Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck

Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):896-917 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Does ‘remembering that p’ entail ‘knowing that p’? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often ‘vaguely remember’ a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on prominent theories of misremembering in philosophy of psychology, I will construct cases where the subject vaguely remembers that p while fails to meet the safety condition, which imply either that ETM is false or that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The conclusion reached in this paper will be a conditional: if veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge, then ‘remembering that p’ does not entail ‘knowing that p’.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,446

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):463-479.
The Third Type of Epistemic Luck.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Studies in Dialectics of Nature 7 (37):14-20.
Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Epistemic Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (11):550-571.
A problem for moral luck.Steven D. Hales - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2385-2403.
Epistemic Entitlement and Luck.Sandy Goldberg - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.
Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1-22.
Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.


Added to PP

90 (#171,220)

6 months
16 (#107,233)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Changsheng Lai
Shanghai JiaoTong University

Citations of this work

Remembering requires no reliability.Changsheng Lai - 2023 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-21.
Memory belief is weak.Changsheng Lai - 2023 - Ratio 36 (3):204-214.
Memory scepticism and the Pritchardean solution.Changsheng Lai - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-20.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

View all 63 references / Add more references