Metaphilosophical Views

Louise Chapman, Filippo Contesi and Constantine Sandis ask whether philosophy has a language problem.

Along with “epoché” or his “reductions”, Husserl’s “noema” and “noesis”, being neologisms invented by him, are main concepts in phenomenology able to represent its originality. Following the trace of a recent paper (Penchev 2021 July 23), its formal and philosophical approach is extended to both correlative notions, in the present article. They are able to reveal the genesis of the world from consciousness in a transcendental method relevant to Husserl, but furthermore described formally as a process of how subjective temporality (...) appears being isomorphic to objective temporality of the “world by itself” (an abstraction meaning it out of consciousness or transcendental consciousness): thus, it shares the same mathematical structure, which is embodied in the physical process of decoherence by the physical quantity of quantum information. The temporal world is able to appear naturally (rather as a ridiculous effect of the mythical “Big Bang”). The same process translated by formal and mathematical tools as interpreted in terms of “noema”, “noesis”, or transcendental consciousness is isomorphic to how “Self” (including in an individual and psychological sense) appears in virtue of transcendental consciousness. (shrink)

The article aims to substantiate the philosophy of synthesis, which is built on the basis of analysis, but gives it a constructive direction. The turning point from analysis to synthesis is the problematization of the elements identified in the analysis, their criticism, replacement, or rearrangement, leading to the construction of alternative concepts and propositions that expand the field of the thinkable and innovate the categorical apparatus of philosophy. This article provides examples of philosophical synthesis at different levels: alternative terms and (...) concepts (“infinition”), postulates (the “diamond rule” in ethics), and disciplines (“horrology” as the study of the self-destructive mechanisms of civilization). Next, we consider the transition from the philosophy of synthesis to the synthesis of philosophy itself with contemporary scientific and technical practices. Technology of the 21st century is no longer instrumental/utilitarian, but a fundamental technology ("onto–technology"), which, thanks to science’s penetration into the micro- and macrocosm, can change the foundational parameters of being, thereby acquiring a philosophical dimension. Accordingly, philosophy as a study of the most general principles of the universe becomes a practical requirement in any “world-forming,” synthesizing acts of technology, including the design of computer games and multi-populated virtual worlds (e.g., “Second Life”), that involve a new ontology, logic, ethics, and axiology. The vocation of philosophy in the 21st century is not just to comprehend our unique world, but to lay the foundations for new world-forming practices, to initiate and design the ontology of possible worlds, and to pave the way for alternative forms of synthetic life and artificial intelligence. Contrary to Hegel, philosophy is no longer the “owl of Minerva” taking flight at dusk, but a skylark proclaiming the dawn of a new creative day. -/- . (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual (...) engineering — namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. On its ‘broad-spectrum’ version, it is expected to be appropriately applicable to any of our representation-involving cognitive activities, with major consequences for our whole cognitive life. This paper is about the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering thus characterised. With a view to ensuring the actionability of conceptual engineering as a broad-spectrum method, it addresses the issue of how best to construe the subject matter of conceptual engineering and successively (...) defends the theses that conceptual engineering should be: (i) About concepts, (ii) psychologically theorised, (iii) as multiply realised functional kinds. Thereby, I claim to theoretically secure and justify the maximum scope, flexibility, and impact for the method of conceptual engineering on our representational devices in our whole cognitive life—in other words, a broad-spectrum version of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Here we will go beyond the variety of violence to show its unity, common points and continuities. For although there are multiple forms of violence, they are interrelated: they define a continuum from trivial to extreme violence. Violence against oneself, things, living things such as plants and animals, other nations, the other, one’s fellow human beings, therefore the violence of society against its members, which returns to self-violence. Another continuum is its spiral development, with violence generating violence and pushing it (...) to grow. Violence can also be learned, we progress ever further in violence: in gangs, in armies, in society... Everyone is capable of violence, sometimes to a good advantage as in self-defence. Here it resides in necessity, that of survival, but in general it is impunity that allows and encourages it. In closed, totalitarian, universes: family, work, hospital, army, state... The proximity and distance between the perpetrator and the victim defines yet another continuity. We will discuss the various elements that contribute to its development. And paradoxically, to see that violence also serves to avoid violence. In this way, evacuating it, refusing it, is in fact feeding it, which makes today’s violence, which is an evolution of previous violence and which prepares and defines tomorrow’s violence. (shrink)

Abstract: According to the realist about philosophy, the goal of philosophy is to come to know the truth about philosophical questions; according to what Helen Beebee calls equilibrism, by contrast, the goal is rather to place one’s commitments in a coherent system. In this paper, I present a critique of equilibrism in the form Beebee defends it, paying particular attention to her suggestion that various meta-philosophical remarks made by David Lewis may be recruited to defend equilibrism. At the end of (...) the paper, I point out that a realist about philosophy may also be a pluralist about philosophical culture, thus undermining one main motivation for equilibrism. (shrink)

This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (...) (false) dilemma and self‐referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail. (shrink)

The intended title was “Universe Oriented Ontology” or “Multiverse Oriented Ontology”, or “Universe or Multiverse Metaphysics”. I mention this as it gives an idea about the meaning and intention of the title and the work as well as the titles I considered and why I moved away from them to the present one. The sub-title provides a further hint towards the intentions of the work, namely: ” Beyond Earth- and Human-centricity’. I opted for ‘transcending’ rather than beyond, as I am (...) still in the process of describing the process of transcending and many of the ideas I am obliged to use from our conceptual system and practices are still earth- and anthropo-centered, And, they have not yet gone to a state beyond those two -isms. I say something about universe-centeredness, then about planet earth as point and frame of reference and anthropo-centricity. The socio-cultural practice of philosophy and the doing of philosophy is merely one of many human, social and cultural practices. I post different notions of philosophy by a number of writers, some of them philosophers. These notions are about their perceptions of what philosophy is. Few of them go into detail about the subject-matter of philosophy. No one really deal with the aims, purposes and objectives of the discipline and none deal with the nature of the doing of philosophy or philosophizing. Activities that I suggest resemble certain features of the processes of theorizing. I end with explorations of possible characteristics of original- and creative thinkers. I do this by mentioning a number of themes of meta-philosophy listed and described by Peter Suber. I make a number of comments in them and highlight aspects relevant to these type of thinkers. One find them of course in all disciplines and socio-cultural [racticesand disciplines be they the arts,humanities, sciences, etc. I am of course specifically concerned with original andcreative thinkers inthe Western tradition of philosophy. As I am a radical and absolute sceptic, I end with an article on this theme. It is said by everyone, for example Hume, Russell and Pascal, that such a radical position is psychologically impossible and that it cannot be lived 24/7. Pascal for example opted for believe or faith and he and a number of writers suggest that that is the only way out and the final position of radical sceptics. I disagree with him. (shrink)

Although the later Wittgenstein appears as one of the most influential figures in Davidson’s later works on meaning, it is not, for the most part, clear how Davidson interprets and employs Wittgenstein’s ideas. In this paper, I will argue that Davidson’s later works on meaning can be seen as mainly a manifestation of his attempt to accommodate the later Wittgenstein’s basic ideas about meaning and understanding, especially the requirement of drawing the seems right/is right distinction and the way this requirement (...) must be met. These ideas, however, are interpreted by Davidson in his own way. I will then argue that Davidson even attempts to respect Wittgenstein’s quietism, provided that we understand this view in the way Davidson does. Having argued for that, I will finally investigate whether, for Davidson at least, his more theoretical and supposedly explanatory projects, such as that of constructing a formal theory of meaning and his use of the notion of triangulation, are in conflict with this Wittgensteinian quietist view. (shrink)

While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two reasons: First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy: Her view differs considerably from current alternatives in metaphilosophy. Here (...) we want to begin to fill this lacuna. (shrink)

In domains like stock brokerage, clinical psychiatry, and long‐term political forecasting, experts generally fail to outperform novices. Empirical researchers agree on why this is: experts must receive direct or environmental learning feedback during training to develop reliable expertise, and these domains are deficient in this type of feedback. A growing number of philosophers resource this consensus view to argue that, given the absence of direct or environmental philosophical feedback, we should not give the philosophical intuitions or theories of expert philosophers (...) greater credence than those of novice philosophers. This article has three objectives. The first is to explore several overlooked issues concerning the strategy of generalizing from empirical studies of non‐philosophical expertise to the epistemic status of philosophical expertise. The second is to explain why empirical research into a causal relationship between direct learning feedback and enhanced expert performance does not provide good grounds for abandoning a default optimism about the epistemic superiority of expert philosophical theories. The third is to sketch a positive characterization of learning feedback that addresses developmental concerns made salient by the empirical literature on expert performance for specifically theory‐driven or “armchair” domains like philosophy. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to explain the nature of philosophy as a distinct science with its own subject-matter. This is achieved through a comparative analysis of mathematical and philosophical knowledge that reveals a profound similarity between mathematics and philosophy as mutually complementary sciences exploring the field of abstract entities that can be comprehended only by purely a priori theoretical inquiry. By considering this complementarity, a general definition of philosophy can be obtained by dualizing the traditional Aristotelian definition of (...) mathematics as the “science of quantity”. Philosophy should thus be interpreted as an a priori science of the pure qualitative attributes of being. (shrink)

The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates (...) in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’, where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes. (shrink)

The Concept of Life and Death of Chuang-tzu have inherited and developed Confucianism and Taoism thoughts, establishing Ontological foundation of "Life - Body", distinguishing the transcendental concept of "Dead Heart" and the empirical concept of "Death Body", as well as proposing the thought of "Equivalence of Life and Death" finally. The logic Reasoning of Chuang-tzu "Equivalence of Life and Death", start from constructing the equal status of "Life" and “Death" from ontological argument. Life and Death then are reduced to be (...) a natural phenomenon to dispel its mystery. With emphasizing the social connotation of life and death, the difference between them has been removed, and finally the Thought experiment of "Chuang-tzu dreaming butterfly" has deepened the idea of "Equivalence of Life and Death". The Ideological Characteristic of the Concept of Life and Death of Chuang-tzu mainly reflects in the aspects of Ontology, Epistemology and Ethical practice. (shrink)

The Pathology of Man is the first comprehensive study of the psychology and epistemology of human evil, long urged by leading psychiatrists and psychologists, including Freud, Jung, Menninger, Fromm, and Peck. The book breaks new ground by offering a clear, empirically based, and theoretically sound understanding of human evil as a widespread, real, non-metaphorical pathology. With deliberate and thorough scholarship the author proposes a new framework-relative theory of disease and justifies the provocative thesis that human evil should be classified as (...) a pathology which is not a deviation from an accepted norm, but rather is a normal state. This break with tradition provides the necessary psychological foundation for the familiar concept of the banality of human evil, a foundation which in the past it has lacked. (shrink)

Robert S. Corrington has misgivings about the use of the word "naturalism" to describe his view of reality; in fact, more recently he has been using "deep pantheism" and variants.1 Nevertheless, "naturalism" remains an apt word, conjuring the creative depths of the world around us, and we should continue to use it to describe Corrington's philosophical-theological system—without unduly apologizing for its inevitably circular semantic content, and despite the risk that his view might be known by its name instead of its (...) content. The variant of naturalism for which Corrington is so well known is called (by him) ecstatic naturalism, and he has shown it to be an important version of religiously and axiologically .. (shrink)

This is an essay on Kant's neglected late tract On a Recently Adopted Prominent Tone in Philosophy (RTP) and Derrida's oblique commentary on this work in his D'un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie. The theme of the essay is metaphilosophical and considers issues concerning the nature of critical philosophy, fanaticism (Schwärmerei), and the use of religious tropes in philosophy. I am primarily interested in the ways in which RTP thematises the legitimacy of speaking in an exalted, quasi-religious tone apropos (...) of the authority of Reason as a self-legitimising capacity in philosophical speech. An important additional reason for taking a closer look at this text is because the late Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) took a great interest in this work of Kant’s and, indeed, emphasised, rightly I think, that despite its prima facie rhetorically charged, polemical nature this work—which might at first be taken to be merely a lampoon—is anything but insignificant in Kant’s œuvre. Derrida’s On a Recently Adopted Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy, originally published in 1983, is an oblique commentary on Kant’s RTP, and aims to expose to view the alleged hidden underpinnings of Kant’s polemic against exaltation or fanaticism (Schwärmerei) in philosophy. Derrida tries to show that Kant’s appeal for tonal moderation in philosophy, for a measured speech, which should rein in exalted modes of speech, is itself not neutral and rather fundamentally biased against an exalted, quasi-religious, manner of thought. It is evident that, as he himself notes early on in RTP, Kant is predisposed towards a more Aristotelian, academic kind of philosophy, which adopts a “proper” tone or pitch in philosophical debate, but Derrida claims that Kant himself raises his voice precisely in lampooning exalted thinkers. I am particularly interested in the extent to which Derrida’s critique manifests a fundamental misapprehension of the Kantian mode of moderating critique. By expounding this misapprehension, Kant’s own reasons for his philippic against religious or quasi-religious talk in philosophy are foregrounded, thus showing the nature of properly critical thought. At the same time, I shall show how Derrida underestimates the self-reflexivity, and hence properly critical, self-authorising mode of thinking, underlying his own oblique references to the adieu as a trope for quasi-transcendental intentionality towards the so-called ‘Other’. (shrink)

While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two reasons: First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy: Her view differs considerably from current alternatives in metaphilosophy. Here (...) we want to begin to fill this lacuna. -/- REPRINT IN: John Haldane (ed.) (2019): The Life and Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe. (St. Andrews Studies in Philosophy.) Imprint Academic: Exeter: 42-61. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta un acercamiento a la resolución de problemas abductivos en C-estructuras, estructuras que tienen un universo de discurso finito y cada uno de sus elementos es la interpretación de una constante conocida. Empleando una variante del cálculo de tablas semánticas y resolución dual, construimos un procedimiento efectivo para encontrar soluciones abductivas minimales dentro de la semántica propuesta. /// We present an approach to abductive reasoning on C-structures, that is, structures with a finite domain such that each of its (...) elements is the interpretation of a known constant of the language. We use a modification of the tableaux calculus and dual resolution to make a process which finds minimal abductive solutions within the proposed semantics. (shrink)

Because the paperback edition of Dewey’s early works places within easy reach those writings in which he was coming to terms with the foundational issues of his philosophical methodology, it should stimulate the much needed examination of the underpinnings of the later, more popular expressions of his thought. Dewey’s basic ideas grew and changed form many times over his long career, yet there are unifying themes and standpoints which are more rigorously expressed in the early works, and without an understanding (...) of which the reader of later Dewian [[sic]] epistemology is likely to be either hopelessly lost or think himself to be floating on a sea of ungrounded opinion. Two connecting themes which span the breadth of his writing career are worthy of special comment: the first since it helps to locate the center and tie together the periphery of Dewey’s many faceted work, and the second because it is a lingering and unexpressed presupposition of his later metaphysical work. (shrink)

Rousseau considered the Émile to be the most important of all his writings and thought it would be the one to seal his reputation as a thinker. It is not that the Émile is different in any fundamental respect from his other writings, for Rousseau insisted that however the subject might vary he always wrote according to the same principles. No, it is simply that Rousseau develops his basic argument more clearly and at greater length in this, his last substantive (...) work explicitly intended for the public. As Rousseau would have it, this work shows most clearly that man is good by nature, that he is naturally attracted to justice as well as order, that both vice and error are foreign to his original make-up, that they arose only because of society, and that the ills from which man now suffers because of the poor organization of society can be mitigated. These and many other intriguing lines of thought are developed in the Émile as Rousseau pursues his declared goal of explaining how to raise a youth according to nature. Yet until now the subtlety, not to mention the simple formal structure, of Rousseau’s treatise has not been accessible to the English-reading public. With this new translation of the Émile, Allan Bloom has made it possible for those who read only English to encounter Rousseau on his own terms. (shrink)

A political theorist considers the interface between political and moral theory. Drawing freely from classical theories of human nature and morality, Professor Ryn argues that constitutional, representative democracy coheres better with human social ethical aspirations than does democracy by plebiscite, unqualified majority rule.

A volume in the International Library of the Philosophy of Education under the general editorship of R. S. Peters, which will both interest and repay close study by epistemologists and philosophers of language, as well as philosophers of education. The book concerns concept formation and the growth of knowledge, i.e., as the general editor of the series writes, "the genesis of knowledge and not just the logical properties of its outcome." The book is divided into two parts: in the first, (...) Hamlyn, employing a Piagetian framework and terminology, examines first the classical empiricist account of the genesis of knowledge, which, after Piaget, he strictures as "genesis without structure." This account fails to explain the existence of intersubjective agreement. Then Hamlyn goes on to examine the rival rationalist account, which he strictures as "structure without genesis." Here, the failure is that there is no good account of how knowledge even gets started. Finally, Hamlyn examines an account of the growth of knowledge to which he is more sympathetic; that of the French psychologist, Piaget: "structure with genesis." Hamlyn finds striking similarities between the Piagetian theory and that of Kant, but, in the end, this account has a fatal flaw as well. Indeed, according to Hamlyn, all three accounts really fail for the same basic cause, viz., their account of knowledge is too egocentric, and "they all start from the same starting point, the individual set against his environment." In the second part of the book, Hamlyn sets out his own view, the object of which is to correct the egocentric view of knowledge which undermines the traditional theories and even their more modern versions, in Chomsky as the representative of Rationalism, and Piaget, as the Kantian representative. Here Hamlyn argues that knowledge would be impossible without what Wittgenstein called "agreement in judgments" and then argues that this implies common reactions, attitudes, wants, and interests, in relation to the world. Finally, Hamlyn proceeds to apply this "social view" of knowledge and understanding to the acquisition of both in the case of the child. In the course of doing so, he relates the acquisition of knowledge and understanding in the child to the child’s acquisition of language. In the course of his discussion, Hamlyn has interesting things to say about a wide variety of topics such as "non-epistemic seeing" and the relations between knowledge and understanding. In addition he provides illuminatingly critical discussions of the main ideas of Piaget and Chomsky; and although most philosophers are persuaded that they should become familiar with the ideas of the latter, Hamlyn makes out a good case that philosophers ought to start to think about the work of the former as well. All of this is done in a pleasingly straightforward way, devoid of any tiresome literary conceits. (shrink)

The volume contains new translations of the introduction and preface to the second edition of The Essence of Christianity and Principles of the Philosophy of the Future. This comprises about one-half of the book. The remainder is Hanfi’s fifty-page introduction and translations of "Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy," "The Beginning of Philosophy," "The Necessity of a Reform of Philosophy," "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy," and "Fragments Concerning the Characteristics of My Philosophical Development." The translations are quite readable. (...) Hanfi’s introduction refers to the relation of Feuerbach to Marx in the first and third sections while the second is given over to a survey of Feuerbach’s development and thought. Another aspect, and one of the most suggestive, is at the end of the first section where Hanfi attempts to show how Feuerbach’s anthropology relates to Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik. One of the most interesting sections of Feuerbach’s text is "On the beginning of Philosophy," for Kierkegaard, in the context of fathering another philosophy of a very different kind, came upon some of the same criticisms of Hegel’s philosophy. This translation, along with those of Essence of Christianity, and the more recent The Essence of Religion, The Essence of Faith According to Luther, and the book by Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, bespeak a renewed interest in the essential Feuerbach.—R.L.P. (shrink)

In discussing a variety of issues in the philosophy of education, Professor Crittenden focuses his attention on liberal education, i.e., the process of education which is principally concerned with promoting understanding and appreciation of the main forms of knowledge and with developing various skills of inquiry, expression, and performance. He believes that the defense of liberal education as a necessary feature of democracy is unsatisfactory; although citizens must have some knowledge and intellectual competence to make the choices expected of them, (...) these might not be needed to any significant degree. Liberal education can be defended only on the ground that it is crucial to the welfare of each individual: since liberal education develops those capacities needed to live a fully human life, Crittenden believes it proper to maintain that all men have a moral right to receive it. Though this right cannot, for a variety of reasons, be fully implemented; it is an ideal at which authorities should aim. (shrink)

The book is equally divided into three parts, treating respectively Godfrey's metaphysics of essence and existence, his metaphysics of substance and accident, and his metaphysics of matter and form. The basic theme running throughout Godfrey's metaphysics is seen to be his understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of potency and act.

This is a brief, clear, and vigorous reinterpretation of Bergson's philosophy. The author attempts to prove that, far from being an irrationalist, Bergson is a systematic metaphysician firmly committed to the concept of final cause.

In the midst of a recrudescence of interest in the philosophy of Hegel in the United States and England, this polished translation of Hegel’s introduction to his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History is a timely and welcome addition to the English translations of the massive Hegelian corpus. At long last, Johannes Hoffmeister’s superlative edition of this accessible work is available in English twenty years after its publication in Germany. H. B. Nisbet presents Hegel’s lectures in italics and intersperses (...) the reconstructions of students’ notes in Roman type. Including Hegel’s first and second drafts of the first part of the "Introduction," the well-integrated lecture notes, an appendix on "The natural context or the geographical basis of world history," additions from 1826-7, Lasson’s "Notes on the Composition of the Text," and a chronological bibliography of writings dealing with the Lectures, this volume supersedes the previous English translations which were derived from Karl Hegel’s shorter edition. Duncan Forbes’ spritely introduction is a rapid fire counter-attack on a number of Hegel’s critics which charges that Hegel is misunderstood because of an inadequate grasp of the principle of identity in difference and the assumption that, for Hegel, the Absolute "absorbs" the contingencies, contradictions, and tensions in existence. Forbes appropriately stresses the "concrete universal" as the unity of the universal and the particular in history, a unity which preserves the particular as particular, the contingent as contingent. Even though Forbes overreaches himself at times, his defenses of Hegel’s interpretation of meaning in history are provocative and lively. This fine translation of Hoffmeister’s edition of the introduction to the lectures presents Hegel’s vision of history in a lucid, accessible form and captures the nuances of the thought of a philosopher who has been as often misunderstood as maligned.—G.J.S. (shrink)

This latest in attempts to collect statements from living American philosophers presents thoughts and interests of those writing in the "middle decades," the fifty years from 1920 to 1970. The editor has restricted himself to America’s senior philosophers asking each to reflect on "the things that matter most," or "to share the motifs in their work and to present concerns about their world". Although some influential elders are missing from this collection, an interesting variety of viewpoints and styles of American (...) philosophizing are represented. Especially interesting are the reflections of Brand Blanshard, Edwin Burtt, Herbert Feigl, Charles Hartshorne, Stephen Pepper, Roy Wood Sellars, and Herbert Spiegelberg. Blanshard traces his development from the influences upon him of Bradley, and describes his own rationalist ethics and humanist religion. Herbert Feigl in an even more autobiographical vein relates how he came under the important influence of Moritz Schlick and to be a member of the Vienna Circle. Also included in his article is a summary of his views on the issues of induction, scientific explanation, the mind-body problem, determinism, and some matters of practical philosophy. Pepper explains how he originated the idea of world hypotheses, and how he believes these hypotheses themselves originate and function, and Spiegelberg sketches an intriguing "ethics for fellows in the fate of existence." In his essay Hartshorne mixes comments on pragmatism, idealism, and the "linguistic turn," with explanations of his own "neoclassical metaphysics."—B.M. (shrink)

The title of the volume is apt: Steinkraus succeeded in assembling an admirable collection, truly representative of the thought, the intellectual development and the spirit of one of the most remarkable figures of American philosophy, Borden Parker Bowne, for thirty six years--until his untimely death at 63 in 1910--a professor of philosophy at Boston University and one of the most prolific philosophic writers in America.

The greatest defender of democracy in the twentieth century could only say of it that it was a bad form of government, but better than any of the alternatives. It is thus a tribute to academic insularity that there can continue to be an academic discipline, subdiscipline, or interdiscipline devoted to "democratic theory." The major premise of "democratic theory" is that, contrary to the experience of Churchill and all other perceptive democratic statesmen, democracy can be viewed and justified without reference (...) to the circumstances in which it is found or to the available alternatives. On Justifying Democracy is a contribution to this dubious enterprise. (shrink)

Ulrich Claesges, author of an important book on Husserl’s theory of the constitution of space, has edited the famous lectures of 1907 in which Husserl examines the phenomena of "thing" and "space." The introduction to this course has already been published as Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Claesges includes supplementary texts dating from 1906-1917, with one from 1926. It is in the introduction to this course that Husserl uses the transcendental reduction for the first time, and quite appropriately; for the reduction (...) is motivated by the peculiarities inherent in our experience of things. Husserl is persuaded by his analysis of this experience that he must turn to another kind of experience as the basis for philosophy. The reduction is mentioned only a few times in this volume, however. (shrink)

Four papers on Hocking, short passages from his writings, and a selected list of his books and articles. Of the four papers, one is a tribute to Hocking by Brand Blanshard, first published in 1966; another is an essay on "Dialectic in the Unfolding of Hocking’s Thought," written by his son Richard, emeritus professor of philosophy at Emory University; the third and fourth are essays, by the two editors of the volume, on Hocking’s views regarding "insight" and "the self as (...) creative agent," respectively. (shrink)

This is the most stimulating and therefore the most important book elicited by the bicentennial of the American Constitution. At first sight, it appears to be yet another contribution to the ongoing debate among intellectual historians and historians of political theory about the relative influence of Lockean liberalism and so-called "classical republicanism" on the thought and deeds of the American founding generation. Pangle does indeed maintain that Locke, not classical republicanism, was the most powerful influence on America's most thoughtful, articulate, (...) and farsighted statesmen. But his more important claim is that Locke is still "America's philosopher," whose thought even today remains the introduction to philosophy for the Founders' authentic heirs--those public-spirited citizens who wish to take a reasonable pride in America but are perplexed about what, if anything, supports nobility and human dignity in their regime. That is, Pangle does not understand his book to be primarily an exercise in either intellectual history or history of political theory. He argues, rightly I believe, that the most influential present-day historians take for granted the truth of some version of historicism and are thereby prevented either from understanding Locke and the Framers as they understood themselves or from taking seriously the possibility that their understanding of the modern liberal republic may be superior to our own. Thus Pangle aims "to recover for modern liberals and citizens of liberal democracy something of [the] excitement and greatness and challenge" of "the theoretical choices" confronting Locke and the Founders. By suspending the prejudice in favor of historicism, Pangle seeks to show that we are not, simply by virtue of our particular vantage point, beyond the problems with which Locke and the Framers had to wrestle. (shrink)

The introduction to this translation of excerpts of Dilthey’s writings offers a precise, yet comprehensive outline of the manifold theories of the German philosopher. The translation is to be justified and to be recommended by a report of the great influence that by the originality of his ideas and the width of his interests Dilthey exercises not only in contemporary, especially phenomenological and existentialistic philosophy, but also in the human studies of history, literature, psychology, and sociology.

William Gerber’s study of American liberalism is a valuable compendium of the varied, changing, and often conflicting uses of that "slippery" word, liberalism, in the United States, past and present, and in antecedent Western political thought. But Gerber identifies himself as having "set his sights on trying to build an adequate definition of liberalism". The problem is introduced by chapter 1, which asks if liberalism is dying or already dead, and by chapter 2, which asks why liberalism has not brought (...) about the "millennium" it promised. Chapter 3 calls attention to the "Difficulty of Isolating the Essence of the Liberal Viewpoint" from many competing claims, and stipulates three criteria. 1) The definition should encompass only those features of liberalism with which all experts are in agreement. This requirement leads Gerber to extensive and sometimes strained marshalling of quotations showing the frequency of disagreement among liberals with regard to those beliefs commonly associated with liberalism: freedom, majority rule, improvement of society, preference for change, perfectibility, progress, etc. 2) The definition should be exclusive to liberalism and encompass no tenets shared by other than liberals. 3) The definition should be value-neutral. Understandably, these criteria result in a definition of liberalism at a high level of abstraction: "Liberalism is the belief that individuals and institutions, including governments, should so act—or refrain from acting—as to liberate as many individuals as possible from as many shackles as possible without overturning basic social machinery". In chapters 4-8 the "pedigree" of American liberalism is traced from Hammurabi, Moses, Buddha, Laotse, and Jesus to the ancient Greeks and Romans, the Enlightenment and the Glorious Revolution, to 19th century British liberalism. Chapters 6-8 examine American liberalism before 1900, from 1900 to 1945, and since World War II. Chapters 9-11 discuss the stand of liberals on political, economic, and social issues, and chapter 12 looks to the future of liberalism. (shrink)

An outgrowth of the Bicentennial. White examines the metaphysics, epistemology, and moral philosophy which influenced American revolutionary thought. Focusing on the doctrines of self-evident truth and natural law expressed in the Declaration of Independence, he elucidates them by erudite explications and critical analyses of such 17th and 18th century thinkers as John Locke, Francis Hutcheson, and Jean Jacques Burlamaqui. Traditional interpretations, best represented by Carl Becker’s The Declaration of Independence, have stressed the role of Locke. More recently, intellectual historians have (...) reassessed the Scottish influence on American thought, apparent in White’s own Science & Sentiment in America, chap. 3, and in Garry Wills’s Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence. Wills claims for Hutcheson the place formerly reserved for Locke as the philosopher who most directly shaped Jefferson’s thought and style in the Declaration. Now White makes a case for the neglected 18th century Swiss legal philosopher, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui. (shrink)