The Consistency of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson

Studia Logica 94 (3):331-345 (2010)
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Abstract

In a recent paper, Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson [ Studia Logica, 89:333-341 ] have challenged the foundationalist rejection of infinitism by giving an example of an infinite, yet explicitly solvable regress of probabilistic justification. So far, however, there has been no criterion for the consistency of infinite probabilistic regresses, and in particular, foundationalists might still question the consistency of the solvable regress proposed by Peijnenburg and Atkinson

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