Classical Confucianism

Xunzi’s philosophy provides a rich resource for understanding how ethical relationships between humans and nature can be articulated in terms of harmony. In this paper, I build on his ideas to develop the concept of reciprocal harmony, which requires us to reciprocate those who make our lives liveable. In the context of the environment, I argue that reciprocal harmony generates moral obligations towards nature, in return for the existential debt that humanity owes towards heaven and earth. This can be used (...) as a normative basis for an environmental ethic that enables humanity and nature to flourish together. (shrink)

Although current educational priorities tend to avoid strong moral positions, one of the world's most venerable yet persistently influential moral traditions not only lays out a number of major moral principles but also incorporates them into its pedagogy. Confucius teaches us about the importance of seeking knowledge, learning how to learn, applying ancient wisdom to contemporary situations, valuing virtue over material gain, following the Golden Rule, and living by our principles. He also has ways of assessing his own students' progress (...) in these matters. Confucius' pedagogy is an interesting model to consider and contrast with contemporary models. This chapter introduces these principles and assessments from the Analects and draws out some comparisons to and contrasts with two alternative theories in western moral thought, Augustine and John Dewey. (shrink)

Creating and caring for a garden is a long-term project whose success requires commitment and devotion and love and proper performance of a range of activities that involve virtues and sensibilities like attentiveness, carefulness, humility, imaginativeness, and sensitivity to the natures and needs of plants and animals. In this chapter, I elaborate this conception of gardens and explore its relationship to artistic activities, like composing poetry or performing music. My focus are Confucianism and Daosim and their accounts of the relationships (...) between cultured practices, ethics and the arts, and garden-practices. (shrink)

"Is Traditional Chinese Thought Philosophy?" has been a perennial question ever since the term zhexue 哲學, as a translation of the Western concept of philosophy, was introduced to China via Japan, and it will stay this way for years to come. Two factors make the answering of this question a Sisyphean project. First, a lot of scholars feel that they have to answer this question. The contemporary academic disciplines were defined by Westerners, and the discipline of philosophy was alien to (...) traditional Chinese scholarship. Then, unless the structure of academia is radically redefined, anyone who relies heavily on traditional Chinese materials and wishes to work... (shrink)

The idea of the Anthropocene is not only about environmental issues; it is for a new geologic epoch. Moreover, it is a new worldview, a new philosophy. It provides a new context and perspective for us to re-think some traditional philosophical ideas, including the ancient Confucian philosophy of harmony among heaven, earth, and humanity.

The study of Chinese philosophy in the English-speaking world has largely focused on ethical and political theories. In comparison, Chinese metaphysics—here understood primarily as theories regarding the nature, components, and operating principles of reality—has been far less researched and recognized. In this essay, we examine various meanings of “metaphysics” as it has been used in denoting a branch of philosophy and make the case that metaphysics is an important part of Chinese philosophy. We argue for the need to study Chinese (...) metaphysics as a serious field of scholarship. We also present some most recent studies of Chinese metaphysics by leading scholars of Chinese philosophy who publish in the English-speaking world. This essay aims to show that not only that Chinese metaphysics is an appropriate and legitimate subject of scholarly research but it can also be a fruitful subfield of in the study in Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

本文討論儒家思想傳統在近代和現代所面臨的五個主要的挑戰:科學,民 主,女性主義,環境主義,以及儒家自身如何生存下去的挑戰。.

Abstract: In this essay I will discuss five major challenges faced by Confucianism in recent times. Two of these challenges have been widely acknowledged, namely those of science and democracy. I believe that Confucianism's problem with science has been largely solved, even though more constructive work would further strengthen Confucianism in this regard. The problem of democracy is still being dealt with. I will examine three more major challenges. The third major challenge for Confucianism comes from environmentalism. Confucianism has taken (...) note of its important message and has begun to respond to it. The fourth major challenge is the feminist challenge. Even though contemporary Confucianism accepts sexual equality, philosophically significant progress is yet to be made. The final challenge is the challenge of Confucianism's own survival. After serving three major assults in the 20th century, especially the most recent assult by "the glorious cat," Confucianism needs to find a way to renew itself into future. . (shrink)

平等是现代社会的主要理想价值之一。我们必须认识到，平等有不同的形式。而且任何形式的平等都有随之而来的其他形式的不平等。本文考察儒家思想传统在经济、伦理和政治维度的平等和不平等观念。认为儒家平等观念的主 要特征是比例平等以及随之而来的相关方方面的不平等。儒家的平等思想是其理想社会的重要部分，并试图探究这一观念的当代意涵。.

当代儒家研究的一个特点，是不仅把儒家哲学看做伦理道德哲学，而且也看做社会政治哲学。结合当今世界语境，尝试提出一个儒家关于世界和谐理念的构想，应从研究儒家思想中的道义领先原则、恕道以及“和而不同”等方面 着手，重点研究这些问题，对于现实当今世界的政治秩序和谐，有着重要价值。.

长期以来，中国学术界流行把儒家的基本思想乃至整个中国文化归结为“天人合一”，并常常把“天人合一” 的源头归结于《易经》。其实考诸中国思想史，把儒家的基本思想总结为“天人合一”，特别是把“天人合一” 的来源归结于《易经》的说法并不准确，是一种误导。《易经》的“天、地、人”三才思想较之于“天人合一”更为符合儒家思想的本旨。在儒家三才和谐的理念中，天、地、人三者各自都有自身的功能与价值。身为三才和谐结 构中的积极参与者，人类拥有促进与维持宇宙和谐的重要责任。就环境哲学而言，儒家的“三才”说既不是“环境保护主义”，也不是“自然保护主义”，而且相对于大地伦理学与深层生态学等西方的整体性环境哲学而言，儒家 整体性的环境哲学赋予人类在宇宙间以一个更崇高的地位和责任。 .

Engaging in dialogue with African philosophy, I respond to questions raised by Thaddeus Metz on characteristics of Confucian philosophy in comparison with African philosophy. First, in both Confucian philosophy and African philosophy, harmony/harmonization and self-realization coincide in the process of person-making. Second, Confucians accept that sometimes it is inevitable to sacrifice individual components in order to achieve or maintain harmony at large scales; the point is how to minimize such costs. Third, Confucians give family love a central place in the (...) good life before extend love to the rest of the world. Fourth, the Confucian philosophy of gender equality is based on appropriate division of labor consistent with its yin-yang philosophy, rather than equal split of power in the family. Fifth, in the Confucian view, hierarchy and harmony do not necessarily contradict each other, though hierarchy is not essential to all forms of harmony. The two can co-exist. (shrink)

感謝《鵝湖月刊》給我機會討論拙作《比較的時代 ——中西視野中的儒家哲學前沿問題》（以下簡稱《比較的時代》），也很感謝李明書、李健君、張麗麗三位年輕有為的學者認真討論我在書中提出的一些問題。 三位學者都認識到這裏討論的「比較哲學」是通過比較來研究哲學，而不僅僅是比較已經存在的相同和不同的哲學思想。 在我看來， 單純地比較不同的哲學思想基本上是哲學史的工作。 而通過運用比較的方法做哲學則是哲學本身的工作，是建構性的原創性的工作。 說我們的時代是一個比較的時代，是說我們處於一個以比較為特徵來研究和建構哲學思想的時代。 通過比較來做哲學，就是要通過研究不同的哲學流派和不同的哲學思想，來進而建構新的哲學思想，以回答時代向我們提出的問題。在這個方面，我個人的看法是，今天的儒家哲學研究已經進入了一個不可迴避、不可逆轉的比較 的時代。 這是一件大好事。 這樣的研究使我們有更廣闊的視野，使我們有更多、更豐富的思想資源，也使我們更可能有效地回答時代提出的問題。 這裡我分別對三位學者提出的問題做出回應。.

The political philosophies of Kongzi, Mengzi, and Xunzi can fruitfully be understood as focusing substantially on politically relevant merit – and as having conceptions of politically relevant merit intertwined with their conceptions of morality and virtue. In short, on their account, politically relevant merit finds its necessary foundation in morally relevant merit. In critiquing this position, Han Fei questions four positions that must be true in order for the early Confucian position to succeed: 1) Politically relevant merit is necessarily tied (...) to moral merit; 2) Virtuous individuals who possess the relevant moral merits can reliably be identified even by those who are not themselves virtuous; 3) Moral cultivation is actually possible; and 4) Those qualities that make someone virtuous can reliably be ascertained. This paper examines the worries that Han Fei has with these positions and offers up an account of Han Fei’s own account of politically relevant merit – a non-moral alternative tied to task specific competencies. (shrink)

Introduction to special issue of Culture and Dialogue, on “Confucianism: Comparisons and Controversies,” co-edited with Henrique Schneider.

This chapter examines key Confucian worries about the Aristotelian sophos as a model of human flourishing. How strong are these worries? Do Aristotelians have good replies to them? Could the Aristotelian sophos, and this figure's distinguishing feature, sophia, be more appealing to the Confucian than they initially appear?

The Lüshi chunqiu was written for and inspired the king who united the warring state to become China's first emperor in 221 BCE. This book explicates the concept of "proper timing," proposing that it helps bring unity to the diverse eclectic content of the text. The book analyzes the roles of human nature, the justification for the existence of the state, and the significance of personal, historical and cosmic timing. An organic instrumental position emerges from the diverse theories contained in (...) the Lüshi chunqiu. The conclusion looks at ways to apply the Lüshi chunqiu’s philosophy to contemporary issues of time and timing, human nature, political order and constitutions, social and environmental ethics. (shrink)

Confucius aimed to overcome the Spring and Autumn period and achieve order by restoring the humanist tradition and putting it right. At the same time, Confucius distanced himself from discovering the order of natural things, which caused him to be regarded as a representative humanist philosopher. This interpretation could be misleading in that it overlooks the natural aspect of Confucian philosophy. To that aspect, this article asserts that a moral practice in Confucianism has a natural character. The point emphasizing the (...) natural character of Confucian philosophy must be argued in a way in that it does not disregard the humanist character of Confucian thought. This is possible by recognizing the dual aspect of Zhi (直), and I argue further that Confucius can be interpreted through the concept of moral naturalism. Definitions of Zhi in the Analects indicates that morality bases itself on forms of human life developed in a natural way. Confucius’s references surrounding Zhi underlie the concept that our moral beliefs and actions are not solely justified by reason alone but in a sense also depend on facts in the natural world, providing grounds to interpret his moral philosophy as a naturalism. On the other hand, that Confucius thinks Zhi alone cannot make one Ren differentiates his position from strong naturalism, which reduces the normative realm of morality to causal laws of nature. From his emphasis on the cultivation of the given dispositions to personality, one can infer that Confucius did not agree with the reduction of moral norms to natural facts. The duality of Zhi showing the aspect of morality being forced by nature while not negating the proper character of morality can be properly and coherently understood from the view of soft naturalism. (shrink)

A short textbook survey of Chinese religion, from ancient times to the present.

This essay analyses the Confucian conception of xin, an attribute that broadly resembles what we would ordinarily call trustworthiness. More specifically, it provides an analysis of the psychology of someone who is xin and highlights a feature of the Confucian conception of trustworthiness: the trustworthy person has to ensure that there is a match between her self-presentation and the way she is. My goal is not to argue against any of the existing accounts of trustworthiness but to draw on Confucian (...) insights so as to shed light on features of trustworthiness that are overlooked in current discussions. I hope to show that the Confucian conception of trustworthiness puts more emphasis on the way a trustworthy person actively tries to make sure another’s dependency on her is not unwarranted than on how the trustworthy person responds to the one who gives trust. (shrink)

This paper takes behavioural propriety as the source of ritual or the ritualistic in indigenous philosophy in the Philippines. Filipino understanding of behavioural propriety is seen in what have been identified as elements or features of indigenous philosophy in the country. These features are stored in pre-hispanic era (pre-16th century CE) maxims or proverbs and myths. In this paper, I engage conception of behavioural propriety in Filipino philosophy with that in Confucian philosophy. In Confucian philosophy, it is “li” 禮 which (...) relates to ritual. Li encompasses ritual propriety and behavioural propriety. It is originally about ritual or ceremony and, as understood in contemporary scholarship, it has the general meaning of proper conduct; it refers first and foremost to rules of proper conduct. In this paper, I address the question of what each understanding offers for the enrichment of the other. I suggest that importantly, Confucian understanding of li offers the view of behavioural propriety as having an ennobling function, and that Filipino understanding of behavioural propriety offers a perspective on the debate in Confucianism about whether it is ren 仁 or li that is more fundamental in Confucius’s thought. A point that appears to be present in the Filipino understanding is that propriety in behaviour cannot be separated from humaneness (ren). The point comes from the view in the proverbs that a person of ren is necessarily a person of li. Accordingly, the perspective which the Filipino understanding offers proposes the view that behavioural propriety is a necessary condition for humanity (ren). (shrink)

English reprint of part of an article first appearing in Philosophy East and West (2017).

In a number of papers, Liu Qingping has critiqued Confucianism’s commitment to “consanguineous affection” or filial values, claiming it to be excessive and indefensible. Many have taken issue with his textual readings and interpretive claims, but these responses do little to undermine the force of his central claim that filial values cause widespread corruption in Chinese society. This is not an interpretive claim but an empirical one. If true, it merits serious consideration. But is it true? How can we know? (...) I survey the empirical evidence and argue that there is no stable or direct relationship between filial values and corruption. Instead, other cultural dimensions are more robust predictors of corruption. As it happens, China ranks very high in these other cultural dimensions. I conclude that if the empirical research is correct then Liu’s claims lack support. (shrink)

This article focuses on a psychological phenomenon discussed by the early Confucian: yuan 怨, which is often translated as “resentment”, “grievance”, “lament”, or “complaint”. I attempt to use the early Confucian discussions of yuan to shed light on an aspect of human psychology, namely, when one laments about certain conditions that obtain in such a way that she sees as beyond her control and negatively affects her. This is an unusual reactive attitude because one who has yuan takes the “passive (...) stance.” This paper has four main sections: the first section makes textual observations of “yuan” in the early Confucian texts; the second section proposes a Confucian-inspired account of yuan and highlights the psychological state in which one who has yuan sees oneself as object; the third section discusses the problematic dimensions of yuan; the final section discusses the negative implications of the passive stance with respect to contemporary concerns: vulnerability, moral repair, and self-respect. (shrink)

A virtue-based theory of right action aims to explain deontic moral principles in terms of virtue and vice. For example, it may maintain the following account of moral obligation: It is morally obligatory for an agent A to ϕ in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous and relevantly informed person V would characteristically ϕ in C. However, this account faces the so-called supererogation problem. A supererogatory action is an action that is morally praiseworthy but not morally obligatory. (...) Suppose John risks his own life to save a stranger, which is supererogatory rather than obligatory. However, a fully virtuous... (shrink)

In discussing the origin and history of Orphism, it is usual to treat it rather as a system of belief than as a ritual. The former aspect of it probably was more salient in later times, yet it is certain that the Orphic movement began rather as a ritual with strong emphasis on purification and a rule of life. Its theological and traditional aspect developed only gradually, and the greatest characteristic of this development was always its readiness to incorporate elements (...) possibly alien to the original Dionysos mystery, till it finally takes all Greek religious tradition within its scope. It was early influenced by Eleusinian ideas, and exerted a mutual influence on the cults and myths of the Kabeiroi and those of Sabazios. Whether its own ritual was affected by these latter to the same degree as its mythology we cannot say with certainty, but it may at any rate be affirmed that Orphism was an eclectic type of religion from the beginning. This was indeed only natural to such a system which depended for its teaching on wandering priests, and may never have possessed any kind of temple. It may also be safely said that neither the rite nor the central beliefs of Orphism were nearly as much affected by these borrowings as its mythology. It took over the names and some of the legends of strange deities and grafted them on to its own system. The ritual may have remained in all essentials the same, as did the eschatology. (shrink)