The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia. If successful, the initial sections will draw attention to an interesting akratic phenomenon which has not received much attention in the literature on akrasia (although it has been discussed by logicians in different terms). Secondly, §3 and §4 present a dilemma related to logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano Arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem (...) it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano Arithmetic or akratic in our arithmetical theorizing. If successful, these sections will underscore the pertinence and persistence of akrasia in arithmetic (by appeal to Gödel’s seminal work). Thirdly, §5 concludes by suggesting a way of translating the dilemma of arithmetical akrasia into a case of regular epistemic akrasia; and further how one might try to escape the dilemma when it’s framed this way. (shrink)

Den filosofiske position konsekventialisme er ofte genstand for debat i filosofikredse, men alt for hyppigt opstår der misforståelser blandt de involverede, fordi de ikke er eksplicitte, hvad grundantagelser og væsentlige distinktioner angår. Denne korte artikel vil give en approksimation af, hvad der forstås ved konsekventialisme på et generisk niveau. Målet med artiklen er at klargøre nogle af de grundantagelser og distinktioner, som konsekventialister ofte benytter i deres teoridannelse, og som bør holdes for øje i ønsket om en frugtbar debat.

This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.

A key question in the philosophy of logic is how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical entailment (assuming we have such justification at all). Justification holism asserts that claims of logical entailment can only be justified in the context of an entire logical theory, e.g., classical, intuitionistic, paraconsistent, paracomplete etc. According to holism, claims of logical entailment cannot be atomistically justified as isolated statements, independently of theory choice. At present there is a developing interest in—and endorsement of—justification holism (...) due to the revival of an abductivist approach to the epistemology of logic. This paper presents an argument against holism by establishing a foundational entailment-sentence of deduction which is justified independently of theory choice and outside the context of a whole logical theory. (shrink)

Nietzsche ne peut que se tuer lui-même pour tuer son père ; et, en se tuant, il ne fait que tuer un père déjà mort. Est-ce à dire que Nietzsche va mourir de ne pouvoir tuer son père?

Frederik L. Schodt explores his lifelong fascination with the Heart Sutra: its mesmerizing mantra, its ancient history, the 'emptiness' theory, and the way it is used around the world as a metaphysical tool to overcome chaos and confusion and reach a new understanding of reality--a perfection of wisdom."--Back cover.

Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excessive reconsideration caused by mind‐wandering. Our response resolves this tension, presenting (...) a model that aligns the roles of mind‐wandering in planning with empirical evidence and the sustained stability of intentions. (shrink)

While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and (...) 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a specific proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ‘logical disagreement’. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of one’s background logic and the logical theory one prefers (officially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic significance of central principles from the literature are at best deflated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reflections on the potential epistemic significance of convergence in logical theorizing. (shrink)

Artifacts are probably our most obvious everyday encounter with technology. Therefore, a good understanding of the nature of technical artifacts is a relevant part of technological literacy. In this article we draw from the philosophy of technology to develop a conceptualization of technical artifacts that can be used for educational purposes. Furthermore we report a small exploratory empirical study to see to what extent teachers’ intuitive ideas about artifacts match with the way philosophers write about the nature of artifacts. Finally, (...) we suggest a teaching and learning strategy for improving teachers’ concepts of technical artifacts through practical activities. (shrink)

This paper prepares an investigation into environmental performance among multinational enterprises in the context of greenhouse gas emissions. The authors offer a theoretical background about how MNCs are faced with opposing choices with regard to standardising or adjusting their local environmental performances. Moreover, we outline a potential methodology for exploring the variation in MNCs’ levels of greenhouse gas emissions around the world.

Examines acts of showing--from dog shows to striptease--to understand and theorize instances of heightened performance in everyday life as well as on the stage.

A première vue, Friedrich Nietzsche et Cesare Pavese n'ont rien en commun. Et pourtant! Tous deux sont orphelins de père. Tous deux ont grandi dans un entourage exclusivement féminin. Tous deux n'ont jamais su se faire aimer d'une femme. Tous deux sont également poètes. Tous deux ont eu une vie brève, solitaire et émouvante. Et tous deux ont amplement écrit sur Turin, sur son atmosphère si parfaitement " psychologique ". De cette ville, qui fut un temps la capitale de l'Italie, (...) Nietzsche n'en a dit que l'abord exaltant, aristocratique et baroque, tandis que Pavese en a recraché toute la tristesse, avec ses vastes quartiers industriels, ses usines qui noircissent le ciel, ses ouvriers exténués. C'est à Turin que Nietzsche perd définitivement la raison. Il a quarante-quatre ans. Et c'est à Turin que Pavese se suicide dans une chambre d'hôtel. Il a quarante-deux ans. Le philosophe allemand meurt le 25 août 1900. L'écrivain piémontais meurt le 26 août 1950 - un demi-siècle plus tard, à un jour près. En cherchant des rapprochements entre ces deux artistes exceptionnels, l'auteur pénètre dans leur drame intime, dans les blessures inguérissables de leur enfance ; et l'on revit les derniers instants tragiques qui les conduisirent à la folie et à la mort. Ce livre, s'il est empreint de gravité, est avant tout une rêverie faite de détours et de coïncidences. Les murs de Turin y transpirent. Ils parlent. Et il fallait bien près de trois cents dessins pour faire entendre ces voix. (shrink)

Indledning -- Nihilisme. Kunst ; Uddannelse ; Ontologi -- Ontologi. Musik ; Musikdidaktik ; Pædagogik -- Konklusion.

This article investigates recent shifts in the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (ai), focusing on the emergence and controversies surrounding Large Language Models (llm s). Tracing the historical trajectory of ai enthusiasm from the 1960s to the present, the paper delves into the paradigm shifts influenced by symbolic ai, parallel distributed processing, and the rise of llm s, with particular emphasis on the transformative impact of OpenAI’s ChatGPT 3.5 release in late 2022. The paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on ai (...) ethics, societal implications, and the intricate debate surrounding the perceived intelligence and consciousness of contemporary language models. (shrink)

This paper discusses the uniqueness thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.

Default logic has been a very active research topic in artificial intelligence since the early 1980s, but has not received as much attention in the philosophical literature thus far. This paper shows one way in which the technical tools of artificial intelligence can be applied in contemporary epistemology by modeling a paradigmatic case of deep disagreement using default logic. In §1 model-building viewed as a kind of philosophical progress is briefly motivated, while §2 introduces the case of deep disagreement we (...) aim to model. On the heels of this, §3 defines our formal framework, viz., a refined Horty-style default logic. §4 then uses the framework to model deep disagreement, and finally §5 provides a critical discussion of the result. (shrink)

Summary Whereas many aspects of the Augustan age continue to enjoy ongoing or renewed interest, the early careers of Tiberius Claudius Nero (born 16 November 42 BCE) and Nero Claudius Drusus (March/april 38 BCE), Livia’s sons from her marriage to Ti. Claudius Nero (pr. 42), have not been subject to much discussion or controversy of late. On the one hand, this could, perhaps, be explained in that they were quite young during the formative stages of the so-called Augustan monarchy, the (...) critical settlements being those of 27, 23 and 19 BCE, the eye-catchers par excellence in the political history of the early Augustan era. On the other hand, Livia’s sons only really emerge into the spotlight of both ancient sources and modern scholarship after the untimely passing of M. Vipsanius Agrippa in 12 BCE. This paper aims at revisiting the evidence for Tiberius’ and Drusus’ careers in the decade or so before the latter’s premature death in Germany in 9 BCE, the period preceding the rapid rise (and demise) of Gaius and Lucius Caesar. There are, indeed, strong indications that Livia’s sons played a far more important part than has hitherto been recognized, both in terms of their official position and their role in assisting Augustus with one of his most important political objectives, namely the imperial monopolization of the public triumph. (shrink)

This article sets out to research and resolve the conceptual lag between the family as defined and recognised in law and the multiplicity of queer constellations of ‘intimate citizenship’ in which families are actually done. The focus is on adult unions outside of conjugal coupledom. The family law practices, and awareness and expectations of adults in such unions were analysed through 21 interviews and the content analysis of 40 documents and were projected against the applicable legal mould. The article then (...) proposes to resolve the existing conceptual lag by advancing a conception of the family as a malleable, open-ended assemblage, in lieu of the current rigid status approach in family law, which is both under- and overinclusive. The proposed conception does justice to the increasing fluidity of family formations, which are not always already domestic, dyadic and sexual. (shrink)

The overall aim of this article is to reorient the contemporary debate about epistemic consequentialism. Thus far the debate has to a large extent focused on whether standard theories of epistemic justification are consequentialist in nature and therefore vulnerable to certain trade-off cases where accepting a false or unjustified belief leads to good epistemic outcomes. We claim that these trade-offs raise an important—yet somewhat neglected—issue about the epistemic demands on inquiry. We first distinguish between two different kinds of epistemic evaluation, (...) viz., backing evaluation and outcome evaluation, and then go on to outline and discuss a consequentialist metatheory about the right combinations of decision procedures to adopt in inquiry. Note that the piece is exploratory in the following sense: we try to explore epistemic evaluation in consequentialist terms, which involves stating a form of epistemic consequentialism, but also pointing to what non-consequentialist alternatives might be. Rather than trying to argue decisively for a particular conclusion, we aim to outline various intricate issues in an underexplored area of theorizing. In the course of doing this, we’ll transpose some well-known themes from discussions of consequentialism in ethics to the current debate about consequentialism in epistemology, e.g., agent-neutrality, options, and side-constraints. (shrink)

Precisamos repensar a nossa abordagem quanto à proteção da privacidade na internet. Atualmente, os formuladores de políticas vêm se aprofundando na ideia de consentimento informado como um meio para proteger a privacidade. Por exemplo, em diversos países, as empresas são obrigadas por lei a obter o consentimento de um indivíduo antes de fazer uso dos seus dados; com base nessas requisitos de consentimento informado, a lei tem por objetivo empoderar as pessoas a fazerem escolhas de privacidade tendo em vista os (...) seus melhores interesses. No entanto, estudos comportamentais colocam em cheque a eficácia desta abordagem de empoderamento como um meio para proteger a privacidade. Este artigo defende uma abordagem conjunta de proteção e empoderamento dos indivíduos para aprimorar a proteção da privacidade. Este artigo aborda problemas práticos do consentimento informado como um meio para proteger a privacidade, e ilustra problemas com os atuais regulamentos de proteção à privacidade dos dados, concernentes à segmentação comportamental. Primeiramente, discutem-se os problemas de privacidade relativos à segmentação comportamental, e o papel central do consentimento informado ao abrigo da lei de proteção à privacidade. Em seguida, enfatizam-se os problemas práticos referentes ao consentimento informado. Por fim, o artigo argumenta que os formuladores de políticas devem dar mais atenção aos regulamentos que protegem as pessoas, e menos aos que as empoderam. INFORMED CONSENT: WE CAN DO BETTER TO DEFEND PRIVACYAbstractWe need to rethink our approach to defend privacy on the internet. Currently, policymakers focus heavily on the idea of informed consent as a means to defend privacy. For instance, in many countries the law requires firms to obtain an individual’s consent before they use data about her. With such informed consent requirements, the law aims to empower people to make privacy choices in their best interests. But behavioural studies cast doubt on this approach’s effectiveness, as people tend to click OK to almost any request they see on their screens. To improve privacy protection, this article argues for a combined approach of protecting and empowering the individual. (shrink)

Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that firms are responding differently to the mounting concerns over environmental degradation and climate change. While a few studies at individual firm level do exist, relatively little is known about the longitudinal development of corporate environmental strategy at the population level of firms. Employing KLD data we explore the evolution of environmental strategy among a sample of S&P500 corporations over the period 1997 to 2006. We theoretically ground our study in Burgelman’s (1991) autonomous and induced (...) perspectives of strategy-making. Our findings suggest widespread inertia among firms to adjust to the changing socio-institutional environment. (shrink)

In times of the coronavirus, complying with public health policies is essential to save lives. Understanding the factors that influence compliance with social distancing measures is therefore an urgent issue. The present research investigated the role of political and social trust for social distancing using a variety of methods. In Study 1, conducted with a sample from the United Kingdom in the midst of the virus outbreak, neither political nor social trust had main associations with self-reported social distancing tendencies. However, (...) both factors interacted such that social trust was associated with lower social distancing tendencies among participants with low levels of political trust. In Study 2, using an experimental longitudinal design and again conducted with a sample collected from the UK during the first wave of the pandemic, social distancing practices increased over time, independent of an experimental manipulation of political trust. Moreover, while the interaction between political and social trust from the first study could not be conceptually replicated, social trust was positively related to social distancing intentions. Moving from the individual to the country level and assessing actual behavior at both the first and second wave of the pandemic, in Study 3, country-level political trust was related to less social distancing during the first wave. Social trust was related to a higher growth rate of infections. Against the background of these inconsistent findings, we discuss the potential positive and unexpected negative effects of social trust for social distancing. (shrink)

SUMMARYThe history of the law of nations is generally seen as a synonym for the history of the laws of war. Yet, a strictly bilateral perspective can distort our interpretation of early modern diplomacy. The Peace of Utrecht inaugurated an era of relative stability in the European state system, based on balance-of-power politics and anti-hegemonic legal argumentation. Incidental conflicts ought to be interpreted against this background. Declarations of war issued in 1718, 1719 and 1733 during the War of the Quadruple (...) Alliance and the Polish Succession should not be read as doctrinal surrogates for trials between two parties, but as manifestos in a European arena. (shrink)

We propose simple nonlinear mathematical models for the legal concept of balancing of interests. Our aim is to bridge the gap between an abstract formalisation of a balancing decision while assuring consistency and ultimately legal certainty across cases. We focus on the conflict between the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data in Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCh) against the right of access to information derived from Art. 11 EUCh. (...) These competing rights are denoted by ( \(i_1\) ) _right to privacy _ and ( \(i_2\) ) _access to information_; mathematically, their indices are respectively assigned by \(u_1\in [0,1]\) and \(u_2\in [0,1]\) subject to the constraint \(u_1+u_2=1\). This constraint allows us to use one single index _u_ to resolve the conflict through balancing. The outcome will be concluded by comparing the index _u_ with a prior given threshold \(u_0\). For simplicity, we assume that the balancing depends on only selected legal criteria such as the social status of affected person, and the sphere from which the information originated, which are represented as inputs of the models, called legal parameters. Additionally, we take “time” into consideration as a legal criterion, building on the European Court of Justice’s ruling on the right to be forgotten: by considering time as a legal parameter, we model how the outcome of the balancing changes over the passage of time. To catch the dependence of the outcome _u_ by these criteria as legal parameters, data were created by a fully-qualified lawyer. By comparison to other approaches based on machine learning, especially neural networks, this approach requires significantly less data. This might come at the price of higher abstraction and simplification, but also provides for higher transparency and explainability. Two mathematical models for _u_, a time-independent model and a time-dependent model, are proposed, that are fitted by using the data. (shrink)

Environmental philosophers are often concerned to show that non-sentient things, such as plants or ecosystems, have interests and therefore are appropriate objects of moral concern. They deny that mentality is a necessary condition for having interests. Yet they also deny that they are committed to recognizing interests in things like machines. I argue that either machines have interests (and hence moral standing) too or mentality is a necessary condition for inclusion within the purview of morality. I go on to argue (...) that the aspect of mentality necessary for having interests is more complicated than mere sentience. (shrink)

On the basis of the Suppes–Sneed structuralview of scientific theories, we take a freshlook at the concept of refutability,which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g., pseudo-scientificand metaphysical theories. By way of an introduction we argue that a clash between Popper and his critics on whether scientific theories are, in fact, refutablecan be partly explained by the fact Popper and his criticsascribed different meanings to the term (...) theoryThen we narrow our attention to one particular theory,namely quantum mechanics, in order to elucidate general matters discussed. We prove that quantum mechanics is irrefutable in a rather straightforward sense, but argue that it is refutable in a more sophisticated sense, which incorporates someobservations obtained by looking closely at the practiceof physics. We shall locate exactly where non-rigourous elements enter the evaluation of a scientific theory – thismakes us see clearly how fruitful mathematics isfor the philosophy of science. (shrink)

We characterise the intermediate logics which admit a cut-free hypersequent calculus of the form \, where \ is the hypersequent counterpart of the sequent calculus \ for propositional intuitionistic logic, and \ is a set of so-called structural hypersequent rules, i.e., rules not involving any logical connectives. The characterisation of this class of intermediate logics is presented both in terms of the algebraic and the relational semantics for intermediate logics. We discuss various—positive as well as negative—consequences of this characterisation.