Studies in Dialectics of Nature 7 (37):14-20 (2021)

Changsheng (Lex) Lai
Shanghai JiaoTong University
The core thesis of anti-luck epistemology is the incompatibility thesis, that is, knowledge is incompatible with veritic epistemic luck. Traditionally, anti-luck epistemologists hold that there are two distinct types of veritic epistemic luck, viz, intervening luck and environmental luck. The former occurs when something luckily intervenes between the subject’s belief and the target fact, which renders the subject’s belief luckily true. The latter can be found in cases where the subject’s belief is luckily true when she is in an unfriendly epistemic environment. This paper purports to show that there is another long-neglected type of veritic epistemic luck—I name it ‘interpretative luck’. It refers to the type of luck occurring when the subject accidentally chooses the correct interpretation of evidence and thus her belief is luckily true. I will demonstrate that no proper reasons can support the incompatibility between interpretative luck and knowledge. Instead, the price for insisting this incompatibility would be unacceptably high. Therefore, the existence of interpretative luck falsifies the incompatibility thesis of anti-luck epistemology.
Keywords anti-luck epistemology  intervening luck  environmental luck  interpretative luck
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Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck.Changsheng Lai - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

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