The article advances a new way of thinking about classifications in general and the classification of mental disorders in particular. By applying insights from measurement practice to the context of classification, I defend a notion of epistemic accuracy that allows one to evaluate and improve classifications by comparing different classifying methods to each other. Progress in classification arises from the mutual development of classification systems and classifying methods. Based on this notion of accuracy, the article illustrates with an example (...) how psychiatric classifications can be improved via circumscribed comparisons of different perspectives on mental disorders, without relying on complete models of their complex aetiology. When applying this strategy, the traditional opposition between symptom-based and causal approaches is of little consequence for making progress in the epistemic accuracy of psychiatric classification. (shrink)

By illustrating the presence and scope of the bodhisattva ideal in Theravāda Buddhist theory and practice, this article shows that some of the distinctions used to separate Mahāyāna Buddhism from Hīnayāna Buddhism are problematic, and, in particular, calls into question the commonly held theoretical model that postulates that the goal of Mahāyāna practitioners is to become buddhas by following the path of the bodhisattva (bodhisattva-yāna), whereas the goal of Hīnayāna practitioners is to become arahants by following the path of (...) the hearers of Buddha's disciples (śrāvaka-yāna). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cognitive Error and Contemplative Practices:The Cultivation of Discernment in Mind and HeartWesley J. WildmanBrains are amazing organs in all creatures with central nervous systems and especially in human beings. But they are not perfect. Without forgetting the larger success story of cognitive evolution, I want to explore the way that cognitive biases sometimes produce errors in both religious and secular social settings and how such errors can be diagnosed (...) and corrected when they occur. This will involve noticing that error diagnosis and correction is a process that certain social groups have a vested interest in resisting or neglecting, in some respects, while the very same social groups may furnish resources that support the detection of cognitive errors, in other respects.This presents a moral quandary for both secular and religious groups. Should we educate children to be fully aware of their cognitive vulnerability to advertising, thereby learning how to resist and eventually become immune to one of the fundamental power sources of modern market economies? Should religious groups explain to young people their cognitive tendencies to posit the action of supernatural beings whether or not any such action exists, even though this may disrupt the power of religious groups to forge bracing social togetherness that supports psychologically useful coping skills? While I do not seek to answer such complex moral questions in this paper, I do argue that knowledge of cognitive biases and the resulting tendencies to cognitive error, self-defeating behaviors, and self-deception should be made available to those individuals and groups who are interested in promoting a high degree of critical self-awareness in the analysis of beliefs and behaviors in both secular and religious contexts.The term "error" is a potentially problematic one in that it misleadingly suggests that there might be a uniquely correct way in which cognition should work. I do not wish to suggest such a binary opposition. After all, biases exist in the human cognitive system either because they have been selected in the evolutionary process for their survival benefits or because they are side effects of other traits selected for their usefulness. My concern is with the wondrous human discovery that we can analyze [End Page 61] our behaviors and beliefs with such precision that we can sometimes detect when our cognitive biases produce mistaken beliefs and self-defeating behaviors. This forms the basis for my contention that cognition can often work better than it does—more accurately, less self-destructively—when tendencies to cognitive error are diagnosed, corrected, and perhaps even systematically resisted.The profound irony here is that the very same social groups (secular and religious) with an obvious vested interest in resisting such enlightenment in some respects can also promote processes of discernment and insight in other respects. Existing literature in the cognitive psychology of religion rarely bothers with such subtleties. It is common to assume that simply to notice the operation of cognitive biases in religion—say, in supporting belief in supernatural entities who providentially interact in human affairs, or in establishing and reinforcing people's willingness to defer to certain kinds of religious authority—is at the same time to establish the presence of rampant cognitive error, massive resistance to diagnosing and correcting it, and thus the infliction of pernicious cruelties on young children who have no way of escaping the resulting irrational indoctrination.This moral reflex to condemn religious groups because of their characteristic reluctance to acknowledge the role of cognitive biases in their beliefs and practices is understandable given the irrationality, ignorance, or denial that such reluctance suggests. I frankly acknowledge that I share this moral concern. But the actual complexities of religious practice demonstrate that the situation demands a subtler evaluation. Resistance to awareness of cognitive biases exists both inside and outside religious groups; economic and political practices in all eras and of all types have every bit as much to gain from neglecting to enlighten people about their cognitive operations as religious groups do—just consider the techniques employed in commercial advertising and political campaigns. Moreover, religious groups also promote methods of discernment and self-awareness that have historically been, and continue to be, the dominant method by which... (shrink)

This book examines the legacy of Antonio Gramsci and Leon Trotsky in the shadow of Stalinism in order to reassess the very different and distorted academic reception of the two figures, as well as to contribute to the revitalization of Marxism for our time. While Gramsci and Trotsky lived and died in a similar fashion, as revolutionary Marxist leaders and theoreticians, their reception in academia could not be more different. Gramsci has become tremendously popular, becoming a central figure in many (...) disciplines, while Trotsky remains largely ignored. Saccarelli argues that not only is Gramsci popular for the wrong reasons--being routinely distorted and depoliticized--even when rescued from his contemporary users, Gramsci remains inadequate. Conversely, the fact that Trotsky remains beyond the pale of "theory" is a terrible indictment of the current state of academic thinking. (shrink)

Dialectics of Knowing strengthens the philosophical basis of formal education that has been weakened by neoliberalism over the past thirty years. It draws upon Greek philosophy that asked 'How should we live?' and European Enlightenment that considered 'What can we know?' to question today 'What does it mean to experience mind, to act, think and create ethically?' Focusing particularly on the notion of praxis and specific issues involving indigenous, feminist and practitioner knowing, this book will help scholars and practitioners to (...) transform their education theories and practices in ways that encourage democracy, emancipation, social action, culture, inquiry and creativity. (shrink)

How do social institutions exist? How do they direct our conduct? The Opposite Mirrors defends the thesis that the existence of institutions is a conventional matter. Ultimately they exist because we believe in their existence, and because they play a role in our practical reasoning. Human action necessarily has an unpredictable aspect; human institutions perform an important task by reducing uncertainty in our interactions. The author applies this thesis to the most important institutions: the law and the monetary system. In (...) his analysis he connects many traditional topics of the philosophy of law, social philosophy and the philosophy of social sciences in a new way. He discusses the nature of rules, authority, and power and analyzes the Hobbesian presuppositions which have been dominant in legal theory and in the economic analyses of the state. The book is written for legal theorists as well as for political and social philosophers, and theoretically oriented social scientists. (shrink)

Rule is commonly conceptualized with reference to the compliance it invokes. In this article, we propose a conception of rule via the practice of resistance instead. In contrast to liberal approaches, we stress the possibility of illegitimate rule, and, as opposed to critical approaches, the possibility of legitimate authority. In the international realm, forms of rule and the changes they undergo can thus be reconstructed in terms of the resistance they provoke. To this end, we distinguish between two types (...) of resistance—opposition and dissidence—in order to demonstrate how resistance and rule imply each other. We draw on two case studies of resistance in and to international institutions to illustrate the relationship between rule and resistance and close with a discussion of the normative implications of such a conceptualization. (shrink)

This study investigated the relationships among oppositional defiant attitudes, moral reasoning, moral value evaluation and self-reported delinquent behaviour in adolescents (N = 351, MAGE = 13.8 years, SDAGE = 1.1). Of particular interest were the moderating effects of age, educational environment and gender on the relationship between moral reasoning and delinquency. The results indicate that oppositional defiance was a strong positive correlate of delinquent behaviour, particularly in late adolescence. Furthermore, moral reasoning was modestly and negatively related to delinquency, (...) but only for males. No moderating effects for educational environment were observed. Moreover, moral value evaluation was uncorrelated with delinquent behaviour when controlling for other sociomoral processes. These findings invite further research on the relationship between attitudes and behaviour, with respect to causal links and practical applications within behavioural interventions. (shrink)

This book examines the legacy of Antonio Gramsci and Leon Trotsky in the shadow of Stalinism in order to reassess the very different and distorted academic reception of the two figures, as well as to contribute to the revitalization of Marxism for our time. While Gramsci and Trotsky lived and died in a similar fashion, as revolutionary Marxist leaders and theoreticians, their reception in academia could not be more different. Gramsci has become tremendously popular, becoming a central figure in many (...) disciplines, while Trotsky remains largely ignored. Saccarelli argues that not only is Gramsci popular for the wrong reasons--being routinely distorted and depoliticized--even when rescued from his contemporary users, Gramsci remains inadequate. Conversely, the fact that Trotsky remains beyond the pale of "theory" is a terrible indictment of the current state of academic thinking. (shrink)

In this article, I examine what the ethical and political implications of conceptualizing and practicing philosophy for/with children in the neoliberal debt economy are. Though P4wC cannot alone bring about any significant transformation of debt political-economic realities, it can play an important role in cultivating oppositional debt ethics and consciousness. The first half of this article situates P4wC within the current global debt economy. Here, I summarize the analyses made by critical theorists of the ways that debt impacts public (...) institutions, and shapes individual subjectivity. The second half of this article builds on Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of “counter-conduct.” For Foucault, counter-conduct is an ethical/political act of resistance against governmentality, one that makes possible alternative social relations and ways of being in the world. I argue in this section that P4wC should be conceptualized, and practiced, as form of counter-conduct that challenges power in the debt economy. Both the form of P4wC pedagogy, and the content that can be taken up in a collective manner in communities of inquiry, make P4wC a potential site for debt counter-conduct practices. Thought of as counter-conduct, P4wC is an educational practice with liberatory promise. I conclude this piece with brief ruminations on practicing P4wC in the time of COVID, and during the uprisings around the world against racial capitalism. It is suggested here that P4wC not only be practiced within formal education settings, but also in the social movements that are fighting to bring into being a world more just for all of us. En este artículo, examino cuáles son las implicaciones éticas y políticas de conceptualizar y practicar la filosofía para / con niños en la economía de la deuda neoliberal. Aunque P4wC no puede provocar por sí solo ninguna transformación significativa de las realidades político-económicas de la deuda, puede desempeñar un papel importante en el cultivo de una ética y una conciencia de la deuda opuestas. La primera mitad de este artículo sitúa a P4wC dentro de la economía de deuda global actual. Aquí, resumo los análisis realizados por teóricos críticos sobre las formas en que la deuda afecta a las instituciones públicas y configura la subjetividad individual. La segunda mitad de este artículo se basa en la conceptualización de la "contra-conducta" de Michel Foucault. Para Foucault, la contra-conducta es un acto ético / político de resistencia contra la gobernamentalidad, que posibilita relaciones sociales y formas de estar en el mundo alternativas. Sostengo en esta sección que P4wC debe conceptualizarse y practicarse como una forma de contra-conducta que desafía el poder en la economía de la deuda. Tanto la forma pedagógica de P4wC, como su contenido adoptados de manera colectiva en las comunidades de investigación, hacen de P4wC un sitio potencial para las prácticas de contra-conducta de la deuda. Pensada como una contra-conducta, P4wC es una práctica educativa con promesa liberadora. Concluyo este artículo con breves reflexiones sobre la práctica de P4wC en la época de COVID y de los alzamientos en todo el mundo contra el capitalismo racial. Aquí se sugiere que P4wC no solo se practique dentro de los entornos de educación formal, sino también en los movimientos sociales que luchan por crear un mundo más justo para todos nosotros. Key Words: Debt, Philosophy for/with Children, Counter-Conduct. (shrink)

This book, which presents Spinoza's main ideas in dictionary form, has as its subject the opposition between ethics and morality, and the link between ethical ...

ABSTRACT:Ethical research on consumption has focused mainly on the obligations, principles and values guiding consumers' actions and reasons for action. In doing so, it has concerned itself mostly with such bounded contexts as voluntary simplifiers, anti-consumption movements or so-called ‘ethical consumers,’ thereby fostering an artificial opposition between ethical and non-ethical consumption. This paper proposes virtue ethics as a more apt conceptual framework for the ethical analysis of consumption because it takes into account the developmental dynamic triggered by engagement in consumption (...) practices. We build on MacIntyre's goods-virtues-practices-institutions framework and Beabout's concept of a domain-relative practice and argue that when engaging in consumption activities, agents may pursue goods internal to practices, further their individual life narratives and contribute to the good of their communities, thus developing virtues that perfect themselves both as consumers and as ethical agents. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Ethical research on consumption has focused mainly on the obligations, principles and values guiding consumers' actions and reasons for action. In doing so, it has concerned itself mostly with such bounded contexts as voluntary simplifiers, anti-consumption movements or so-called ‘ethical consumers,’ thereby fostering an artificial opposition between ethical and non-ethical consumption. This paper proposes virtue ethics as a more apt conceptual framework for the ethical analysis of consumption because it takes into account the developmental dynamic triggered by engagement in consumption (...) practices. We build on MacIntyre's goods-virtues-practices-institutions framework and Beabout's concept of a domain-relative practice and argue that when engaging in consumption activities, agents may pursue goods internal to practices, further their individual life narratives and contribute to the good of their communities, thus developing virtues that perfect themselves both as consumers and as ethical agents. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to propose a precise characterization of the collective practice behind at least an important part of the phenomena named “decision by consensus”. First, I provide descriptions of the use of this rule, and give a definition of the non-opposition rule, both as a specific sequence of acts and as a stopping rule. Second, I challenge the usual way of understanding the non-opposition rule by contrast with voting, stating that the contrast between logic of (...) approval and logic of consent also has to be taken into account. Third, I examine the conditions of its use. The non-opposition rule satisfies groups whose concern is to decide without dividing. Finally, from the analytic benefit of opening up decision by consensus as the use of the non-opposition rule, I will examine, in a fourth part, whether consensus in decision-making is as democratic a procedure as is sometimes thought. (shrink)

This paper has two interrelated goals. The first is to introduce a framework: oppositional democracy. The second is to use this framework to address what I see as a central problem that occurs when learning to teach: the moment when someone with power tells an aspiring teacher that something she hopes to accomplish is unrealistic. The framework of oppositional democracy helps us understand this problem while also suggesting responses that free an aspiring teacher to experiment in responsible ways, (...) thereby empowering her to work against practices she does not want to be complicit in perpetuating. (shrink)

In view of the current fragmentation in management and organisation studies, we argue that there is a need to elaborate techniques that help reconcile contradictory and superficially incommensurable standpoints. For this purpose, we draw on ‘pre-modern’ Aristotelian epistemological and methodological sources, particularly the idea of ‘saving the appearances’ (SA), not previously introduced into organisation studies. Using SA as our starting point, we outline a methodology that helps to develop reasonable and acceptable intermediary positions in contemporary debates between ‘modernism’ and ‘post-modernism’. (...) We illustrate the functioning of SA in the case of three issues in the philosophy of science where ‘modernist’ and ‘post-modernist’ scholars seem to have incommensurable standpoints: the nature of scientific knowledge; the conception of causality; and the epistemology of practice. We show in particular how to use the logics of ‘qualification’, ‘new conception’, and ‘complementary combination’ to form the basis for mediating positions which could then be accepted by less extreme proponents of both ‘modernism’ and ‘postmodernism’. (shrink)

Disputational models of argumentation have been criticized as introducing adversariality into argumentation by mistakenly conceiving of it as minimally adversarial, and, in doing so, structurally incentivizing ancillary adversariality. As an alternative, non-adversarial models of argumentation like inquiry have been recommended. In this article I defend disputational, minimally adversarial models of disagreement-based argumentation. First, I argue that the normative kernel of minimal adversariality is properly located in the normative fabric of disagreement, not our practices of disputation. Thus, argumentation’s minimal adversariality is (...) a hereditary, rather than an acquired, trait. Second, I show how attempts to model disagreement-based argumentation non-adversarially, as co-inquiry, misrepresent the normative commitments of disagreers. Indeed, such attempts backfire in their efforts to make argumentation less adversarial, by removing the normative, discursive mechanisms by which we may hold each other to rational account for our commitments. Finally, I show how regulative models of disputation, like the Pragma-Dialectical critical discussion, are designed to minimize ancillary adversariality thereby preventing its escalation. (shrink)

Practical Knowledge Versus Knowledge as Practice The main thesis of this essay is that practice is superior to a "theoretical vs. practical" distinction. In this sense, every sort of knowledge is essentially "practical"; so-called "theoretical" knowledge is an historically overemphasised borderline example of the practical. Based mostly on Wittgenstein's view, I shall gradually refine an opposition between theoretical and practical knowledge by analysing some related dualisms on an active, processual, communicative and applicative concept of knowledge. Then I will (...) provide some arguments as to why knowledge as a practical matter in this sense should be seen as, both logically and temporally, prior to the distinction. (shrink)

Current debates about sex selection start from a paradox: on the one hand, the 'liberal' argument in favour of sex selection is often thought to be sound; but on the other hand there is widespread public opposition to sex selection. So it is worth spending some time examining the arguments against sex selection. Four different types of argument are identified: (i) religious arguments; (ii) consequentialist arguments, mainly concerning disturbance to the sex ratio; (iii) arguments to the effect that sex selection (...) involves a failure to respect the autonomy of a child; (iv) arguments to the effect that the motivation for sex selection brings with it an instrumental attitude to children not compatible with a child's need for unconditional acceptance and love. In the end the conclusion is reached that none of these arguments provide decisive arguments against the liberal thesis that sex selection ought to be permitted, especially where 'family balancing' is envisaged. In the light of this conclusion the issue of fetal sexing followed by selective feticide as a method of sex selection C is discussed. It is argued that sex selection is not in general a good reason for abortion, but that this practice may become unstoppable. Copyright (C) 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. (shrink)

While recently hyped as a defense against AI plagiarism, oral exams have fallen out of favor in American philosophy departments. They are often perceived as part of an antiquated system where the day-to-day coursework is sharply distinguished from a 100% weighted final exam, with a more oppositional than collaborative student-professor relationship. Such examinations do not lend themselves to blind grading, and also reinforce the existing privilege of students who are confident, fast-spoken, and know what to study. This kind of (...) oral examination is clearly at odds with the contemporary transparent and collaborative process embodied in techniques like specifications grading, with its proven benefits for novice philosophy students in introductory-level courses. I want to defend a rather different role for oral exams. Novice philosophy students need rapid feedback in order to know whether they have correctly understood the expectations embodied in syllabi and rubrics. Six best practices are offered for achieving this goal while minimizing drawbacks. (shrink)

Hume raises the issue of how common life and philosophy are related. He presents the possibility that they are irreconcilably opposed, that philosophy rigorously and honestly pursued must lead to skepticism. I discuss some prominent interpretive issues about Hume in light of this opposition between common life and philosophy. I also argue that this opposition is a deep and general philosophical problem, and sketch an approach to this problem. ;These are my interpretive claims: I argue that Hume has constructive aims (...) in his epistemology, and that he is surprised when his naturalism subverts these constructive aims and leads to skepticism. I argue that Hume does not entertain a moral skepticism similar to his skepticism about the external world and causal relations, but that he should have entertained such a skepticism. I argue that, in the Dialogues, Philo does not concede that religious belief is natural and therefore secure despite its unreasonableness. Rather, Philo contends that religious belief is not natural, and contends that this lack of naturalness gives us principled grounds for preferring causal and moral beliefs to natural ones. However, I argue, the problem of general philosophical skepticism keeps this religious skepticism from being satisfactory. ;I use the interpretation of Hume to clarify and deepen Hume's Problem, and to begin working toward a solution of that problem. I argue that there is a perspective we can take up that makes skepticism about the status of our physical and moral beliefs and practices seem inevitable. To resolve Hume's Problem, we must show that this perspective is the wrong perspective on human life, or at least that there is some alternative perspective that does not lead to skepticism but is no less rational than the perspective that does lead to skepticism. (shrink)

The concept of practice is thematically central to modern conservative thought, as evident in Edmund Burke’s writings on the aesthetic and his diatribe against the French Revolution. It is also the main organizing thread in the framework in the human sciences known as practice theory, which extends back at least to Karl Marx’s ‘Theses on Feuerbach’. This article historicizes ‘practice’ in conservative thought and practice theory, accounts for the family resemblance between the two, and takes apart (...) that family resemblance to reveal differences. The ingredients of practice theory (historical inheritance, embodiment, cognitive limits, loose coupling between conscious thought and action) are in many cases also distinctive traits of conservative thought. But the similarity is deceptive. Practice theory and conservative thought constitute two distinct interpretations of practice, two disparate endeavours for connecting human science with political strategy, and two different formulas for opposing theory and practice. The present study will argue that this is primarily a political opposition for conservative thought, while it is a human-scientific opposition for practice theory. Conservative thought is initially political and then human-scientific; practice theory is initially human-scientific and then political. This article advocates for practice theory against conservative thought as differently amended versions of a politics that recognizes human finitude. (shrink)

This chapter considers the centrality of principles in Kant’s moral philosophy, their distinctively ‘Kantian’ character, why Kant presents a ‘metaphysical’ system of moral principles and how these ‘formal’ principles are to be used in practice. These points are central to how Kant thinks pure reason can be practical. These features have often puzzled Anglophone readers, in part due to focusing on Kant’s Groundwork, to the neglect of his later works in moral philosophy, in which the theoretical preliminaries of that (...) first essay are properly articulated. In part, however, these puzzles stem, directly or indirectly, from Kant’s opposition to moral empiricism, which is bound to puzzle Anglophone readers, whose default orientation is empiricist. Accordingly, particular attention is paid to Kant’s reasons for rejecting moral empiricism and for developing an alternative to it, to Kant’s account of how his universalization tests serve as criteria of morally obligatory, permissible or prohibited actions and to his account of what is morally wrong with actions which violate those criteria. Examining these points provides a compelling synopsis of Kant’s system of moral principles, centring on the key terms ‘practical reason’, ‘law’, ‘maxim’ and ‘Categorical Imperative’. (shrink)

Questions of medical ethics are often treated as especially difficult casuistical problems or as difficult cases illustrative of paradoxes or advantages in global moral theories. I argue here, in opposition to such approaches, for the inseparability of questions of social history and social theory from any normative assessment of medical practices. The focus of the discussion is the question of the legitimacy of the social authority exercised by physicians, and the insufficiency of traditional defences of such authority in liberal societies (...) (voluntarist, informed consent approaches), as well as traditional attacks on such strategies (ideology critique). Seeing such authority as institution bound and role based, it is argued, can help reframe, more broadly and more adequately, what is an “ethical problem” in medical practice and why. (shrink)

In this article we attempt to answer the question of how the ethical and conceptual framework (ECF) for a learning health‐care system (LHS) affects some of the main controversies in research ethics by addressing five key problems of research ethics: (a) What is the difference between practice and research? (b) What is the relationship between research ethics and clinical ethics? (c) What is the ethical relevance of the principle of clinical equipoise? (d) Does participation in research require a higher (...) standard of informed consent than the practice of medicine? and (e) What ethical principle should take precedence in medicine? These questions allow us to construct two opposite idealized positions on the distinction between research and practice: the integration model and the segregation model of research and practice. We then compare the ECF for an LHS with these two idealized positions. We argue that the ECF for a LHS does not, in fact, solve these problems, but that it is a third, separate position in the relationship between research ethics and clinical ethics. Moreover, we suggest that the ECF for a LHS raises new ethical problems that require additional ethical analysis and justification. Our article contributes to the discussion on the relationship between research ethics and clinical ethics, revealing that although a learning health‐care system may significantly change the landscape of health care, some ethical dilemmas still require resolving on both theoretical and policy‐making levels. (shrink)

This paper begins with Hegel’s critique of Kant in the Encyclopaedia’s examination of three positions on objectivity. According to this critique, Kant’s philosophy is flawed because it reduces objectivity to a relation isolated within the subjectivity of the knower, does not integrate the contingent into its understanding of the rational, and does not acknowledge the reality status of contradiction. The second section of the paper examines Hegel’s analysis of dialectical proof procedure in the introductory essays of his major works. The (...) rest of the paper examines the way the Phenomenology proves that rationality is a common ground governing both independent thought and the independence of the natural world, that the contradictory otherness of nature requires an irrational element, which neither observational nor practical thought can overcome, and that truth is an infinite spirit that both transcends and dwells within the finite reality of the human spirit. (shrink)

The next forty years will see us through the most imperative issues in bioethics and public health today. We will face continuing challenges regarding health care reform, reproductive freedom, and euthanasia. We will confront growing disparities stemming from global development and cope with complex questions of social and environmental justice. We will grapple with the health effects of global climate change and with the implications of the rapidly expanding role of genomics in health research and practice. Bioethicists will face (...) no shortage of contentious issues in the coming decades, but as I begin my career, I wonder if we are prepared to meet them.With the topics of normative debate so ripe for discussion, it .. (shrink)

In visually cataloging the endearing and enigmatic ways in which the built environment takes shape, 'Best Practices' proposes a new way of thinking about neighbourhoods, housing developments, streetscapes, and storefronts, not so much as places defined by building codes, dimensions, or geographic features, but as assemblages of ad hoc interventions and incidental ephemera. Drawing on the history of architecture, media theory, cultural anthropology, and urban studies, 'Best Practices' pairs photographic documentation with extensive captions and citations to define a territory within (...) the margins between the sanctioned and unsanctioned, the regulated and unregulated, the tasteful and tacky, the novel and the nonsense. While not necessarily in opposition of those mechanisms, Best Practices asserts that interest, knowledge, and meaning are more often generated on the lines that divide such categories. This book advocates for a more thorough consideration of the unauthorised remodels, slap-dash handiwork, haphazard paint jobs, half-hearted do-it-yourself projects, cracked facades, contradictions, compromises, and coincidences. (shrink)

Recently, some philosophers have defended the idea that knowledge is an interest-relative notion. According to this thesis, whether an agent knows P may depend on the practical costs of her being wrong about P. This perspective marks a radical departure from traditional accounts that take knowledge to be a purely intellectual concept. I think there is much to say on behalf of the interest-relative notion. In this paper, I report on some new evidence which strongly suggests that ordinary people’s attributions (...) of knowledge are in fact sensitive to practical interests. This is noteworthy because recent experiments have been interpreted by many to support the opposite conclusion. I also argue that the new results support an invariantist but interest-relativist account of knowledge, a thesis known as Interest Relative Invariantism (IRI). I do not make the case here that IRI gives us the very best explanation of the results presented here. Any such attempt would require an in-depth survey of the last few decades of work in epistemology. I only want to argue here that IRI gives us a simple and elegant explanation of the new data, and that the same cannot be said about traditional contextualism, a leading competitor to IRI. (shrink)

From 1687, the year when Newton published his Principia, to the Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851, science gradually became central to Western thought and economic development. The book examines how, despite powerful opposition on the Continent, a Newtonian understanding gained acceptance and practical application.

The nineteenth-century engineering hero Isambard Kingdom Brunel was a prominent patent abolitionist in debates about the patent system in Britain. His opposition is usually regarded as principled, that is, based in liberal laissez-faire opposition to monopolies and to the constraints of bureaucracy. Against this it is argued that Brunel's views on patents evolved. As late as 1840, despite lessons about patents from the bad experiences of his father, Brunel could still consider taking out a patent himself, something that a decade (...) later he denied he had ever contemplated. Brunel's engineering persona, his experiences and conduct of engineering practice were the base from which he eventually formulated principled opposition to the patent system. The paper examines his responses to importunate inventors who pestered him with inventions in the 1840s and elucidates how he dealt with the patented inventions of others that he wanted to use in his projects. It is suggested that for Brunel patent abolitionism was in effect a way of doing business before it became a political cause. The case suggests the value of approaching the history of patents and, by implication, of intellectual property more generally, through detailed examination of practices. (shrink)

Two significantly different, if related, themes run through pacifist ideas in western history. One school of pacifism rejects violence as itself evil by whomever practiced and in whatever cause, but accepts the state as the agent of change to abolish violence. This point of view includes an expressed hope that a Utopian reconstitution of government will produce a totally peaceful world society. The other major theme expressed by pacifists in western culture accepts violence as inevitable in history and perhaps even (...) in some sense "ordained by God." The moral rejection of violence follows from an all-encompassing desire to separate from the society where violence is practiced and to live apart in a peaceful society ruled by the love of Christ. This paper explores these two themes in the western historical context via examination of the pacifism of Erasmus, exemplifying the first theme, and that of the Anabaptists of the Schleitheim Confession, representing the second theme. (shrink)

This paper defends the deflationary character of two recent views regarding scientific representation, namely RIG Hughes’ DDI model and the inferential conception. It is first argued that these views’ deflationism is akin to the homonymous position in discussions regarding the nature of truth. There, we are invited to consider the platitudes that the predicate “true” obeys at the level of practice, disregarding any deeper, or more substantive, account of its nature. More generally, for any concept X, a deflationary approach (...) is then defined in opposition to a substantive approach, where a substantive approach to X is an analysis of X in terms of some property P, or relation R, accounting for and explaining the standard use of X. It then becomes possible to characterize a deflationary view of scientific representation in three distinct senses, namely: a “no-theory” view, a “minimalist” view, and a “use-based” view – in line with three standard deflationary responses in the philosophical literature on truth. It is then argued that both the DDI model and the inferential conception may be suitably understood in any of these three different senses. The application of these deflationary ‘hermeneutics’ moreover yields significant improvements on the DDI model, which bring it closer to the inferential conception. It is finally argued that what these approaches have in common – the key to any deflationary account of scientific representation – is the denial that scientific representation may be ultimately reduced to any substantive explanatory property of sources, or targets, or their relations. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the conceptual limitations of Kant's ethical theory with the purpose of assessing its suitability as a model of practical philosophy based upon the idea of autonomy. My aim is not only to exhibit the specific weaknesses in Kant's treatment of morality, but also to explore a contrast between two different approaches in ethical theory. This contrast can be characterized in terms of an opposition between a 'formal-individualistic' and a 'social-historical' model for the analysis and derivation of ethical (...) principles. The crucial problem here is whether an ethical theory can be constructed on the exiguous basis of concepts such as the 'rationality' or 'freedom' of the will, or whether it requires an insight into the connection between moral principles and specific conditions of historical and social life that constitute the real foundation of moral judgment. ;The dissertation is composed of four chapters. In Chapter One I consider the deficiencies in Kant's treatment of the historical and temporal dimensions of moral volition. I focus especially upon his neglect of the conditions of historical genesis that underlie the framework of moral concepts he analyzes. In the second and third chapters I examine Kant's failure to attend to the social dimension of morality and distinguish two separate parts to this objection: difficulties resulting from his restriction of the scope of moral freedom to the domain of an agent's inner intentions, so that a consideration of the consequences of action is excluded, and problems arising from his monological interpretation of the universalization procedure. Finally, in Chapter Four I argue that Kant's neglect of the historical and social dimensions of morality is by no means accidental. Rather, it is a function of his reliance upon a two-world metaphysical framework in which moral principles are understood essentially as the laws governing a purely rational, non-natural order. The dependence of Kant's ethical theory upon 'problematic' metaphysical premises--particularly in his justification of the moral law--suggests that the two dimensions he excludes from his analysis--history and society--must be integrated within it in order to yield a more convincing elaboration of the basic concepts of morality. (shrink)

The intuitions of Raimundus Lullus religious metaphysics are in this article explicated according to the opportunities of the convergence between the medieval and the new time philosophy. Such approach to the creativity of the thinker is possible, because his conception is one sides associated with the mystical symbolic theologism, that is typical for the medieval tradition, over sides develops Lullus the new understanding of the infinity of the world, inherent in the newtime philosophy. This opposition conditions some of the features (...) of Lullus spiritual quest. This quest connected the respect to the past, that causes the homesickness to the lost ideals, together with the progressivity – the presentation of the future. This presentiment is by Lullus expressed as the desire to change the external world. The aim of this change is the approximation of the rational theological base – the model for the real life. Lullus experiences the combination and the unrealized synthesis of this intentions as the tragedy. The acute and intensive conflict of this intentions triggers the practical atheism, when the stimulation of the external distraction of the evil leads causes the appearance and the activation of the new evil. This disaster of life is determined with some aspects of Lullus metaphysics, in that the infinity of God is realized as the infinity of the world. The infinity of the world is by Lullus given as the rational hierarchical order, leading to the creator of the world. The tragedy of life is for Lullus the marker, that emphasizes the crisis of the medieval philosophy, that was based on the revelation. This crisis discovers the land of new philosophy. This philosophy stresses the autonomy of the human personality. (shrink)

The article carries out a comprehensive comparative analysis of the understanding of "practice" in the context of thinkers of two directions of Marxism – Ukrainian-Soviet and Chinese philosophers. When examining the concept of "practice" in Ukrainian Soviet Marxism, the work of the following domestic thinkers is studied: P. Kopnin, V. Shynkaruk, V. Tabachkovskyi, V. Ivanov, O. Yatsenko. It is substantiated that domestic thinkers in the 60s and 80s of the XX century. focused their attention on practice not (...) so much in the epistemological or socio-philosophical content, but in the anthropological and existential one. According to most of them, practice is not so much the opposite of theory, but a fundamental principle of consideration of all scientific and theoretical problems through the prism of their humanistic content, which allows us to realize the connection of theoretical knowledge with all the variety of ways of mastering a person. being, reveals the essence of knowledge as a cultural phenomenon. The work "On Practice" by Mao Zedong is analyzed, which reveals the prospect of further understanding of the researched concept within the framework of Chinese Marxism. In particular, he singles out two key aspects of the explanation of "practice": epistemological and political-philosophical. Therefore, Marxism in China is used to solve its problems and transform the rich practical experience of the state into theory, as well as in combination with Chinese history and unique Chinese traditional culture. (shrink)

Background There is a growing concern about artificial intelligence (AI) applications in healthcare that can disadvantage already under-represented and marginalised groups (eg, based on gender or race). Objectives Our objectives are to canvas the range of strategies stakeholders endorse in attempting to mitigate algorithmic bias, and to consider the ethical question of responsibility for algorithmic bias. Methodology The study involves in-depth, semistructured interviews with healthcare workers, screening programme managers, consumer health representatives, regulators, data scientists and developers. Results Findings reveal considerable (...) divergent views on three key issues. First, views on whether bias is a problem in healthcare AI varied, with most participants agreeing bias is a problem (which we call the bias-critical view), a small number believing the opposite (the bias-denial view), and some arguing that the benefits of AI outweigh any harms or wrongs arising from the bias problem (the bias-apologist view). Second, there was a disagreement on the strategies to mitigate bias, and who is responsible for such strategies. Finally, there were divergent views on whether to include or exclude sociocultural identifiers (eg, race, ethnicity or gender-diverse identities) in the development of AI as a way to mitigate bias. Conclusion/significance Based on the views of participants, we set out responses that stakeholders might pursue, including greater interdisciplinary collaboration, tailored stakeholder engagement activities, empirical studies to understand algorithmic bias and strategies to modify dominant approaches in AI development such as the use of participatory methods, and increased diversity and inclusion in research teams and research participant recruitment and selection. (shrink)

Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper will defend (...) the opposite reaction. Contrary to what recent discussions lead us to expect, practical reason is not simply a philosophical fiction lacking empirical roots. Empirical research does not exclude the possibility that practical reason can play a substantive role; rather, there is evidence that it can help us both to determine our first personal moral judgments and to motivate us to act on them. (shrink)

In contrast to standardized guidelines, personalized medicine and person centered care are two notions that have recently developed and are aspiring for more individualized health care for each single patient. While having a similar drive toward individualized care, their sources are markedly different. While personalized medicine stems from a biomedical framework, person centered care originates from a caring perspective, and a wish for a more holistic view of patients. It is unclear to what extent these two concepts can be combined (...) or if they conflict at fundamental or pragmatic levels. This paper reviews existing literature in both medicine and related philosophy to analyze closer the meaning of the two notions, and to explore the extent to which they overlap or oppose each other, in theory or in practice, in particular regarding ethical assumptions and their respective practical implications. (shrink)

Moral philosophers working today on concrete moral issues seem to assume certain views that are opposite to those of their predecessors; chief among these is that morality has an objective basis, that it is not just the result of subjective reactions, but comprises a body of beliefs acquired through some kind of perception of certain traits of reality. However, the reasons for thinking that people who discuss substantive moral issues are committed to moral objectivism are either not very clear or (...) not entirely convincing. In what follows I shall examine the reasons given by John Mackie for considering that the use of first-level moral language—the language frequently used in the discussion of concrete moral problems—commits the user to moral objectivism. (shrink)