suggestions as to how we can make progress with this issue while avoiding tempting mistakes. I do this by discussing the question of whether there is (...) a sense in which attention to a seen object can be said to contribute to the object’s visual phenomenal salience. It is often suggested that focusing visual attention on a seen object renders the object phenomenally salient. I look at potential evidence for this suggestion, and consider what form, if any, of visual phenomenal salience it may support. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 209-231, January 2022.

The fact that you see some particular object seems to be due to the causal relation between your visual experience and that object, rather than to your experiences’ phenomenal character. On the one hand, whenever some phenomenal element of your experience stands in the right sort of causal relation to some object, your experience presents that object (your experience’s phenomenology doesn’t need to match that object). On the other hand, you can’t have a perceptual experience that presents some object unless (...) you stand in the right sort of causal relation to that object (no matter how closely your experience’s phenomenology matches some object). According to the continuity thesis, property perception is similar to object perception in these two respects. A standard reason to reject the continuity thesis is the assumption that the environmental properties that a perceptual experience presents are determined by its phenomenal properties (which are not determined by the environmental properties that cause the experience). I maintain that the continuity thesis is false but for a different reason: perceptual experiences present both objects and properties via manners of presentation; but, whereas perceptual manners of presentation for objects are purely relational, perceptual manners of presentation for properties are satisfactional. (shrink)

This is an advanced introduction to and original interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's greatest work, Phenomenology of Perception. Timothy Mooney provides a clear and compelling exposition of the theory of our projective being in the world, and demonstrates as never before the centrality of the body schema in the theory. Thanks to the schema's motor intentionality our bodies inhabit and appropriate space: our postures and perceptual fields are organised schematically when we move to realise our projects. Thus our lived bodies are ineliminably (...) expressive in being both animated and outcome oriented through-and-through. Mooney also analyses the place of the work in the modern philosophical world, showing what Merleau-Ponty takes up from the Kantian and Phenomenological traditions and what he contributes to each. Casting a fresh light on his magnum opus, this book is essential reading for all those interested in the philosophy and phenomenology of the body. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 8, August 2022.

In Aspiration, Agnes Callard examines the phenomenon of aspiration, the process by which one acquires values and becomes a certain kind of person. Aspiring to become a certain type of person involves more than wanting to act in certain ways. We want to come to see the world in a certain way and to develop the dispositions, attributes, and skills that allow us to seamlessly and effectively respond to situations. The skilled athlete or musician, for example, has developed the muscle (...) memory and the perceptual equivalent to naturally see what a situation requires and to respond well, whether playing a Rachmaninoff concerto or returning a tennis volley. -/- I use Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception to flesh out the process of becoming, through which aspired-to values, skills, and characteristics become part of one’s embodied being-in-the-world. Although some rightly focus on Merleau-Ponty’s efforts to avoid over-intellectualizing skillful action, without appreciating his distinction between habitual actions and human (or personal) acts, we overlook an important aspect of robust human agency—the way “a human act becomes dormant and is continued absent-mindedly as a reflex” (90). Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit and its relation to personal acts offers a rich and phenomenologically sensitive picture of aspiration. (shrink)

Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception - Irfan Ajvazi.

There is a recent surge in interest in agential accounts of perception, i.e. accounts where activity plays a central role in accounting for the nature of perceptions. Within this camp, Lisa Miracch...

There is a recent surge in interest in agential accounts of perception, i.e. accounts where activity plays a central role in accounting for the nature of perceptions. Within this camp, Lisa Miracch...

Youth life is closely related to spiritual activity. The phenomenon that is still encountered is Hubbu Ilahi, or the love attitude of Allah SWT. This phenomenon is presumed that adolescents only state and do not know the consequences of their attitudes. So, this study aims to determine the perceptions of today's adolescents on the phenomenon of Hubbu Ilahi. This research is descriptive qualitative research with a survey research method. This study used a purposive random sampling technique to 39 adolescents. Data (...) collection used a questionnaire with the google form platform. Then, the data were analyzed using: data presentation, data reduction, and concluding. The results showed that adolescent respondents stated the consistency of love of the Quran, love of Rasulullah, love of the Prophet's Sunnah, and love of the Akhirat life. However, the busyness of the world blocks the proven proof of love. The analysis concluded that only 7.7% of adolescents fit Hubbu Ilahi's criteria. (shrink)

Oblak et al. portray perceptual presence as an individually driven reflective operation. I question their account and suggest that PP involves a socially induced pre-reflective awareness of ….

According to the decomposition thesis, perceptual experiences resolve without remainder into their different modality-specific components. Contrary to this view, I argue that certain cases of multisensory integration give rise to experiences representing features of a novel type. Through the coordinated use of bodily awareness—understood here as encompassing both proprioception and kinaesthesis—and the exteroceptive sensory modalities, one becomes perceptually responsive to spatial features whose instances couldn’t be represented by any of the contributing modalities functioning in isolation. I develop an argument for (...) this conclusion focusing on two cases: 3D shape perception in haptic touch and experiencing an object’s egocentric location in crossmodally accessible, environmental space. (shrink)

This is the first in a series of attempts to unveil the implications of the ontological difference between meaning and perception. I begin with general consideration regarding the tension between dualism and physicalism and move on some phenomenologically driven set of implications which will be later detailed and expanded in order to lay the grounds for the architecture of meaning. The main assumption at work is that meaning and perception are ontologically different but not disconnected in a sense that in (...) order for an act of meaning to be fulfilled, a “lifting above perceptual contents” must necessarily occur. The lifting above perceptual content is what confers the act of meaning a special ontological status but it also the reason for ongoing explanatory difficulties. (shrink)

Can we describe certain sonic experiences as “homely,” even when they take place outside of a traditional home-space? While phenomenological accounts of home abound, with writers detailing a rich spectrum of the felt characteristics of the homely including safety, familiarity, and affective “warmth,” there is a scarcity of research into sonic experience that engages with such literatures. With specific interest in the experience of embodied space, I account here for what might be termed feelings of “sonic homeliness” as they emerge (...) during headphone listening. After forming a conceptual model of homeliness that draws from phenomenological philosophy, I investigate its applicability to experiences of headphone listening. Through analysis of primary interview data, I consider how headphones may be said to territorialize space for listeners, analyzing how sonic “boundaries” are experienced in relation to the body, as well as how some listeners describe their experiences as interiorized, comforting, and “wombic.”. (shrink)

Metamorphosis as it is represented by some pre-historical artists seems problematic for our occidental point of view. In fact, it seems to be strongly against identity and law of non-contradiction. Becoming in general is also viewed as an error or exception by our classic point of view. This very claim can conduct to theories of non-classical logic. Deleuze and Guattari in their monumental work had tried to offer enormous contributions in order to comprehend the becoming phenomenon. Through a pre-historical representations (...) analysis, with also an intrusion in contemporary art's field, I want to confront with possible metamorphosis representations remain theoretically founded in the deleuzian proposal in dialogue with phenomenological inquiry. New principle of individuation and analysis of expression provide new looks to arisen problems with classical logic and metamorphosis representations, which will be acceptable and comprehensible as art shows. (shrink)