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Reliabilism
Edited by Luis R. G. Oliveira (University of Houston)
About this topic
| Summary | Reliabilism is a general approach to questions about knowledge and justification. It focuses on different ways of measuring and employing the property of truth-conduciveness. This general approach comes in four main varieties, each with alternative formulations. Process Reliabilism focuses on the truth-conduciveness of the type-process producing a certain belief. Anti-Luck Reliabilism focuses on the truth-conduciveness of the token-process producing a certain belief (these accounts make use of the modal notions of sensitivity and safety). Virtue Reliabilism focuses on the truth-conduciveness of an agent’s intellectual character traits, or of an agent's believing performance. And Proper Function Reliabilism adds to truth-conduciveness (in whichever guise) the requirement for a purposeful fit between mind and world. The main objections to Reliabilism come from the difficulties attending its proper formulation (counterexamples) and from four much-discussed problems: the Generality Problem, the New Evil Demon Problem, the Problem of Easy Knowledge (Bootstrapping), and the Swamping Problem. |
| Key works | Contemporary discussions of Reliabilism begin with Goldman 1967, Unger 1968, and Armstrong 1973. Process Reliabilism is developed in Goldman 1975, 1976, 2000, 1986, Kornblith 2002, 2008, and Lyons 2009. Anti-Luck Reliabilism is developed in Dretske 1971, Nozick 1981, Sosa 1999, Williamson 2000, and Pritchard 2005. Virtue Reliabilism is developed in Sosa 1980, 1991, 2007, and Greco 1999, 2000, 2003. And Proper Function Reliabilism is developed in Plantinga 1993 and Bergmann 2006. Influential counterexamples appear in Bonjour 1980, Lehrer 1990, and Plantinga 1993 (see Lyons 2009 for replies). The classic statement of the Generality Problem appears in E. Conee & Feldman 1998 (see Beebe 2004 and Comesaña 2006 for replies). Early statements of the Problem of Easy Knowledge appear in Vogel 2000 and Cohen 2002 (see Kornblith 2009 for a reply). An early statement of the New Evil Demon Problem appears in Cohen 1984 (see Goldman 1987, Majors & Sawyer 2005, and Comesaña 2002 for replies). And detailed discussions of the Swamping Problem appear in Zagzebski 2003 and Kvanvig 2003 (see Goldman & Olsson 2009 for replies). Recently, Berker 2013, 2013 sparked a renewed critical interest on the consequentialist structure of Reliabilism (see Goldman 2015 and Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn 2014 for replies). |
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- Chinese Chat Room: AI hallucinations, epistemology and cognition.Kristina Šekrst - forthcoming - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric.The purpose of this paper is to show that understanding AI hallucination requires an interdisciplinary approach that combines insights from epistemology and cognitive science to address the nature of AI-generated knowledge, with a terminological worry that concepts we often use might carry unnecessary presuppositions. Along with terminological issues, it is demonstrated that AI systems, comparable to human cognition, are susceptible to errors in judgement and reasoning, and proposes that epistemological frameworks, such as reliabilism, can be similarly applied to enhance the (...)
- Non‐ideal epistemic rationality.Nick Hughes - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):72-95.I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non-ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non-ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.
- The Boundaries of Gnoseology.Jesús Navarro & Dani Pino - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 10:1-19.According to Sosa (2015, 2021), the domain of epistemic normativity divides into gnoseology and intellectual ethics, a boundary that results from the key notion that gnoseological assessments are telic. We share this view here and highlight the implications that the telic claim has for different debates in contemporary epistemology. However, we also raise the complaint that Sosa’s analogy of the archer has suggested that this boundary aligns with those of the instant of cognitive performance and its attributability to an individual, (...)
- Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check.Michele Palmira - 2024 - Noûs 58 (3):799-824.The paper proposes an account of the rational response to higher‐order evidence whose key claim is that whenever we acquire such evidence we ought to engage in the inquiring activity of double‐checking. Combined with a principle that establishes a connection between rational inquiry and rational belief retention, the account offers a novel explanation of the alleged impermissibility of retaining one's belief in the face of higher‐order evidence. It is argued that this explanation is superior to the main competitor view which (...)
- Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism.Guido Tana - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):243-272.The aim of this paper is to analyse and develop how scepticism becomes an intelligible question starting from requirements that epistemologists themselves aim to endorse. We argue for and defend the idea that the root of scepticism is the underdetermination principle by articulating its specificitya respectable epistemic principle and by defending it against objections in current literature. This engagement offers a novel understanding of underdetermination-based scepticism. While most anti-sceptical approaches challenge scepticism by understanding it as postulating uneliminated scenarios of mass (...)
- The Prescriptive and the Hypological: A Radical Detachment.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-29.A wide range of more objectivist norms appear to leave uncharted an important part of normative space. In the beginning of this paper I briefly outline two broad ways of seeking more subject-directed norms: perspectivism and feasibilism. According to feasibilism, the ultimate reason why more objectivist norms are inadequate on their own is not that they fail to take into account the limits of an agent’s perspective, but that they are not sensitive to limits on what ways of choosing, acting, (...)
- Dini Epistemoloji: Alvin Plantinga Örneği.Musa Yanık - 2019 - Dissertation, Ondokuz Mayis UniversitesiAlvin Plantinga, analitik felsefe düşüncesi içerisinde yetişmiş ve bu gelenek içinde teistik din felsefesinin oluşumuna katkıda bulunmuş bir filozoftur. Ayrıca teizmin savunusu için yaptığı çalışmalarla, çeşitli üniversitelerden aldığı onur ödülleri ve 2017 yılında kazandığı Templeton Prize ödülüyle, haklı bir üne kavuşmuş bir şahsiyettir. Bu çalışmayı yapmamızdaki en önemli amaç, Plantinga’nın dini epistemoloji üzerine yaptığı çalışmaları analiz edip bu düşüncelerinin ardalanına dair bir tespitte bulunmaktır. Bu çalışmada yararlandığımız öncelikli kaynaklar, Plantinga’nın Nicholas Wolterstorff ile birlikte kaleme aldığı “Faith and Rationality” adlı eser (...)
- Epistemik Güvenilircilik ve Alvin Plantinga’da Tanrı İnancının Güvenilirliği Sorunu.Musa Yanık - 2020 - Din Ve Felsefe Araştırmaları Dergisi 3 (6):181-208.Güvenilirci (reliabilist) bilgi teorisi, çağdaş epistemik gerekçelendirme kuramları içerisinde, dışsalcı (externalist) kuramın bir türü olarak kendisine yer bulmaktadır. Kısaca, bir inancı gerekçelendiren şeyin o inancın oluşturulduğu sürecin güvenilirliği olduğunu öne süren bu yaklaşım, bu bilişsel süreçleri özne dışı unsurlara bağladığı içinde dışsalcı bir pozisyonda yer almaktadır. Bu bilgi teorisinin tam karşı konumunda yer alan içselci (internalist) bilgi teorisi ise, özne merkezli bir yaklaşımla, doğru inancı gerekçelendirecek yöntemin, kişinin kendi zihinsel yapısından yola çıkarak, belli kognitif süreçler sonucunda ulaşılabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Epistemik (...)
- A RELIABILIST INTERPRETATION OF SOCRATES’ AUTOBIOGRAPHY.Tonguç Seferoğlu - 2023 - Schole 17 (2):582-604.This paper aims to offer a novel interpretation of Socrates’ autobiography in the Phaedo 96-102 by using reliabilist epistemology as a heuristic guide to spell out the complex dynamics of the intellectual development of Socrates of the Phaedo. Surprisingly, scholars have mostly focused on the outcomes of Socrates’s scientific investigations, but they neglected the dynamics of the discovery process. The reason why Socrates rejected many earlier scientific ideas and the way in which he discovered new theories as much significant and (...)
- Reliabilist epistemology meets bounded rationality.Giovanni Dusi - 2024 - Synthese 203 (4):1-21.Epistemic reliabilism holds that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable or truth-conducive process. I argue that reliabilism offers an epistemology for bounded rationality. This latter concept refers to normative and descriptive accounts of real-world reasoning instead of some ideal reasoning. However, as initially formulated, reliabilism involves an absolute, context-independent assessment of rationality that does not do justice to the fact that several processes are reliable in some reasoning environments but not in others, (...)
- Immediate justification and process reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.
- (1 other version)Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Prescriptive and Evaluative Norms of Assertion.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Analysis.Critical notice of Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion's _Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion_.
- Dimensional Reliabilism.S. Orestis Palermos - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.The paper argues that (i) the notion of epistemic reliability, as it is standardly defined within mainstream epistemology, is a multidimensional concept, and that (ii) paying attention to reliability’s multidimensional nature can significantly expand reliabilism’s purview both in the theoretical and practical domain. Reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification agree that a process is reliable just in case it leads to a ‘sufficiently high preponderance of true over false beliefs.’ Given this straightforward definition, reliability appears to be, and so far (...)
- (1 other version)Virtue-Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New Problems.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2018 - In .
- (1 other version)The Value Problem for Knowledge and Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology.오희철 ) - 2023 - Journal of the Society of Philosophical Studies 68:239-276.
- A novel Process Reliabilist response to the Swamping Problem.Sanford Goldberg - 2023 - Analysis 83 (3):465-473.This paper aims to provide a novel response on behalf of Process Reliabilism to the Swamping Problem. Unlike previous responses, the present response does not involve conditional probabilities (as Goldman and Olsson do), it does not appeal to permissivism or attitudes towards epistemic risk (as Pettigrew does), it will not depend on the generality of the problem (as Carter and Jarvis do) and it does not embrace either evidentialism or evidence monism (as Bjelde does). Instead it appeals to the modal (...)
- (1 other version)The Value Problem for Knowledge and Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology.오희철 ) - 2023 - Journal of the Society of Philosophical Studies 68:81-104.
- Remembering requires no reliability.Changsheng Lai - 2023 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-21.I argue against mnemic reliabilism, an influential view that successful remembering must be produced by a reliable memory process. Drawing on empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience, I refute mnemic reliabilism by demonstrating that: (1) patients with memory impairments (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease) can also successfully remember the past despite the unreliability of their corresponding memory processes; (2) some reliability-affecting factors (e.g., stress, divided attention, and insufficient encoding time) can render the memory processes of healthy individuals unreliable without preventing them from (...)
- A virtue reliabilist solution to moore’s paradox.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Synthese 202 (5):1-14.Most of the literature surrounding virtue reliabilism revolves around issues pertaining to the analysis of knowledge. With the exception of the lottery paradox, virtue reliabilists have paid relatively little attention to classic epistemological paradoxes, such as Moore’s paradox. This is a significant omission given how central role such paradoxes have in epistemic theorizing. In this essay I take a step towards remedying this shortcoming by providing a solution to Moore’s paradox. The solution that I offer stems directly from the core (...)
- The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism.Erik J. Olsson, Trond A. Tjøstheim, Andreas Stephens, Arthur Schwaninger & Maximilian Roszko - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):417-438.The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. The problem arises for reliabilism in particular, i.e., the externalist view that knowledge amounts to reliably acquired true belief. Goldman and Olsson argue that knowledge, in this sense, is more valuable than mere true belief due to the higher likelihood of future true beliefs (produced by the same reliable process) in the case of knowledge. They maintain that their solution works given (...)
- A Virtue Reliabilist Error-Theory of Defeat.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2449-2466.Knowledge defeat occurs when a subject knows that _p_, gains a defeater for her belief, and thereby loses her knowledge without necessarily losing her belief. It’s far from obvious that externalists can accommodate putative cases of knowledge defeat since a belief that satisfies the externalist conditions for knowledge can satisfy those conditions even if the subject later gains a defeater for her belief. I’ll argue that virtue reliabilists can accommodate defeat intuitions via a new kind of error theory. I argue (...)
- Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.Epistemologists spend a great deal of time thinking about how we should respond to our evidence. They spend far less time thinking about the ways that evidence can be acquired in the first place. This is an oversight. Some ways of acquiring evidence are better than others. Many normative epistemologies struggle to accommodate this fact. In this article I develop one that can and does. I identify a phenomenon – epistemic feedback loops – in which evidence acquisition has gone awry, (...)
- Kornblith and His Critics.Luis Oliveira & Joshua DiPaolo (eds.) - forthcoming - Wiley-Blackwell.Hilary Kornblith is one of the world’s leading epistemologists, a champion of an innovative philosophical research program that is at once traditional and revisionary. In viewing the study of knowledge as inseparable from the empirical study of the mind, Kornblith aligns himself closely with the approach of the traditional empiricists of the 17th and 18th centuries. Yet in taking contemporary empirical work seriously, Kornblith has developed views and arguments that shift the epistemological focus away from what is available first-personally _within_ (...)Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - Reliabilism.Sanford Goldberg - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum.
- Dini Epistemoloji Nedir?Musa Yanık - 2022 - İstanbul, Türkiye: Düşün Yayıncılık.Dini epistemoloji, teistik inançların rasyonel zeminde gerekçelendirilme yollarını arayan, çağdaş epistemolojinin bir alt dalıdır. Musa Yanık, bu kitapta günümüzdeki en güçlü yaklaşım olan reform epistemolojisinden güvenilircilik bakış açısıyla yani “daha yüksek bir olasılıkla doğru olması yönünden” İslam inancının rasyonelliğini ortaya koymakta ve uygulamalı dini epistemolojinin sağlam ve cesur bir örneğini sergilemektedir. (Prof. Dr. Hasan Yücel Başdemir) -/- Epistemoloji topyekûn insan zihnini biçimlendirme ve inanç da dahil olmak üzere bilişsel faaliyetleri yönlendirme potansiyeline sahip bir alandır. Zira Allah’ın varlığı, birliği, nübüvvet ve (...)
- Does singular thought have an epistemic essence?James Openshaw - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.What is involved in having a singular thought about an ordinary object? On the leading epistemic view, one has this capacity if and only if one has belief-forming dispositions which would reliably enable one to get its properties right (Dickie, 2015). I first argue that Dickie’s official view entails surprising and unpalatable claims about either rationality or singular thought, before offering a precisification. Once we have reached that level of abstraction, it becomes difficult to see what is distinctively epistemic about (...)
- Reliabilism and First- and Second-Order Skepticism.Byeong D. Lee - 2016 - Philosophical Analysis 35:27-49.One reliabilist option against the problem of bootstrapping is to argue that circular reasoning is bad, but reliabilism can avoid circular reasoning. Vogel dismisses this option on the grounds that reliabilists need circular reasoning in order to circumvent skepticism. Briesen argues, however, that although reliabilists need circular reasoning to block second-order skepticism, they do not need it to block first-order skepticism. But I argue in this paper that reliabilists cannot legitimately reject first-order skepticism unless they can block second-order skepticism. In (...)
- (1 other version)Self-Knowledge and Epistemic Virtues: between Reliabilism and Responsibilism.César Schirmer Santos - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):579-593.This paper is about the role of self-knowledge in the cognitive life of a virtuous knower. The main idea is that it is hard to know ourselves because introspection is an unreliable epistemic source, and reason can be a source of insidious forms of self-deception. Nevertheless, our epistemic situation is such that an epistemically responsible agent must be constantly looking for a better understanding of her own character traits and beliefs, under the risk of jeopardizing her own status as a (...)
- (1 other version)Infinitism and Inferential Externalism.Tito Flores - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):566-578.The purpose of this essay is to show that the version of epistemological infinitism defended by Peter Klein is externalistic in character. I present the most important questions infinitism is supposed to resolve and also present the fundamental difference regarding internalism and externalism in epistemology. I conclude with an indication of what would be the best way to understand infinitism and how to evade the problems that emerge from Klein’s externalist infinitism.
- Externalism About Knowledge: A Brief Introduction.Luis Oliveira - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.Abstracting away from its various particular versions, contemporary externalism about knowledge can be broadly characterized as the rejection of two central ideas: that knowledge is incompatible with reflective awareness of the possibility of error, and that knowledge is necessarily tied to the resources that are available from within the first-person perspective. In this brief introduction, I outline five distinctly externalist accounts of knowledge, and two distinctly externalist methodological approaches to knowledge, all fitting this general description.$95.10 used (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- Gettier Cases, Mimicking, and Virtue Reliabilism.M. Hosein M. A. Khalaj - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (3):273-286.It has been argued that virtue reliabilism faces difficulties in explaining why the “because-of” relation between true belief and the relevant competence is absent in Gettier cases. However, prominent proponents of this view such as Sosa and Turri suggest that these difficulties can be overcome by invoking the manifestation relation. In his Judgment and Agency, Sosa supports this claim based on an analogy between Gettier cases and what in the literature on dispositions is called mimic cases. While there are initial (...)
- Abilism, Ableism, and Reliabilism’s Achievement Gap: A Normative Argument for A New Paradigm in Epistemology.John Turri - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1495-1501.Reliabilism says that knowledge must be produced by reliable abilities. Abilism disagrees and allows that knowledge is produced by unreliable abilities. Previous research strongly supports the conclusion that abilism better describes how knowledge is actually defined in commonsense and science. In this paper, I provide a novel argument that abilism is ethically superior to reliabilism. Whereas reliabilism unethically discriminates against agents by excluding them from knowing, abilism virtuously includes them.
- A Different Solution to the Generality Problem for Process Reliabilism.Alvin Goldman - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):105-111.
- (1 other version)Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1481-1500.Strong epistemic anti-individualism—i.e., the claim that knowledge can be irreducibly social—is increasingly debated within mainstream and social epistemology. Most existing approaches attempt to argue for the view on the basis of aggregative analyses, which focus on the way certain groups aggregate the epistemic attitudes of their members. Such approaches are well motivated, given that many groups to which we often ascribe group knowledge—such as juries and committees—operate in this way. Yet another way that group knowledge can be generated is on (...)
- Reliabilism Defended.Jeffrey Tolly - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):619-635.Reliabilism about knowledge states that a belief-forming process generates knowledge only if its likelihood of generating true belief exceeds 50 percent. Despite the prominence of reliabilism today, there are very few if any explicit arguments for reliabilism in the literature. In this essay, I address this lacuna by formulating a new independent argument for reliabilism. As I explain, reliabilism can be derived from certain key knowledge-closure principles. Furthermore, I show how this argument can withstand John Turri’s two recent objections to (...)
- (1 other version)Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism.Andrea Fábiková - 2021 - Filosoficky Casopis 69 (Special issue 3):62-74.
- Hume and reliabilism.Qu Hsueh - 2021 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (34):27-51.Hume's epistemological legacy is often perceived as a predominantly negative sceptical one. His infamous problem of induction continues to perplex philosophers to this day, and many of his sceptical worries maintain their interest in contemporary eyes (e.g. with regard to reason, the senses, substance, causation). Yet Hume's positive epistemological contributions also hold significance for philosophy in this day and age. In this paper, I aim to situate Hume's epistemology in a more contemporary context, particularly with regard to the theme of (...)
- Reason, Reflection, and Reliabilism: Kant and the Grounds of Rational and Empirical Knowledge.James Hebbeler - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 735-742.$232.00 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark 1 citation
- Structural Reliabilism: Inductive Logic as a Theory of Justification.Paweł Kawalec - 2002 - Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Kawalec's monograph is a novel defence of the programme of inductive logic, developed initially by Rudolf Carnap in the 1950s and Jaakko Hintikka in the 1960s. It revives inductive logic by bringing out the underlying epistemology. The main strength of the work is its link between inductive logic and contemporary discussions of epistemology. Through this perspective the author succeeds to shed new light on the significance of inductive logic. The resulting structural reliabilist theory propounds the view that justification supervenes on (...)
- Racial Injustice and information flow.Eric Bayruns García - 2021 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 7 (4):1-18.I submit that the critical epistemology of race and standpoint literature has not explicitly focused on the properties of information about, say, racial or gender injustice in a way similar to how epistemologists have focused on propositions and information when they describe propositional justification. I describe information in the racial-injustice-information domain in a way similar to how epistemologists describe propositional justification. To this end, I argue (C1) that if subjects in racially unjust societies tend to violate norms that promote a (...)
- A Virtue-Theoretic Approach to Religious Epistemology: Faith as an Act of Epistemic Virtue.Benjamin McCraw - 2012 - Dissertation, University of GeorgiaThis work lies at the juncture between religious epistemology and virtue epistemology. Currently, both fields in epistemology are burgeoning with interest and novel theories, arguments, and applications. However, there is no systematic or sustained overlap between the two. I aim to provide such a systematic connection. Virtue epistemology holds that epistemology should turn away from analyzing person-neutral concepts like evidence, reliability, etc. as the primary locus of analysis in favor of person-based properties like intellectual character traits. I develop and defend (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- The Problem with Impure Infinitism.Husein Inusah - 2021 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):339-351.It is generally believed that pure versions of infinitism face two problems, namely: 1) they are unable to distinguish between potential and actual series of justified reasons because they are defined strictly in terms of relations between beliefs in the series so that every succeeding belief is justified by the belief before it and so on ad infinitum and, 2) they are unable to mark the difference between a set of justified reasons that are connected to truth and one that (...)
- Deslimitando a Sosa. Diacronía y Colectividad del Juicio Doxástico.Jesus Navarro & Dani Pino - 2021 - In Modesto Gómez-Alonso & David Perez Chico (eds.), Ernesto Sosa: Conocimiento y Virtud. Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza. pp. 211-244.Ernesto Sosa tiene el mérito de haber sido pionero en lo que podría describirse, quizás sin demasiada exageración, como un cambio de paradigma en la epistemología contemporánea: el que supuso el tránsito desde una epistemología centrada en el problema de la estructura de la justificación hasta una nueva concepción del conocimiento enfocada en la naturaleza del agente epistémico. Un aspecto de este cambio que conviene no tratar con negligencia es el cambio de las analogías fundamentales, que pasaron de ser arquitectónicas (...)
- (1 other version)Delimitando a Sosa. Diacronía y Colectividad del Juicio Doxástico.Jesus Navarro & Dani Pino - 2021 - In Modesto Gómez-Alonso & David Perez Chico (eds.), Ernesto Sosa: Conocimiento y Virtud. Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza. pp. 211-244.Ernesto Sosa tiene el mérito de haber sido pionero en lo que podría describirse, quizás sin demasiada exageración, como un cambio de paradigma en la epistemología contemporánea: el que supuso el tránsito desde una epistemología centrada en el problema de la estructura de la justificación hasta una nueva concepción del conocimiento enfocada en la naturaleza del agente epistémico. Un aspecto de este cambio que conviene no tratar con negligencia es el cambio de las analogías fundamentales, que pasaron de ser arquitectónicas (...)
- (1 other version)Delimitando a Sosa. Diacronía y Colectividad del Juicio Doxástico.Jesus Navarro & Dani Pino - 2021 - In Modesto Gómez-Alonso & David Perez Chico (eds.), Ernesto Sosa: Conocimiento y Virtud. Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza. pp. 211-244.Ernesto Sosa tiene el mérito de haber sido pionero en lo que podría describirse, quizás sin demasiada exageración, como un cambio de paradigma en la epistemología contemporánea: el que supuso el tránsito desde una epistemología centrada en el problema de la estructura de la justificación hasta una nueva concepción del conocimiento enfocada en la naturaleza del agente epistémico. Un aspecto de este cambio que conviene no tratar con negligencia es el cambio de las analogías fundamentales, que pasaron de ser arquitectónicas (...)
- On Sosa’s telic epistemology.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2021 - TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA 44 (Special):25-28.Comments to: SOSA, Ernest. Representations, judgments, and the swamping problem for reliabilism: why the problem applies to process reliabilism, but not to virtue reliabilism. Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp journal of philosophy, vol. 44, Special issue in honor of Ernest Sosa, p. 19-24, 2021.
- (1 other version)How Racial Injustice Undermines News Sources and News-Based Inferences.Eric Bayruns García - 2020 - Episteme 2020:1-22.I argue racial injustice undermines the reliability of news source reports in the information domain of racial injustice. I argue that this in turn undermines subjects’ doxastic justification in inferences they base on these news sources in the racial injustice information domain. I explain that racial injustice does this undermining through the effect of racial prejudice on news organizations’ members and the effect of society's racially unjust structure on non-dominant racial group-controlled news sources.
- Historical Versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology.Thomas Kelly - 2016 - In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 43-65.This chapter explores one theme that in the author judgment has not received as much sustained attention as it warrants: the distinction between historical and current time slice theories of epistemic justification. It devotes to the hermeneutical tasks of explicating and contextualizing the distinction between historical and current time slice theories. The chapter examines Goldman's longstanding claim that no current time slice theory can possibly do justice to the epistemic role of preservative memory. It argues that a principle governing preservative (...)
- A modal theory of discrimination.Guido Melchior - 2021 - Synthese 198 (11):10661-10684.Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use discrimination as a vehicle for analyzing knowledge. This paper aims at developing a self-contained theory of discrimination. Internalist theories of discrimination fail since there is no compelling correlation between discriminatory capacities and experiences. Moreover, statistical reliabilist theories are also flawed. Only a modal theory of discrimination is promising. Versions of sensitivity and adherence that take particular alternatives into account provide necessary and sufficient conditions on discrimination. Safety in (...)
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