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  1. How is Neuroscience Possible?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that neuroscience not only is not complemented, but rather is positively undermined, by the substantive commitments of materialist philosophers of mind. Thus, we can have neuroscience or "neurophilosophy" but not both. Since neuroscience is a real science, to the extent that it is in tension with materialistic neurophilosophy, the latter should be abandoned and the former retained.
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  2. Evidential Equivalence.Ioannis Votsis - manuscript
    In this article I probe the consequences and limits of the underdetermination thesis and the empirical equivalence thesis, using Laudan and Leplin's fecund article as a springboard. Although a realist at heart, my primary intention is not to undermine the anti-realist arguments but rather to try to precisify the challenge the realist, and more generally the participant in the scientific realism debate, faces.
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  3. 50 words for snow.John Wilkins - manuscript
    Scientists and philosophers routinely talk about phenomena, and the ways in which they relate to explanation, theory and practice in science. However, there are very few definitions of the term, which is often used synonymously with "data'', "model'' and in older literature, "hypothesis''. In this paper I will attempt to clarify how phenomena are recognized, categorized and the role they play in scientific epistemology. I conclude that phenomena are not necessarily theory-based commitments, but that they are what explanations are called (...)
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  4. Pan-Perspectival Realism Explained and Defended.Paul Teller - 2016
    Conventional scientific realism is just the doctrine that our theoretical terms refer. Conventional antirealism denies, for various reasons, theoretical reference and takes theory to give us only information about the word of the perceptual where reference, it would appear, is secure. But reference fails for the perceptual every bit as much for the perceptual as for the theoretical, and for the same reason: the world is too complicated for us to succeed in attaching specific referents to our terms. That would (...)
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  5. The Pragmatist Challenge: Pragmatist Metaphysics for Philosophy of Science.H. K. Andersen & Sandra D. Mitchell (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    This volume offers a collection of in-depth explorations of pragmatism as a framework for discussions in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Each chapter involves explicit reflection on what it means to be pragmatist, and how to use pragmatism as a guiding framework in addressing topics such as realism, unification, fundamentality, truth, laws, reduction, and more. -/- .
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  6. Acerca de la Relación entre el Realismo Científico y la Metafísica Científica.Anjan Chakravartty - forthcoming - In B. Borge & N. Gentile (eds.), La ciencia y el mundo inobservable: Discusiones contemporáneas en torno al realismo científico. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
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  7. Expanding the Empirical Realm: Constructive Empiricism and Augmented Observation.Finnur Dellsén - forthcoming - In Michael Frauchiger (ed.), Themes from van Fraassen (Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy). De Gruyter.
    Manifestationalism holds that science aims only to give us theories that are correct about what has been observed thus far. Several philosophers, including Bas van Fraassen, have argued that manifestationalism cannot make sense of the scientific impetus to make new observations, since such observations only risk turning manifestationally adequate theories into inadequate ones. This paper argues that a strikingly similar objection applies to van Fraassen’s own constructive empiricism, the view that science aims only to find theories that are empirically adequate. (...)
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  8. Beauty as a Guide to Truth: Aquinas, Fittingness, and Explanatory Virtues.Levi Durham - forthcoming - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.
    Many scientists and philosophers of science think that beauty should play a role in theory selection. Physicists like Paul Dirac and Steven Weinberg explicitly claim that the ultimate explanations of the physical world must be beautiful. And philosophers of science like Peter Lipton say that we should expect the loveliest theory to also be the most likely. In this paper, I contend that these arguments from loveliness bear a striking similarity to Thomas Aquinas’ arguments from fittingness; both seem to presume (...)
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  9. The Ontic Return: The Current Epochal Shift from Meaning to Being.J. E. Ford (ed.) - forthcoming - Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  10. Is the Reality Criterion Analytic?David Glick & Florian J. Boge - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-7.
    Tim Maudlin has claimed that EPR’s Reality Criterion is analytically true. We argue that it is not. Moreover, one may be a subjectivist about quantum probabilities without giving up on objective physical reality. Thus, would-be detractors must reject QBism and other epistemic approaches to quantum theory on other grounds.
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  11. Realism, Physical Meaningfulness, and Molecular Spectroscopy.Teru Miyake & George E. Smith - forthcoming - In Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers (eds.), Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge from the History of Science. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 159-182.
  12. Visions visualised? On the evidential status of scientific visualisations.Nicola Mößner - forthcoming - In Erna Fiorentini (ed.), On Visualization. A Multicentric Critique beyond Infographics. Berlin et al.:
    ‘Visualisations play an important role in science’, this seems to be an uncontroversial statement today. Scientists not only use visual representations as means to communicate their research results in publications or talks, but also often as surrogates for their objects of interest during the process of research. Thus, we can make a distinction between two contexts of usage here, namely the explanatory and the exploratory context. The focus of this paper is on the latter one. Obviously, using visualisations as surrogates (...)
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  13. Realism and instrumentalism.Mark Sprevak - forthcoming - In H. Pashler (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE Publications.
    The choice between realism and instrumentalism is at the core of concerns about how our scientific models relate to reality: Do our models aim to be literally true descriptions of reality, or is their role only as useful instruments for generating predictions? Realism about X, roughly speaking, is the claim that X exists and has its nature independent of our interests, attitudes, and beliefs. An instrumentalist about X denies this. She claims that talk of X should be understood as no (...)
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  14. Verstehen verstehen. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung.Federica Isabella Malfatti - 2023 - Berlin, Deutschland: Schwabe Verlag.
    Wir Menschen streben danach, die Wirklichkeit zu verstehen. Eine Welt, die wir gut verstehen, ist eine, die wir "im Griff" haben, mit der wir gut umgehen können. Aber was heißt es genau, ein Phänomen der Wirklichkeit zu verstehen? Wie sieht unser Weltbild aus, wenn wir ein Phänomen verstanden haben? Welche Bedingungen müssen erfüllt sein, damit Verstehen gelingt? Die Kernthese des Buches ist, dass wir Phänomene der Wirklichkeit durch noetische Integration verstehen. Wir verstehen Phänomene, indem wir den entsprechenden Informationseinheiten eine sinnvolle (...)
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  15. The epistemic value of metaphysics.Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo & Jonas R. Becker Arenhart - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):337.
    It is sometimes argued that, given its detachment from our current most successful science, analytic metaphysics has no epistemic value because it contributes nothing to our knowledge of reality. Relatedly, it is also argued that metaphysics properly constrained by science can avoid that problem. In this paper we argue, however, that given the current understanding of the relation between science and metaphysics, metaphysics allegedly constrained by science suffers the same fate as its unconstrained sister; that is, what is currently thought (...)
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  16. Scientific Realism and the Objects of Medicine in the Hippocratic Treatise On the Art.Kevin Ray Cales - 2022 - Studia Gilsoniana 11 (2):229-248.
    On the Art is a polemical treatise in the Hippocratic Corpus that has been dated to 450 – 400 BCE. As a polemical work, the author defends the existence of medicine against detractors. I argue that the author employs two arguments for scientific realism in defense of medicine that are among the earliest known. First, I situate the work in the context of the sophistic movement and the nomos vs. physis debate. Second, I analyze the two arguments in On the (...)
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  17. The Quantum Wave Function Isn't Real.Eddy Keming Chen - 2022 - The Institute of Art and Ideas.
    In this popular article, I suggest that the task of interpreting quantum mechanics becomes easier if we reject the view that the quantum universe must be described by a wave function. We should zoom out from the wave function and represent the universe with something more coarse-grained, one that naturally arises from considerations about the Past Hypothesis. The new proposal is called the Wentaculus.
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  18. From Phenomenological-Hermeneutical Approaches to Realist Perspectivism.Mahdi Khalili - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (4):1-26.
    This paper draws on the phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches to philosophy of science to develop realist perspectivism, an integration of experimental realism and perspectivism. Specifically, the paper employs the distinction between “manifestation” and “phenomenon” and it advances the view that the evidence of a real entity is “explorable” in order to argue that instrumentally-mediated robust evidence indicates real entities. Furthermore, it underpins the phenomenological notion of the horizonal nature of scientific observation with perspectivism, so accounting for scientific pluralism even in the cases (...)
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  19. Qu'est-ce que l'ontologie métascientifique?François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 2:19-43.
    L’ontologie métascientifique se distingue des ontologies philosophiques par ses objectifs, ses objets et ses méthodes. Par un examen des théories ontologiques de Mario Bunge, nous montrerons que leur principal objectif est l’élaboration d’une représentation unifiée du monde tel que connu via les sciences, que leurs objets d’étude sont les concepts scientifiques, et que leurs méthodes ne diffèrent pas de celles qu’on s’attend à trouver dans toute activité rationnelle. L’ontologie métascientifique n’est donc pas transcendante parce qu’elle ne cherche pas à représenter (...)
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  20. What Is Metascientific Ontology?François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 2:22-44.
    Metascientific ontology differs from philosophical ontologies in its objectives, objects and methods. By an examination of the ontological theories of Mario Bunge, we will show their main objective is a unified representation of the world as known through the sciences, that their objects of study are scientific concepts, and that their methods do not differ from those that one expects to find in any rational activity. Metascientific ontology is therefore not transcendent because it does not seek to represent non-concrete objects (...)
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  21. Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory without Homeostatic Mechanisms: Two Recent Attempts and their Costs.Yukinori Onishi & Davide Serpico - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (N/A):61-82.
    The homeostatic property cluster theory is widely influential for its ability to account for many natural-kind terms in the life sciences. However, the notion of homeostatic mechanism has never been fully explicated. In 2009, Carl Craver interpreted the notion in the sense articulated in discussions on mechanistic explanation and pointed out that the HPC account equipped with such notion invites interest-relativity. In this paper, we analyze two recent refinements on HPC: one that avoids any reference to the causes of the (...)
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  22. Le scientisme au-delà de ses détracteurs.Andrés Pereyra Rabanal - 2022 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 2:245-265.
    Le scientisme a plus de notoriété que l’histoire proprement dite, car il a été identifié avec le « positivisme », le « réductionnisme », le « matérialisme » ou le « marxisme », ou même tenu responsable de la domination de la science sur leur autres activités humaines. L’idée que la recherche scientifique produit les meilleures connaissances possible réside dans la définition même du « scientisme ». Cependant, alors même que la science peut se prévaloir d’un nombre considérable de succès (...)
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  23. Do molecules have structure in isolation? How models can provide the answer.Vanessa Seifert - 2022 - In Olimpia Lombardi, Juan Camilo Martínez & Sebastian Fortin (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Quantum Chemistry. Springer Cham. pp. 125–143.
    I argue that molecules may not have structure in isolation. I support this by investigating how quantum models identify structure for isolated molecules. Specifically, I distinguish between two sets of models: those that identify structure in isolation and those that do not. The former identify structure because they presuppose structural information about the target system via the Born- Oppenheimer approximation. However, it is an idealisation to assume structure in isolation because there is no empirical evidence of this. In fact, whenever (...)
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  24. Fallibilism versus Relativism in the Philosophy of Science.David J. Stump - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (2):187-199.
    In response to a recent argument by David Bloor, I argue that denying absolutes does not necessarily lead to relativism, that one can be a fallibilist without being a relativist. At issue are the empirical natural sciences and what might be called “framework relativism”, that is, the idea that there is always a conceptual scheme or set of practices in use, and all observations are theory-laden relative to the framework. My strategy is to look at the elements that define a (...)
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  25. Sur quelques aspects de l’arrière-plan hyloréaliste scientifique de la chimie des cristaux.Matias Velázquez - 2022 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 2:125-161.
    Dans cet article, nous essayons de comprendre comment l’hyloréalisme scientifique de Bunge peut s’accommoder avec plusieurs objets de la chimie des cristaux et leurs propriétés. Nous montrons que plusieurs d’entre eux, constituant le cœur de la discipline, soutiennent l’émergentisme ontologique. Les unités de construction, comme les lacunes, leur potentiel chimique, le nombre quantique cristallographique et plusieurs aspects des propriétés spectroscopiques des électrons 4f dans les cristaux ioniques, sont présentés comme des exemples remarquables d’objets ou de propriétés émergents (ou submergents) rencontrés (...)
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  26. Continuing After Species: An Afterword.Robert A. Wilson - 2022 - In John S. Wilkins, Igor Pavlinov & Frank Zachos (eds.), Species Problems and Beyond: Contemporary Issues in Philosophy and Practice. New York: Routledge. pp. 343-353.
    This afterword to Species and Beyond provides some reflections on species, with special attention to what I think the most significant developments have been in the thinking of biologists and philosophers working on species over the past 25 years, as well as some bad jokes.
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  27. Is the Reality Criterion Analytic?Florian J. Boge & David Glick - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1445-1451.
    Tim Maudlin has claimed that EPR’s Reality Criterion is analytically true. We argue that it is not. Moreover, one may be a subjectivist about quantum probabilities without giving up on objective physical reality. Thus, would-be detractors must reject QBism and other epistemic approaches to quantum theory on other grounds.
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  28. Steven French & Juha Saatsi (Eds.): Scientific Realism and the Quantum. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2020, 336 pp., £60.00 (hardback), ISBN: 9780198814979. [REVIEW]David Glick - 2021 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (1):177-183.
  29. Ernst Mach and Friedrich Nietzsche. On the Prejudices of Scientists.Pietro Gori - 2021 - In John Preston (ed.), Interpreting Mach. Critical Essays. Cambridge, Regno Unito: pp. 123-141.
    The paper provides a thorough account of the relationship between Ernst Mach’s thought and that of an apparently more intellectually distant near-contemporary, Friedrich Nietzsche. The consistency of their views is in fact substantial, as I try to show within the paper. Despite their interests being different, both Mach and Nietzsche were concerned with the same issues about our intellectual relationship with the external world, dealing with the same questions and pursuing a common aim of eliminating worn-out philosophical conceptions. Moreover, it (...)
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  30. Hume's Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation by David Landy.Emily Kelahan - 2021 - Hume Studies 44 (1):109-112.
    As the title suggests, David Landy’s Hume’s Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation defends a staunchly realist interpretation of Hume on scientific explanation. Landy’s forward-looking view sees Hume’s methodology in the Treatise as anticipating developments much later in history. He gives Hume a Sellarsian update, making his philosophy of science more impactful and contemporary than previously thought. The motivation for his view is twofold. First, he wants to respond to the long line of Hume critics who (...)
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  31. Feyerabend's Reevaluation of Scientific Practice: Quantum Mechanics, Realism and Niels Bohr.Daniel Kuby - 2021 - In Karim Bschir & Jamie Shaw (eds.), Interpreting Feyerabend: Critical Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 132-156.
    The aim of this paper is to give an account of the change in Feyerabend's philosophy that made him abandon methodological monism and embrace methodological pluralism. In this paper I offer an explanation in terms of a simple model of 'change of belief through evidence'. My main claim is that the evidence triggering this belief revision can be identified in Feyerabend's technical work in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, in particular his reevaluation of Bohr's contribution to it. This highlights an (...)
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  32. History and the Contemporary Scientific Realism Debate.Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers - 2021 - In Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers (eds.), Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge from the History of Science. Oxford University Press.
  33. Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge From the History of Science.Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers (eds.) - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    Scientific realists claim we can justifiably believe that science is getting at the truth. But they have long faced historical challenges: various episodes across history appear to demonstrate that even strongly supported scientific theories can be overturned and left behind. In response, realists have developed new positions and arguments. As a result of specific challenges from the history of science, and realist responses, we find ourselves with an ever increasing data-set bearing on the (possible) relationship between science and truth. The (...)
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  34. Cosmological Realism.David Merritt - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 88 (C):193-208.
    I discuss the relevance of the current predicament in cosmology to the debate over scientific realism. I argue that the existence of two, empirically successful but ontologically inconsistent cosmological theories presents difficulties for the realist position.
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  35. Conceptions of scientific progress in scientific practice: an empirical study.Moti Mizrahi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2375-2394.
    The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress, the epistemic account of scientific progress, and the noetic account of scientific progress. Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study lend some empirical support to the epistemic (...)
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  36. The Relativity of Theory by Moti Mizrahi: Reply by the Author.Moti Mizrahi - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 87 (C):173-174.
  37. In Defense of Relative Realism: A Reply to Park.Moti Mizrahi - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (1):1-6.
    In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism. Relative Realism is the view that, of a set of competing scientific theories, the more predictively successful theory is comparatively true. Comparative truth is a relation between competing theories. So, to say that T1 is comparatively true is to say that T1 (...)
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  38. Why Park’s Argument from Double Spaces is Not a Problem for Relative Realism.Moti Mizrahi - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (6):58-62.
    In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2021) reply to my (Mizrahi 2021) reply to his (Park 2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism. Relative Realism is the view that, of a set of competing scientific theories, the more successful theory is comparatively true. Comparative truth is a relation between competing theories. So, to say that (...)
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  39. Walter Burley on Negative Propositions, in: «Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge» 88 (2021), pp. 41-63.Chiara Paladini - 2021 - Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 88 (2021):41-63.
    The basic principle of all realist theories of truth developed in the 13th and 14th centuries was that a proposition is true if and only if it tells us how things are in reality. Walter Burley (1275-1344) interpreted this principle in a more radical way than 13th-century realists did. Burley, in fact, proposed a strong correspondence theory, in which there is a strict biunique correspondence between linguistic and extra-linguistic elements. Now, if the principle of correspondence can be applied to Burley (...)
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  40. Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science.Howard Sankey - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):5-20.
    The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. (...)
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  41. An ontology of weak entity realism for HPC kinds.Reuben Sass - 2021 - Synthese 198 (12):11861-11880.
    This paper defends an ontology of weak entity realism for homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theories of natural kinds, adapted from Bird’s (Synthese 195(4):1397–1426, 2018) taxonomy of such theories. Weak entity realism about HPC kinds accepts the existence of natural kinds. Weak entity realism denies two theses: that (1) HPC kinds have mind-independent essences, and that (2) HPC kinds reduce to entities, such as complex universals, posited only by metaphysical theories. Strong entity realism accepts (1) and (2), whereas moderate entity realism (...)
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  42. The Relativity of Theory by Moti Mizrahi: Pandemics and Pathogens: What’s at Stake in the Debate Over Scientific Realism? [REVIEW]Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 87 (C):168-169.
    I provide a critical review of Moti Mizrahi's The Relativity of Theory, expounding on the book's strengths and then providing an extended argument that Mizrahi mischaracterizes the epistemic attitude of concern to antirealism about science as well as the practical stakes involved in adopting the antirealist position.
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  43. Kuhn and the Contemporary Realism/Antirealism Debates.K. Brad Wray - 2021 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 11 (1):72-92.
    Thomas Kuhn was never a player in the contemporary realism/anti-realism debates, the debate that gained momentum around 1980 or so, with the publication of Bas van Fraassen’s Scientific Image and Larry Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism”. But I argue that Kuhn had a significant influence on these debates. Kuhn played a significant role in focusing philosophers’ attention on a different issue than the focus of the realism/anti-realism debate of the 1950s and 1960s. Instead of focusing on the meaning of theoretical (...)
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  44. Why Scientific Realists Should Reject the Second Dogma of Quantum Mechanics.Valia Allori - 2020 - In Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker (eds.), Quantum, Probability, Logic: Itamar Pitowsky’s Work and Influence. Springer. pp. 19-48.
    The information-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics, proposed by Bub and Pitowsky, is a realist approach to quantum theory which rejects the “two dogmas” of quantum mechanics: in this theory measurement results are not analysed in terms of something more fundamental, and the quantum state does not represent physical entities. Bub and Pitowsky’s approach has been criticized because their rejection of the first dogma relies on their argument that kinematic explanations are more satisfactory than dynamical ones. However, little attention has been (...)
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  45. Platonism and the Objects of Science.Scott Berman - 2020 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.
    What are the objects of science? Are they just the things in our scientific experiments that are located in space and time? Or does science also require that there be additional things that are not located in space and time? Using clear examples, these are just some of the questions that Scott Berman explores as he shows why alternative theories such as Nominalism, Contemporary Aristotelianism, Constructivism, and Classical Aristotelianism, fall short. He demonstrates why the objects of scientific knowledge need to (...)
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  46. Pluralism and Perspectivism in the American Pragmatist Tradition.Matthew Brown - 2020 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Springer Verlag.
    This chapter explores perspectivism in the American Pragmatist tradition. On the one hand, the thematization of perspectivism in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science can benefit from resources in the American Pragmatist philosophical tradition. On the other hand, the Pragmatists have interesting and innovative, pluralistic views that can be illuminated through the lens of perspectivism. I pursue this inquiry primarily through examining relevant sources from the Pragmatist tradition. I will illustrate productive engagements between pragmatism and perspectivism in three areas: in (...)
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  47. Scientific Realism and the Quantum.Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.) - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Quantum theory explains a hugely diverse array of phenomena in the history of science. But how can the world be the way quantum theory says it is? Fifteen expert scholars consider what the world is like according to quantum physics in this volume and offer illuminating new perspectives on fundamental debates that span physics and philosophy.
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  48. Does Criminal Responsibility Rest Upon a False Supposition? No.Luke William Hunt - 2020 - Washington University Jurisprudence Review 13 (1):65-84.
    Our understanding of folk and scientific psychology often informs the law’s conclusions regarding questions about the voluntariness of a defendant’s action. The field of psychology plays a direct role in the law’s conclusions about a defendant’s guilt, innocence, and term of incarceration. However, physical sciences such as neuroscience increasingly deny the intuitions behind psychology. This paper examines contemporary biases against the autonomy of psychology and responds with considerations that cast doubt upon the legitimacy of those biases. The upshot is that (...)
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  49. A Realistic Argument for Scientific Realism: How to be a Realist Without Really Knowing It.Samuel Kahn - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1901-1914.
    In this paper I provide a novel argument for scientific realism. In contrast to most recent defenses of SR, my defense of SR does not rely on the no-miracles argument. Instead, I take a more unconventional approach: I focus on the different kinds of justification available to different individuals in relation to different kinds of propositions. I maintain that this alternative focus shows that most people are warranted in believing many propositions about unobservables. The paper is divided into three main (...)
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  50. On the untrustworthiness of axiomatic-founded science.Spyridon Kakos - 2020 - Harmonia Philosophica.
    The idea of science being the best – or the only – way to reach the truth about our cosmos has been a major belief of modern civilization. Yet, science has grown tall on fragile legs of clay. Every scientific theory uses axioms and assumptions that by definition cannot be proved. This poses a serious limitation to the use of science as a tool to find the truth. The only way to search for the latter is to redefine the former (...)
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