This reply to «Against System in Ethics», stresses both agreement and desagreement between the authoress and Griffin's point ofview.There is an argument for a strong link between the prudential and the moral, as well as for the relevance of personal excelence and personal flourishing. However there is a propossal here to make personal, individual, flourishing dependent on sympathetic feelings and a broad frame of mind so to embrace individual and personal flourishing for everybody else.Griffin's aminating aim, is brought from the (...) background to the front now, as the authoress believes that general benevolence frees every single person from petty feelings and misery (moral and otherwise). (shrink)

Emphasis is placed in the need of taking persons seriously instead of only taking their rights seriously. Accordingly human well-being (physical, psychological and moral) is a «trump» against any sort of consideration about alleged rights that could go counter human development and well-being. Instead of current talk about classical rights such as liberty, freedom and dignity, too formal and too abstract, the paper deals with three main rights that prove to be more promising: 1) The right to be considered as (...) a being whose suffering is to be minimized. 2) The right to a free, full personal development. and 3) The right to receive care and sympathy. Against current theories of rights a plea is made for enlightened and enlarged sympathy as the foundation of rights and ethics, thus avoiding the partiality that infects Dworkin's and many other's theories of private ethics. (shrink)

First, I want to thank Professor Rosen’s deep and illuminating study of the Philosophy of Stuart Mill. In my view, one of the most important contributions of the author is his claim that Mill was not only a social moralist but was primarily a philosopher and a logician. In many ways, Rosen is right. Mill was not a moral philosopher, or at least was not only a moral philosopher. However, he was concerned with the part of philosophy that deals with (...) morality and enthusiastically defended both the welfare and the individual and social development. First, I want to thank Professor Rosen’s deep and illuminating study of the Philosophy of Stuart Mill. In my view, one of the most important contributions of the author is his claim that Mill was not only a social moralist but was primarily a philosopher and a logician. In many ways, Rosen is right. Mill was not a moral philosopher, or at least was not only a moral philosopher. However, he was concerned with the part of philosophy that deals with morality and enthusiastically defended both the welfare and the individual and social development. As we say, Mill was not only a moral philosopher, because in many cases he anticipated to contemporary metaphysics, showing that the principles of normative ethical could be defended so that the human intellect helps to understand them. Even so, it should be added that Mill was, however, a reformer and a defender of moral character education. I think no exaggeration to say that Mill used logic and reasoning as ways to promote intellectual and moral development of all human beings, which is necessary for the individual improvement of welfare and social harmony. Reading Mill carefully is discovered that all his reasoning and use of the senses is aimed at deepening the welfare of all members of humanity, recommending the highest pleasures. Being a moral philosopher is not so, and as Fred Rosen suggests in his brilliant work, an obstacle to Mill being a defender of ethical revolution of society, i.e., the transformation of human life. Thus, while I deeply admire the contribution of Professor Rosen to the study of Mill, I will show my disagreement with it at some length, and finally I will also summarize the main points of convergence between the study of Rosen and my own view of John Stuart Mill’s thought. (shrink)

Presentación del número monográfico de Télos dedicado a la conmemoración del Quinto Centenario del Descubrimiento de América.