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  1. Becoming What One Is: Thinking-About Trauma and Authenticity.Ryan Wasser - manuscript
    Ecce Homo, Nietzsche's autobiography, is distinguished it the rest of his oeuvre and discloses, in no uncertain terms, by its profound candor in bringing to question a topic of vital importance that has remained a central concern of the cultural zeitgeist especially as a reaction to various events of the 21st century: trauma. Trauma [τραῦμα], a Grecian term that traditionally refers to "a wound," underpins much of Nietzsche's writing, and is present in observations of his own lived experience, those of (...)
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  2. Awareness of the body "from the inside": Identification, ownership, and error.Roblin Meeks - manuscript
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  3. The Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness.Adrian J. T. Alsmith & Andrea Serino (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
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  4. Margins of Me: A Personal Story (Chapter 1 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - In The Peripheral Mind. Philosophy of Mind and the Peripheral Nervous System. Oxford University Press.
    The author presents an autobiographical story of serious peripheral motor nerve damage resulting from chemotoxicity induced as a side effect of Hodgkin’s Lymphoma treatment. The first-person, phenomenological account of the condition naturally leads to philosophical questions about consciousness, felt presence of oneself all over and within one’s body, and the felt constitutiveness of peripheral processes to one’s mental life. The first-person data only fit well with a philosophical approach to the mind that takes peripheral, bodily events and states at their (...)
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  5. Not a Sailor in His Ship: Descartes on Bodily Awareness.Colin Chamberlain - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness.
    Despite his reputation for neglecting the body, Descartes develops a systematic account of bodily awareness. He holds that in bodily awareness each of us feels intimately connected to our body. We experience this body as inescapable, as infused with bodily sensations and volitions, and as a special object of concern. This multifaceted experience plays an ambivalent role in Descartes’s philosophy. Bodily awareness is epistemically dangerous. It tempts us to falsely judge that we cannot exist apart from our bodies. But bodily (...)
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  6. Drug-Induced Body Disownership.Raphaël Millière - forthcoming - In Chris Letheby & Philip Gerrans (eds.), Philosophical Perspective on Psychedelic Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In recent years, a debate has emerged on whether bodily sensations are typically accompanied by a sense of body ownership, namely a distinctive experience of one's body or body part as one's own. Realists about the sense of body ownership heavily rely on evidence from experimentally-induced bodily illusions (e.g., the rubber hand illusion) and pathological disownership syndromes (e.g. somatoparaphrenia). In this chapter, I will introduce novel evidence regarding body disownership syndromes induced by psychoactive drugs rather than pathological conditions, and discuss (...)
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  7. Drug-Induced Alterations of Bodily Awareness.Raphaël Millière - forthcoming - In Adrian J. T. Alsmith & Andrea Serino (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness. London: Routledge.
    Philosophical and empirical research on bodily awareness has mostly focused so far on bodily disorders – such as anorexia nervosa, somatoparaphrenia, or xenomelia (body integrity dysphoria) – and bodily illusions induced in an experimental setting – such as the rubber hand illusion, or the thermal grid illusion. Studying these conditions can be illuminating to investigate a broad range of issues about the nature, function, and etiology of bodily experience. However, a number of psychoactive compounds can also induce a remarkably wide (...)
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  8. Proprioception and the body image.B. O’Shaughnessy - forthcoming - The Body and the Self:175–203.
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  9. Schopenhauer on Inner Awareness and World-Understanding.Vasfi Onur Özen - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
    I argue against a prevailing interpretation of Schopenhauer’s account of inner awareness and world- understanding. Because scholars have typically taken on board the assumption that inner awareness is non- representational, they have concerned themselves in the main with how to transfer this immediate cognition of will in ourselves and apply it to our understanding of the world–as–representation. Some scholars propose that the relation of the world-as-will to the world-as-representation is to be understood in figurative or metaphorical terms. I disagree because, (...)
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  10. Movement under uncertainty: The effects of the rubber-hand illusion vary along the nonclinical autism spectrum.Colin Palmer, Bryan Paton, Jakob Hohwy & Peter Enticott - forthcoming - Neuropsychologia.
    Recent research has begun to investigate sensory processing in relation to nonclinical variation in traits associated with the autism spectrum disorders (ASD). We propose that existing accounts of autistic perception can be augmented by considering a role for individual differences in top-down expectations for the precision of sensory input, related to the processing of state-dependent levels of uncertainty. We therefore examined ASD-like traits in relation to the rubber-hand illusion: an experimental paradigm that typically elicits crossmodal integration of visual, tactile, and (...)
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  11. The Bounded Body. On the Sense of Bodily Ownership and the Experience of Space.Carlota Serrahima - forthcoming - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Marie Guillot (eds.), Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness.
    Bodily sensations are mental states typically suitable to be reported in judgments in which a first-person indexical is used to qualify the felt body. In other words, subjects typically have a sense of bodily ownership for the body that they feel in bodily sensations. This paper puts forward, firstly, three desiderata that theories on the sense of bodily ownership should meet. Secondly, it assesses two views that account for the sense of bodily ownership in terms of the spatial content of (...)
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  12. Bodily-awareness-in-reflection: Advancing the epistemological foundation of post-simulation debriefing.Martin Viktorelius & Charlott Sellberg - forthcoming - Educational Philosophy and Theory.
    Reflection is generally considered to be important for learning from simulation-based training in professional and vocational education. The mainstream conceptualization of reflection is argued to rest on a dualistic ground separating the mind from the body. Drawing on phenomenological analyses of bodily awareness and an ethnographic case study of maritime safety training we show how and why students’ embodied experiences and subjectivity play a foundational role in reflection. We develop and illustrate the notion of bodily-awareness-in-reflection which captures a mode of (...)
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  13. Bodily Awareness.Tony Cheng - 2022 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Bodily Awareness Most of us agree that we are conscious, and we can be consciously aware of public things such as mountains, tables, foods, and so forth; we can also be consciously aware of our own psychological states and episodes such as emotions, thoughts, perceptions, and so forth. Each of us can be aware of … Continue reading Bodily Awareness →.
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  14. Touch and other Somatosensory Senses.Tony Cheng & Antonio Cataldo - 2022 - In Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Neuroscience and Philosophy. pp. 211-240.
    In 1925, David Katz published an influential monograph on touch, Der Aufbau der Tastwelt, which was translated into English in 1989. Although it is called “the world of touch,” it also discusses the thermal and the nociceptive senses, albeit briefly. In this chapter, we will follow this approach, but we will speak about “somatosensory senses” in general in order to remind ourselves that perceptions of temperatures and pains should also be considered together in this context.
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  15. Resisting Phenomenalism, From Bodily Experience to Mind-Independence.Massin Olivier - 2022 - In Alsmith Adrian & Serino Andrea (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness. London: Routledge.
    Can one refute Berkeleyan phenomenalism by arguing that sensory objects seem mind-independent, and that, according to Berkeley, experience is to be taken at face value? Relying on Mackie’s recent discussion of the issue, I argue, first, that phenomenalism cannot be straightforwardly refuted by relying on perceptual or bodily experience of mind-independence together with the truthfulness of experience. However, I maintain, second that phenomenalism can be indirectly refuted by appealing to the bodily experience of resistance. Such experience presents us with the (...)
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  16. Sensory Fields: the Visual and the Bodily.Carlota Serrahima - 2022 - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Philosophers of perception have been readier to postulate the existence of a visual field than to acknowledge sensory fields in other modalities. In this paper, I argue that the set of phenomenal features that philosophers have relied on when positing a visual field aptly characterise, mutatis mutandis, bodily sensation. I argue, in particular, that in localised bodily sensations we experience the body as a sensory field. I first motivate this claim for the case of haptic touch, and then generalise it (...)
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  17. Bodily Self-Knowledge as a Special Form of Perception.Hao Tang - 2022 - Disputatio 11 (20).
    We enjoy immediate knowledge of our own limbs and bodies. I argue that this knowledge, which is also called proprioception, is a special form of perception, special in that it is, unlike perception by the external senses, at the same time also a form of genuine self-knowledge. The argument has two parts. Negatively, I argue against the view, held by G. E. M. Anscombe and strengthened by John McDowell, that this knowledge, bodily self-knowledge, is non-perceptual. This involves, inter alia, rescuing (...)
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  18. Embodied Intelligence and Self-Regulation in Skilled Performance: or, Two Anxious Moments on the Static Trapeze.Kath Bicknell - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):595-614.
    In emphasising improvement, smooth coping and success over variability and regression, skill theory has overlooked the processes performers at all levels develop and rely on for managing bodily and affective fluctuations, and their impact on skilled performance. I argue that responding to the instability and variability of unique bodily capacities is a vital feature of skilled action processes. I suggest that embodied intelligence – a term I use to describe a set of abilities to perceptively interpret and make use of (...)
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  19. Bodily awareness and novel multisensory features.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198:3913-3941.
    According to the decomposition thesis, perceptual experiences resolve without remainder into their different modality-specific components. Contrary to this view, I argue that certain cases of multisensory integration give rise to experiences representing features of a novel type. Through the coordinated use of bodily awareness—understood here as encompassing both proprioception and kinaesthesis—and the exteroceptive sensory modalities, one becomes perceptually responsive to spatial features whose instances couldn’t be represented by any of the contributing modalities functioning in isolation. I develop an argument for (...)
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  20. Unity and objectivity in Strawson and Cassam.Anil Gomes - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):84-96.
    Some comments on Quassim Cassam’s Self and World written for a conference at the Institute of Philosophy in 2017. I consider the objection that Cassam raises to Strawson’s argument from unity to objectivity in The Bounds of Sense and raise some general questions about Cassam’s problem of misconception and its application to transcendental arguments.
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  21. Body schema dynamics in Merleau-Ponty.Jan Halák - 2021 - In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. pp. 33-51.
    This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema as an operative intentionality that is not only opposed to, but also complexly intermingled with, the representation-like grasp of the world and one’s own body, or the body image. The chapter reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s position primarily based on his preparatory notes for his 1953 lecture ‘The Sensible World and the World of Expression’. Here, Merleau-Ponty elaborates his earlier efforts to show that the body schema is a perceptual ground against (...)
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  22. Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena.Caleb Liang, Wen-Hsiang Lin, Tai-Yuan Chang, Chi-Hong Chen, Chen-Wei Wu, Wen-Yeo Chen, Hsu-Chia Huang & Yen-Tung Lee - 2021 - Scientific Reports 10602 (11):1-11.
    Body ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I am the one who is having a conscious experience. Are body ownership and experiential ownership actually the same phenomenon or are they genuinely different? In our experiments, the participant watched a (...)
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  23. Bovine Prospection, the Mesocorticolimbic Pathways, and Neuroethics: Is a Cow’s Future Like Ours?Gary Comstock - 2020 - In L. Syd M. Johnson, Andrew Fenton & Adam Shriver (eds.), Neuroethics and Nonhuman Animals. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 73-97.
    What can neuroscience tell us, if anything, about the capacities of cows to think about the future? The question is important if having the right to a future requires the ability to think about one’s future. To think about one’s future involves the mental state of prospection, in which we direct our attention to things yet to come. I distinguish several kinds of prospection, identify the behavioral markers of future thinking, and survey what is known about the neuroanatomy of future-directed (...)
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  24. New materialism and postmodern subject models fail to explain human memory and self-awareness: A comment on Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe (2020).Radek Trnka - 2020 - Theory & Psychology 31 (1):130-137.
    Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe (2020) show the several conceptual limits that new materialism and postmodern subject models have for psychological theory and research. The present study continues in this discussion and argues that the applicability of the ideas of quantum-inspired new materialism depends on the theoretical perspectives that we consider for analysis: be it the first-person perspective referring to the subjective experience of a human subject, or the third-person perspective, in which a human subject is observed by an external observer. While (...)
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  25. Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal Identity.Rina Tzinman - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):22-42.
    According to constitution views of persons, we are constituted by spatially coinciding human animals. Constitution views face an ‘overpopulation’ puzzle: if the animal has my brain, there is another thinker where I am. An influential solution to this problem distinguishes between derivative and non‐derivative property possession: persons non‐derivatively have their personal properties, while inheriting others from their constituters. I will show that this solution raises a new problem, by constructing a puzzle with the absurd result that we instantiate certain properties (...)
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  26. How to operationalise consciousness.Glenn Carruthers, Sidney Carls-Diamante, Linus Huang, Melanie Rosen & Elizabeth Schier - 2019 - Australian Journal of Psychology 71:390-410.
    Objective To review the way consciousness is operationalised in contemporary research, discuss strengths and weaknesses of current approaches and propose new measures. Method We first reviewed the literature pertaining to the phenomenal character of visual and self-consciousness as well as awareness of visual stimuli. We also reviewed more problematic cases of dreams and animal consciousness, specifically that of octopuses. Results Despite controversies, work in visual and self consciousness is highly developed and there are notable successes. Cases where experiences are not (...)
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  27. “The body I call ‘mine’ ”: A sense of bodily ownership in Descartes.Colin Chamberlain - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):3-24.
    How does Descartes characterize the peculiar way in which each of us is aware of our bodies? I argue that Descartes recognizes a sense of bodily ownership, such that the body sensorily appears to be one's own in bodily awareness. This sensory appearance of ownership is ubiquitous, for Descartes, in that bodily awareness always confers a sense of ownership. This appearance is confused, in so far as bodily awareness simultaneously represents the subject as identical to, partially composed by, and united (...)
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  28. On the Very Idea of a Tactile Field, or: A Plea for Skin Space.Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Ophelia Deroy, Charles Spence & Tony Cheng (eds.), Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science. pp. 226-247.
  29. Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science.Tony Cheng, Ophelia Deroy & Charles Spence (eds.) - 2019 - New York: Routledge.
    This collection of essays brings together research on sense modalities in general and spatial perception in particular in a systematic and interdisciplinary way. It updates a long-standing philosophical fascination with this topic by incorporating theoretical and empirical research from cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychology. The book is divided thematically to cover a wide range of established and emerging issues. Part I covers notions of objectivity and subjectivity in spatial perception and thinking. Part II focuses on the canonical distal senses, such (...)
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  30. What Do We Need to Know to Know that Animals are Conscious of What They Know?Gary Comstock - 2019 - Animal Behavior and Cognition 6 (4):289-308.
    In this paper I argue for the following six claims: 1) The problem is that some think metacognition and consciousness are dissociable. 2) The solution is not to revive associationist explanations; 3) …nor is the solution to identify metacognition with Carruthers’ gatekeeping mechanism. 4) The solution is to define conscious metacognition; 5) … devise an empirical test for it in humans; and 6) … apply it to animals.
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  31. Realism's Kick.Massin Olivier - 2019 - In Limbeck-Lilienau Christoph & Stadler Friedrich (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception Proceedings of the 40th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 39-57.
    Samuel Johnson claimed to have refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone. It is generally thought that Johnson misses the point of Berkeley's immaterialism for a rather obvious reason: Berkeley never denied that the stone feels solid, but only that the stone could exist independently of any mind. I argue that Johnson was on the right track. On my interpretation, Johnson’s idea is that because the stone feels to resist our effort, the stone seems to have causal powers. But if appearances (...)
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  32. The Recurrent Model of Bodily Spatial Phenomenology.Tony Cheng & Patrick Haggard - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4):55-70.
    In this paper, we introduce and defend the recurrent model for understanding bodily spatial phenomenology. While Longo, Azañón and Haggard (2010) propose a bottom-up model, Bermúdez (2017) emphasizes the top-down aspect of the information processing loop. We argue that both are only half of the story. Section 1 intro- duces what the issues are. Section 2 starts by explaining why the top- down, descending direction is necessary with the illustration from the ‘body-based tactile rescaling’ paradigm (de Vignemont, Ehrsson and Haggard, (...)
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  33. Is bodily awareness a form of perception?Ignacio Ávila - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):337-354.
    In this paper I address the question of whether bodily awareness is a form of perceptual awareness or not. I discuss José Luis Bermúdez’s and Shaun Gallagher’s proposals about this issue and find them unsatisfactory. Then I suggest an alternative view and offer some reasons for it.
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  34. The most profound spiritual autobiography of all time?- a review of "The Knee of Listening" by Adi Da (Franklin Jones).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    A brief review of the life and spiritual autobiography of the unique American mystic Adi Da (Franklin Jones). The sticker on the cover of some editions says `The most profound spiritual autobiography of all time` and this might well be true. I am in my 70´s and have read many books by spiritual teachers and on spirituality, and this is one of the greatest ones. Certainly it is by far the fullest and clearest account of the process of enlightenment I (...)
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  35. Timing disownership experiences in the rubber hand illusion.Lane Timothy - 2017 - Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 2 (4):1-14.
    Some investigators of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) have suggested that when standard RHI induction procedures are employed, if the rubber hand is experienced by participants as owned, their corresponding biological hands are experienced as disowned. Others have demurred: drawing upon a variety of experimental data and conceptual considerations, they infer that experience of the RHI might include the experience of a supernumerary limb, but that experienced disownership of biological hands does not occur. Indeed, some investigators even categorically deny that (...)
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  36. Switching to the rubber hand.S. L. Yeh & Timothy Joseph Lane - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Inducing the rubber hand illusion (RHI) requires that participants look at an imitation hand while it is stroked in synchrony with their occluded biological hand. Previous explanations of the RHI have emphasized multisensory integration, and excluded higher cognitive functions. We investigated the relationship between the RHI and higher cognitive functions by experimentally testing task switch (as measured by switch cost) and mind wandering (as measured by SART score); we also included a questionnaire for attentional control that comprises two subscales, attention-shift (...)
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  37. Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights from the Study of Depersonalisation.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (3):356-391.
    Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...)
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  38. When the dissolution of perceived body boundaries elicits happiness: The effect of selflessness induced by a body scan meditation.Michaël Dambrun - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 46:89-98.
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  39. Trauma-related versus positive involuntary thoughts with and without meta-awareness.Deanne M. Green, Deryn Strange, D. Stephen Lindsay & Melanie K. T. Takarangi - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 46:163-172.
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  40. Nerve/Nurses of the Cosmic Doctor: Wang Yang-ming on Self-Awareness as World-Awareness.Joshua M. Hall - 2016 - Asian Philosophy 26 (2):149-165.
    In Philip J. Ivanhoe’s introduction to his Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism, he argues convincingly that the Ming-era Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) was much more influenced by Buddhism (especially Zen’s Platform Sutra) than has generally been recognized. In light of this influence, and the centrality of questions of selfhood in Buddhism, in this article I will explore the theme of selfhood in Wang’s Neo-Confucianism. Put as a mantra, for Wang “self-awareness is world-awareness.” My central image for this (...)
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  41. Attention in bodily awareness.Gregor Hochstetter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (12):3819-3842.
    The aim of this paper is to develop and defend an Attentional View of bodily awareness, on which attention is necessary for bodily awareness. The original formulation of the Attentional View is due to Marcel Kinsbourne. First, I will show that the Attentional View of bodily awareness as formulated by Kinsbourne is superior to other accounts in the literature for characterizing the relationship between attention and bodily awareness. Kinsbourne’s account is the only account in the literature so far which can (...)
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  42. Bodily ownership, bodily awareness and knowledge without observation.José Luis Bermúdez - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):37-45.
    In a recent paper, Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership . She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermúdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombe’s various discussions of what she terms knowledge without observation . De Vignemont is not convinced and appeals to the Rubber Hand Illusion (...)
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  43. Somatoparaphrenia, Anosognosia, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 55-74.
    Somatoparaphrenia is a pathology of self characterized by the sense of alienaton from parts of one’s body. It is usually construed as a kind of delusional disorder caused by extensive right hemisphere lesions. Lesions in the temporoparietal junction are common in somatoparaphrenia but deep cortical regions (for example, the posterior insula) and subcortical regions (for example, the basal ganglia) are also sometimes implicated (Valler and Ronschi 2009). Patients are often described as feeling that a limb belongs to another person and (...)
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  44. COGNITIVE (IM)PENETRABILITY OF VISION: RESTRICTING VISION vs. RESTRICTING COGNITION.Costas Pagondiotis - 2015 - In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press. pp. 378-403.
    Pylyshyn restricts cognitively penetrable vision to late vision, whereas he does not make any distinction between different kinds of penetrating cognition. I argue that this approach disconnects early vision content from late vision content and blurs the distinction between the latter and the content of thought. To overcome this problem I suggest that we should not distinguish between different kinds of visual content but instead introduce a restriction on the kind of cognition that can directly penetrate visual experience. In particular, (...)
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  45. On the Significance of Bodily Awareness for Bodily Action.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):790-812.
    What is the significance of bodily awareness for bodily action? The orthodox philosophical account from O'Shaughnessy claims that bodily awareness is necessary for bodily action. Whilst O'Shaughnessy's account appears to be consonant with the phenomenology of ordinary agency, it falls afoul to empirical counterexamples. The failure of O'Shaughnessy's account and its cousins might suggest that bodily action does not depend on bodily awareness. On the contrary, I argue that the contrast between the character of afferented and deafferented agency shows that (...)
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  46. Evans on Bodily Awareness and Perceptual Self‐Location.Ignacio Ávila - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):269-287.
    In Chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference Evans implicitly outlines a view to the effect that bodily awareness plays no role in perceptual self-location or in the specification of our perceptual perspective of the world. In this paper I discuss this story and offer an alternative proposal. Then I explore some consequences of this account for our understanding of the elusiveness of the self in perceptual experience.
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  47. Eye contact elicits bodily self-awareness in human adults.Matias Baltazar, Nesrine Hazem, Emma Vilarem, Virginie Beaucousin, Jean-Luc Picq & Laurence Conty - 2014 - Cognition 133 (1):120-127.
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  48. A multimodal conception of bodily awareness.Frédérique De Vignemont - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):00-00.
    One way to characterize the special relation that one has to one's own body is to say that only one's body appears to one from the inside. Although widely accepted, the nature of this specific experiential mode of presentation of the body is rarely spelled out. Most definitions amount to little more than lists of the various body senses (including senses of posture, movement, heat, pressure, and balance). It is true that body senses provide a kind of informational access to (...)
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  49. Review of "The Self in Question" by Andy Hamilton. [REVIEW]Kristina Musholt - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (7).
  50. My body as an object: self-distance and social experience.Line Ryberg Ingerslev - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):163-178.
    In phenomenology the body is often referred to as the lived body which makes the world familiar to me. In this paper, however, I discuss bodily self-consciousness in terms of self-distance. Self-distance is the suggestion that bodily self-consciousness consist in a reflective stance where you conceive of your body as a physical thing, an object in the world as well as the subject of bodily experiences. I argue that we are bodily self-conscious because we experience our own body in more (...)
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