Presentación del número monográfico de Télos dedicado a la conmemoración del Quinto Centenario del Descubrimiento de América.

Emphasis is placed in the need of taking persons seriously instead of only taking their rights seriously. Accordingly human well-being (physical, psychological and moral) is a «trump» against any sort of consideration about alleged rights that could go counter human development and well-being. Instead of current talk about classical rights such as liberty, freedom and dignity, too formal and too abstract, the paper deals with three main rights that prove to be more promising: 1) The right to be considered as (...) a being whose suffering is to be minimized. 2) The right to a free, full personal development. and 3) The right to receive care and sympathy. Against current theories of rights a plea is made for enlightened and enlarged sympathy as the foundation of rights and ethics, thus avoiding the partiality that infects Dworkin's and many other's theories of private ethics. (shrink)

First, I want to thank Professor Rosen’s deep and illuminating study of the Philosophy of Stuart Mill. In my view, one of the most important contributions of the author is his claim that Mill was not only a social moralist but was primarily a philosopher and a logician. In many ways, Rosen is right. Mill was not a moral philosopher, or at least was not only a moral philosopher. However, he was concerned with the part of philosophy that deals with (...) morality and enthusiastically defended both the welfare and the individual and social development. First, I want to thank Professor Rosen’s deep and illuminating study of the Philosophy of Stuart Mill. In my view, one of the most important contributions of the author is his claim that Mill was not only a social moralist but was primarily a philosopher and a logician. In many ways, Rosen is right. Mill was not a moral philosopher, or at least was not only a moral philosopher. However, he was concerned with the part of philosophy that deals with morality and enthusiastically defended both the welfare and the individual and social development. As we say, Mill was not only a moral philosopher, because in many cases he anticipated to contemporary metaphysics, showing that the principles of normative ethical could be defended so that the human intellect helps to understand them. Even so, it should be added that Mill was, however, a reformer and a defender of moral character education. I think no exaggeration to say that Mill used logic and reasoning as ways to promote intellectual and moral development of all human beings, which is necessary for the individual improvement of welfare and social harmony. Reading Mill carefully is discovered that all his reasoning and use of the senses is aimed at deepening the welfare of all members of humanity, recommending the highest pleasures. Being a moral philosopher is not so, and as Fred Rosen suggests in his brilliant work, an obstacle to Mill being a defender of ethical revolution of society, i.e., the transformation of human life. Thus, while I deeply admire the contribution of Professor Rosen to the study of Mill, I will show my disagreement with it at some length, and finally I will also summarize the main points of convergence between the study of Rosen and my own view of John Stuart Mill’s thought. (shrink)

Courage is a basic virtue to any heroic society. It is the defining virtue of the aristocratic warrior in the Iliad. It came with a set of other related virtues, all functioning in a social setting unique to that heroic era. However, as society evolved beyond the heroics of war to the civility of settled city–states, courage would be reviewed and redefined. In fact the whole virtue complex would undergo fundamental changes. Still later, when from out of the cities philosophers (...) rose, they would, in their commitment to a higher justice or righteousness than what the city had to offer to date, submit courage to a third critique and transformation. We see this in Greece; we may also see it in China. (shrink)

It is proposed here that the Confucian li, norms of appropriate behavior, be understood as part of the dynamic process of moral self-cultivation. Within this framework li are multidimensional, as they have different functions at different stages in the cultivation process. This novel interpretation refocuses the issue regarding the flexibility of li, a topic that is still being debated by scholars. The significance of this proposal is not restricted to a new understanding of li. Key features of the various stages (...) of moral development in Confucian thought are also articulated. This account presents the picture of a Confucian paradigmatic person as critically self-aware and ethically sensitive. (shrink)

A potencialidade na filosofia da educação antiga e medieval 1 Resumo: O texto aborda a potencialidade, na filosofia da educação antiga e medieval, como a capacidade de aperfeiçoamento da razão. A noção de paideia conduz essa reflexão, uma vez que perpassa o pensamento educacional desde a antiguidade clássica até a baixa Idade Média. Essa continuidade explicita a tradição da formação integral do homem que considerava os aspectos morais e políticos como uma totalidade indissociável. O encaminhamento teórico segue a concepção de (...) História Social de Braudel (1902-1985), já que o foco é a compreensão da herança teológica e filosófica, que exprime os fundamentos da educação. Para refletir sobre esse legado do conhecimento, três momentos foram estudados: a paideia grega na perspectiva aristotélica e platônica; a patrística, por meio do entendimento de Clemente de Alexandria (150-215 d.C.) e de Agostinho de Hipona (354-430 d.C.); e a escolástica, analisada nas concepções de Hugo de São Vítor (1096-1141) e Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274). Assim, nos autores apresentados, há a permanência da compreensão de que o aperfeiçoamento da razão significava a transformação em ato da potência essencial do homem: a razão. A principal finalidade da educação, portanto, era a formação da consciência de cada pessoa, pois entendia-se que esse era o principal meio para o êxito da vida em comum. Palavras-chave: Filosofia da Educação; Potencialidade; Paideia; Patrística; Escolástica. Potentiality in the philosophy of ancient and medieval education Abstract: The text addresses the potentiality, in the philosophy of ancient and medieval education, as the ability to improve reason. The notion of paideia guides this reflection since it pervades educational thought from classical antiquity to the low Middle Ages. This continuity explains the tradition of the integral formation of man which considered the moral and political aspects as an inseparable totality. The theoretical approach follows Braudel’s conception of Social History since the focus is on understanding the theological and philosophical heritage, which expresses the fundamentals of education. To reflect on this legacy of knowledge, three periods were studied: the Greek paideia in the Aristotelian and Platonic perspective; patristic, through the understanding of Clement of Alexandria and Augustine of Hippo; and scholasticism, analysed in the conceptions of Hugh of Saint Victor and Thomas Aquinas. Thus, there is a continuing understanding in the authors presented that the improvement of reason meant the actualization of man's essential potency: reason. The main purpose of education was the formation of the conscience of each person, as it was understood that this was the main means for the success of life in common. Key words: Philosophy of education; Potentiality; Paideia; Patristic; Scholastic. Potencialidad en la filosofía de la educación antigua y medieval Resumen: El texto aborda la potencialidad en la filosofía de la educación antigua y medieval, como capacidad para mejorar la razón. La noción de paideia orienta esta reflexión ya que impregna el pensamiento educativo desde la antigüedad hasta la baja Edad Media. Esta continuidad explica la tradición de la formación integral del hombre que consideraba los aspectos morales y políticos como una totalidad. El enfoque teórico sigue la concepción de Braudel de Historia Social, ya que el enfoque está en la comprensión de la herencia teológica y filosófica, que expresa los fundamentos de la educación. Por tanto, se estudiaron tres períodos: la paideia griega en la perspectiva aristotélica y platónica; la patrística, a través del entendimiento de Clemente de Alejandría y Agustín de Hipona; y escolasticismo, analizado en las concepciones de Hugo de San Víctor y Tomás de Aquino. Por lo tanto, existe un entendimiento continuo en los autores presentados de que la mejora de la razón significó la actualización de lo potencial del hombre: la razón. El propósito principal de la educación era la formación de la conciencia de cada persona, pues se entendía que este era el principal medio para el éxito de la vida comunitaria. Palabras-clave: Filosofía de la educación; Potencialidad; Paideia; Patrística; Escolástica. Data de registro: 22/04/2021 Data de aceite: 22/09/2021 1 Artigo desenvolvido com base na tese Hábito e subjetividade na educação: aproximações entre Aristóteles, Tomás de Aquino e a neurociência, defendida por Lais Boveto, orientada por Terezinha Oliveira. Pesquisa com bolsa doutorado CAPES. (shrink)

Does ‘remembering that p’ entail ‘knowing that p’? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often ‘vaguely remember’ a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on prominent theories of misremembering in philosophy of psychology, I will construct cases where the subject (...) vaguely remembers that p while fails to meet the safety condition, which imply either that ETM is false or that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The conclusion reached in this paper will be a conditional: if veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge, then ‘remembering that p’ does not entail ‘knowing that p’. (shrink)

Social movements often impose nontrivial costs on others against their wills. Civil disobedience is no exception. How can social movements in general, and civil disobedience in particular, be justifiable despite this apparent wrong-making feature? We examine an intuitively plausible account—it is fair that everyone should bear the burdens of tackling injustice. We extend this fairness-based argument for civil disobedience to defend some acts of uncivil disobedience. Focusing on uncivil environmental activism—such as ecotage (sabotage with the aim of protecting the environment)—we (...) argue that some acts of uncivil disobedience can be morally superior to their civil counterparts, when and because such acts target people who are responsible for environmental threats. Indeed, insofar as some acts of uncivil disobedience can more accurately target responsible people, they can better satisfy the demands of fairness compared to their civil counterparts. In some circumstances, our argument may require activists to engage in uncivil disobedienceeven whencivil disobedience is available. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the unity of several virtues in pre-Qin Confucians. Confucius maintains the proper application and coherence of such virtues as benevolence, wisdom, trustworthiness, straightforwardness, courage, and firmness. Further, Confucius takes benevolence and nobility as characteristic of human being. Particular attention is paid to the distinction and relationship between virtuous characters and virtuous actions.

This paper is a preliminary study of Bhāviveka’s Svātantrika-Mādhyamika justifications for taking non-existent things as the subject of an inference, based on his Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun. Bhāviveka’s treatment of inference is similar to that of Dignāga in that the subject is required to be existent. Bhāviveka also holds that, in a conventional sense, words refer to universals and to the existent entities that possess them, while the two are cognised together. However, in his inference for the unreality of unconditioned things, (...) he likens these things to a sky-flower that never arises and is unreal even conventionally. This paper first demonstrates how taking unconditioned things as the subject of an inference can be problematic for Bhāviveka. Then, it discusses Bhāviveka’s attempts to address the problems by subsuming the unconditioned things under the domain of conventional reality. The paper concludes that these attempts show his flexibility in terms of what is taken as conventionally real. (shrink)

Every man, says Mencius, has within him this mind of commiseration, this pu-jen chih hsin that cannot bear to see another person suffer. To support his argument, Mencius cites the parable of the child about to fall into a well. A man with an innate mind of compassion unable to bear to see the child suffer would naturally feel the urge to run ahead to save the child . Yet elsewhere in Mencius 4A.17, it appears that had the potential victim (...) been a drowning sister-in-law, the man would also be momentarily checked by a fear of impropriety. Since the sense of propriety has its beginning in the mind as much as the sense of compassion, is not the mind of goodness somehow divided against itself? The present essay will examine this possible dilemma. (shrink)

Skill and Mastery: Philosophical Stories from the Zhuangzi presents an illuminating analysis of skill stories from the Zhuangzi, a 4th century BCE Daoist text. In this intriguing text that subverts conventional norms and pursuits, ordinary activities such as swimming, cicada-catching and wheelmaking are executed with such remarkable efficacy and spontaneity that they seem like magical feats. An international team of scholars explores these stories in their philosophical, historical and political contexts. Their analyses’ highlight the stories’underlying conceptions of agency, character and (...) cultivation; and relevance to contemporary debates on human action and experience. The result is a valuable collection, opening up new lines of inquiry in comparative East-West philosophical debates on skill, cultivation and mastery, as well as cross-disciplinary debates in psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. (shrink)

Tainted political symbols ought to be confronted, removed, or at least recontextualized. Despite the best efforts to achieve this, however, official actions on tainted symbols often fail to take place. In such cases, I argue that political vandalism—the unauthorized defacement, destruction, or removal of political symbols—may be morally permissible or even obligatory. This is when, and insofar as, political vandalism serves as fitting counter-speech that undermines the authority of tainted symbols in ways that match their publicity, refuses to let them (...) speak in our name, and challenges the derogatory messages expressed through a mechanism I call derogatory pedestalling: the glorification or honoring of certain individuals or ideologies that can only make sense when members of a targeted group are taken to be inferior. (shrink)

Exemplarism – the view that exemplary people, whom we admire, are the bearers of our moral concepts – presents considerable challenges to the (widely-assumed) place of moral theory in how we learn to be moral. Exemplarism has been garnered by Amy Olberding to articulate a Confucian approach to moral learning. This paper extends Exemplarism by considering how it may be put into practice, based on a seminal Confucian text, the Analects of Confucius. To date, the majority of discussions on Confucian (...) ethics that have brought Confucian philosophy to the attention of Anglophone scholars tend to focus on conceptually-based matters. There remain questions regarding how these values may be inculcated and embodied in our moral lives. Central to our proposal is the practice of reflective observation (guan 觀), comprised by three integrated components: observation, evaluation, and emulation. Observing, reflectively, is important not only for an individual’s acculturation to existing norms and practices but also for how they may subsequently exercise some latitude over their moral practices. Our reflections offer a practical approach to Confucian moral learning. In doing so, we demystify moral learning in Confucianism and open up avenues for future cross-tradition dialogues on moral education. (shrink)

In Daoist philosophy, the self is understood as an individual interdependent with others, and situated within a broader environment. Within this framework, the concept ziran is frequently understood in terms of naturalness or nature while wuwei is explained in terms of non-oppressive government. In many existing accounts, little is done to connect these two key Daoist concepts. Here, I suggest that wuwei and ziran are correlated, ethical, concepts. Together, they provide a unifying ethical framework for understanding the philosophy of the (...) Daodejing. I explore the meaning of ziran as self-so-ness or, in human terms, as pertaining to an individual’s spontaneity. The appropriate response to the spontaneity of individuals is to avoid, insofar as possible, imposing or using restrictive norms and methods, that is, wuwei. According to this view, ziran and wuwei offer an account of ethics that attends to core notions of interdependent selfhood, including mutuality, relationality, interdependence, symbiosis, and responsiveness. (shrink)

I argue against mnemic reliabilism, an influential view that successful remembering must be produced by a reliable memory process. Drawing on empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience, I refute mnemic reliabilism by demonstrating that: (1) patients with memory impairments (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease) can also successfully remember the past despite the unreliability of their corresponding memory processes; (2) some reliability-affecting factors (e.g., stress, divided attention, and insufficient encoding time) can render the memory processes of healthy individuals unreliable without preventing them from (...) occasionally resulting in successful remembering. Potential responses available for mnemic reliabilism are also evaluated. I show that those responses are susceptible to a challenge akin to the generality problem for process reliabilism. (shrink)

Learning from Chinese Philosophies engages Confucian and Daoist philosophies in creative interplay, developing a theory of interdependent selfhood in the two philosophical traditions. Karyn Lai draws on the unique insights of the two philosophies to address contemporary debates on ethics, community and government. Issues discussed include questions on selfhood, attachment, moral development, government, culture and tradition, and feminist queries regarding biases and dualism in ethics. Throughout the book, Lai demonstrates that Chinese philosophies embody novel and insightful ideas for addressing contemporary (...) issues and problems. (shrink)

Ben shu ba zhe xue shi yan jiu, bi jiao zhe xue yan jiu, wen hua wen ti yan jiu he wen xian shi liao yan jiu he wei yi ti, dui Wang Yangming zhe xue de nei rong jin xing le quan mian he shen ru de fen xi, bing dui qi zhe xue de nei rong jin xing le quan mian he shen ru de fen xi, bing dui qi zhe xue de bu tong fa zhan jie duan (...) jin xing le xi zhi de kao cha, li tu cheng xian chu Wang Yangming zhe xue de ji ben xing ge he zheng ti mian mao. (shrink)

A prominent way of justifying civil disobedience is to postulate a pro tanto duty to obey the law and to argue that the considerations that ground this duty sometimes justify forms of civil disobedience. However, this view entails that certain kinds of uncivil disobedience are also justified. Thus, either a) civil disobedience is never justified or b) uncivil disobedience is sometimes justified. Since a) is implausible, we should accept b). I respond to the objection that this ignores the fact that (...) civil disobedience enjoys a special normative status on account of instantiating certain special features: nonviolence, publicity, the acceptance of legal consequences, and conscientiousness. I then show that my view is superior to two rivals: the view that we should expand the notion of civility and that civil disobedience, expansively construed, is uniquely appropriate; and the view that uncivil disobedience is justifiable in but only in unfavorable conditions. (shrink)

Retrospect and prospect for contemporary Chinese thought -- Resolving the tension between tradition and modernity : reflections on the May Fourth cultural tide -- The May Fourth tide and modernity -- Radicalism in the cultural movement of the twentieth century -- Modern Chinese culture and the difficulties of Confucian learning -- Liang Shuming's early view of Oriental and Western culture -- The establishment and development of Feng Youlan's view of culture -- A reflection on the new school of principle and (...) thoughts on modernity -- Confucian thought and the world of modern East Asia -- Confucian ethics and China's modernisation -- East Asian tradition according to modernisation theory -- A sense of predicament and inter-dependency -- Liang Shuming and Max Weber on Chinese culture -- Values, authority, tradition and Chinese philosophy -- The difficulty of undertaking national studies research in the nineties : the problem of the national studies fever and research into traditional culture -- The value and status of traditional Chinese culture. (shrink)

The Zhuangzi is noted for its advocacy of many different perspectives—chickens, cicadas, fish and the like. There is much debate in the literature about the implications of Zhuangzi’s pluralist inclinations. I suggest that Zhuangzi highlights the limitations of individual, perspectivally-constrained, knowledge claims. He also spurns the ‘view from nowhere’ and is sceptical about the possibility of an ideal observer. For him, wisdom consists in understanding the epistemological inadequacies of each perspective. I propose that Zhuangzi’s philosophy offers significant insights to an (...) increasingly globalized world characterized by a plurality of ethical and value commitments. It does not assume there will necessarily be universal agreement or a standardized answer. Most importantly, it is a position that seeks to augment self-understanding and enrich the self in dialogue with and response to others. (shrink)

By examining fundamental Confucian concepts -- zhengming, ren, li, xiao, shu and dao -- the essay demonstrates that Confucian ways of thinking do not always fit neatly into categories such as 'moral' or rights'. The author provides a positive interpretation of certain Confucian ideas including: the concept of a person as a self- in- relation; the notion of responsibility as particularistic and dependent upon the kinds of relationships one has and the social positions one occupies; and the view of the (...) moral community as comprised by selves- in- relation who are reciprocally connected and who share similar ideals and forms of life. (shrink)

This comprehensive introductory textbook to early Chinese philosophy covers a range of philosophical traditions which arose during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods in China, including Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism, and Legalism. It considers concepts, themes and argumentative methods of early Chinese philosophy and follows the development of some ideas in subsequent periods, including the introduction of Buddhism into China. The book examines key issues and debates in early Chinese philosophy, cross-influences between its traditions and interpretations by scholars up (...) to the present day. The discussion draws upon both primary texts and secondary sources, and there are suggestions for further reading. This will be an invaluable guide for all who are interested in the foundations of Chinese philosophy and its richness and continuing relevance. (shrink)

Many have argued that certain statues or monuments are objectionable, and thus ought to be removed. Even if their arguments are compelling, a major obstacle is the apparent historical value of those commemorations. Preservation in some form seems to be the best way to respect the value of commemorations as connections to the past or opportunities to learn important historical lessons. Against this, I argue that we have exaggerated the historical value of objectionable commemorations. Sometimes commemorations connect to biased or (...) distorted versions of history, if not mere myths. We can also learn historical lessons through what I call repudiatory honouring: the honouring of certain victims or resistors that can only make sense if the oppressor(s) or target(s) of resistance are deemed unjust, where no part of the original objectionable commemorations is preserved. This type of commemorative practice can even help to overcome some of the obstacles objectionable commemorations pose against properly connecting to the past. (shrink)

Using a sample of 11,357 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market for the period of 2001–2011, we investigate whether and how religion can mitigate earnings management. Specifically, based on geographic-proximity-based religion variables, we provide strong and robust evidence to show that religion is significantly negatively associated with the extent of earnings management, suggesting that religion can serve as a set of social norms to mitigate corporate unethical behavior such as earnings management. Our findings also reveal that the negative association (...) between religion and earnings management is less pronounced for firms with closer distance to the regulatory centers than for their counterparts, implying the substitutive effects between religion and the distance to regulators on mitigating earnings management. The above results are robust to different measures of earnings management, various religion variables, and a variety of sensitivity tests. (shrink)

The core thesis of anti-luck epistemology is the incompatibility thesis, that is, knowledge is incompatible with veritic epistemic luck. Traditionally, anti-luck epistemologists hold that there are two distinct types of veritic epistemic luck, viz, intervening luck and environmental luck. The former occurs when something luckily intervenes between the subject’s belief and the target fact, which renders the subject’s belief luckily true. The latter can be found in cases where the subject’s belief is luckily true when she is in an unfriendly (...) epistemic environment. This paper purports to show that there is another long-neglected type of veritic epistemic luck—I name it ‘interpretative luck’. It refers to the type of luck occurring when the subject accidentally chooses the correct interpretation of evidence and thus her belief is luckily true. I will demonstrate that no proper reasons can support the incompatibility between interpretative luck and knowledge. Instead, the price for insisting this incompatibility would be unacceptably high. Therefore, the existence of interpretative luck falsifies the incompatibility thesis of anti-luck epistemology. (shrink)

A distinguishing characteristic of Confucianism is its emphasis on learning (xue), is a key element in moral self cultivation. This paper discusses why learning from the experiences of those in the past is important in Confucian learning.

Abstract Kung?sun Lung's thesis on ?White Horse [is] not Horse? has been solved by A. C. Graham on the basis of a part/whole logic and by Chad Hansen on that and a ?mass?noun? hypothesis. We present it as a case of reducing White Horse to its two most telling marks and then, on the basis of the good Sense (instead of Reference) in a Negative Logic?the pragmatics of locating X as the remainder left over when all non?X's have been removed?show (...) how a stable hand, receiving an order for White Horse would scan first for Horse by removing all non?horse shapes and then for White by removing all colours except White. This way we can prove how indeed ?A request for White Horse cannot be satisfied by Black and Brown that fills an order for Horse... (because) to exclude some colour [in the second scan] is not the same as to exclude yet no colour [in the first scan].? No part/whole or mass?sum is presumed. The whole discussion is set in the context of shifting criteria for judging name from Confucius to Hsun?tzu. (shrink)

Drawing on the core values of western civilization, the author refines the counterparts in Chinese civilization, summarized as four core principles: duty before freedom, obedience before rights, community before individual, and harmony before conflict. Focusing on guoxue or Sinology as the basis of his approach, the author provides detailed explanations of traditional Chinese values. Recent scholars have addressed the concept of guoxue since the modern age, sorting through it and piecing it together, which has produced an extremely abundant range of (...) information. However, given that the concepts and theories involved have been left largely unanalyzed, this book develops a theoretical treatment of them in several important respects. First, it analyzes the mindset of guoxue, examining the dominant ideas and values of the era from which the term "guoxue" arose, focusing on its connection to early changes and trends in society and culture, and distinguishing three key phases of development. Past scholars mainly had in mind the range of objects studied in guoxue when defining it, and what this book underscores is the meaning of guoxue as a modern body of research. Secondly, it assesses several phases in the modern evolution of the body of guoxue research from the beginning to the end of the 20th century, id est, ending with the later phase of the National Heritage movement. Third and lastly, the book explores the various main modes of modern guoxue, which correspond step by step with the evolutionary phases of guoxue research. (shrink)

In this article, we present an account of ming 明 in the Zhuangzi's Neipian in light of the disagreements among the thinkers of the time. We suggest that ming is associated with the Daoist sage's vision: he sees through the debaters' attempts to win the debates. We propose that ming is primarily a meta-epistemological stance, that is, the sage understands the nature of the debates and does not enter the fray; therefore he does not share the thinkers' anxieties. The sage (...) takes his stance at the pivot of dao (daoshu 道樞) and, from there, responds to the different views limitlessly. (shrink)

This essay articulates the contribution that the Zhuangzi can make to contemporary epistemological discussions of wisdom. It suggests that wisdom in the Zhuangzi involves, in part, correctly distinguishing the "heavenly" (or the naturally given) from human artifice. It is important for humanity to understand naturally given conditions (e.g., seasons, climate, forces, mortality) to grasp what is within, and what beyond, our initiatives. To enable this, we need to be openly engaged with the world, rather than approach it with rigid convictions (...) about outcomes or goals. We characterize such openness and readiness to engage as an attitude, that of "epistemic humility." In building up our position, we assess two themes in analytic philosophical debates on wisdom: the epistemic component of wisdom and the domain of wisdom. This helps establish what we believe is an important contribution of the Zhuangzi to the discussion on wisdom, that is, the wise person's epistemic humility. (shrink)