Government

Few debates in political theory are challenged as much by the constant change of their empirical subject as those about democracy in the European Union. With A Republican Europe of States, Ric...

One is occasionally reminded of Foucault's proclamation in a 1970 interview that "perhaps, one day this century will be known as Deleuzian." Less often is one compelled to update and restart with a supplementary counter-proclamation of the mathematician, David Lindley: "the twenty-first century would be a Bayesian era..." The verb tenses of both are conspicuous. // To critically attend to what is today often feared and demonized, but also revered, deployed, and commonly referred to as algorithm(s), one cannot avoid the (...) mathematical and philosophical legacies of probability. // But attending to these probabilistic or Bayesian legacies must include an undeniable theological legacy in which they remain entangled. // We are not, today, discovering quirky theological metaphors in contemporary technics. It's the other way around. The technologies are mere metaphors of past theologies. (shrink)

"This book discusses political corruption and anticorruption as a matter of a public ethics of office. It shows how political corruption is the Trojan horse that undermines public institutions from within via the interrelated action of the officeholders. Even well-designed and legitimate institutions may go off track if the officeholders fail to uphold by their conduct a public ethics of office accountability. Most current discussions of what political corruption is and why it is wrong have concentrated either on explaining and (...) assessing it as a matter of an individual's corrupt character and motives or as a dysfunction of institutional procedures. The book investigates the common normative root of these two manifestations of political corruption as a relationally wrongful practice that consists in an unaccountable use of the power of office by the officeholders in public institutions. From this perspective, political corruption is an internal enemy of public institutions that can only be opposed by mobilizing the officeholders to engage in answerability practices. In this way, officeholders are responsible for working together to maintain an interactively just institutional system"--. (shrink)

Despite having a set of well-intended tobacco control policies since 2003, the production and consumption of tobacco in Bangladesh have increased. This paper explains why the tobacco control policies in Bangladesh failed to deliver their intended outcomes. Using a combined framework of political economy and policy implementation analysis, this study examines the information collected from primary and secondary sources. Based on the findings, the paper argues that the game of interests among the stakeholders have made the state institutions inactive and (...) ineffective. Lack of political commitment and politics of interests have failed the implementation and skewed the outcome. (shrink)

Climate change activists sometimes engage in protests that exert coercion on governments, businesses, and citizens, instead of protests that just attempt to persuade them. I argue that these coercive protests are sometimes undemocratic, despite recent attempts in the literature to describe them as democratic. Coercive climate protests do not always improve deliberative decision-making, and they are a means of exerting control over official decisions that is not available to all affected. I then claim that the fact that some of these (...) protests are undemocratic is not a decisive objection against them. Climate change poses such an extremely serious threat to basic rights worldwide – risking hundreds of millions of lives – that people's right to democracy is outweighed when infringing it is a necessary means for achieving climate change mitigation. (shrink)

This is a review of Lee Drutman's recent book endorsing multi-party democracy in America.

Debates about the ethics of health care and medical research in contemporary pluralistic democracies often arise partly from competing religious and secular values. Such disagreements raise challenges of balancing claims of religious liberty with claims to equal treatment in health care. This paper proposes several mid-level principles to help in framing sound policies for resolving such disputes. We develop and illustrate these principles, exploring their application to conscientious objection by religious providers and religious institutions, accommodation of religious priorities in biomedical (...) research, and treatment of patients’ religious views in doctor–patient encounters. Given that no sound set of guiding principles yields precise solutions for every policy dispute, we explore how morally sound democracies might deliberatively resolve such policy issues, following our proposed principles. Taken together and carefully interpreted, these principles may help in guiding difficult decision making in the indefinitely large realm where government, medical providers, and patients encounter problems concerning religion and medicine. (shrink)

John Locke’s theory of state is heavily constructed around his doctrine of consent. The doctrine indeed signifies a critical moment in the development of liberal and democratic theories in the history of political thought. Nevertheless, the doctrine has provoked various controversies and raises doubts on whether Locke’s early and later positions are reconcilable. This paper joins the scholarly debate through investigating the role of consent in Locke’s theory of state. It rejects the ahistorical readings of the doctrine that deliberation and (...) voluntary intention constitute the necessary condition of consent. It also opposes the view that the doctrine of consent offers a moral ground for Locke’s argument on the legitimacy of government, nor does the doctrine directly makes the case for political obligation. Instead, I argue that the doctrine of consent normatively proclaims the essential value of liberty in Locke’s theory of state while historically it was employed as a response to England’s political reality. Locke’s articulation of the doctrine also reveals his life-long concern about the peril of anarchy. Thus, consent should be understood as a dynamic process of recognising the necessity of government while acknowledging the people’s resolution to be free. (shrink)

Political corruption is a contested concept. Both terms in the concept are the object of controversies in political theory, and concern what corruption is and how it is a politically relevant phenomenon. Political corruption has been contested across time, space, cultures, and philosophical traditions. Usually, political corruption is assumed to involve an exchange between a private corruptor and a public official who pursues her personal interest by abusing her power of office. While this account may be true with respect to (...) some such instances as bribery, some significant uncertainties affect its plausibility. Practices such as patronage or state capture might escape this account either because they do not involve a corruptor or because the corrupted officer does not pursue her personal interest but, say, that of her party or faction. Interestingly, despite or perhaps in reason of this semantic uncertainty, political corruption is generally perceived as a disease of the public function, something which any sensible political theory of the good state should want to avoid. Why is such a negative intuition about the nature of political corruption so widespread? A growing debate in political theory is now starting to inquire into the exact nature of the wrongness of political corruption. In this timely book, Robert Sparling engages with such an important but still developing debate. (shrink)

In times of a prevailing sense of crisis and disorder in modern politics, there is a growing sentiment that anger, despair or resignation are more appropriate attitudes to navigate the world than h...

In response to the republican revival of the ideal of freedom as non-domination, a number of ‘radical’, ‘labour’ and ‘workplace’ republicans have criticised the limitations of Philip Pettit’s accou...

Cualquier propuesta de alternativa a la democracia representativa, sea para mejorarla, sea para sustituirla por otro tipo de forma política, debería de tomar en cuenta dos tipos de restricciones para que la alternativa en cuestión tenga mayores probabilidades de éxito. Al primer grupo de restricciones los llamaremos factores limitantes de la conducta humana, mientras que al segundo grupo los llamaremos funciones impropias de esa forma política, es decir, las funciones que no debería tener. Tanto los factores limitantes de la conducta (...) humana como las funciones impropias de una forma política son restricciones sobre lo que realmente, es decir, no utópicamente, podríamos hacer para mejorar a la democracia y en general a la gobernabilidad de las sociedades. Esas restricciones, que a continuación señalaré, constituyen los argumentos que me llevan a plantear la siguiente tesis: la democracia representativa puede y debe ser mejorada al reducir su alcance económico, político y social, pero continúa siendo una mejor opción de gobierno que cualquier alternativa, incluyendo la demarquía. (shrink)

Kant is often regarded as one of the founding fathers of modern liberal democracy. His political theory reaches its climax in the ground-breaking work, Perpetual Peace (1795), which sets out the basic framework for a world federation of states united by a system of international law. What is less well known is that two years earlier, in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793/1794), Kant had postulated a very different, explicitly religious path to the politics of peace: he (...) presents the idea of an “ethical community” as a necessary requirement for humanity to become “satisfactory to God”. While many recent scholars have noted the importance of Kant’s concept of the ethical community, few recognize the force of his argument that such a community is possible only if it takes the form of a church; as a result, the precise status of his proposal remains unclear and under-appreciated. He argues in Division One, Section IV, of Religion’s Third Piece that the idea of this community can become a reality only through a “church” that is characterized by four rational requirements: unity, integrity, freedom, and the changeability of all church rules except these four unchangeable marks. Prior to Section IV, Division One portrays this ethical community as having a political form, yet an essentially nonpolitical matter. He compares it with Jewish theocracy, but observes that the latter failed to be an ethical commonwealth because it was explicitly political. Whereas traditional theocracy replaces the political state of nature (which conforms to the law, “might makes right”) with an ethical state of nature (which conforms to the law that I call, “should makes good”), or attempts to synthesize them, non-coercive theocracy transcends this distinction through a new perspective: it unites humanity in a common vision of a divine legislator whose only law is inward, binding church members together like families, through the law of love. Whereas the legal rights supported by democracy and a system of international law can go a long way to prepare for world peace, Kant’s conviction is that it will be ultimately impossible without support from healthy religion. (shrink)

Governments have previously sought to reduce climate-change-inducing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere through mitigation and adaptation activities, with limited success. New approaches are being explored, such as negative emissions technologies, including carbon dioxide removal, as well as solar geoengineering, also known as solar radiation management, or modification. This article outlines these emerging technologies focusing on bioenergy, carbon capture and storage, and stratospheric aerosol injection, and explores some of the challenges they pose. Prevention of emissions and their reliable, (...) safe, and environmentally benign removal remain the best options. Robust governance systems and a careful, unbiased, and knowledge-driven assessment of the risks of these emerging technologies are required before they are implemented any further. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 47, Issue 4, Page 412-424, Fall 2019.

I offered the title for this paper before family separations were on the news, before the president had brought attention to the exodus of migrants, and before the government shutdown in response to the request of billions of dollars to build a border wall.1 I had no idea how common immigration would be in everyday conversation. By the time you read this, I am sure there will be other worrisome news. Perhaps we will still be thinking about immigration, or we (...) might have moved on.I have been intrigued, however, as to what this intensified public discussion of the threats of immigration reveals about the self-image of the United States, and the racial and religious ideas that undergird that... (shrink)

Some African thinkers have argued that the governance system in traditional pre-colonial African societies were democratic, and the kind of democracy they practiced was consensual democracy (Wiredu, 2012; Wamala, 2004; Teffo, 2004). It was democratic, because it ensured the maximal participation of all members in the governance of the society; and it was consensual because it involved the rational deliberation of issues where decisions were primarily reached by consensus. The aim of this paper is to examine, on the one side, (...) the nature of the demos and kratos in traditional African system of governance that warrants characterizing it as democratic; and, on the other side, the decision-making procedure that marks it as a distinctive form of democracy – consensual democracy. The question of democracy in relation to the traditional African system of governance should be pursued, I will argue, not from how it cherishes consensual decision making, but by how it uniquely conceptualizes the demos and kratos in the political experiences of African societies. (shrink)

Is there a human right to be governed democratically – and how should we approach such an issue philosophically? These are the questions raised by Joshua Cohen’s 2006 article, ‘Is There a Human Right to Democracy?’ – a paper over which I have agonised since I saw it in draft form, many years ago. I am still uncomfortable with its central claim, that while justice demands democratic government, the proper standard for human rights is something less. But, as I hope (...) to show, the reasons for that discomfort are occasioned less by the thought that democracy may not be a human right than by the very significant gaps in our understanding of rights which debates about the human rights status of democracy exemplify. (shrink)

In ‘Bureaucratic respectful equality’, Christopher Nathan puts forward two challenges for the author’s claim that basic equality can be grounded in a form of ‘opacity respect’ appropriately shown b...

This essay argues that gun control in America is a philosophical as well as a policy debate. This explains the depth of acrimony it causes. It also explains why the technocratic public health argument favored by the gun control movement has been so unsuccessful in persuading opponents and motivating supporters. My analysis also yields some positive advice for advocates of gun control: take the political philosophy of the gun rights movement seriously and take up the challenge of showing that a (...) society without guns is a better society, not merely a safer one. (shrink)

This paper explicates the influential Confucian view that “people” and not “institutional rules” are the proper sources of good governance and social order, as well as some notable Confucian objections to this position. It takes Xunzi 荀子, Hu Hong 胡宏, and Zhu Xi 朱熹 as the primary representatives of the “virtue-centered” position, which holds that people’s good character and not institutional rules bear primary credit for successful governance. And it takes Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 as a major advocate for the “institutionalist” (...) position, which holds that institutional rules have some power to effect success independently of improvements in character. Historians have often called attention to this debate but left the major arguments and positions relatively unspecified. As I show, the Confucian virtue-centered view is best captured in two theses: first, that reforming people is far more demanding than reforming institutional rules; second, that once the rules have reached a certain threshold of viability, further improvements in those rules are unlikely to be effective on their own. Once we specify the theses in this way, we can catalogue the different respects and degrees to which the more virtue-centered political thinkers endorse virtue-centrism in governance. Zhu Xi, for example, turns out to endorse a stronger version of virtue-centrism than Hu Hong. I also use this account of the major theses to show that Huang Zongxi, who is sometimes regarded as historical Confucianism’s foremost institutionalist, has more complicated and mixed views about the power of institutional reform than scholars usually assume. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Volume 48, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 1-7.

I raise two critical points about Emanuela Ceva’s theory of interactive justice. First, I argue the value of individual dignity is insufficient in itself to establish principles of interactive justice, but that the lacuna can be filled by an account of democratic authority. Second, I argue that realising interactive justice in political conflict management is better understood as a form of quasi-pure proceduralism rather than intrinsic proceduralism. This is because the moral quality of a decision procedure can be an essential (...) part of the explanation for why political decisions can possess moral authority. (shrink)

The paper evaluates the claims of Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu that the Akan traditional governance structures are just as democratic or even more democratic that Western style representative democracies.

"In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: -/- This excellent collection, edited by Julian Young, features ten essays on the topic of Nietzsche’s valuation of the individual and the implications this has for notions of community. The book features contributions from some of the most respected contemporary Nietzsche scholars, and each essay displays rigorous analysis while being written in an engaging style. -/- Many of these contributions are evidently written in response to Young’s own (...) provocative reading of Nietzsche as a communitarian thinker in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), and Young presents aspects of this reading in the opening essay. He argues that Nietzsche’s “liberal communitarianism” (8) stems from his intellectual inheritance from Wagner of a distinctly Hegelian project, that of synthesizing the need for common meaning with the desire for liberal individual rights. Young provides a close reading of Wagner, identifying the liberal aspect of Wagner’s communitarianism in a form of “soft power” (9)—namely, the capacity to inspire, rather than coerce, the collective toward a shared ideal. This soft power opens the space for reconciliation between the desires of the individual and the goals of the community at large. Young contends that Wagner’s early Hegelianism “appears virtually word for word” in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy (16). More controversially and less convincingly, he extends this liberal communitarianism across Nietzsche’s entire corpus. In particular, for Young, we should understand Nietzsche’s free spirits as “agents of change” (25), exemplary individuals who both establish and question the evaluative boundaries of the collective ethical imperative. -/- Hans Sluga’s chapter investigates Nietzsche’s call for a new “great politics” (32). Drawing comparisons with Plato, Sluga argues that Nietzsche views the lack of a socially recognized order of rank, a corollary of modern democratic pluralism, as the inception of political nihilism. Sluga locates this diagnosis in Human, All Too Human, where Nietzsche’s critique of modern democracy inaugurates his concern with the tensions between political processes and the prospect of cultural flourishing. For Sluga, however, it is in Beyond Good and Evil that Nietzsche floats the possibility of reconciliation between the two, with the prospect of exceptional individuals instigating a new political relationship. Sluga argues that Nietzsche sees the European notion of the nation-state as something that should and will be abolished. While taking Nietzsche’s recommendation to be problematic, Sluga concludes that his diagnosis is profound. [End Page 469] -/- How convincing one takes Sluga’s argument to be depends on the literalness one thinks should be placed on the phrase “great politics.” By Beyond Good and Evil, is it not employed purely as a metaphor? This would accord with Ken Gemes and Chris Sykes’s approach in the following essay. Like Young, Gemes and Sykes emphasize Nietzsche’s kinship with Wagner, identifying the problem of meaning as central to both. Nietzsche is identified as conducting an anthropology of communities’ answers to the problem of meaning, or, rather, their creations of illusions to act as semblances of meaning. In his early works they take Nietzsche to hold that the foundations for the kind of cultural consecration necessary for the provision of collective meaning can be provided through myth, in the place of metaphysics. But, contra Young, Gemes and Sykes argue that Nietzsche develops away from his early communitarianism: first, toward an (ultimately pessimistic) investigation into the possibility of a scientific culture that provides meaning, and then by advocating a narrower individualism. For Gemes and Sykes, then, Nietzsche’s aspiration for communitarian cultural flourishing died at Bayreuth, and with Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche makes a final attempt to provide a life-affirming “mythology” (72) for the flourishing of his intended recipients, now of a far more limited scope—namely, only truly exemplary individuals. -/- Here one might wonder whether Nietzsche’s thought of the eternal recurrence might better fit this need for the provision of a mythology. Although Nietzsche marks out Zarathustra as the jewel of his oeuvre (EH P:4), he also declares the eternal recurrence, which receives...". (shrink)