This classic anthology offers ancient and modern perspectives on Job's question: 'If a man die, shall he live again?' Spanning over 5,000 years of world thought, the selections invite consideration of an idea that has found hospitality in the greatest minds of history.

What experimental game theorists may have demonstrated is not that people are systematically irrational but that human rationality is heavily scaffolded. Remove the scaffolding, and we do not do very well. People are able to get on because they “offload” an enormous amount of practical reasoning onto their environment. As a result, when they are put in novel or unfamiliar environments, they perform very poorly, even on apparently simple tasks. -/- This observation is supported by recent empirically informed shifts in (...) philosophy of mind toward a view of cognition as (to cite the current slogan) “embodied, embedded, enactive, extended.” Andy Clark and others have made a very plausible case for the idea that a proper assessment of human cognitive competence must include environmental components. To limit our attention to what lies within the skin-skull boundary is, in effect, to miss the big story on human rationality. Insofar as we are rational, it is often because of our ingenuity at developing “work-arounds” to the glitches in the fast-and-frugal heuristic problem-solving capabilities that natural selection has equipped us with. And these work-arounds often involve a detour through the environment (so-called offloading of cognitive burdens). -/- When it comes to practical rationality, things are no different. Yet in many discussions of “the will,” there is still a tendency to put too much emphasis on what goes on inside the agent’s head. Our objective in this chapter is to articulate this conception of “the extended will” more clearly, using the strategies that people employ to overcome procrastination for the central set of examples. Procrastination, in our view, constitutes a particular type of self-control problem, one that is particularly amenable to philosophical reflection, not only because of the high volume of psychological research on the subject but also because of the large quantity of “self-help” literature in circulationa literature that provides an invaluable perspective on the everyday strategies that people use in order to defeat (or, better yet, circumvent) this type of self-defeating behavior pattern. In general, what we find is that the internalist bias that permeates discussions of the will gives rise to a set of practical recommendations that overemphasize changing the way one thinks about a task, while ignoring the much richer set of strategies that are available in the realm of environmental scaffolding. In the concluding section, we highlight some of the policy implications of this, particularly regarding social trends involving the dismantling of support structures. (shrink)

Imagine slicing your hand with a steak knife. Inevitably, this leads to a characteristic unpleasant sensation, and just as reliably, to a withdrawal of the wounded limb. But can this rather mundane fact--and other similar facts--shed any light on the mind-body problem or the issue of the role of experience in causing behavior? In my dissertation, I explore this issue head on, and in the process clarify and criticize the arguments of philosophers who have given an affirmative answer to (...) this question--philosophers such as William James and Herbert Spencer. These arguments have coupled evidence like the above with the fact that human beings have evolved, in order to make the case that epiphenomenalism with respect to qualia is false. My first task will be to formulate a rigorous version of a James-Spencer style argument, which will occupy us in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 is dedicated to answering a number of objections to the argument, in an effort to show that if there is a problem with it, this problem lies elsewhere. Chapter 3 explores alternative arguments in the spirit of the original one formulated in Chapter 1, and discusses any resulting effects on the plausibility of the conclusion. Chapter 4 is the capstone chapter of the dissertation. In it, I discuss a crucial objection to all arguments in the spirit of that given in the first chapter--namely, that physicalism has analogous flaws to epiphenomenalism where accommodating the relevant evidence is concerned. My conclusions in this final chapter are twofold. First, that even if there is no fatal flaw in the general strategy the evolutionary argument employs, it works against all forms of dualism, not just epiphenomenalism. And second, the accusations made in the objection are correct; physicalism suffers from problems analogous to those faced by epiphenomenalism. Although the primary findings of the dissertation are negative, there are many lessons we can take from them along the way. Most prominent among them is an improved perspective on the appropriate roles of empirical findings and armchair philosophical theorizing in debate over the mind-body problem. (shrink)

The idea of human-like robots with artificial intelligence (AI) engaging in sports has been considered in the light of robotics, technology and culture. However, robots with AI can also be used to clarify ethical questions in sports such as boxing with its inherent risks of brain injury and even death.This article develops an innovative way to assess the ethical issues in boxing by using a thought experiment, responding to recent medical data and overall concerns about harms and risks to boxers. (...) The thought experiment imagines a fight between a human and a robot. Critical issues about head trauma and brain injuries are then discussed. These can be summed up in two ethical questions: ‘why is it acceptable for a boxer to deliver concussive and recurrent subconcussive punches to a human head (skull and brain), powerful enough to achieve a knockout, or score more points, or to potentially inflict an injury immediately or eventually resulting in death?’, with the reciprocal question, ‘why is it acceptable to allow oneself to be injured in a like manner, possibly fatally, by an opponent?’The two questions are explored using the thought experiment in two matching perspectives: where the human boxer is attacking and the robot boxer is defending; and conversely, where the human boxer is on the receiving end of punches delivered by the robot. Each perspective opens with some general remarks, followed by an analysis of the boxing contest and eliciting some implications for future opportunities for the sport. (shrink)

THE word “ Organicism,” although it may seem unfamiliar to the younger generation of biologists, is not a new one, and has been heard of already in that shadowy limbo where philosophical and biological conceptions meet on common ground. The genius of its original minting is not known, but it figured largely in the great work of Yves Delage, the French zoologist, in which he attempted to survey and criticize every important biological theory which had ever been seriously produced. Hisl'Hérédité (...) et les grands Problèmes de la Biologie appeared in 1903, and in it he classified all biological theories, past, present, and future, under the four heads of. (shrink)

This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and (...) culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10.1 (2000) 103-108 [Access article in PDF] Letters "Small Sacrifices" in Stem Cell Research Madam: I agree with Professors McGee and Caplan (in their article "The Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices in Stem Cell Research," KIEJ, June 1999) that the question of the nature and status of the source of stem cells must be addressed. However, in their eagerness to convince us of (...) the smallness of the sacrifices, I think the authors use some unfortunate rhetorical devices and move much too quickly over some necessary distinctions.The rhetorical display is unfortunate if the article is intended to be a fair and rational development of an argument--e.g., those who hold a position in opposition to the authors do not argue they "inveigh." The section on the political area of the controversy seems particularly dismissive of other's positions.However, I will focus on just two areas where I think a more nuanced consideration would make the question of the moral legitimacy of the "small sacrifices" of embryos less obvious than the authors' rhetoric would suggest.First, they claim that opponents of such research assume some sort of "super status" for an embryo. The rights generally conceded to born human beings may not be as "weak" as they characterize. But even considering only the "negative right against unwarranted violence," I think the authors misdescribe the situation. Contrary to their assertion, I do not know when "adults and even children are... forced to give life... in the defense or at least interest of the community's highest ideals and most pressing interests" (p. 153). Could they be speaking of capital punishment, justified in the name of protecting the community? But then why mention children?It is true that not everyone can be guaranteed every means to preserving and enhancing life. But this limitation on positive rights is not a "forced giving." Adults may be compelled to risk life--e.g. in a draft for the sake of a war. But, again, the more or less justifiable imposition of a risk is not the same as selecting out one particular individual or class to be directly killed. Neither adults nor born children are compelled to be killed for the sake of organ "donation," even if a greater number might be saved. If one grants equivalent status to the embryo (as the authors seem to do here for the sake of argument), opponents do not have to claim a "super status" for embryos, just the ordinary human right not to be killed even for "compassionate" motives.A second area where I think the authors move too quickly is in their impoverished definition of the essential humanity of the early embryo as exhaustively represented by the physical structure of its DNA. The authors seem to recognize [End Page 103] that, ordinarily, there is more to personhood than sheer physical structure. For example, they mention memories and habits (p. 154). They could also speak of relationships, attitudes, and the like. Since an early embryo has no such components of personality as we experience it, the authors hold that its identity could only be contained in its DNA. Since this DNA is preserved, even spread far and wide, by the use of stem cells, it almost seems as if we are doing the early embryo a favor by breaking it up.However, just because the embryo does not have any conscious memories or other attributes of character or personality, that does not mean its identity is constituted only by its physical structure described statically. The early embryo is not just a bundle of discrete structures, and its DNA is not just an inert lump made up of certain smaller lumps. Both the embryo and its DNA are active. Thus the identity of even an early embryo includes both its current processes and the innate potential for further activity and development. Although lacking a conscious will, the early embryo is already in a sense an agent, already doing things--growing, changing, and heading toward something that... (shrink)

_Jokes, Life after Death, and God _has two main tasks: to try to understand exactly what a joke is, and to see whether there are any connections between jokes, on the one hand, and life after death and God, on the other hand. But it pursues other tasks as well, tasks of an ancillary sort. This book devises a general and comprehensive, but brief, theory of jokes. The author begins with critiques of other writers’ views on the subject. 1) Ted (...) Cohen thinks that such a theory is impossible. 2) Ronald Berk, on the other hand, provides just such a theory. And 3) John Morreall provides a general theory of laughter, which may include some things which can be used in a general theory of jokes. 4) Neil Schaeffer, too, provides a general theory of laughter, which makes a big point out of what he calls the “ludicrous context”; but he does include a chapter on jokes. 5) Christopher Wilson offers a general theory of jokes in which he focuses on form and content. And 6) Thomas Werge, in reflecting on the comic, suggests a general theory of jokes which identifies their matter, form, agents, purposes, and beyond these, the underlying shared relational context, which makes it possible for jokes to arise. 7) Bill Fuller’s message is that there is more funniness coming out of two or more heads than out of one, just as Socrates’ message was that there is more clarity coming out of two or more heads than out of one. 8) Umberto Eco feels that monks should laugh, just as ordinary people do; for laughter not only refreshes our seeking spirits, it also illuminates the truth we seek. 9) Simon Critchley, in his reflections on humor, notes that jokes bring on a kind of everyday anamnesis, that they are anti-story stories, that they are like prayers, that they are like philosophy; and that they require a certain underlying context, which is implicitly recognized by both teller and listener, and which renders possible the tension needed to make the punch line work. 10) Martha Wolfenstein, pursuing a psychological analysis of children’s humor, proposes that the underlying motive for telling jokes remains the same from childhood to adulthood, i.e., to transform painful and frustrating experiences so as to extract pleasure from them; and that the agent or productive cause of jokes is the repressing unconscious, as suggested by Freud. As John Morreall has argued, neither the Superiority Theory, nor the Relief Theory, nor the Incongruity Theory appears to work as a general and comprehensive theory. Moreover, these writers talk more about humor and laughter than about jokes. To be sure, a joke is a type of humor. Thus, to say something about humor is to say something, though of a generic sort, about jokes. Similarly, to say something about the laughter caused by humor is to say something, though generic, about the laughter caused by jokes. Most of the authors considered in chapter one are concerned with jokes, and not only with humor as such. Section 11 of chapter one puts together, out of the combined contributions of these authors, what can be considered the beginnings of, some thoughts toward, a general and comprehensive theory of jokes. This task the author illustrates in a concrete way, by looking at individual jokes of different sorts; not, however, without inviting the reader to enjoy these jokes. The author looks particularly at Jewish jokes, Christian jokes, and Islamic jokes, jokes about philosophy and philosophers, yo mama jokes, Italian jokes and Slovak jokes, all of which makes for a clearer understanding of exactly what a joke is. The analysis of general theory is then followed by some views on the morality of jokes and joke-telling, and an analysis of the connection between jokes and life after death, on the one hand, and God, on the other. Throughout the book Bobik offers innumerable examples to heighten our understanding and entertain us. (shrink)

1. The Real Claim of the Chicago School If anything dramatic has happened in economic theory over the last one hundred years – namely, since the advent of marginalism – then, everyone agrees, it was not the rise of the Chicago neo -classical school which, after all, only synthesized the various versions of marginalism, but the Keynesian Revolution. Assessments of this revolution were repeatedly invited, particularly by opponent, chiefly from Chicago. F. A. von Hayek has explicitly and bitterly blames Keynes (...) for all our economic troubles; Harry Johnson has repeatedly declared the most revolutionary work of Keynes, his General Theory of 1936, so poor that but for its author's name on its title page it would have totally flopped. Can such a flop cause so much damage? Are these two assessments – of Hayek and of Johnson – in conflict or no t? Don Patinkin has raised a different question: how different is Keynes from his Chicago opponents, say, Milton Friedman? How many heads need roll, to use his metaphor, before a revolution may be declared? Patinkin sees Keynes as slightly deviant but stil l a member of the mainstream – the mainstream of the mainstream being Friedman and his Chicago followers, of course. Now, can a minor deviant be a flop? Can minor deviations from the true blue doctrine be to blame for all of our economic woes? I do not kno w. Joan Robinson sees in Keynes a minor deviation from classical theory because he said once his correction of classical theory is implemented, that theory takes over once again. Moreover, Samuelson and Friedman have endorsed a (poor) version of Keynes' theory of shortterm relative price and ignored his general theory of price and money. (shrink)

1. The Real Claim of the Chicago School If anything dramatic has happened in economic theory over the last one hundred years – namely, since the advent of marginalism – then, everyone agrees, it was not the rise of the Chicago neo -classical school which, after all, only synthesized the various versions of marginalism, but the Keynesian Revolution. Assessments of this revolution were repeatedly invited, particularly by opponent, chiefly from Chicago. F. A. von Hayek has explicitly and bitterly blames Keynes (...) for all our economic troubles; Harry Johnson has repeatedly declared the most revolutionary work of Keynes, his General Theory of 1936, so poor that but for its author's name on its title page it would have totally flopped. Can such a flop cause so much damage? Are these two assessments – of Hayek and of Johnson – in conflict or no t? Don Patinkin has raised a different question: how different is Keynes from his Chicago opponents, say, Milton Friedman? How many heads need roll, to use his metaphor, before a revolution may be declared? Patinkin sees Keynes as slightly deviant but stil l a member of the mainstream – the mainstream of the mainstream being Friedman and his Chicago followers, of course. Now, can a minor deviant be a flop? Can minor deviations from the true blue doctrine be to blame for all of our economic woes? I do not kno w. Joan Robinson sees in Keynes a minor deviation from classical theory because he said once his correction of classical theory is implemented, that theory takes over once again. Moreover, Samuelson and Friedman have endorsed a (poor) version of Keynes' theory of shortterm relative price and ignored his general theory of price and money. (shrink)

Academic scholarship has steadily reported unfavourable clinical findings on the sport of boxing, and national medical bodies have issued calls for restrictions on the sport. Yet, the positions taken on boxing by medical bodies have been subject to serious discussions. Beyond the medical and legal writings, there is also literature referring to the social and cultural features of boxing as ethically significant. However, what is missing in the bioethical literature is an understanding of the boxers themselves. This is apart from (...) their brain injuries, the debates about the degenerative brain disease known as chronic traumatic encephalopathy, and related issues about the disease. This article argues that the lives of boxers, their relationships, their careers, and their futures, also requires its own research, particularly in telling stories about their lives, and those lives and futures which boxing affects. The article uses two approaches. First, to imagine a more enduring “whole of life viewpoint” by using an extended future timeframe. Second, to consider perspectives of a person’s significant others. After reviewing the boxing literature, the article discusses social settings and then explores the hidden social relationships in life after boxing. With these longer time and close relationship viewpoints, three important themes emerge: family and kinship; age, stage and career; and the effects of boxing fatalities. These analyses are used in conjunction with relevant clinical findings. which complement the telling of stories to improve medical information, and engages professional and public empathy for people’s experience of illness and difficulties in coping. (shrink)

This essay offers a new interpretation of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s landmark work of critical social theory Empire. It develops an account of the politics of exile by situating this political strategy in terms of Hardt and Negri’s claim that it is no longer feasible to confront capitalist power head-on. It attends closely to Hardt and Negri’s account of Empire’s pyramidal structure, and the problems that this structure creates for the multitude’s passage from virtuality to actuality. It criticizes (...) the authors’ assertion that, under Empire, the institutions associated with modernity have become indistinguishable from one another in ‘society of control.’ This essay concludes by theorizing the historicity and power of the university, in an attempt to specify what the democratic self-organization of the multitude, together with its exodus from Empire, might look like. Accordingly, it contends that the production of knowledge and higher education depend upon an idea of absolute value which outstrips the commodity-form, and in so doing, provides an intimation of the multitude passing to the exterior of Empire. (shrink)

Suppose you come to my house and I invite you in. ‘I’m just heading out’, I say, ‘but make yourself at home’. I have consented to you remaining in my house, but what else? In your home, you put your feet up on the coffee table, so may you now do that in mine? If I complain that you’ve left crumbs from eating biscuits in my bed, can you defend yourself on the grounds that I told you to make yourself (...) at home? These questions concern the scope of my consent. How we should ascertain the scope of someone's consent is the topic of Tom Dougherty's book.The book is divided into three main parts, each corresponding to a view about what fixes the scope of consent: the mental account, the successful communication account, and the evidential account, which Dougherty favours.Versions of the mental account have in common that they think consent can be granted without any behavioural signal. Provided that the person granting consent has the appropriate mental state, they can grant permission to the recipient of consent, even if they do nothing to communicate the consent. Proponents of these views, Dougherty argues, should adopt a principle according to which the scope of consent is fixed by what the consent-giver intends to permit. However, Dougherty rejects the mental account on the grounds that consent requires some sort of publicity so that we can hold each other accountable: ‘what you do in the privacy of your own mind is not enough to waive your rights in the public sphere’ (p. 60). (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to illustrate the significance of hope (elpis, elpizein) in Plato’s Philebus and to indicate topics under this heading that invite further investigation. Even though there is some scholarship treating the issue of hope in the Philebus, there is no study solely devoted to this topic. By providing such a study I intend to fill this lacuna and to show that examining this topic is valuable because it develops our understanding of the good life. In (...) this essay I maintain that the Philebus defines hope as (1) a pleasure of the soul that (2) anticipates pleasure as certain, (3) may be true or false, (4) may be pure or impure, and (5) involves memory. I proceed chronologically through the Philebus’s discussions of hope and make every effort to treat each of the aforementioned components of the definition separately. In so doing I explain why certain topics, such as the relationship between pure intellectual hope and philosophical activity, invite further investigation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Streminger: "Religion a Threat to Morality" Joseph Ellin The question posed by Gerhard Streminger is, "What did Hume think of the effect of religion on morality?" Professor Streminger makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume's views. Streminger demonstrates that, in addition tohis critique ofthe rational basis ofreligion, and his perhaps less well-known critique ofthe origins ofreligion in what we may call the dark side ofhuman nature, (...) Hume strongly objected to religion on moral grounds. Religion is a threat to morality, Hume thinks. There is no doubt that this is Hume's view; in fact, as I shall show, Hume's opposition to religion is even more far-reaching than Streminger acknowledges. Though Hume did not write systematically on the subject, Streminger has ingeniously brought some order to Hume's views by arranging them under three heads. I shall, in turn, continue this clarification by summarizing Streminger's report of Hume's criticisms into sixteen propositions, as follows: 1.Because "fear of the unknown is the origin of religion," clergy have an incentive to limit knowledge. 2.Religious devotion arises from sorrow and terror (terror is the primary principle ofreligion [D 225-6]), so clergy have an interest in increasing human misery. 3.Clergy are necessarily hypocrites, who sometimes feign more devotion than they possess, and guard against the natural, cheerful sentiments. 4.The God of common religion is no moral authority because, among His other faults, He is malevolent, vengeful and wicked. 5.Due to His omnipotence and omniscience, He is an object offear, from whom nothing can be hidden. 6.This dominating God evokes flattery and adulation. 7.Because He is the product of human prejudices, God embodies discordant elements. 8.He unjustly inflicts excessive punishments and contradicts our natural human generosity. 9.False religion leads to an unnatural life and threatens our natural moral sentiments, in that superstitious terror evokes the monkish virtues ofmortification and humility. 10.Monotheism especially leads to intolerance, Volume XV Number 2 295 JOSEPH ELLIN 11.and to the suppression of the love ofknowledge and liberty. 12.In order to produce amazement and wonder, and to give value to service to the deity by provoking opposition and ridicule, religion deliberately promulgates absurdities. 13.The product of this is an obstinate, dogmatic spirit, guided by the rule that the greater the absurdity, the more zealous the advocacy. 14.Absurdities are also promulgated to assure that religious acts are done, not for morality, which, since itis natural and rational cannot be done for God, nor be an object offavour in God's eyes, but for God's sake alone. 15.The consequence of this is that superstition, rites and ceremonies, and not morality, are made the essence ofreligious observance. 16.By encouraging attention to eternal salvation, religion is likely to extinguish the benevolent affections, rendering its devotees untrustworthy. These are the criticisms. They are rather an odd catalogue of horrors, reflecting, no doubt, Hume's deep dislike of conventional religion as well as his unsystematic treatment ofthe subject. But what exactly are they criticisms of? Streminger thinks that Hume's target is "common religion," "established churches," religion "found in the world," "corruption," "popular," "vulgar" beliefs and practices, etc. Hume's target is thus not religion itself, but a certain degenerate or false form of it, not "true" but "false" religion. Thus for Hume there is a form of religion, "true religion," which escapes the criticisms, Streminger seems to suggest. But this is a distortion of Hume's views, based on a misreading of Hume's text. There is no evidence that for Hume there is any form of religion which can be identified as "true religion." What is supposed to be the distinction between true and false religion? Streminger quotes Hume on the "proper office of religion," whichis toinculcate goodmoral order. He quotes a passage, ultimately excised from the History ofEngland, but appearing in the Dialogues: The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit oftemperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of mortality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Streminger: "Religion a Threat to Morality" Joseph Ellin The question posed by Gerhard Streminger is, "What did Hume think of the effect of religion on morality?" Professor Streminger makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume's views. Streminger demonstrates that, in addition tohis critique ofthe rational basis ofreligion, and his perhaps less well-known critique ofthe origins ofreligion in what we may call the dark side ofhuman nature, (...) Hume strongly objected to religion on moral grounds. Religion is a threat to morality, Hume thinks. There is no doubt that this is Hume's view; in fact, as I shall show, Hume's opposition to religion is even more far-reaching than Streminger acknowledges. Though Hume did not write systematically on the subject, Streminger has ingeniously brought some order to Hume's views by arranging them under three heads. I shall, in turn, continue this clarification by summarizing Streminger's report of Hume's criticisms into sixteen propositions, as follows: 1.Because "fear of the unknown is the origin of religion," clergy have an incentive to limit knowledge. 2.Religious devotion arises from sorrow and terror (terror is the primary principle ofreligion [D 225-6]), so clergy have an interest in increasing human misery. 3.Clergy are necessarily hypocrites, who sometimes feign more devotion than they possess, and guard against the natural, cheerful sentiments. 4.The God of common religion is no moral authority because, among His other faults, He is malevolent, vengeful and wicked. 5.Due to His omnipotence and omniscience, He is an object offear, from whom nothing can be hidden. 6.This dominating God evokes flattery and adulation. 7.Because He is the product of human prejudices, God embodies discordant elements. 8.He unjustly inflicts excessive punishments and contradicts our natural human generosity. 9.False religion leads to an unnatural life and threatens our natural moral sentiments, in that superstitious terror evokes the monkish virtues ofmortification and humility. 10.Monotheism especially leads to intolerance, Volume XV Number 2 295 JOSEPH ELLIN 11.and to the suppression of the love ofknowledge and liberty. 12.In order to produce amazement and wonder, and to give value to service to the deity by provoking opposition and ridicule, religion deliberately promulgates absurdities. 13.The product of this is an obstinate, dogmatic spirit, guided by the rule that the greater the absurdity, the more zealous the advocacy. 14.Absurdities are also promulgated to assure that religious acts are done, not for morality, which, since itis natural and rational cannot be done for God, nor be an object offavour in God's eyes, but for God's sake alone. 15.The consequence of this is that superstition, rites and ceremonies, and not morality, are made the essence ofreligious observance. 16.By encouraging attention to eternal salvation, religion is likely to extinguish the benevolent affections, rendering its devotees untrustworthy. These are the criticisms. They are rather an odd catalogue of horrors, reflecting, no doubt, Hume's deep dislike of conventional religion as well as his unsystematic treatment ofthe subject. But what exactly are they criticisms of? Streminger thinks that Hume's target is "common religion," "established churches," religion "found in the world," "corruption," "popular," "vulgar" beliefs and practices, etc. Hume's target is thus not religion itself, but a certain degenerate or false form of it, not "true" but "false" religion. Thus for Hume there is a form of religion, "true religion," which escapes the criticisms, Streminger seems to suggest. But this is a distortion of Hume's views, based on a misreading of Hume's text. There is no evidence that for Hume there is any form of religion which can be identified as "true religion." What is supposed to be the distinction between true and false religion? Streminger quotes Hume on the "proper office of religion," whichis toinculcate goodmoral order. He quotes a passage, ultimately excised from the History ofEngland, but appearing in the Dialogues: The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit oftemperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of mortality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded... (shrink)

Today there are over 90,000 Small Christian Communities in the eight AMECEA countries in Eastern Africa. Kenya alone has over 35,000 SCCs.Increasingly SCCs are promoting reconciliation, justice and peace, the three main themes of 2009 Second African Synod. This essay treats the following headings: “Tracking the Historical Shifts of SCCs,” “SCCs’ Increasing Involvement in Justice and Peace Issues,” “Case Study of SCC Involvement in the Kenya Lenten Campaigns 2009 and 2010,” “Involving Youth in Small Christian Communities,” “SCCs Using the Internet (...) Especially Facebook” and “SCCs as Facilitators of Reconciliation, Justice and Peace in Africa.” One major change is the increasing use of a Pastoral Theological Reflection Process such as the “Pastoral Circle” to help SCCs to go deeper. Now more and more SCCs in Africa are reflecting pastorally and theologically on their experiences, often using the tools of social analysis. (shrink)

After the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, conservatives in this country were almost unanimous in their conviction that it was time for Canada to throw in the towel as an independent nation. Historian Michael Bliss was first out of the blocks, arguing that “although we may still chant the camp songs of Canadian sovereignty, there is probably no turning back. We are heading toward some kind of greater North American union.”1 Others were quick to chime (...) in, barely able to conceal their satisfaction at the thought that Canada would finally get its comeuppance for having, on so many occasions, defied the regional hegemon.2 Yet less than two years later, with Canada-U.S. relations at an all-time low, not only did the prospects for regional integration seem dimmer than ever, but existing arrangements like NAFTA even began to show signs of strain in the face of renewed American unilateralism. (shrink)

The Sleeping Beauty problem has spawned a debate between “Thirders” and “Halfers” who draw conflicting conclusions about Sleeping Beauty’s credence that a coin lands Heads. Our analysis is based on a probability model for what Sleeping Beauty knows at each time during the Experiment. We show that conflicting conclusions result from different modeling assumptions that each group makes. Our analysis uses a standard “Bayesian” account of rational belief with conditioning. No special handling is used for self-locating beliefs or centered propositions. (...) We also explore what fair prices Sleeping Beauty computes for gambles that she might be offered during the Experiment. (shrink)

Recent advances in spatially resolved transcriptomics have greatly expanded the knowledge of complex multicellular biological systems. The field has quickly expanded in recent years, and several new technologies have been developed that all aim to combine gene expression data with spatial information. The vast array of methodologies displays fundamental differences in their approach to obtain this information, and thus, demonstrate method‐specific advantages and shortcomings. While the field is moving forward at a rapid pace, there are still multiple challenges presented to (...) be addressed, including sensitivity, labor extensiveness, tissue‐type dependence, and limited capacity to obtain detailed single‐cell information. No single method can currently address all these key parameters. In this review, available spatial transcriptomics methods are described and their applications as well as their strengths and weaknesses are discussed. Future developments are explored and where the field is heading to is deliberated upon. (shrink)

A forty-year-old man is brought to the emergency room by his wife at five in the morning, two hours after he fell down the stairs at home, hitting his head and injuring his arm. He tells the ER physician that he got up to get a drink of water and tripped in the dark. His speech is slurred, and he smells strongly of alcohol. Lab results reveal elevated liver enzymes, and his blood alcohol level is 0.1. His medical history (...) is unremarkable. When asked about his alcohol consumption, he says he usually has one or two drinks a night with dinner but that he drinks more on holidays and special occasions. He admits he had more to drink than usual last night because it had been a stressful day at work, but he is vague about how much he drank. His wife takes the ER physician aside and describes a very different situation. She says that her husband regularly has three or four drinks a night. She always goes to bed before he does and thinks he stays up later so he can continue to drink. She says that he often has no memory of conversations they had the night before and is concerned because he makes work-related calls at night. When asked what he does for a living, she hesitates, and then answers that he is an internist. He does not work at this hospital but works at one of its affiliated clinics. The ER doctor is concerned that his patient is an impaired physician. Yet when the admitting hospitalist, to whom he explains the situation, asks if he really wants to “go there,” he shrugs his shoulders. “I suppose,” she replies, “you might as well call an ethics consult.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:JOSEPH MARGOLIS THE LOGIC AND STRUCTURES OF FICTIONAL NARRATIVE The fascination of fiction and narrative is plainly immense, sind current analyses are notably fresh and ingenious. But ifone were to venture a compendious account of die most strategic conceptual claims bearing on those notions, they might well be captured by the following three theses: (i) that fiction and narrative are logically quite distinct, without necessarily excluding one anodier; (...) (ii) that fictional worlds are no worlds at all; they are merely imagined to exist; and (iii) that events, whether actual or imagined, cannot be specified independently of the categories by which we identify them as the events they are, categories subject to change over time. What is intriguing about mese three claims is that they strike the ear as utterly commonplace and obvious. But that is dieir strength. For it would be a great convenience if the relevant puzzles generated by analytic philosophy, hermeneutics, the new narratology, semiotics and the like could be resolved, convincingly, by appeal to die implications of these diree homely trudis. In addition, diey affect one another in a rather complicated way, and, taken joindy, easily expose certain influential false starts. The import of (iii), for example, is notably ignored in die otherwise powerful analysis of narrative afforded by Gérard Genette. Its bearing on (i) utterly undermines the explicit dualism favored by Seymour Chatman, who is clearly influenced by Genette himself. The failure to mark die force of (i) and its analogue regarding poetry is most obvious in I. A. Richards's contrast between poetry and science, the work of the Prague circle, Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, and such recent speech-act theories of poetry and fiction as those proposed by Richard Ohmann, Monroe Beardsley, and Mary Louise Pratt. The corresponding failure widi respect to (ii) is clear in John Searle's theory of reference and in die ontological claims made by Nicholas Wolterstorff. The connection between (i) and (ii) is muddled most famously by G. E. Moore. These charges suggest die quarrelsome promise of the intended economy. But, as we shall see, they also lead in the direction of a more constructive theory of texts and their interpretation and of die constraints of narrative and style diat affect fiction. 162 Joseph Margolis163 Fiction, we say, differs from reality as well as from legend. But in speaking thus, we betray an understandable confidence that these three kinds of"world"— or, these three worlds — are conceptually well-behaved and open to straightforward demarcation. Once more, we slip altogether too easily between talking about certain worlds and about the narrative accounts by which we do so. What distinguishes fictional reference? we ask, and what is a fictional world? The best way to proceed here is to begin with strong intuitions and to trace dieir systematic consequences in order to test how far they are unassailable — or whether and where they must yield to others that are more accommodating. One particularly promising equivocation is the following. We speak of fictional worlds as possible (but not actual) worlds; but even if what is possible in a fictional world corresponds (in some sense) to what is possible in the actual world, it is not, as such, a possibility of or at the actual world. The "possible worlds" idiom is fundamentally and doubly equivocal. For, a "possible world" signifies either what is merely logically or conceptually compossible, or what (under suitably referential, predicative, causal, and similar constraints) is compossible specifically with respect to the actual world (or some part of it). Certainly, Balzac's La Cousine Bette "presents" an imaginary world that is internally coherent and compossible. One might even say, ignoring its fictive nature, diat such a world — or events very much like those of the story — is compossible with a certain portion of the actual world of nineteenth-century France. But Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderfond, though it scrupulously presents a coherent world of compossible events, does not present a world compossible with the actual world. And, on certain views at least, Thomas Mann's The Transposed Heads presents a possible world that is a conceptual impossibility. There is, however, no need to quarrel about particular cases... (shrink)

The Sleeping Beauty problem has spawned a debate between “thirders” and “halfers” who draw conflicting conclusions about Sleeping Beauty's credence that a coin lands heads. Our analysis is based on a probability model for what Sleeping Beauty knows at each time during the experiment. We show that conflicting conclusions result from different modeling assumptions that each group makes. Our analysis uses a standard “Bayesian” account of rational belief with conditioning. No special handling is used for self-locating beliefs or centered propositions. (...) We also explore what fair prices Sleeping Beauty computes for gambles that she might be offered during the experiment. (shrink)

“That's my dad on the floor.”And there he was unconscious in a pool of blood in the bathroom. A paramedic who had accompanied him to the john was holding him off the ground, the USMC tattoo on his forearm cradling his head. My sister shrieked, and I went down on my knees to see about his airway. “We need a doctor here. Cardiac Team!” Could this really be happening to him? To us? Jesus Christ.

This is the second of a three volume collection dealing with Ricoeur's views on a variety of authors and subjects. In volume one he dealt with political philosophy. Volume two includes essays dating in the extremes from 1948 through 1992. Under the general headings of Existential Thinkers and Poetics, Semiotics, and Rhetoric, he speaks to concerns he has found and admired in a number of French and foreign philosophers. While the number of thinkers is wide, the subjects are carefully grouped.

Given its subject matter, biological psychiatry is uniquely poised to lead STEM DEI initiatives related to disability. Drawing on literatures in science, philosophy, psychiatry, and disability studies, we outline how that leadership might be undertaken. We first review existing opportunities for the advancement of DEI in biological psychiatry around axes of gender and race. We then explore the expansion of biological psychiatry’s DEI efforts to disability, especially along the lines of representation and access, community accountability, first person testimony, and revised (...) theoretical frameworks for pathology. We close with concrete recommendations for scholarship and practice going forward. By tackling head-on the challenge of disability inclusion, biological psychiatry has the opportunity to be a force of transformation in the biological sciences and beyond. (shrink)

Recognition is used here in its military sense of “reconnaissance”: reconnaissance is about territory and how, survey done and maps out on the table, one will proceed methodically, strategically to seize and control. Counterterrorism and surveillance protocols have been feeding on this basic idea without giving it any more thought than the addition of technologies.1 A couple of provisos: I do not use the word “recognition” in its Aristotelian sense of “anagnôrisis”, a dramatic catastrophe, a turning on its head (...) of a plot, when a.. (shrink)

The papers published here were given at the second biennial conference of the Hegel Society of America, held at the University of Notre Dame, November 9-11, 1972. They appear in an order which reflects roughly two headings: (1) Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy in general, and (2) his relation to individual thinkers both before and after him. Given the importance of the history of philosophy for Hegel, and the far-reaching impact of his thought upon subsequent philosophy, it becomes (...) immediately apparent that we have here only a beginning. At the conference, cries went up "Why not Hegel and Aristotle, Aquinas, HusserI and Hart mann?" Indeed, why not? The answer, of course, might be given by Hegel himself : if we wish to accomplish anything, we have to limit ourselves. We trust that future conferences and scholarship will bring to light these relationships and the many more which testify to Hegel's profound presence in the mainstream of past and present thought. It is furthermore no accident that the renaissance of Hegelian studies has brought with it a rebirth of the history of philosophy as something relevant to our own problems. For Hegel, the object of philosophy is alone the truth, the history of philosophy is philosophy itself, and this truth which it gives us cannot be what has passed away. (shrink)

Determining how we use our body to support cognition represents an important part of understanding the embodied and embedded nature of cognition. In the present investigation, we pursue this question in the context of a common perceptual task. Specifically, we report a series of experiments investigating head tilt (i.e., external normalization) as a strategy in letter naming and reading stimuli that are upright or rotated. We demonstrate that the frequency of this natural behavior is modulated by the cost of (...) stimulus rotation on performance. In addition, we demonstrate that external normalization can benefit performance. All of the results are consistent with the notion that external normalization represents a form of cognitive offloading and that effort is an important factor in the decision to adopt an internal or external strategy. (shrink)

This is a description of an avian-shaped feature that rests below a network of cellular structures found on a mound within the Argyre Basin of Mars in Mars Global Surveyor image M14-02185, acquired on April 30, 2000, and released to the public on April 4, 2001. The area examined is located near 48.0° South, 55.1° West. The formation is approximately 2,400 meters long from the tip of its beak to the tip of its farthest tail feather. There is a minimum (...) of six different variations in appearance of the surface material over this small area. Utilizing the public targeting request form provided on the Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) website, co-author Miller secured a second image of the area that was obtained on July 3, 2006, showing this feature under different conditions S20-00165. The new image was then released to the public on August 11, 2006. A third image of the formation identified as MGS S13-01480 was acquired on December 15, 2005, and although officially processed on June 20, 2006, it was not made available to the public until August 22, 2009, on NASA’s Planetary Data System (PDS) website. All three of the MGS images reveal defining aspects of this avian feature, including a head, beak, body, eye, leg, foot, toes, wing, and feathers. When taken together, these components induce the visual impression of an avian-shaped formation that exhibits a unique set of proportional features. Adjoining this formation is a composite of complex cellular features that form a compartmentalized infrastructure. The three authors who are veterinarians provide a critical analysis of the avian features, and the geologist and geoscientist authors examine natural mechanisms that could contribute to the formation of this feature. An extensive search of comparable regions within and beyond the area of the Argyre Basin was conducted. A list of these sites is provided, and terrestrial comparisons are also offered. (shrink)

BackgroundAn important principle underlying the Dutch Euthanasia Act is physicians' responsibility to alleviate patients' suffering. The Dutch Act states that euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are not punishable if the attending physician acts in accordance with criteria of due care. These criteria concern the patient's request, the patient's suffering (unbearable and hopeless), the information provided to the patient, the presence of reasonable alternatives, consultation of another physician and the applied method of ending life. To demonstrate their compliance, the Act requires physicians (...) to report euthanasia to a review committee. We studied which arguments Dutch physicians use to substantiate their adherence to the criteria and which aspects attract review committees' attention.MethodsWe examined 158 files of reported euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide cases that were approved by the review committees. We studied the physicians' reports and the verdicts of the review committees by using a checklist.ResultsPhysicians reported that the patient's request had been well-considered because the patient was clear-headed (65%) and/or had repeated the request several times (23%). Unbearable suffering was often substantiated with physical symptoms (62%), function loss (33%), dependency (28%) or deterioration (15%). In 35%, physicians reported that there had been alternatives to relieve patients' suffering which were refused by the majority. The nature of the relationship with the consultant was sometimes unclear: the consultant was reported to have been an unknown colleague (39%), a known colleague (21%), otherwise (25%), or not clearly specified in the report (24%). Review committees relatively often scrutinized the consultation (41%) and the patient's (unbearable) suffering (32%); they had few questions about possible alternatives (1%).ConclusionDutch physicians substantiate their adherence to the criteria in a variable way with an emphasis on physical symptoms. The information they provide is in most cases sufficient to enable adequate review. Review committees' control seems to focus on (unbearable) suffering and on procedural issues. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the ontological and theological ground of political institutions in order to then reflect upon the eschatological calling of society. The paper builds on Tillich's ontological insight that love does not simply transcend justice, but that it permeates and drives justice, that justice gives form to love's reunion of the separated. This relation between love and justice is at play in political institutions: these unite human beings under forms of justice that must be transformed ever anew (...) if they are not to lose touch with the dynamic power of love and freeze into increasingly unjust juridicalism. The modern history of Western civilisation bears witness to this ontological tension, and the phenomenon of globalisation is yet another instance of human society's mystical calling. Thus, love heads the dynamic movement that transforms political institutions ever anew. Yet society as a whole must become conscious of its ontology for humanity to truly reach its eschatological potential, and this will require both that theology recovers its ground and that political theory thinks theologically. (shrink)

BackgroundThe globalization of medical science carries for doctors worldwide a correlative duty to deepen their understanding of patients' cultural contexts and religious backgrounds, in order to satisfy each as a unique individual. To become better informed, practitioners may turn to MedLine, but it is unclear whether the information found there is an accurate representation of culture and religion. To test MedLine's representation of this field, we chose the topic of death and dying in the three major monotheistic religions.MethodsWe searched MedLine (...) using PubMed in order to retrieve and thematically analyze full-length scholarly journal papers or case reports dealing with religious traditions and end-of-life care. Our search consisted of a string of words that included the most common denominations of the three religions, the standard heading terms used by the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature (NRCBL), and the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) used by the National Library of Medicine. Eligible articles were limited to English-language papers with an abstract.ResultsWe found that while a bibliographic search in MedLine on this topic produced instant results and some valuable literature, the aggregate reflected a selection bias. American writers were over-represented given the global prevalence of these religious traditions. Denominationally affiliated authors predominated in representing the Christian traditions. The Islamic tradition was under-represented.ConclusionMedLine's capability to identify the most current, reliable and accurate information about purely scientific topics should not be assumed to be the same case when considering the interface of religion, culture and end-of-life care. (shrink)

Background Ensuring individual free and informed decision‐making for research participation is challenging. It is thought that preliminarily informing communities through ‘community sensitization’ procedures may improve individual decision‐making. This study set out to assess the relevance of community sensitization for individual decision‐making in research participation in rural Gambia. Methods This anthropological mixed‐methods study triangulated qualitative methods and quantitative survey methods in the context of an observational study and a clinical trial on malaria carried out by the Medical Research Council Unit Gambia. (...) Results/discussion Although 38.7% of the respondents were present during sensitization sessions, 91.1% of the respondents were inclined to participate in the trial when surveyed after the sensitization and prior to the informed consent process. This difference can be explained by the informal transmission of information within the community after the community sensitization, expectations such as the benefits of participation based on previous research experiences, and the positive reputation of the research institute. Commonly mentioned barriers to participation were blood sampling and the potential disapproval of the household head. Conclusion Community sensitization is effective in providing first‐hand, reliable information to communities as the information is cascaded to those who could not attend the sessions. However, further research is needed to assess how the informal spread of information further shapes people's expectations, how the process engages with existing social relations and hierarchies (e.g. local political power structures; permissions of heads of households) and how this influences or changes individual consent. (shrink)

Background The globalization of medical science carries for doctors worldwide a correlative duty to deepen their understanding of patients' cultural contexts and religious backgrounds, in order to satisfy each as a unique individual. To become better informed, practitioners may turn to MedLine, but it is unclear whether the information found there is an accurate representation of culture and religion. To test MedLine's representation of this field, we chose the topic of death and dying in the three major monotheistic religions. Methods (...) We searched MedLine using PubMed in order to retrieve and thematically analyze full-length scholarly journal papers or case reports dealing with religious traditions and end-of-life care. Our search consisted of a string of words that included the most common denominations of the three religions, the standard heading terms used by the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature (NRCBL), and the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) used by the National Library of Medicine. Eligible articles were limited to English-language papers with an abstract. Results We found that while a bibliographic search in MedLine on this topic produced instant results and some valuable literature, the aggregate reflected a selection bias. American writers were over-represented given the global prevalence of these religious traditions. Denominationally affiliated authors predominated in representing the Christian traditions. The Islamic tradition was under-represented. Conclusion MedLine's capability to identify the most current, reliable and accurate information about purely scientific topics should not be assumed to be the same case when considering the interface of religion, culture and end-of-life care. (shrink)

Theories of discourse bring to realism new ideas about how knowledge develops and how representations of reality are influenced. We gain an understanding of the conceptual aspect of social life and the processes by which meaning is produced. This collection reflects the growing interest realist critics have shown towards forms of discourse theory and deconstruction. The diverse range of contributions address such issues as the work of Derrida and deconstruction, discourse theory, Eurocentrism and poststructuralism. What unites all of the contributions (...) is a sense that it is essential to provide a realist alternative to the hitherto dominance of social constructionism, hermeneutics and postmodernism, over many of the issues discussed. By developing a realist perspective the different authors attempt to embed discourse within the structured nature of the reality of the world. Realism can situate language, discourse and ideology within context specific, or 'causally efficacious' circumstances. Realism can help to uncover issues of power, representation, and subjectivity and how discursive and other social practices produce real effects. This can help us understand the manner in which social structures are reproduced through various forms of ideology and discourse. And by knowing this, we can start to address questions concerning human emancipation and how the world is to be transformed. (shrink)

Topics covered in Discrete Mathematics have become essential tools in many areas of studies in recent years. This is primarily due to the revolution in technology, communications, and cyber security. The book treats major themes in a typical introductory modern Discrete Mathematics course: Propositional and predicate logic, proof techniques, set theory (including Boolean algebra, functions and relations), introduction to number theory, combinatorics and graph theory. An accessible, precise, and comprehensive approach is adopted in the treatment of each topic. The ability (...) of abstract thinking and the art of writing valid arguments are emphasized through detailed proof of (almost) every result. Developing the ability to think abstractly and roguishly is key in any areas of science, information technology and engineering. Every result presented in the book is followed by examples and applications to consolidate its comprehension. The hope is that the reader ends up developing both the abstract reasoning as well as acquiring practical skills. All efforts are made to write the book at a level accessible to first-year students and to present each topic in a way that facilitates self-directed learning. Each chapter starts with basic concepts of the subject at hand and progresses gradually to cover more ground on the subject. Chapters are divided into sections and subsections to facilitate readings. Each section ends with its own carefully chosen set of practice exercises to reenforce comprehension and to challenge and stimulate readers. As an introduction to Discrete Mathematics, the book is written with the smallest set of prerequisites possible. Familiarity with basic mathematical concepts (usually acquired in high school) is sufficient for most chapters. However, some mathematical maturity comes in handy to grasp some harder concepts presented in the book. (shrink)

Recent scandals at Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing have put the ethical spotlight on corporate malfeasance as never before. However, these are the situations in which management knew that they made the wrong choice. As professor Joseph Badaracco of Harvard Business School points out, the real ethical dilemmas arise when people must choose between right and right — where both choices can be justified, yet one must be chosen over the other. Whether or not to reprice stock options represents (...) one such ethical dilemma. Repricing can help exodus of talented employees and motivate them to improve firm performance. However, it alienates shareholders and other workers of the company who are left unprotected from the adverse economic consequences of a stock price decline.In this paper we examine the ethics and the economics of stock option repricing. We find that repricing runs counter to two key tenets of business ethics — distributive justice and ordinary decency. To examine the economics of repricing, we draw upon agency theory to identify situations where repricing has the potential to benefit shareholders. However, a survey of empirical research reveals that these benefits do not translate into reality. Repricing does not improve employee retention or firm performance. In addition, managers benefit by opportunistically timing the repricing. Due to weaknesses in corporate governance such as lack of independence and conflicts of interest, the current repricing practice seems to be at odds with the objective of shareholder wealth maximization, and at a more fundamental level, a violation of board's fiduciary duty to shareholders. We offer suggestions that mitigate the ethically undesirable effects of repricing in the wider context of prevailing corporate governance and regulatory environment. We believe that these suggestions, if properly implemented, can transform repricing from a greed-inspired evil to a valuable compensation tool to retain employees, boost their morale, and enhance stockholder wealth. (shrink)