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The Perceptual Relation
Edited by Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers - New Brunswick)
Assistant editor: Andrew Rubner (Rutgers - New Brunswick)
About this topic
| Summary | There are three questions structuring the debate on perceptual relations. One question concerns the connection between perceptual relations to the environment and the representational content of experiences. Are perceptual relations or perceptual representations more fundamental in an account of the nature of perceptual experience? Austere relationalists have it that perceptual relations to the environment are more fundamental than any representations. Austere representationalists have it that representations are more fundamental than any perceptual relations to the environment. Hybrid views have it that perceptual experience is fundamentally both relational and representational. A second question is whether we are perceptually related to particulars or universals. Direct realists have it that we are perceptually related to particulars such as objects, events, and property-instances in our environment. Likewise, sense-data theorists have it that we are related to particulars, but understand the particulars in play to be strange particulars, namely sense-data. While it is compatible with a representationalist view to hold that we are perceptually related to particulars in our environment, at least some representationalists have it that we are perceptually related to properties and so to universals rather than particulars. A third question concerns the nature of the relation. Is the perceptual relation a causal relation, is it a sensory relation such as an awareness relation, or is it an epistemic relation such as an acquaintance relation? |
| Key works | Brewer 2011, Campbell 2002, Dretske 1981 |
| Introductions | Crane 2006, Schellenberg 2010 |
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- Perceptually Secured Knowledge.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Ori Beck & Farid Masrour (eds.), The Relational View of Perception: New Essays. Routledge.Perceptually secured knowledge consists of beliefs that amount to knowledge just because they are based on suitable perceptual states. Relationism about the ground of perceptually secured knowledge is the view that if a perceptual state can make a belief based on it amount to knowledge, then it can do that because it constitutes an appropriate kind of relational state, e.g., a state of perceptual acquaintance. I explore the prospects of both maintaining that some beliefs amount to perceptually secured knowledge and (...)
- Perceptual Relations in Digital Environments.Floriana Ferro - 2023 - Foundations of Science 28 (4):1071-1084.The aim of the paper is to develop the concept of perceptual relation and to apply it to digital environments. First, the meaning of perceptual relation is phenomenologically analyzed and defined as the interaction between the whole and its parts, which is theorized by the founders of Gestalt psychology. However, this relation is not considered as an intrinsic, but as an extended one, implying also the relation with the surrounding world (Umwelt). Subsequently, this concept of extended relation is applied to (...)
- Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science (2nd edition).Craig French & Phillips Ian - 2023 - In Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 363-383.
- What Does it Mean to be an Ontological Naïve Realist?Ícaro M. I. Machado - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2035-2063.Although meritorious, Naïve Realism faces theoretical issues stemming from the lack of clarity in the concepts forming its propositions and the relevant (but not usually acknowledged) diversity of its theses. In this paper, my goal is to provide a groundwork that mitigates these theoretical complications. One such distinction concerns its subject matter, in particular, whether it deals with the nature of perceptual episodes or their phenomenology. My first goal is to acknowledge such distinctions by delimiting the former option, which I (...)
- Touch and Bodily Transparency.Vivian Mizrahi - 2023 - Mind 132 (527):803-827.As most philosophers recognize, the body’s central role in touch differs from the role it plays in the other sense modalities. Any account of touch must then explain the pivotal nature of the body’s involvement in touch. Unlike most accounts of touch, this paper argues that the body’s centrality in touch is not phenomenological or experiential: the body is not felt in any special way in tactile experiences. Building on Aristotle’s account in De Anima, I argue that the body is (...)
- The Visual Experience of Causation.Susanna Siegel - 2011 - In Katherine Hawley & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), The Admissible Contents of Experience. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley. pp. 150–171.The thesis that we can visually perceive causal relations is distinct from the thesis that visual experiences can represent causal relations. I defend the latter thesis about visual experience, and argue that although they are suggestive, the data provided by Albert Michotte's experiments on perceptual causality do not establish this thesis. Turning to the perception of causality, I defend the claim that we can perceive causation against the objection that its arcane features are unlikely to be represented in experience.
- Visual Feeling of Presence.Gabriele Ferretti - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (7–8):112-136.Everyday visual experience constantly confronts us with things we can interact with in the real world. We literally feel the outside presence of physical objects in our environment via visual perceptual experience. The visual feeling of presence is a crucial feature of vision that is largely unexplored in the philosophy of perception, and poorly debated in vision neuroscience. The aim of this article is to investigate the feeling of presence. I suggest that visual feeling of presence depends on the visual (...)
- Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition.Michael Williams - 1999 - Princeton University Press.Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation. The point of this wider-than-normal usage of the term "phenomenalism," according to which even some forms of direct realism deserve to be called phenomenalistic, is to call attention to important continuities of thought between theories often thought to be competitors. Williams's target is not phenomenalism in its classical (...)
- Reprezentări filosofice ale unității existenței: prin credință noetică și credință perceptivă.Viorel Cernica - 2022 - Studii de Istorie a Filosofiei Românești 18:11-27.In the following paper, I suggest an interpretation of Petrovici’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, both of them structured in accordance with the concept of unity of existence (the world), itself given in a close relation with the idea about an existential subject. Each philosophy includes a representation of the unity of existence, founded, the first, in a spiritual conviction (noetic belief), and the second, in a perceptual faith. This representation is in the same time a privileged kind by which a subject (...)
- Cartesian intuition.Elliot Samuel Paul - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (4):693-723.This paper explicates Descartes’ theory of intuition (intuitus). Departing from certain commentators, I argue that intuition, for Descartes, is a form of clear and distinct intellectual perception. Because it is clear and distinct, it is indubitable, infallible, and provides a grade of certain knowledge he calls ‘cognitio’. I pay special attention to why he treats intuition as a form of perception, and what he means when he says it is ‘clear and distinct’. Finally, I situate his view in relation to (...)
- Cartesian intuition.Elliot Samuel Paul - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (4):693-723.This paper explicates Descartes’ theory of intuition (intuitus). Departing from certain commentators, I argue that intuition, for Descartes, is a form of clear and distinct intellectual perception. Because it is clear and distinct, it is indubitable, infallible, and provides a grade of certain knowledge he calls ‘cognitio’. I pay special attention to why he treats intuition as a form of perception, and what he means when he says it is ‘clear and distinct’. Finally, I situate his view in relation to (...)
- Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference.Jake Quilty-Dunn & E. J. Green - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):273-298.Perceptual representations pick out individuals and attribute properties to them. This paper considers the role of perceptual attribution in determining or guiding perceptual reference to objects. We consider three extant models of the relation between perceptual attribution and perceptual reference–all attribution guides reference, no attribution guides reference, or a privileged subset of attributions guides reference–and argue that empirical evidence undermines all three. We then defend a flexible-attributives model, on which the range of perceptual attributives used to guide reference shifts adaptively (...)
- Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-luminosity Arguments.David de Bruijn - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.Epistemological disjunctivists hold that perceiving subjects have “reflective access” to factive perceptual support for belief. However, little has been done to elaborate the intended notion of reflection, or introspective awareness more generally. Moreover, critics have pointed out that the disjunctivist conception of “reflective access” can seem vulnerable to varieties of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. In this paper I defend disjunctivism from this charge, arguing that it holds the resources for a potent defense of the claim that knowledge of perceptual states is (...)
- Against the very idea of a perceptual belief.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (2):93-105.The aim of this paper is to argue that there is no unproblematic way of delineating perceptual beliefs from non-perceptual beliefs. The concept of perceptual belief is one of the central concepts not only of philosophy of perception but also of epistemology in a broad foundationalist tradition. Philosophers of perception talk about perceptual belief as the interface between perception and cognition and foundationalist epistemologists understand perceptual justification as a relation between perceptual states and perceptual beliefs. We consider three ways of (...)
- La relazione percettiva nella fenomenologia sperimentale.Floriana Ferro - 2021 - Aesthetica Preprint 117:57-71.The paper is focused on the concept of perceptual relation according to experimental phenomenology, belonging to Gestaltist and ecological traditions. First of all, it will be shown the meaning of “relation” in the perceptual domain, including a specific definition of object and subject. For this purpose, the paper will present the difference with the representationalist perspective, which challenges immediate experience and the perception of unified objects. Secondly, the concept of “perceptual relation” will be compared to the idea of Gestalttheorie’s “intrinsic (...)
- Crossmodal Basing.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1163-1194.What kinds of mental states can be based on epistemic reasons? The standard answer is only beliefs. I argue that perceptual states can also be based on reasons, as the result of crossmodal interactions. A perceptual state from one modality can provide a reason on which an experience in another modality is based. My argument identifies key markers of the basing relation and locates them in the crossmodal Marimba Illusion (Schutz & Kubovy 2009). The subject’s auditory experience of musical tone (...)
- Naïve Realism Face to Face with the Time Lag Argument.Fabio Bacchini - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):185-209.Naïve realists traditionally reject the time lag argument by replying that we can be in a direct visual perceptual relation to temporally distant facts or objects. I first show that this answer entails that some visual perceptions—i.e., those that are direct relation between us and an external material object that has visually changed, or ceased to exist, during the time lag—should also count as illusions and hallucinations, respectively. I then examine the possible attempts by the naïve realist to tell such (...)
- Virtue, emotion, and attention.Michael S. Brady - 2010 - In Heather D. Battaly (ed.), Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 115–131.This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 4 Acknowledgments References.$41.46 used (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation
Bookmark 2 citations - Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):602-627.According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal relations, linguistic meanings, and moral properties. An important dialectical tool in the debate between Rich and Sparse theorists is the (...)
- Naïve realism and supersaturated hue.William A. Sharp - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-24.Naïve realists have yet to successfully discharge the problem of supersaturated hue, afterimage-experiences as of hued surfaces that are beyond-maximally saturated. The experiences are a problem for the view because supersaturation, qua property of external objects, is an impossible color property. Accordingly, the experiences cannot be handled in terms of their indiscriminability from perceptions of such surfaces, in the manner of Martin ( 2004 ). Nor can they be handled in terms of seen surfaces looking supersaturated, in the manner of (...)
- A new case of the Myth of the Given?Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2022 - Theoria 88 (5):927-942.For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject's taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in (...)
- The Social Orders of Existence of Affordances.Giuseppe Flavio Artese & Julian Kiverstein - forthcoming - Philosophia Scientiae:211-232.Central figures in the phenomenological tradition, such as Aron Gurwitsch, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, drew extensively on gestalt psychology in their writings. The dialogue between phenomenology and psychology they began continues today in the field of embodied cognitive science. We take up this conversation starting from Aron Gurwitsch’s rich phenomenological analysis of the perception of the cultural world. Gurwitsch’s phenomenological descriptions of the perception of the cultural world bear a striking resemblance to work in embodied cognitive science that takes (...)
- The Social Orders of Existence of Affordances.Giuseppe Flavio Artese & Julian Kiverstein - 2022 - Philosophia Scientiae 26:211-232.Central figures in the phenomenological tradition, such as Aron Gurwitsch, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, drew extensively on gestalt psychology in their writings. The dialogue between phenomenology and psychology they began continues today in the field of embodied cognitive science. We take up this conversation starting from Aron Gurwitsch’s rich phenomenological analysis of the perception of the cultural world. Gurwitsch’s phenomenological descriptions of the perception of the cultural world bear a striking resemblance to work in embodied cognitive science that takes (...)
- Queer Defamiliarisation: Writing, Mattering, Making Strange by Helen Palmer.Trevor Norris - 2022 - philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism 12 (1):217-223.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Queer Defamiliarisation: Writing, Mattering, Making Strange by Helen PalmerTrevor Norris (bio)Helen Palmer, Queer Defamiliarisation: Writing, Mattering, Making Strange Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020, 214 pp. ISBN 978-1-4744-3414-0Helen palmer is senior lecturer in English literature and creative writing at Kingston University in London and the author of Deleuze and Futurism: A Manifesto for Nonsense (2014). Her research examines queer theory, performance, literary modernism, gender, aesthetics, and feminist and Afrofuturist (...)
- The Problem of Objectivity in Gadamer's Hermeneutics in Light of McDowell's Empiricism.Morten S. Thaning - 2015 - Cham: Imprint: Springer.This book reassesses Gadamer's hermeneutics by bringing it into a dialogue with John McDowell's minimal empiricism. It employs the resources of McDowell's minimal empiricism to address the transcendental and ontological presuppositions for objective experience and understanding, while retaining Gadamer's emphasis on the historicity of understanding. By means of the dialogue with McDowell, the book develops a hermeneutical conception of objectivity and perceptual experience, which also entails reinterpretations of Gadamer's notions of tradition, practical wisdom and meaning. The book explores the philosophical (...)
- The Shared World: Perceptual Common Knowledge, Demonstrative Communication, and Social Space.Axel Seemann - 2019 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.The book offers a new treatment of the capacity to perceive, act on, and know about the world together with others. I argue that creatures capable of joint attention stand in a unique perceptual and epistemic relation to their surroundings: they operate in an environment that they, through their communication with their fellow perceivers, help constitute. I show that this relation can be marshaled to address a range of questions about the social aspect of the mind and its perceptual and (...)
- Consciousness, Haecceitism, and Grounding.Hasen Khudairi - manuscriptThis paper aims to demonstrate that the ontology of consciousness is consistent with both the modal and the metaphysical versions of Haecceitism. I examine the varieties of Haecceitism, and I specify the intended versions that the arguments will vindicate. I define the property of 'being purely qualitative', and examine its relation to the properties of phenomenal consciousness. I draw, inter alia, on Bayesian perceptual psychology, in order to specify the identity-conditions of phenomenal properties in detail. I provide two, abductive arguments (...)
- Personal Acts, Habit, and Embodied Agency in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception.Justin F. White - 2022 - In Jeremy Dunham & Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (eds.), Habit and the History of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 152–165.In Aspiration, Agnes Callard examines the phenomenon of aspiration, the process by which one acquires values and becomes a certain kind of person. Aspiring to become a certain type of person involves more than wanting to act in certain ways. We want to come to see the world in a certain way and to develop the dispositions, attributes, and skills that allow us to seamlessly and effectively respond to situations. The skilled athlete or musician, for example, has developed the muscle (...)$56.95 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- The suitability of topology for the investigation of geometric-perceptual phenomena.Farshad Nemati - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.Topology has been characterized as an unsuitable mathematical framework for the investigation of geometric-perceptual phenomena. This has been attributed to the highly abstract nature of topology leading to failures in tasks such as making distinctions between geometrical figures (e.g., a cube versus a sphere) in which the human perceptual system succeeds easily. An alternative thesis is proposed on both philosophical and empirical grounds. The present analysis applies the Müller-Lyer (ML) illusion as a method of investigation to examine the suitability of (...)
- Visvabandhu Tarkatīrtha’s “The Nyāya on True Cognition (pramā)”. Translated from Sanskrit and Bengali with explanatory notes.Jaysankar Lal Shaw - 2022 - RUDN Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):259-284.The following publication includes the translation of the paper “The Nyāya on True Cognition ” by late Mahāmahopādhya pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatīrtha, translated from Sanskrit and Bengali, supplemented with an introduction and additional explanatory notes by J.L. Shaw. The text aims to discuss the Nyāya conception of truth, which is a property of cognition. According to Gaṅgeśa, the founder of Navya-Nyāya, the truth cannot be considered as a class-essence because there will be a defect called ‘ sāṅkarya ’ between truth and (...)
- Hypersensitivity to passive voice hearing in hallucination proneness.Joseph F. Johnson, Michel Belyk, Michael Schwartze, Ana P. Pinheiro & Sonja A. Kotz - 2022 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 16.Voices are a complex and rich acoustic signal processed in an extensive cortical brain network. Specialized regions within this network support voice perception and production and may be differentially affected in pathological voice processing. For example, the experience of hallucinating voices has been linked to hyperactivity in temporal and extra-temporal voice areas, possibly extending into regions associated with vocalization. Predominant self-monitoring hypotheses ascribe a primary role of voice production regions to auditory verbal hallucinations. Alternative postulations view a generalized perceptual salience (...)
- Autism and the Sensory Disruption of Social Experience.Sofie Boldsen - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.Autism research has recently witnessed an embodied turn. In response to the cognitivist approaches dominating the field, phenomenological scholars have suggested a reconceptualization of autism as a disorder of embodied intersubjectivity. Part of this interest in autistic embodiment concerns the role of sensory differences, which have recently been added to the diagnostic criteria of autism. While research suggests that sensory differences are implicated in a wide array of autistic social difficulties, it has not yet been explored how sensory and social (...)
- Imagination in the Generation of Pictures and Interpersonal Scenarios.Keith Oatley - 2021 - Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 5 (1):67-72.In Imagination, Jim Davies explains that most humans have mental imagery: an ability to make pictures in the mind without immediate perceptual input-as we do when we dream. Davies writes programs that enable computers to do something similar. Given a few words of description, a computer can generate pictures with several objects arranged in appropriate ways. Jonathan Gilmore’s Apt Imaginings is about whether engagement in works of fiction is continuous or discontinuous with how we deal with people and objects in (...)
- Perceiving properties versus perceiving objects.Boyd Millar - 2022 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (2):99-117.The fact that you see some particular object seems to be due to the causal relation between your visual experience and that object, rather than to your experiences’ phenomenal character. On the one hand, whenever some phenomenal element of your experience stands in the right sort of causal relation to some object, your experience presents that object (your experience’s phenomenology doesn’t need to match that object). On the other hand, you can’t have a perceptual experience that presents some object unless (...)
- Sensorimotor Relationalism and Conscious Vision.Dave Ward - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):258-281.I argue that the phenomenal properties of conscious visual experiences are properties of the mind-independent objects to which the subject is perceptually related, mediated by the subject's practical understanding of their sensorimotor relation to those properties. This position conjoins two existing strategies for explaining the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences: accounts appealing to perceivers’ limited, non-inferential access to the details of their sensory relation to the environment, and the relationalist conception of phenomenal properties. Bringing these two positions together by emphasizing (...)
- The repulsion effect in preferential choice and its relation to perceptual choice.Mikhail S. Spektor, David Kellen & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2022 - Cognition 225 (C):105164.
- Attention and Perception.Ronald A. Rensink - 2015 - In R. A. Scott, S. M. Kosslyn & M. C. Buchmann (eds.), Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisicplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource. Wiley. pp. 1-14.This article discusses several key issues concerning the study of attention and its relation to visual perception, with an emphasis on behavioral and experiential aspects. It begins with an overview of several classical works carried out in the latter half of the 20th century, such as the development of early filter and spotlight models of attention. This is followed by a survey of subsequent research that extended or modified these results in significant ways. It covers current work on various forms (...)
- Intuition as Conscious Experience.Ole Koksvik - 2020 - New York, NY: Routledge."The nature of intuition and its relation to other mental faculties, particularly perception, is one of the most hotly contested debates in philosophy of mind and psychology. Do intuitions justify belief or merely dispositions to believe? Is intuition a mental state with distinctive phenomenal qualities and if so, how do these differ from normal perceptual states? Drawing on the most recent philosophical research on intuition and perception, Ole Koksvik defends the idea that intuition not only justifies belief but can play (...)
- Perceptual Emotions and Emotional Virtue.Charles Starkey - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 3 (1):10-15.In this essay I focus on two areas discussed in Michael Brady’s Emotion: The Basics, namely perceptual models of emotion and the relation between emotion and virtue. Brady raises two concerns about perceptual theories: that they arguably collapse into feeling or cognitive theories of emotion; and that the analogy between emotion and perception is questionable at best, and is thus not an adequate way of characterizing emotion. I argue that a close look at perception and emotional experience reveals a structure (...)
- Understanding Creativity: Affect Decision and Inference.Avijit Lahiri - manuscriptIn this essay we collect and put together a number of ideas relevant to the under- standing of the phenomenon of creativity, confining our considerations mostly to the domain of cognitive psychology while we will, on a few occasions, hint at neuropsy- chological underpinnings as well. In this, we will mostly focus on creativity in science, since creativity in other domains of human endeavor have common links with scientific creativity while differing in numerous other specific respects. We begin by briefly (...)
- Missing a Soul That Endows Bodies with Life: An Introduction.Fabrizio Baldassarri & Andreas Blank - 2021 - In Fabrizio Baldassarri & Andreas Blank (eds.), Vegetative Powers: The Roots of Life in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Natural Philosophy. Springer. pp. 1-12.In the history of ideas, innumerable attempts to explain life and to define living activities have invoked the notion of the soul. Yet this theoretical entity seems to be an unfathomable thing. Difficulties beset the mere definition of it, and controversies span from whether the soul is a material body or an immaterial form, an immortal or a mortal thing, a subject of experiential or of theoretical knowledge, to the question of whether it is the subject of a specific discipline (...)
- A Holey Perspective on Venn Diagrams.Anna N. Bartel, Kevin J. Lande, Joris Roos & Karen B. Schloss - 2021 - Cognitive Science 46 (1):e13073.When interpreting the meanings of visual features in information visualizations, observers have expectations about how visual features map onto concepts (inferred mappings.) In this study, we examined whether aspects of inferred mappings that have been previously identified for colormap data visualizations generalize to a different type of visualization, Venn diagrams. Venn diagrams offer an interesting test case because empirical evidence about the nature of inferred mappings for colormaps suggests that established conventions for Venn diagrams are counterintuitive. Venn diagrams represent classes (...)
- Image, Art and Virtuality: Towards an Aesthetics of Relation.Roberto Diodato - 2021 - Springer Verlag.This book investigates the ontological state of relations in a unique way. Starting with the notion of system, it shows that the system can be understood as a relational structure, and that relations can be assessed within themselves, with no need to transform relations in elements. “Relations” are understood in contrast to “relational property”: without a relation there is no identity, therefore no existence. What allows us to do that without hypostatizing the relation, and without immediately taking it simply as (...)
- The Structure of Perceptual Experience: A New Look at Adverbialism.Frances Egan - forthcoming - In Deflating Mental Representation (The 2021 Jean Nicod Lectures).In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all phenomenological differences among mental states are representational differences, in other words, differences in content. In this paper I defend an alternative view which I call external sortalism, inspired by traditional adverbialism, and according to which experiences are not essentially representational. The central idea is that the external world serves as a model for sorting, conceptualizing, and reasoning surrogatively about perceptual experience. On external sortalism, contents are construed as a kind (...)
- Disjunctivism and Realism: not naive but conceptual.Sonia Sedivy - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. New York and London: pp. 153-168.This article argues that conceptual realism offers an important alternative to naïve realist, purely relational approaches with which ‘disjunctivism’ has come to be readily associated. I argue that John McDowell’s account of perception as both contentful and relational tends to go unnoted when the options for disjunctive theories are laid out. But McDowell’s approach is important because it comes up the middle between ‘intentional’ and ‘relational’ views of perception. In doing so, it offers theoretical resources for explaining perceptual experience and (...)
- Faith Assimilated to Perception: the Embodied Perspective.Elena Kalmykova - 2020 - Sophia 60 (4):989-1007.In this paper, I consider how the embodied approach can be applied to religious faith, and possibly other kinds of faith. I start with the reformed epistemologists’ idea that religious faith is similar to sense perception, and I argue that we can elaborate this idea by taking into account our capability perceptually to grasp what is not accessible by senses—the ‘presence in absence’ or, as I call it, perceptual faith. As perception necessarily involves not only a mental but also an (...)
- Perceptual breakdown during a global pandemic: introducing phenomenological insights for digital mental health purposes.Janna van Grunsven - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (S1):91-98.Online therapy sessions and other forms of digital mental health services (DMH) have seen a sharp spike in new users since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Having little access to their social networks and support systems, people have had to turn to digital tools and spaces to cope with their experiences of anxiety and loss. With no clear end to the pandemic in sight, many of us are likely to remain reliant upon DMH for the foreseeable future. As such, (...)
- Contrastive Hinge Epistemology.Giorgio Volpe - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1222-1249.In this paper, I outline an account of the structure of perceptual justification that develops Wittgenstein's thought that the possibility of acquiring any degree of justification for our beliefs depends on placing certain propositions outside the route of empirical inquiry, turning them into the “hinges” of our rational evaluations. The proposal is akin to “moderate” accounts of the structure of perceptual justification; however, it conjoins Wittgenstein's insight with explanationist and contrastivist ideas and thus differs in important respects both from such (...)
- Expressiveness: Perception and Emotions in the Experience of Expressive Objects.Marta Benenti - 2020 - De Gruyter.A natural landscape can look serene, a shade of colour cheerful and a piece of music might sound heartrending. Why do we ascribe affective qualities to objects that can't entertain psychological states? The capacity that objects, and especially artworks, have to express affective states is a bizarre phenomenon that needs to be clarified in numerous respects. Philosophers are still struggling with the phenomenon of expressiveness being a matter of imagination, perception, or mnemonic association, and usually do not agree on the (...)
- Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science.Marx W. Wartofsky (ed.) - 1963 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Reidel.The fourth volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science consists mainly of papers which were contributed to our Colloquium during the past few years. The volume represents a wide range of interests in contem porary philosophy of science: issues in the philosophy of mind and of language, the neurophysiology of perceptual and linguistic behavior, philosophy of history and of the social sciences, and studies in the fun damental categories and methods of philosophy and the inter-relation ships of the (...)
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