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  1. Mapping the Visual Icon.Sam Clarke - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:1-22.
    It is often claimed that pre-attentive vision has an ‘iconic’ format. This is seen to explain pre-attentive vision’s characteristically high processing capacity and to make sense of an overlap in the mechanisms of early vision and mental imagery. But what does the iconicity of pre-attentive vision amount to? This paper considers two prominent ways of characterising pre-attentive visual icons and argues that neither is adequate: one approach renders the claim ‘pre-attentive vision is iconic’ empirically false while the other obscures its (...)
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  2. The Outlier Paradox: The Role of Iterative Ensemble Coding in Discounting Outliers.Michael Epstein, Jake Quilty-Dunn, Eric Mandelbaum & Tatiana Emmanouil - forthcoming - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1.
    Ensemble perception—the encoding of objects by their group properties—is known to be resistant to outlier noise. However, this resistance is somewhat paradoxical: how can the visual system determine which stimuli are outliers without already having derived statistical properties of the ensemble? A simple solution would be that ensemble perception is not a simple, one-step process; instead, outliers are detected through iterative computations that identify items with high deviance from the mean and reduce their weight in the representation over time. Here (...)
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  3. Perception Beyond Inference. The Information Content of Visual Processes.Albertazzi Liliana, Tonder Gervant & Vishwanath Dhanraj (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
  4. Perceiving Agency.Mason Westfall - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    When we look around the world, some things are inert and others are ‘alive’. What is it to ‘look alive’? An account of animacy perception is crucial, both for a proper understanding of visual experience, and for downstream questions about the epistemology of social cognition. I argue that empirical work on animacy supports the view that animacy is genuinely perceptual. We should construe perception of animacy as perception of agents and perception of behavior. My proposal explains how static and dynamic (...)
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  5. Beyond the Icon: Core Cognition and the Bounds of Perception.Sam Clarke - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (1):94-113.
    This paper refines a controversial proposal: that core systems belong to a perceptual kind, marked out by the format of its representational outputs. Following Susan Carey, this proposal has been understood in terms of core representations having an iconic format, like certain paradigmatically perceptual outputs. I argue that they don’t, but suggest that the proposal may be better formulated in terms of a broader analogue format type. Formulated in this way, the proposal accommodates the existence of genuine icons in perception, (...)
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  6. Two Kinds of Cognitive Expertise.Elijah Chudnoff - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):270-292.
    Expertise is traditionally classified into perceptual, cognitive, and motor forms. I argue that the empirical research literature on expertise gives us compelling reasons to reject this traditional classification and accept an alternative. According to the alternative I support there is expertise in forming impressions, which further divides into expertise in forming sensory and intellectual impressions, and there is expertise in performing actions, which further divides into expertise in performing mental and bodily actions. The traditional category of cognitive expertise splits into (...)
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  7. Does perceptual psychology rule out disjunctivism in the theory of perception?Charles Goldhaber - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7025-7047.
    Disjunctivist views in the theory of perception hold that genuine perceptions differ in some relevant kind from misperceptions, such as illusions and hallucinations. In recent papers, Tyler Burge has argued that such views conflict with the basic tenets of perceptual psychology. According to him, perceptual psychology is committed to the view that genuine perceptions and misperceptions produced by the same proximal stimuli must be or involve perceptual states of the same kind. This, he argues, conflicts with disjunctivism. In this paper, (...)
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  8. What Is an Object File?E. J. Green & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):665-699.
    The notion of an object file figures prominently in recent work in philosophy and cognitive science. Object files play a role in theories of singular reference, object individuation, perceptual memory, and the development of cognitive capacities. However, the philosophical literature lacks a detailed, empirically informed theory of object files. In this paper, we articulate and defend the multiple-slots view, which specifies both the format and architecture of object files. We argue that object files represent in a non-iconic, propositional format that (...)
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  9. Material Perception for Philosophers.J. Brendan Ritchie, Vivian C. Paulun, Katherine R. Storrs & Roland W. Fleming - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):e12777.
  10. On Perceptual Expertise.Dustin Stokes - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):241-263.
    Expertise is a cognitive achievement that clearly involves experience and learning, and often requires explicit, time-consuming training specific to the relevant domain. It is also intuitive that this kind of achievement is, in a rich sense, genuinely perceptual. Many experts—be they radiologists, bird watchers, or fingerprint examiners—are better perceivers in the domain(s) of their expertise. The goal of this paper is to motivate three related claims, by substantial appeal to recent empirical research on perceptual expertise: Perceptual expertise is genuinely perceptual (...)
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  11. Social Affordance.Eros Carvalho - 2020 - Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior.
    A short entry on social affordance. Social affordances are possibilities for social interaction or possibilities for action that are shaped by social practices and norms.
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  12. Does the Number Sense Represent Number?Sam Clarke & Jacob Beck - 2020 - In Blair Armstrong, Stephanie Denison, Michael Mack & Yang Xu (eds.), Proceedings of the 42nd Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.
    On a now orthodox view, humans and many other animals are endowed with a “number sense”, or approximate number system (ANS), that represents number. Recently, this orthodox view has been subject to numerous critiques, with critics maintaining either that numerical content is absent altogether, or else that some primitive analog of number (‘numerosity’) is represented as opposed to number itself. We distinguish three arguments for these claims – the arguments from congruency, confounds, and imprecision – and show that none succeed. (...)
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  13. Do Looks Constitute Our Perceptual Evidence?Harmen Ghijsen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):132-147.
    Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks-related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of (...)
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  14. Use Your Illusion: Spatial Functionalism, Vision Science, and the Case Against Global Skepticism.E. J. Green & Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):345-378.
  15. Can Resources Save Rationality? ‘Anti-Bayesian’ Updating in Cognition and Perception.Eric Mandelbaum, Isabel Won, Steven Gross & Chaz Firestone - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 143:e16.
    Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two phenomena — belief polarization and the size-weight illusion — that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them?
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  16. Many Molyneux Questions.Mohan Matthen & Jonathan Cohen - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):47-63.
    Molyneux's Question (MQ) concerns whether a newly sighted man would recognize/distinguish a sphere and a cube by vision, assuming he could previously do this by touch. We argue that (MQ) splits into questions about (a) shared representations of space in different perceptual systems, and about (b) shared ways of constructing higher dimensional spatiotemporal features from information about lower dimensional ones, most of the technical difficulty centring on (b). So understood, MQ resists any monolithic answer: everything depends on the constraints faced (...)
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  17. How Can Perceptual Experiences Explain Uncertainty?Susanna Siegel - 2020 - Mind and Language:134-158.
    Can perceptual experiences be states of uncertainty? We might expect them to be, if the perceptual processes from which they're generated, as well as the behaviors they help produce, take account of probabilistic information. Yet it has long been presumed that perceptual experiences purport to tell us about our environment, without hedging or qualifying. Against this long-standing view, I argue that perceptual experiences may well occasionally be states of uncertainty, but that they are never probabilistically structured. I criticize a powerful (...)
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  18. Against a “Mindless” Account of Perceptual Expertise.Amit Chaturvedi - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):509-531.
    According to Hubert Dreyfus’s famous claim that expertise is fundamentally “mindless,” experts in any domain perform most effectively when their activity is automatic and unmediated by concepts or cognitive processes like attention and memory. While several scholars have recently challenged the plausibility of Dreyfus’s “mindless” account of expertise for explaining a wide range of expert activities, there has been little consideration of the one form of expertise which might be most amenable to Dreyfus’s account – namely, perceptual expertise. Indeed, Dreyfus’s (...)
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  19. Psychology of Mystical Experience: Muḥammad and Siddhārtha.Abdulla Galadari - 2019 - Anthropology of Consciousness 30 (2):152-178.
    A comparison between Muḥammad and Siddhārtha’s psychological states is made to identify how they had their mystical experiences and how their presuppositions and personalities shaped their interpretation of these experiences. Muḥammad’s mystical experience appeared to be based on an altered state of consciousness. Siddhārtha’s teachings include that one must not have blind faith and remain open to various truths. These teachings may reflect that he was high in openness to experience, which may have fortified him from becoming delusional. While mystical (...)
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  20. Naïve Realism About Unconscious Perception.Paweł Zięba - 2019 - Synthese 196 (5):2045-2073.
    Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it (...)
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  21. Colour Vision and Seeing Colours.Will Davies - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):657-690.
    Colour vision plays a foundational explanatory role in the philosophy of colour, and serves as perennial quarry in the wider philosophy of perception. I present two contributions to our understanding of this notion. The first is to develop a constitutive approach to characterizing colour vision. This approach seeks to comprehend the nature of colour vision qua psychological kind, as contrasted with traditional experiential approaches, which prioritize descriptions of our ordinary visual experience of colour. The second contribution is to argue that (...)
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  22. Sensory Malfunctions, Limitations, and Trade-Offs.Todd Ganson - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1705-1713.
    Teleological accounts of sensory normativity treat normal functioning for a species as a standard: sensory error involves departure from normal functioning for the species, i.e. sensory malfunction. Straightforward reflection on sensory trade-offs reveals that normal functioning for a species can exhibit failures of accuracy. Acknowledging these failures of accuracy is central to understanding the adaptations of a species. To make room for these errors we have to go beyond the teleological framework and invoke the notion of an ideal observer from (...)
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  23. The Perspectival Character of Perception.Kevin J. Lande - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (4):187-214.
    You can perceive things, in many respects, as they really are. For example, you can correctly see a coin as circular from most angles. Nonetheless, your perception of the world is perspectival. The coin looks different when slanted than when head-on, and there is some respect in which the slanted coin looks similar to a head-on ellipse. Many hold that perception is perspectival because you perceive certain properties that correspond to the “looks” of things. I argue that this view is (...)
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  24. The Structure of Sensorimotor Explanation.Alfredo Vernazzani - 2018 - Synthese (11):4527-4553.
    The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same (...)
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  25. The Nature of Correlation Perception in Scatterplots.Ronald A. Rensink - 2017 - Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 24 (3):776-797.
    For scatterplots with gaussian distributions of dots, the perception of Pearson correlation r can be described by two simple laws: a linear one for discrimination, and a logarithmic one for perceived magnitude (Rensink & Baldridge, 2010). The underlying perceptual mechanisms, however, remain poorly understood. To cast light on these, four different distributions of datapoints were examined. The first had 100 points with equal variance in both dimensions. Consistent with earlier results, just noticeable difference (JND) was a linear function of the (...)
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  26. Timing Disownership Experiences in the Rubber Hand Illusion.Lane Timothy - 2017 - Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 2 (4):1-14.
    Some investigators of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) have suggested that when standard RHI induction procedures are employed, if the rubber hand is experienced by participants as owned, their corresponding biological hands are experienced as disowned. Others have demurred: drawing upon a variety of experimental data and conceptual considerations, they infer that experience of the RHI might include the experience of a supernumerary limb, but that experienced disownership of biological hands does not occur. Indeed, some investigators even categorically deny that (...)
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  27. Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science.Robert Briscoe - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):43-81.
    Pictures are 2D surfaces designed to elicit 3D-scene-representing experiences from their viewers. In this essay, I argue that philosophers have tended to underestimate the relevance of research in vision science to understanding the nature of pictorial experience. Both the deeply entrenched methodology of virtual psychophysics as well as empirical studies of pictorial space perception provide compelling support for the view that pictorial experience and seeing face-to-face are experiences of the same psychological, explanatory kind. I also show that an empirically informed (...)
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  28. Colour Constancy, Illumination, and Matching.Will Davies - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (4):540-562.
    Colour constancy is a foundational and yet puzzling phenomenon. Standard appearance invariantism is threatened by the psychophysical matching argument, which is taken to favour variantism. This argument, however, is inconclusive. The data at best support a pluralist view: colour constancy is sometimes variantist, sometimes invariantist. I add another potential explanation of these data, complex invariantism, which adopts an atypical six-dimensional model of colour appearance. Finally I prospect for a unifying conception of constancy among two neglected notions: discriminatory colour constancy and (...)
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  29. Confidence as a Common Currency Between Vision and Audition.Vincent de Gardelle, Francois Le Corre & Pascal Mamassian - 2016 - PLoS ONE 11 (1).
    The idea of a common currency underlying our choice behaviour has played an important role in sciences of behaviour, from neurobiology to psychology and economics. However, while it has been mainly investigated in terms of values, with a common scale on which goods would be evaluated and compared, the question of a common scale for subjective probabilities and confidence in particular has received only little empirical investigation so far. The present study extends previous work addressing this question, by showing that (...)
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  30. Review of The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception (Zeimbekis and Raftopoulos, Eds.). [REVIEW]Steven Gross - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016:1-7.
  31. Naive Realism and the Science of (Some) Illusions.Ian Phillips - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):353-380.
    Critics have long complained that naive realism cannot adequately account for perceptual illusion. This complaint has a tendency to ally itself with the aspersion that naive realism is hopelessly out of touch with vision science. Here I offer a partial reply to both complaint and aspersion. I do so by showing how careful reflection on a simple, empirically grounded model of illusion reveals heterodox ways of thinking about familiar illusions which are quite congenial to the naive realist.
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  32. Why Do We Need Perceptual Content?Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788.
    Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
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  33. Perceptual Integration, Modularity, and Cognitive Penetration.Daniel C. Burnston & Jonathan Cohen - 2015 - In A. Raftopoulos & J. Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Influences on Perception: Implications for Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.
  34. Objectifying the Phenomenal in Experimental Psychology: Titchener and Beyond.Gary Hatfield - 2015 - Philosophia Scientiae 19 (3):73-94.
    This paper examines the origins and legacy of Titchener’s notion of stimulus error in the experimental study of sensory experience. It places Titchener’s introspective methods into the intellectual world of early experimental psychology. It follows the subsequent development of perceptual experimentation primarily in the American literature, with notice to British and German studies as needed. Subsequent investigators transformed the specific notion of a “stimulus error” into experimental questions in which subjects’ attitudes toward their perceptual tasks became independent variables to be (...)
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  35. Attention and Cognitive Penetration.Christopher Mole - 2015 - In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. pp. 218-238.
  36. Voluntarism in Early Psychology: The Case of Hermann von Helmholtz.Liesbet De Kock - 2014 - History of Psychology 17 (2):105-28.
    The failure to recognize the programmatic similarity between (post-)Kantian German philosophy and early psychology has impoverished psychology's historical self-understanding to a great extent. This article aims to contribute to recent efforts to overcome the gaps in the historiography of contemporary psychology, which are the result of an empiricist bias. To this end, we present an analysis of the way in which Hermann von Helmholtz's theory of perception resonates with Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Ego-doctrine. It will be argued that this indebtedness is (...)
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  37. On Galileo's Visions: Piercing the Spheres of the Heavens by Eye and Mind.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2014 - Perception 43:1280-1282.
    This bookreview discusses Piccolino and Wades' book on Galileo's impact on contemporary perception science.
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  38. Burge’s Defense of Perceptual Content.Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in (...)
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  39. Problems for the Purported Cognitive Penetration of Perceptual Color Experience and Macpherson’s Proposed Mechanism.Steven Gross, Thitaporn Chaisilprungraung, Elizabeth Kaplan, Jorge Aurelio Menendez & Jonathan Flombaum - 2014 - Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication.
    Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of (...)
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  40. The Space of Sensory Modalities.Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press.
    Is there a space of the sensory modalities? Such a space would be one in which we can represent all the actual, and at least some of the possible, sensory modalities. The relative position of the senses in this space would indicate how similar and how different the senses were from each other. The construction of such a space might reveal unconsidered features of the actual and possible senses, help us to define what a sense is, and provide grounds that (...)
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  41. The First Sense, by Matthew Fulkerson. [REVIEW]John Schwenkler - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7.
  42. Perception and Its Modalities.Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume is about the many ways we perceive. Contributors explore the nature of the individual senses, how and what they tell us about the world, and how they interrelate. They consider how the senses extract perceptual content from receptoral information. They consider what kinds of objects we perceive and whether multiple senses ever perceive a single event. They consider how many senses we have, what makes one sense distinct from another, and whether and why distinguishing senses may be useful. (...)
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  43. Gestalt Models for Data Decomposition and Functional Architecture in Visual Neuroscience.Carmelo Calì - 2013 - Gestalt Theory 35 (3).
    Attempts to introduce Gestalt theory into the realm of visual neuroscience are discussed on both theoretical and experimental grounds. To define the framework in which these proposals can be defended, this paper outlines the characteristics of a standard model, which qualifies as a received view in the visual neurosciences, and of the research into natural images statistics. The objections to the standard model and the main questions of the natural images research are presented. On these grounds, this paper defends the (...)
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  44. Proving Universalism Wrong Does Not Prove Relativism Right: Considerations on the Ongoing Color Categorization Debate.Yasmina Jraissati - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-24.
    For over a century, the question of the relation of language to thought has been extensively discussed in the case of color categorization, where two main views prevail. The relativist view claims that color categories are relative while the universalistic view argues that color categories are universal. Relativists also argue that color categories are linguistically determined, and universalists that they are perceptually determined. Recently, the argument for the perceptual determination of color categorization has been undermined, and the relativist view has (...)
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  45. The Attribute of Realness and the Internal Organization of Perceptual Reality.Rainer Mausfeld - 2013 - In Liliana Albertazzi (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Phenomenology. Visual Peception of Shape, Space and Appearance. Wiley.
    The chapter deals with the notion of phenomenal realness, which was first systematically explored by Albert Michotte. Phenomenal realness refers to the impression that a perceptual object is perceived to have an autonomous existence in our mind-independent world. Perceptual psychology provides an abundance of phenomena, ranging from amodal completion to picture perception, that indicate that phenomenal realness is an independent perceptual attribute that can be conferred to perceptual objects in different degrees. The chapter outlines a theoretical framework that appears particularly (...)
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  46. Hearing, Philosophical Perspectives.Casey O'Callaghan - 2013 - In H. Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE. pp. 388-390.
    Hearing and auditory perception are rapidly developing topics in the philosophy of perception. Recent work has focused on characterizing what we hear and on similarities and differences between audition and other modalities. Future work should address how theorizing about audition impacts theorizing about perception more generally. This entry concerns questions about the objects and contents of hearing. It includes discussion of the spatial content of audition, of the role of time and pitch in the individuation of auditory objects, and of (...)
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  47. Symposium on Louise Richardson’s “Flavour, Taste and Smell”.Louise Richardson, Fiona Macpherson, Mohan Matthen & Matthew Nudds - 2013 - Mind and Language Symposia at the Brains Blog.
  48. Do Things Look the Way They Feel?John Schwenkler - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):86-96.
    Do spatial features appear the same whether they are perceived through vision or touch? This question is at stake in the puzzle that William Molyneux posed to John Locke, concerning whether a man born blind whose sight was restored would be able immediately to identify the shapes of the things he saw. A recent study purports to answer the question negatively, but I argue here that the subjects of the study likely could not see well enough for the result to (...)
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  49. Pojęcie przedmiotu w koncepcjach scalania wzrokowego.Blazej Skrzypulec - 2013 - Filozofia Nauki 21 (1):37-60.
    W artykule analizuję sposób, w jaki psychologiczne i neuronaukowe teorie percepcji wzrokowej posługują się pojęciem przedmiotu. Skupię się na dwóch koncepcjach, które wychodząc z odmiennych perspektyw badawczych, starają się rozwiązać tzw. problem scalania (binding problem) w percepcji. W analizie wykorzystuję pojęcia używane na gruncie analitycznej metafizyki, wskazując, że teoretyczna odmienność rozważanych koncepcji przekłada się na różnice w zakładanej przez nie charakterystyce przedmiotu. W metodologicznej części tekstu staram się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jak za pomocą kategorii zaczerpniętych ze współczesnej metafizyki można zanalizować (...)
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  50. Environmental Representation of the Body.Adrian Cussins - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):15-32.
    Much recent cognitive neuroscientific work on body knowledge is representationalist: “body schema” and “body images”, for example, are cerebral representations of the body (de Vignemont 2009). A framework assumption is that representation of the body plays an important role in cognition. The question is whether this representationalist assumption is compatible with the variety of broadly situated or embodied approaches recently popular in the cognitive neurosciences: approaches in which cognition is taken to have a ‘direct’ relation to the body and to (...)
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