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  1. Colour Experiences and 'Look' Sentences.Wylie Breckenridge - manuscript
  2. A Epistemologia da Percepção (Verbete).Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Tomamos como certo que os nossos sentidos nos colocam em contato com o ambiente ao nosso redor. Enquanto caminhamos em uma rua, vemos obstáculos que temos de contornar ou remover. Mesmo de costas, podemos ouvir a bicicleta que se aproxima e dar passagem. Em suma, por meio de experiências perceptivas (visuais, auditivas, olfativas etc.), ficamos conscientes de objetos ou eventos que estejam ocorrendo ao nosso redor. Além disso, com base no que percebemos, podemos formar e manter crenças acerca do ambiente (...)
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  3. Parousia, Sympathy and Sensory Presentation.Mark Eli Kalderon - manuscript
    I give an account of sensory presentation, an indispensable and irreducible element of perceptual experience, in terms of the principle of sympathy. Haptic touch, audition, and vision are compared.
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  4. Perceptual Normativity and Human Freedom.Sean Dorrance Kelly - manuscript
  5. Comments on Susanna Siegel's The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - manuscript
  6. Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including the (...)
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  7. Perceptual Consciousness and Cognitive Access From the Perspective of Capacity-Unlimited Working Memory.Steven Gross - forthcoming - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.
    Theories of consciousness divide over whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse in specific representational content and whether it requires cognitive access. These two issues are often treated in tandem because of a shared assumption that the representational capacity of cognitive access is fairly limited. Recent research on working memory challenges this shared assumption. This paper argues that abandoning the assumption undermines post-cue-based “overflow” arguments, according to which perceptual conscious is rich and does not require cognitive access. Abandoning it also (...)
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  8. Kantian Neuroscience and Radical Interpretation.Jim Hopkins - forthcoming - In Festschfrift for Mark Platts.
    This is an unedited version of a paper written in 2012 accepted for publication in a forthcoming Festschrift for Mark Platts. In it I argue that the Helmholtz/Bayes tradition of free energy neuroscience begun by Geoffrey Hinton and his colleagues, and now being carried forward by Karl Friston and his, can be seen as a fulfilment of the Quine/Davidson program of radical interpretation, and also of Quine’s conception of a naturalized epistemology. -/- This program, in turn, is rooted in Helmholtz’s (...)
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  9. Material Objects as the Singular Subjects of External Perception.Mohan Matthen - forthcoming - In Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz & Rick Grush (eds.), Sensory Individuals: Contemporary Perspectives on Modality-specific and Multimodal Perceptual Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Higher animals need to identify and track material objects because they depend on interactions with them for nutrition, reproduction, and social interaction. This paper investigates the perception of material objects. It argues, first, that material objects are tagged, in all five external senses, as bearers of the features detected by them. This happens through a perceptual process, here entitled Generalized Completion, which creates the appearance of objects that have properties that transcend the activation of sensory receptors. The paper shows, secondly, (...)
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  10. Alston on the Epistemic Advantages of the Theory of Appearing in Advance.Matthew McGrath - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
  11. Intentionally Suffering?Charles Travis - forthcoming - In Michael O'Sullivan (ed.), ?? Oxford University Press.
    This is a response to Marie McGinn, who, roughly, lined me up with J. L. Austin over against GEM Anscombe and Wittgenstein on the issue whether perception is (or can be) intentional. I do not mind being aligned with Austin, but argue that this is the wrong way to line things up. I stand equally with Wittgenstein. Anscombe turns out to be odd man out on this one.
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  12. What Blindsight Means for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Michael Barkasi - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (11-12):7-30.
    Do perceptual experiences always inherit the content of their neural correlates? Most scientists and philosophers working on perception say ‘yes’. They hold the view that an experience’s content just is (i.e. is identical to) the content of its neural correlate. This paper presses back against this view, while trying to retain as much of its spirit as possible. The paper argues that type-2 blindsight experiences are plausible cases of experiences which lack the content of their neural correlates. They are not (...)
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  13. The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Problem of Perception is a pervasive and traditional problem about our ordinary conception of perceptual experience. The problem is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perceptual experience be what we ordinarily understand it to be: something that enables direct perception of the world? These possibilities of error challenge the intelligibility of our ordinary conception of perceptual experience; the major theories of experience are responses to this challenge.
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  14. Perceptual Confidence: A Husserlian Take.Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy (2):354-364.
    In this paper, I propose a Husserlian account of perceptual confidence, and argue for perceptual confidence by appeal to the self-justification of perceptual experiences. Perceptual confidence is the intriguing view, recently developed by John Morrison, that there are not just doxastic confidences but also perceptual confidences, i.e., confidences as aspect of perceptual experience, enabling us to account, e.g., for the increasing confidence with which we experience an approaching human figure, while telling ourselves, as the viewing distance diminishes, “It looks like (...)
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  15. The Tractability of the Debate on Relationalism.Roberta Locatelli - 2021 - In Louise Richardson & Heather Logue (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 85-106.
    The debate between relationalism and representationalism in the philosophy of perception seems to have come to a standstill where opponents radically disagree on methodological principles or fundamental assumptions. According to Fish (this volume) this is because, not unlike Kuhnian scientific paradigms, the debate displays some elements of incommensurability. This diagnosis makes advancing the debate impossible. I argue that what is hindering progress is not a clash of research programmes, but a series of misunderstandings that can be avoided by disentangling the (...)
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  16. What’s so Naïve About Naïve Realism?Carlo Raineri - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3637-3657.
    Naïve Realism claims that veridical perceptual experiences essentially consist in genuine relations between perceivers and mind-independent objects and their features. The contemporary debate in the philosophy of perception has devoted little attention to assessing one of the main motivations to endorse Naïve Realism–namely, that it is the only view which articulates our ‘intuitive’ conception of perception. In this paper, I first clarify in which sense Naïve Realism is supposed to be ‘naïve’. In this respect, I argue that it is put (...)
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  17. The Mechanism—the Secret—of the Given.Galen Strawson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10909-10928.
    There is, of course, The Given: what is given in experience. The ‘Myth Of The Given’ is just a wrong answer to the question ‘What is given?’ This paper offers a brief sketch of three possible right answers. It examines an early account by Charles Augustus Strong of why The Myth is a myth. It maintains that a natural and naturalistic version of empiricism is compatible with the fact that the Myth is a myth. It gives proper place to enactivist (...)
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  18. Individuating the Senses of ‘Smell’: Orthonasal Versus Retronasal Olfaction.Keith A. Wilson - 2021 - Synthese 199:4217-4242.
    The dual role of olfaction in both smelling and tasting, i.e. flavour perception, makes it an important test case for philosophical theories of sensory individuation. Indeed, the psychologist Paul Rozin claimed that olfaction is a “dual sense”, leading some scientists and philosophers to propose that we have not one, but two senses of smell: orthonasal and retronasal olfaction. In this paper I consider how best to understand Rozin’s claim, and upon what grounds one might judge there to be one or (...)
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  19. The Value of Perception.Keith Allen - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):633-656.
    This paper develops a form of transcendental naïve realism. According to naïve realism, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational. According to transcendental naïve realism, the naïve realist theory of perception is not just one theory of perception amongst others, to be established as an inference to the best explanation and assessed on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that weighs performance along a number of different dimensions: for instance, fidelity to appearances, simplicity, systematicity, fit with scientific theories, and so on. (...)
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  20. On Perceptual Confidence and “Completely Trusting Your Experience”.Jacob Beck - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (2):174-188.
    John Morrison has argued that confidences are assigned in perceptual experience. For example, when you perceive a figure in the distance, your experience might assign a 55-percent confidence to the figure’s being Isaac. Morrison’s argument leans on the phenomenon of ‘completely trusting your experience’. I argue that Morrison presupposes a problematic ‘importation model’ of this familiar phenomenon, and propose a very different way of thinking about it. While the article’s official topic is whether confidences are assigned in perceptual experience, it (...)
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  21. Contenido y Fenomenología de la Percepción: Aproximaciones Filosóficas.Ignacio Cervieri & Álvaro Peláez (eds.) - 2020 - CDMX, México: Gedisa-UAM.
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  22. Belief-Like Imaginings and Perceptual (Non-)Assertoricity.Alon Chasid & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):731-751.
    A commonly-discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has ‘assertoric’ or ‘phenomenal’ force. We will start by discussing various descriptions of the assertoricity of perceptual experience. We will then adopt a minimal characterization of assertoricity: a perceptual experience has assertoric force just in case it inclines the perceiver to believe its content. Adducing cases that show that visual experience is not always assertoric, we will argue that what renders these visual experiences non-assertoric is that they are penetrated by belief-like (...)
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  23. Color for the Perceptual Organization of the Pictorial Plane: Victor Vasarely's Legacy to Gestalt Psychology.Birgitta Dresp-Langley & Adam Reeves - 2020 - Heliyon 6 (6):e04375.
    Victor Vasarely's (1906–1997) important legacy to the study of human perception is brought to the forefront and discussed. A large part of his impressive work conveys the appearance of striking three-dimensional shapes and structures in a large-scale pictorial plane. Current perception science explains such effects by invoking brain mechanisms for the processing of monocular (2D) depth cues. Here in this study, we illustrate and explain local effects of 2D color and contrast cues on the perceptual organization in terms of figure-ground (...)
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  24. Two Dogmas of Empirical Justification.Jack C. Lyons - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):221-237.
    Nearly everyone agrees that perception gives us justification and knowledge, and a great number of epistemologists endorse a particular two-part view about how this happens. The view is that perceptual beliefs get their justification from perceptual experiences, and that they do so by being based on them. Despite the ubiquity of these two views, I think that neither has very much going for it; on the contrary, there’s good reason not to believe either one of them.
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  25. The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):524-546.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
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  26. Augustine on Active Perception, Awareness, and Representation.Tamer Nawar - 2020 - Phronesis 66 (1):84-110.
    It is widely thought that Augustine thinks perception is, in some distinctive sense, an active process and that he takes conscious awareness to be constitutive of perception. I argue that conscious awareness is not straightforwardly constitutive of perception and that Augustine is best understood as an indirect realist. I then clarify Augustine’s views concerning the nature and role of diachronically unified conscious awareness and mental representation in perception, the nature of the soul’s intentio, and the precise sense in which perception (...)
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  27. Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief.Thomas Raleigh & Filippo Vindrola - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):378-406.
    According to the recent Perceptual Confidence view, perceptual experiences possess not only a representational content, but also a degree of confidence in that content. The motivations for this view are partly phenomenological and partly epistemic. We discuss both the phenomenological and epistemic motivations for the view, and the resulting account of the interface between perceptual experiences and degrees of belief. We conclude that, in their present state of development, orthodox accounts of perceptual experience are still to be favoured over the (...)
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  28. Skill and Expertise in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, 2020. Routledge. pp. 306-313.
    Entry in Routledge handbook of skill and expertise. Discusses social perception, perceptual expertise, knowing what things look like, and a bit about about aesthetics at the end.
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  29. Perceiving As: Non-Conceptual Forms of Perception in Medieval Philosophy.Juhana Toivanen - 2020 - In Elena Baltuta (ed.), Medieval Perceptual Puzzles: Theories of Sense Perception in 13th and 14th Centuries. Leiden, Netherlands: pp. 10–37.
    The aim of this chapter is to take a closer look at medieval discussions concerning the phenomenon of ‘perceiving as,’ and the psychological mechanisms that lie behind it. In contemporary philosophical literature this notion is usually used to refer to conceptual aspects of perception. For instance, when I perceive a black birdlike shape as a crow, I may be said to perceive the particular sensible thing x as an instance of a universal crowness φ, that is, as belonging to a (...)
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  30. Merleau-Ponty and Naïve Realism.Keith Allen - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    This paper has two aims. The first is to use contemporary discussions of naïve realist theories of perception to offer an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception. The second is to use consideration of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception to outline a distinctive version of a naïve realist theory of perception. In a Merleau-Pontian spirit, these two aims are inter-dependent.
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  31. Twin Earth and Perceptual Content.Jan Almäng - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6089-6109.
    This paper presents a framework for analysing perceptual Twin Earth thought experiments. Visual content normally has an analogue character, and it is argued in this paper that this sets certain constraints on the extent to which Twin Earth thought experiments can be successful. The argumentation in the paper is developed by using examples from visual spatial content. It is argued that visual spatial content can only be “twin-earthed” in a very limited way. Whereas the metrics of space can be twin-earthed, (...)
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  32. Social Enactivism About Perception—Reply to McGann.Alejandro Arango - 2019 - Adaptive Behavior 27 (2):161-162.
    In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of (...)
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  33. Two Conceptions of Phenomenology.Ori Beck - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1-17.
    The phenomenal particularity thesis says that if a mind-independent particular is consciously perceived in a given perception, that particular is among the constituents of the perception’s phenomenology. Martin, Campbell, Gomes and French and others defend this thesis. Against them are Mehta, Montague, Schellenberg and others, who have produced strong arguments that the phenomenal particularity thesis is false. Unfortunately, neither side has persuaded the other, and it seems that the debate between them is now at an impasse. This paper aims to (...)
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  34. The Light From Our Eyes.Steve Brewer - 2019 - Philosophy Now 129:57-58.
    In which Max is horrified that 50% of American college students think their eyes illuminate the world. Orin thinks they may be on to something. Meanwhile, Freya is entranced by an expensive array of colored circles.
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  35. Socially Extending the Mind Through Social Affordances.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2019 - In Steven Gouveia & Manuel Curado (eds.), Automata's Inner Movie: Science and Philosophy of Mind. "Delaware, USA": Vernon Press. pp. 193-212.
    The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by the organism’s actions on its surrounding environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind thesis. Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I defend the position that perception (...)
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  36. Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experiences Are Transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.
    The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this, and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual (...)
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  37. Objects, Seeing, and Object-Seeing.Mohan Matthen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4).
    Two questions are addressed in this paper. First, what is it to see? I argue that it is veridical experience of things outside the perceiver brought about by looking. Second, what is it to see a material object? I argue that it is experience of an occupant of a spatial region that is a logical subject for other visual features, able to move to another spatial region, to change intrinsically, and to interact with other material objects. I show how this (...)
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  38. Michael Madary's Visual Phenomenology. [REVIEW]Neil Mehta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):131-134.
  39. Classification of Disjunctivism About the Phenomenology of Visual Experience.Takuya Niikawa - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:89-110.
    This paper proposes a classificatory framework for disjunctivism about the phenomenology of visual perceptual experience. Disjunctivism of this sort is typically divided into positive and negative disjunctivism. This distinction successfully reflects the disagreement amongst disjunctivists regarding the explanatory status of the introspective indiscriminability of veridical perception and hallucination. However, it is unsatisfactory in two respects. First, it cannot accommodate eliminativism about the phenomenology of hallucination. Second, the class of positive disjunctivism is too coarse-grained to provide an informative overview of the (...)
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  40. Perspectivalism in the Development of Scientific Observer-Relativity.Lydia Patton - 2019 - In Martin Kusch, Katherina Kinzel, Johannes Steizinger & Niels Jacob Wildschut (eds.), The Emergence of Relativism. New York: Routledge. pp. 63-78.
    Hermann von Helmholtz allows for not only physiological facts and psychological inferences, but also perspectival reasoning, to influence perceptual experience and knowledge gained from perception. But Helmholtz also defends a version of the view according to which there can be a kind of “perspectival truth” revealed in scientific research and investigation. Helmholtz argues that the relationships between subjective and objective, real and actual, actual and illusory, must be analyzed scientifically, within experience. There is no standpoint outside experience from which we (...)
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  41. Dreaming of a Stable World: Vision and Action in Sleep.Melanie Rosen - 2019 - Synthese (Suppl 17):1-36.
    Our eyes, bodies, and perspectives are constantly shifting as we observe the world. Despite this, we are very good at distinguishing between self-caused visual changes and changes in the environment: the world appears mostly stable despite our visual field moving around. This, it seems, also occurs when we are dreaming. As we visually investigate the dream environment, we track moving objects with our dream eyes, examine objects, and shift focus. These movements, research suggests, are reflected in the rapid movements or (...)
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  42. Singularidade fenomênica e conteúdo perceptivo.Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):67-91.
    The most prominent theories of perceptual content are incapable of accounting for the phenomenal particularity of perceptual experience. This difficulty, or so I argue, springs from the absence of a series of distinctions that end up turning the problem apparently unsolvable. After briefly examining the main shortcomings of representationalism and naïve realism, I advance a proposal of my own that aims to make the trivial fact of perceptually experiencing a particular object as such philosophically unproblematic. Though I am well aware (...)
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  43. Encountering Finitude: On the Hermeneutic Radicalization of Experience.Jussi M. Backman - 2018 - In Antonio Cimino & Cees Leijenhorst (eds.), Phenomenology and Experience: New Perspectives. Leiden: Brill. pp. 46-62.
    The chapter approaches the hermeneutic concept of experience introduced by Hans-Georg Gadamer in Truth and Method (1960) from the perspective of the conceptual history of experience in the Western philosophical tradition. Through an overview of the concept and the epistemological function of experience (empeiria, experientia, Erfahrung) in Aristotle, Francis Bacon, and Hegel, it is shown that the tradition has considered experience first and foremost in methodological terms, that is, as a pathway towards a form of scientific knowledge that is itself (...)
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  44. Visual Experience: A Semantic Approach.Wylie Breckenridge - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    I develop a theory of what we mean by the 'look' sentences that we use to describe our visual experiences, and on that basis develop a new adverbial theory of what it is to have a visual experience with a certain character.
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  45. Superimposed Mental Imagery: On the Uses of Make-Perceive.Robert Briscoe - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. pp. 161-185.
    Human beings have the ability to ‘augment’ reality by superimposing mental imagery on the visually perceived scene. For example, when deciding how to arrange furniture in a new home, one might project the image of an armchair into an empty corner or the image of a painting onto a wall. The experience of noticing a constellation in the sky at night is also perceptual-imaginative amalgam: it involves both seeing the stars in the constellation and imagining the lines that connect them (...)
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  46. Naive Realism and the Scientific Narration of Perception.Andrea Bucci - 2018 - Brainfactor:01-05.
    Naive realism is a widely debated topic in the philosophy of the mind. In this article I will review the theses of naive realism through the works of one of the most influential philosophers who supported and developed them, Michael Martin. Once the reasons why naive realism should be supported are discussed, I will propose an empirical argument to show that naive realism and the most basic scientific knowledge of perceptive processes are contradictory.
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  47. Discussion of Anil Gupta's “Outline of an Account of Experience”.Alex Byrne, Charles Goldhaber, Anil Gupta, Adam Pautz & Raja Rosenhagen - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):75-88.
  48. Affordances Sociais e a Tese da Mente Estendida.Eros Carvalho - 2018 - Proceedings of the Brazilian Research Group on Epistemology 2018: Social Epistemology.
    A tese da mente estendida alega que ao menos alguns processos cognitivos se estendem para além do cérebro do organismo no sentido de que eles são constituídos por ações realizadas por esse organismo no ambiente ao seu redor. Um movimento mais radical seria alegar que ações sociais realizadas pelo organismo poderiam pelo menos constituir alguns dos seus processos cognitivos. Isso pode ser chamando de tese da mente socialmente estendida. Baseando-me na noção de affordance tal como ela foi desenvolvida na tradição (...)
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  49. Perceptual Ephemera.Thomas Crowther & Clare Mac Cumhaill (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Most research in philosophy of perception has focussed on the perceptual experience of three-dimensional, solid, bounded and coherent material objects – items like ink-stands and tomatoes. But as well as having perceptual experience of such objects, we also experience such ‘perceptual ephemera’ as, for instance, rainbows, surfaces, and stuff; things that are ephemeral in the sense that they can be contrasted, in selected respects, with material objects. This book collects together fourteen new essays on the perceptual experience of ‘ephemera’. A (...)
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  50. The Concept of ‘Body Schema’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Embodied Subjectivity.Jan Halák - 2018 - In Bernard Andrieu, Jim Parry, Alessandro Porrovecchio & Olivier Sirost (eds.), Body Ecology and Emersive Leisure. Londýn, Velká Británie: Routledge. pp. 37-50.
    In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further developing his idea of embodied subject and interpreted fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studied more in depth the neurological notion of "body schema". According to Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a practical diagram of our relationships to the world, an action-based norm with reference to which things make sense. Merleau-Ponty more precisely tried to describe the fundamentally dynamic (...)
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1 — 50 / 237