To avoid the one-sidedness and abuse of the rule of xieju 絜矩, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 redefines zhong-shu 忠恕, the Confucian golden rule, as two separate yet complementary principles, the idea of which is most manifestly drawn from Zhuangzi’s 莊子 “Qiwulun 齊物論”. Zhang’s association of zhong-shu and qiwu 齊物 is based upon his vision of equality premised on recognition of and respect for differences. In Zhang’s reading of the Zhuangzi in light of Yogācāra, the crucial “concept matching” is the explanation of (...) cheng xin 成心 as seeds in the ālaya consciousness. Cheng xin in this sense not only refers to the natural pattern of things and so is the basis for inference and deduction, but also serves as the means to deal with the diversity of opinions. In moral practice, Zhang proposes the liang xing 兩行 approach of his qiwu philosophy: to recognize the equal worth of all beings on one hand, and to take the particular characteristics and desires of individuals into account on the other. Thus, it requires the dual practice of zhong and shu: to acquire firsthand observation through personal experience, and to imagine oneself in the position of the other. (shrink)

This essay examines the questions raised about debate in _Zhuāngzǐ_ 莊子 2, the practical advice this chapter offers us for dealing with debates when they arise, and some of the questions that will predictably occur about how and why to apply that advice. On the present interpretation, _Zhuāngzǐ_ 2 argues that joining any side in a verbal conflict promotes continued conflict, and that only appreciating and working along with each speaker’s distinct point of view affords us access to what is (...) “really” or “conclusively” (_guǒ_ 果) the case. In contentious situations, the text advises that we pay close attention to speakers and their ways of life—rather than to what they are supposedly speaking about—and that we abandon any immediate goal beyond preserving our own health. Along the way, it foregrounds pleasure and comfort rather than rightness as what we are most attuned to when we listen and respond to one another’s words. (shrink)

This paper challenges the view that contentment leads to personal freedom and autonomy and argues for a relational and exercise concept of de facto freedom in the Zhuangzi 莊子. I first review influential interpretations of freedom in the Zhuangzi that equate freedom with contentment and nonfrustration, starting with Guo Xiang's 郭象 (d. 312 CE). By putting these interpretations in dialog with contemporary social philosophy (Christman, Meyers, Pettit, Elster, and Khader), I reflect on the two seminal problems of the psychologizing causal (...) and procedural approaches that allow the interpretation of freedom as contentment: the “happy slave” problem and the “sour grapes” problem. Proving this account of freedom inadequate, I argue for a different interpretation of freedom in the Zhuangzi that resembles a weakly substantive and constitutive account of freedom and autonomy in modern‐day social philosophy terms, such as Marina Oshana's. The theory of freedom that I analyze in the Zhuangzi, however, helps us correct the risk of material determinism of the constitutive account, offering a description of relational freedom and autonomy as constituted by socio‐material conditions but not determined by them. (shrink)

In Zhuangzi’s philosophy, the intellectual virtues of humility and open-mindedness are best understood in the context of his epistemic perspectivism. The method, which urges knowers to pursue various and diverse points of view and incorporate them into a broad perspective, is justified by a second-order realization that all perspectives are partial and limited. This in turn urges a meta-virtue of humility, defined as a disposition in which knowers become aware of their epistemic limitations. Humility, consequently, encourages the virtue of open-mindedness, (...) defined as the willingness and ability to surpass existing personal perspectives. Zhuangzi endorses the method and its attendant virtues to achieve what he calls great knowing. I propose that we gain a clearer sense of the role of humility and open-mindedness by also considering Zhuangzi’s treatment of the vices, which are addressed with as much frequency as the virtues. Zhuangzi’s treatment of arrogance and closed-mindedness reveals how humility and open-mindedness operate as corrective virtues, in the sense that they compensate for evident and familiar deficiencies in the epistemic practices of knowers in Zhuangzi’s time. Humility and open-mindedness enable knowers to acquire new points of view that reliably produce knowledge. (shrink)

An interesting feature of the language of many Daoist texts is their atypical idealization of Darkness and Obscurity, which contrasts with the positive connotations of Light and Clarity in virtually all great philosophical traditions. This article highlights a formerly unnoted difference between the received and the excavated Guodian 郭店 versions of the Laozi 老子, which reveals an interesting change in the use of Light/Darkness symbolism through the evolution of the text: while the received Laozi uses both metaphorical schemes to roughly (...) the same extent, the presumably earlier Guodian Laozi lacks almost all of the “bright” references that appear in later recensions, thus constituting a much “darker” version of the text. The article discusses the philosophical meaning of this terminological shift and the possible reasons for its occurrence, and closely analyzes three cases in which this process of “textual illumination” seems to have taken place during the transition between the Guodian and received version of the text. Alongside more specific implications such as the formerly unknown linkage between ming 明 and chang 常, a suggested stratification of chapter 55, and the possible relationship between the proto-Laozian materials and the Zhuangzi 莊子, this article also proposes a more general hypothesis according to which the absence of light metaphors in the Guodian version represents the jargon of an earlier “dark” stratum of Daoism, traces of which were preserved in some of the texts known to us today. (shrink)

The ancient Chinese text the Zhuangzi raises a mix of epistemological, psychological, and conceptual challenges against the value and usefulness of philosophical disputation. But instead of advocating the elimination of philosophy, it implicitly embraces a broader conception of philosophy, the goal of which is to engage us to reflect on our limitations, question things we take for granted, and better appreciate alternative perspectives and possibilities. Philosophy thus understood is compatible with a variety of methods and approaches: fictions, jokes, paradoxes, spiritual (...) exercises, argument, disputation, and so on. Philosophical practices, on this view, also pave the way for an open‐minded, adaptive and flexible way of living that is at the core of the Zhuangist good life. (shrink)