Plato: Political Philosophy

This paper provides a framework for understanding how non-ideal constitutions are better or worse imitations of the ideal constitution. My suggestion is that the non-ideal constitutions imitate the skill of the political expert, which includes an epistemic component (their political knowledge) and two teleological components (the benefit to the citizens on the one hand, and the unity of the city on the other). I then show how some constitutions better imitate the political expert’s skill across these dimensions, as higher-ranked constitutions (...) are in a better epistemic condition, better benefit the citizens, and better foster unity in the city than lower-ranked constitutions. A major upshot of my reading will be to show that Plato recognizes the value of some non-ideal constitutions while making clear how they still fall short of the ideal. (shrink)

Abstract: The political views of Plato on women in the Laws have been a subject of debate among scholars. The reintroduction of families and private property in his late dialogue can potentially impact the role of women in the state. Furthermore, it remains a matter of contention whether Plato altered some of his political views on women while writing the Laws. In this debate, I will analyze the inconsistencies in Plato’s Laws, endeavoring to determine whether Plato provided women with equal (...) opportunities in education, employment, and political involvement in his late work or not. I will explore what kinds of training Plato believes should be applied to both genders. Finally, I will draw a conclusion in regard to the social and political impacts of gender equality in education in Plato’s “second best state” as it is described in his Laws. (shrink)

I claim in this paper that Adeimantus’s challenge to Socrates in Book 2 of the Republic has more importance than scholars have generally recognized. The established tendency in the secondary literature is to treat Adeimantus’s objection as virtually indistinct from Glaucon’s objection. Such readings overlook the significance of Adeimantus’s contribution to the argument of the dialogue, especially the unique emphasis he puts on the role of culture and social institutions in shaping human beliefs and desires. Whereas Glaucon objects to Socrates’ (...) conception of justice based on his views on human nature, Adeimantus introduces an indispensable political dimension to the discussion. I argue that these two objections are mutually implicating and vital to understanding why Socrates initiates an inquiry into politics in the Republic. Together, the objections show how Plato’s wide-ranging examination of issues in ethics, politics, psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics hangs together as an integrated whole. A further benefit of this reevaluation of Adeimantus’s challenge, I suggest, is the way it illuminates Plato’s views on poetry in the dialogue. According to this reading, far from advocating for the exclusion of poetry from civic life, Plato assigns it a fundamental role in the education of the philosopher due to the importance of poetic practices in cultivating the wisdom-loving part of the soul. (shrink)

This article critically analyses the concept of ‘partnership’ (koinōnia) in Book II of the Republic (Pl. Resp. 369b–374e), a concept it believes grounds Plato’s political thesis. It attempts to determine the nature of the concept, explore the agential capacities of the partnering agents, identify the original and derivative rational principles that could emerge from it, and argue that these rational principles are also moral principles. Platonic social justice spells out one of the rational and moral principles that emerge from the (...) partnership. In this regard, the paper aims to show, inter alia, the connection between Platonic partnership and social justice and how such connection helps to explain, for instance, the quality of relationship that could exist between the rulers and ruled in Kallipolis. Incidentally, the paper compares Platonic partnership in respect of his defence of justice with Glaucon’s contractarian moral thesis in connection with his pean for injustice. (shrink)

One usually considers that pre-Aristotelian thought had little interest in economic problems. In reality, various authors from the end of the 5th or beginning of the 4th century BC (Ps.-Xenophon, Plato, Xenophon, Phaleas of Chalcedon) paid particular attention to these questions when they developed their political thought. Although their ideas differ in detail, they all share the same distrust of trade and monetary economy. These thinkers develop, from a certain number of (aristocratic) political presuppositions, a strong and detailed critique of (...) the economic transformations of which they are contemporary. The importance that Plato, in particular, attaches to economic realities appears in his harsh criticism of Athenian democracy, as well as in his political constructions of the Republic, the Critias and the Timaeus, or the Laws. By alternating a general approach and a detailed one (because the importance of the economy, in Plato, is also revealed in apparently minor details), we propose to show the fundamental importance of economic reflections in classical Greek thought, even before the Stagirite. (shrink)

Sprawiedliwość jako cecha działającego podmiotu jest w swej istocie doskonałością całości, doskonałością jego istnienia. Taka doskonałość („dzielność”) całości zakłada sprawność każdego zasadniczego elementu naszego wnętrza – intelektu, woli i uczuć, choć nie jest po prostu sumą doskonałości tych elementów, jest czymś jakościowo różnym. Niemniej jednak Platona ujęcie doskonalenia elementów „wnętrza” człowieka prowadzi do refleksji nad powiązaniem sprawiedliwości z pozostałymi uniwersalnymi wartościami konstytucyjnymi – prawdą, dobrem i pięknem. Dzielnością (cnotą) właściwą intelektowi, symbolizowanemu przez władców Platońskiego państwa, jest mądrość, a ta nie (...) może się obyć bez prawdy. Dzielnością woli, symbolizowanej przez żołnierzy i policjantów, jest odwaga pojmowana przez Platona jako postępowanie zgodne z własnymi, rozumnymi przekonaniami, a takie postępowanie jest fundamentem dobra (moralnego). Uczucia – symbolizowane przez wytwórców – ukierunkowywane, „pociągane” są przez piękno. Krótko, wiedza – ma być prawdziwa, działanie – dobre, a to, co wytwarzane – piękne. To przesłanie Platona dotyczące naszych uniwersalnych wartości konstytucyjnych. To też przesłanie dotyczące celów, których realizacji powinna służyć kultura duchowa – nauka zmierza do prawdy, moralność do dobra, sztuka do piękna. Platon każe przy tym pamiętać, że rozwój kultury nie jest celem samym w sobie, ale służyć powinien tworzeniu warunków rozwoju konkretnego człowieka, w tym tworzeniu warunków do bycia sprawiedliwym. (shrink)

This essay considers the role of the soul in Plato’s political philosophy. Contra Gerasimos Santas, I offer a reading of Republic 8 which takes Plato’s criticism of the democratic soul as his criticism of the psychological pressures innate in the democratic constitution. On this account, democracy fails because it encourages unnecessary appetites. These appetites breed anarchy and ignorance under the guise of freedom. Section two reviews Santas reading of the Republic and his interpretation of Plato’s treatment of democratic principles: private (...) property, knowledge, and freedom. Section three provides a reading which takes the soul into consideration. Reading the descent to democracy and the birth of the democratic man as indicative of the pressures of the democratic system, we gain insights into the psychology of democracy. (shrink)

The conception of justice as the “first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls, 1971) and the “virtue of soul” (Plato, 1956) puts forth two different points of view in the realm of social-political thought. From one point of view, the demand for objective principles of justice at the institutional level presupposes a particular epistemic framework where universal/objective truth and specific methods to reach it have been given importance. I would delve into arguing that the presuppositions to reach objectivity in the epistemic (...) and the political realm are quite similar. It is the epistemological foundation of Descartes that facilitates the political to seek objectivity in its principles. On the other hand, by proposing justice as the “virtue of soul”, Plato proposes an epistemology that is grounded in his notion of the Good. The individual in these two epistemological and political systems engages with the world from two completely different approaches. In this paper, I will explore the relationship of these epistemic frameworks with their respective theories of justice and consider the scope of pluralism. -/- . (shrink)

Una deseada organización social por la cual se erige una teoría filosófica en materia política aparece en Platón como una cuestión de orden moral que tiene en la aprehensión de virtudes su naturaleza. La razón regenta sobre el alma cuya condición desiderativa puede tender a un extravío de la virtud, y por ello nada más contrario al orden de sí mismo que el estar dominado por placeres. No obstante, el placer, pese a su caracterización abyecta como sensación natural del hombre, (...) puntualiza sobre la virtud bajo una adecuada formación en su uso. Por tal razón, y por las muchas funciones que ejerce el placer (ἡδονή) en el corpus platonicum, es necesario atender al sentido que este posee en el proyecto educativo-político de Platón. (shrink)

In the Cratylus, Plato criticizes the traditional rendering of Hades’ name as the ‘in-visible’ while in the Phaedo he endorses it. Despite this conflict, in both cases, the etymologies are used to oppose the negative characterization of this god by the tradition, just as prescribed in the Republic. Furthermore, both dialogues convey a similar description of Hades as an intellectual realm. Thus, there is an underlying conceptual coherence and a use of conflicting etymologies serving the same practical prescription. This article (...) will verify if this scenario constitutes an instance of the serviceable lies presented in the Republic. Taking Hades’ different etymologizations as a case study, we will be able to better understand the justification for the pedagogical use of lies based on the complex interaction between souls with true and false beliefs. Two types of pedagogical lies emerge. Syrup lies characterize situations in which some true information is conveyed through an illegitimate but attractive cover such as etymologization or tales. In this way, they can capture the attention of souls who are hostage to false beliefs. Moreover, there is also the case for vaccine lies in which the illegitimate method used to convey some information has in itself a self-eroding element. Thus, those who receive the information are also encouraged to question the method in due course. After these determinations, it will be possible to evaluate how such a conception of lying scores morally. (shrink)

Protagoras est un sophiste, les sophistes sont les ennemis de Platon... De ce syllogisme, la conclusion semble evidente. Elle appelle cependant quelques nuances. Plus qu'un ennemi, Protagoras apparait en effet chez Platon comme une figure exemplaire, un interlocuteur valable qui, a travers son affirmation selon laquelle l'homme est la mesure de toutes choses, incarne la democratie, ses conditions et ses consequences.Ce livre traite le theme general, et classique, de l'opposition entre sophistique et philosophie, mais en le limitant a une seule (...) question dont il deploie les differentes facettes : l'idee de mesure. Il reconstitue une pensee protagoreenne qui replace Platon dans son contexte intellectuel et montre comment, a travers la figure de Protagoras, c'est le debat avec la democratie qui se joue, non seulement en tant que regime politique, mais aussi en tant que modele theorique aux implications multiples (epistemologiques, morales, pedagogiques, techniques).Sur quel critere fonder la mesure? Comment concevoir l'expertise et le savoir? Quel role attribuer au langage dans l'education? Que faire de l'identite du sujet dans le processus de memoire? Comment penser l'unite de la Cite? Autant de questions soulevees dans le dialogue avec le modele protagoreen. Comprendre ce que Platon doit a Protagoras, c'est ainsi chercher par quels elements cette pensee l'a mis au defi et par reaction a quoi il a elabore sa propre theorie de la mesure, de l'expertise, de l'education et de l'unite politique. (shrink)

Socrates believes that living well is primarily an intellectual undertaking: we live well if we think correctly. To intellectualists, one might think, the body and activities related to it are of little interest. Yet Socrates has much to say about food, eating, and cookery. This paper examines Socrates’ criticism of ‘feeding on opson’ (opsophagia) in Xenophon’s Memorabilia and of opson cookery (opsopoiia) in Plato’s Gorgias. I argue that if we consider the specific cultural meaning of eating opson, we can see (...) that Socrates takes a nuanced stance on food and cookery: he recommends careful consumption and skillful production, not austerity or abstinence. This nuance in Socrates’ discussion of food changes our interpretation of Socrates’ criticism of rhetoric in the Gorgias: in comparing rhetoricians to opson chefs—not to pastry chefs, as many have assumed—Socrates evokes the dangers of indulging in speeches while acknowledging their necessity for Athenian public life. (shrink)

The critique of the poetry in Plato’s Ion unfolds in a clearly political context in which, in contrast to the old model of knowledge represented by poetry, Plato presents a new model, identified with philosophy, which questions the legitimacy of poets and rhapsodists as competent guides of the polis and citizens. In this critique, the characters and dramatic elements of dialogue are fundamental. Thus in Ion and Socrates the Athenian philosopher brings together all the characteristics that describe a real rhapsodist (...) of that time as well as the philosophical activity of the historical Socrates. (shrink)

A crucial tenet of virtue-based or expertise-based theorizing about politics is that there are ways to identify and select morally and epistemically excellent people to hold office. This paper considers historical challenges to this task that come from within Greek and Confucian thought and political practice. Because of how difficult it is to assess character in ordinary settings, we argue that it is even more difficult to design institutions that select for virtue at the much wider political scale. Specifically, we (...) argue that the vast majority of proposals that purport to select for virtue are either (a) unlikely to be effective, (b) not implementable at the scale of most current nations, or (c) have already been incorporated into most democratic states. Thus defenders of meritocratic institutions should take more seriously the practical barriers that will almost certainly arise when trying to implement these proposals at scale. Historical proponents of meritocratic values were well aware of concerns about the feasibility of their political ideals, and we should be too. (shrink)

This paper examines Plato’s later model of civic participation in relation to contemporary civic theories. It argues that, although the Platonic model satisfies such common criteria for civic theories as equality, autonomy, and empowerment, the key concept to understand this project is moderation. It is moderation that structures and unifies the constituent elements of this model (the rule of law, the persuasion of the preambles, the empowering economy and education). It also explains what kind of personal disposition is central to (...) achieving a stable and rational political order. (shrink)

El presente artículo contiene una lectura cruzada del Fedro y el Crátilo en la que se aclaran algunos de sus ejes temáticos centrales con el fin de sacar a relucir las constantes del pensamiento platónico que ambos diálogos comparten. La descripción de la dialéctica presente en el Fedro encaja con una definición socrática del Crátilo que explicita que el nombre es un instrumento al servicio del dialéctico. Todo ello nos lleva a concluir que la técnica dialéctica, además de constituir el (...) principal mecanismo regulador de la oratoria, se postula en los diálogos platónicos como un procedimiento de corrección que permite validar cualquier tipo de proposición y aproximar a la verdad los más variados discursos y representaciones de la realidad. Abstract: The current paper contains a comparative reading of the Phaedrus and the Cratylus. Some of their central topics are here contrasted in order to highlight the characteristic traits of Platonic thought present in both dialogues. The description of dialectic in the Phaedrus fits well with a Socratic definition in the Cratylus which clearly specifies that names are tools at the service of the dialectician. This evidence leads us to the conclusion that -besides being the main mechanism to control and judge rhetoric- dialectical technic appears in the dialogues as the only correcting procedure that makes it possible to verify any sort of proposition and bring speeches and depictions of reality closer to the truth. (shrink)

Rad se bavi temom tiranije u Platonovoj filozofiji koja je neraskidivno vezana za Platonovu kritiku demokratije. Stoga, da bi se uopšte moglo govoriti o njegovoj kritici tiranije, u radu će biti prikazana i sva druga društvena uređenja koja on pominje i čija smjenjivanja bivaju odslikana kroz živopisnu paralelu smjene generacija. Izložiću njegov argument zašto su tiranin i tiranija u potpunom opozitu sa njegovom idealnom državom i kraljem filozofom, ali takođe i postaviti mnogobrojna ključna pitanja koja će u radu biti podijeljena (...) u pet cjelina. U prvoj i drugoj cjelini ću govoriti o onome što dovodi do same promjene društvenih uređenja u Platonovoj „Državi“, stavljajući akcenat na prelaz demokratije u tiraniju. U trećem dijelu biće prikazan dopadljivi početak tiranije, da bi potom u četvrtom dijelu bilo riječi o već sasvim uspostavljenoj tiraniji i onome što prof. dr Irina Deretić naziva „povlačenje logosa ili psihopatologija nepravednog tiranina“. Peti dio će poslužiti kao osvrt na razmišljanje o tome da tiranina možda treba i sažaljevati, kako i sam Sokrat govori, a zatim i razmatranje teze Čincia Aruze (engl. Cinzia Arruzza) da je Platonova kritika tiranije zapravo njegova kritika demokratije. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of the second ‘theological’ pattern in Plato’s Republic. Situating Plato within his religious context, it argues that this pattern calls into question the traditional ancient model of divine epiphany. Divine epiphany was a central element in Greek religion. Yet, in the absence of a centralized religious organization, this model threatened the philosophers’ authoritative position. Plato’s second pattern seeks not only to undermine this potential threat but also to pave the way towards a new, philosophicalmodel (...) of divine epiphany, thus further establishing the philosophers’ authority and legitimacy within and outside his ideal city. (shrink)

Plato's antipathy to crowds is a commonplace that reinforces a prevailing portrait of the Socratic method as a practice that centers on individuals, to the exclusion of crowds and the many. This canonical view, however, comes into tension with the tendency of Plato's Socrates to conduct his dialogues in the presence of collective audiences. I argue that Plato's position on crowds is at once more complex and more ambivalent than has been commonly accepted. I distinguish between two distinct lines of (...) critique that Plato develops against crowds: the argument that the incentive structures that move crowds are unconducive to philosophy; and a more ambiguous argument that crowds tend not to be as amenable to control as their portrayal in the Athenian democratic imaginary seems to promise. Plato's depiction of Socratic practice can be understood as an effort to explore an alternative vision of crowd control. (shrink)

This paper approaches the Critias straightforwardly as a work of political philosophy but gives greater attention to Athens’ opponent, Atlantis, whose founding, political organization, and eventual decline each offer important lessons about the aims of legislation and political life. I begin by comparing the foundation of the two cities as presented in Critias’ myth, with a special focus on the role of divine persuasion (I). I then describe the political organization of Athens and Atlantis, showing how they reflect the different (...) ways in which their founding gods exercised divine persuasion (II). Next, I focus on the decline of Atlantis and the causes behind it (III). Finally (IV), I discuss the lessons that I think can be gathered from the foregoing sections and show how the themes that emerge from the comparison of the two cities anticipate their more extensive exploration in the Laws. (shrink)

This paper reevaluates the role of Adeimantus in Book 2 of Plato's Republic, arguing that his challenge to Socrates' view of justice—specifically, his interest in the influence of the outer world on our inner lives—serves a crucial yet underappreciated purpose in initiating the political project of the work. I suggest that it's due to Adeimantus' contribution in the Republic that Plato's wide-ranging inquiry into issues in ethics, politics, psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics hangs together as an integrated whole. A further benefit (...) of this reevaluation, I argue, is the way it illuminates Plato's assessment of poetry in the dialogue. This paper was delivered this past year as part of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. Comments are welcome but please do not cite without permission. (shrink)

Plato is often acknowledged as the first philosophical critic of democracy and his Republic is regularly taken as a paradigm of an anti-democratic work. While it is true that Plato objected to much about the democracy of his own time, Plato’s political theorizing also reveals an interest in improving democratic institutions. This chapter explores three themes in Plato’s thinking about democracy: firstly, Plato's insistence that rulers should be knowledgeable and his claim that most people are politically incompetent (§1); secondly, Plato's (...) criticisms of oratory and the corrupting effects of public rhetoric (§2); thirdly, Plato's use of democratic institutions in the Laws (§3). Once we appreciate these different evaluations of democratic practices, we can see that Plato was not simply ‘anti-democratic’ or ‘pro-democratic’ but thought some democratic practices should be abandoned, some reformed, and some adopted. (shrink)

In this paper, I’d like to contrast Plato’s picture of the self or soul to Nietzsche’s account of what he calls a “manifold” soul. While Plato’s moral ideal is a rigidly hierarchical soul subordinated to reason, Nietzsche’s manifold soul is a dynamic balance of powers, a contentious unity of diverse personas. And although Plato’s just soul serves as the model of his authoritarian, aristocratic politics, I’ll argue Nietzsche’s manifold soul is deeply incompatible with his own aristocratic politics and provides us, (...) very much against his own intentions, with the foundation for a novel theory of egalitarian social harmony. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, according to Plato’s Statesman, true statesmen directly control, administer, or govern none of the affairs of the city. Rather, administration and governance belong entirely to the citizens. Instead of governing the city, the task of the statesman is to facilitate the citizens’ successful self-governance or self-rule. And true statesmen do this through legislation, by means of which they inculcate in the citizens true opinions about the just, the good, the fine, and the opposites of (...) these. (shrink)

El presente capítulo se propone, en primer lugar, elucidar algunos aspectos de la dimensión política de distintos textos nodales de la obra de Hans-Georg Gadamer, como Plato und die Dichter [1934], Platos Staat der Erziehung [1942], y el más tardío Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles [1978]. Para ello, se realizará una revisión crítica de una de las lecturas contemporáneas de estos aspectos, aquella realizada por Dennis Schmidt. En las conclusiones, tras analizar la relación entre phrónesis, areté y andreía (...) en los diálogos platónicos, intentaré demostrar cómo estas nociones alumbran la cuestión de la seducción del poder (descuidada por Schmidt en su lectura del Platón gadameriano), así como la inseparabilidad de este problema con respecto a la concepción dialéctica de la utopía. A partir de esto último se sugerirá que es posible, desde y más allá de la lectura gadameriana de Platón, repensar la idea de desobediencia civil y el valor político del mito desde el punto de vista de la utopía. (shrink)

The relation of philosophy to democracy remains at the center of attention in Oda Tvedt’s essay, ”Philosophy, Democracy and Poverty: The philosopher as political agent in the Apology of Plato”. Tvedt argues that the role of the philosopher as Socrates presents it in this work is first and foremost to be an agent of subversive political activity, and she finds support for this view of the philosopher’s role in other works of Plato as well as within the Apology itself. She (...) holds that the poverty of Socrates is a vital clue to the understanding of the philosopher as a political figure in this dialogue. Taking a cue from Alain Badiou, and regarding justice as the political equivalent of truth, Tvedt investigates the relationship between democracy and philosophy in order to understand the connection between life and teachings for Plato’s Socrates. That Socrates chooses to abstain from the traditional political arenas points, Tvedt argues, toward a distinction in Plato’s political thought: the distinction between the private and the public realm, which in some ways corresponds to the distinction between the individual and the masses, and sheds light on what Plato’s criticism of the political realm really entails. (shrink)

In Plato’s Apology of Socrates we see a philosopher in collision with his society—a society he nonetheless claims to have benefited through his philosophic activity. It has often been asked why democratic Athens condemned a philosopher of Socrates' character to death. This anthology examines the contribution made by Plato’s Apology of Socrates to our understanding of the character of Socrates as well as of the conception of philosophy Plato attributes to him. The 11 chapters offer complementary readings of the Apology, (...) which through their different approaches demonstrate the richness of this Platonic work as well as the various layers that can be discerned in its presentation of Socrates. -/- While the contributions display variety in both topics and angles, they also share common features: An awareness of the importance of the literary aspects of Plato’s courtroom drama, as well as a readiness to take into consideration the historical context of the work. Thereby they provide contributions to a manifold understanding of the aims and impact of the work, without losing sight of the philosophical questions that are raised by Socrates’ confrontational and unrepentant defense speech. Allowing the character of Socrates to take center stage, the chapters of this volume examine the philosopher in relation to ethics, and to politics and democracy, as well as to the ideology, religion, and virtue shared by the Athenians. -/- Readers will also find reflections on classical Platonic subjects such as the nature of Socratic philosophical inquiry and of philosophy itself, as well as on the notoriously ambiguous relationships between philosophy, sophistry and rhetoric, and their several relationships to truth and justice. The anthology emphasizes and explores the equivocal and sometimes problematic aspects of Socrates as Plato presents him in the Apology, illuminating why the Athenians let the verdict fall as they did, while drawing out problematic features of Athenian society and its reaction to Socrates’ philosophic activity, thereby encouraging reflection on the role philosophy can play in our modern societies. (shrink)

This chapter demonstrates that the Seventh Letter, explicitly and throughout its entirety, thematizes hearing and listening, and it comprises an exhortation to listen well. After laying down groundwork showing that logos must include listening, not merely assertion or expression, the chapter first demonstrates the political significance of the exhortation to listen based on a unified reading of the Letter that conjoins the concerns of the so-called digression with the rest of its content. It situates the “weakness of logos” taken up (...) in the digression, which most scholars treat in an ontological-linguistic weakness, as an aural phenomenon within the Letter’s distinctly political aims. That is to say, the “weakness of logos,” referred to in the so-called digression is also a weakness of hearers and hearing and is thus a political weakness, as well. The chapter then goes on to argue that the politics of listening in the Seventh Letter, as well as in some aspects of Socratic dialectic, rely necessarily on certain forms of domination or compelled listening, and I therefore consider the links between hearing and tyranny in the Letter. Finally, I speculate on what a more liberated politics of listening and hearing might look like and what role the Platonic writings might play as a propaedeutic to better listening in the city. I conclude by arguing that because of the “weakness of logos,” Plato’s task is inherently paradoxical: Plato calls us to hear what we are not yet able to hear, tyrannizing in order to liberate our sense of hearing. (shrink)

In her “Saving the Appearances of Plato’s Cave,” Dr. Adriel M. Trott argues that “the philosopher’s claim to true knowledge always operates within the realm of the cave.” In order to probe her claim, I challenge her to make sense of “politics in the cave,” namely, the status and practices of two categories of people in the cave: “woke” cave-dwellers and “woke” puppeteers.

Öz -/- Antikçağ’dan modern dönemlere değin kadınların mevcut durumlarının iyileştirilmesine dair çalışmaların sayısının oldukça yetersiz kaldığını söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. Bu bağlamda siyaset felsefesinin kurucu metinlerinden olan Devlet’in hem yazıldığı dönem hem de takip eden iki milenyuma yakın süre hesaba katıldığında kadınların toplumdaki rolü ve konumu üzerine oldukça radikal ve yenilikçi fikirleri barındırdığı açıktır. Bu çalışmada Platon’un diğer çalışmaları da hesaba katılmakla birlikte özellikle Devlet adlı eseri nezdinde nasıl olup da kimi düşünürlerce hem bir mizojinist hem de bir kadın hakları savunucusu (...) sayıldığı; hem bir kadın düşmanı hem de proto-feminist olarak görülebildiği incelenecek ve Platon bu bağlamda yeniden ele alınacaktır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Platon, Kadın Hakları, Devlet, Feminizm, Mizojini -/- Abstract -/- It is safe to propound that the quantity of studies on the amelioration of the present conditions of women from antiquity through to modern times is quite insufficient. In this context, it seems that the Republic by Plato, which is one of the founding texts of political philosophy, has provided quite radical and innovative ideas about the role and position of women in society, considering into account both its production period and the next two millenniums. This study, based particularly upon his Republic and other works, aims to re-consider how Plato is regarded both as a misogynist and a women's rightist, or both as a woman hater and a proto-feminist by certain scholars. -/- Keywords: Plato, Woman Rights, Republic, Feminism, Misogyny. (shrink)

The main idea of this allegory is the difference between people who simply experience their sensory experiences, and call that knowledge, and those who understand real knowledge by seeing the truth. The allegory actually digs into some deep philosophy, which is not surprising since it comes from Plato. Its main idea is the discussion of how humans perceive reality and if human existence has a higher truth. It explores the theme of belief versus knowledge. The Perception Plato theorizes that the (...) group of people tied up in the cave would assume that the shadows they see on the wall are reality. Plato's theory further states that the echoing sounds the prisoners hear are perceived as reality. This false reality is all that the people in the cave know. They have no true knowledge of the real world. However, they fully believe that what they see on the cave wall is reality, and even try to name the shadows they see passing by. Plato's cave allegory further proposes that one of the prisoners escapes or gains freedom from the cave. The freed prisoner moves toward the fire, which temporarily blinds him. As he gains his eyesight and moves into the real world, he gains a greater sense of reality. (shrink)

Their paper begins with the observation that, even though many philosophers, especially in the twentieth century, have had personal experience of exile, they rarely treat the topic of exile directly in their philosophical works. Existentialist thinkers such as Heidegger, it is true, have employed exile as a metaphor for the human condition, yet the concrete experience of political exile has been treated as somehow lacking the universality that canonical philosophy needs. This paper warns against the temptation to conflate the real (...) situation of exile with a general condition of existential unbelongingness. It goes on to trace two major threads in the history of the philosophical treatment of citizenship, the one deriving from Plato and the other from Kant and to explore their relevance to contemporary debate around the moral and legal status of those who seek refuge abroad from war, oppression, or other kinds of threat in their homeland. The Platonic tradition treats citizenship as deriving primarily from association with a land; it views foreigners as having the potential to contaminate the polis and any citizen who spends time away from the polis as likely to betray it. While many features of the Platonic position have not survived to the present, it is noteworthy that, for indigenous peoples in many parts of the world, attachment to the land remains of fundamental importance. At the same time, though migration of many kinds has become extremely common, some individuals and governments in the first world still demonstrate a visceral belief that refugees and immigrants to their country will somehow corrupt or contaminate it. The Kantian position, by contrast, treats citizenship as, ideally at least, cosmopolitan and global. It envisages nation states as moving towards “an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war”. Consequently, the stranger seeking refuge abroad from life-threatening persecution in his or her own country has what Kant refers to as a “right of resort” in another country. While Kant argues that we must therefore not show hostility to such people, our obligations to them do not extend to philanthropic hospitality. This assertion of a limited obligation to displaced persons forms the basis for much contemporary discussion around the rights of refugees and migrants. Globalization, of course, has not taken quite the form that Kant envisaged. While the United Nations asserts the universality of human rights, and certain clusters of countries, such as those in Western Europe, have moved towards federation and free internal movement of their citizens, so-called globalization has taken place primarily on the economic, rather than the political, level. The extreme international mobility of investment capital from first-world countries in search of cheap labour is not currently matched by an acceptance within such countries of the rights of third-world citizens to migrate to their shores in search of higher wages and improved living conditions. Finally, this paper offers a critique of both the Platonic and the Kantian positions and argues the need in the modern world for institutional arrangements which represent a variety of interests and struggles across national boundaries. (shrink)

In his dialogueStatesman(=Plt.), Plato first sets out one way of thinking of the statesperson, on the model of a nurturer of a herd such as a shepherd; then he sets out a very different way of thinking of him, on the model of a weaver of a social fabric. Critics have long been wondering whether Plato wants to combine the two models or, on the contrary, to abandon the nurturing model in favour of the weaving model.This article shows that a (...) particular passage in the dialogue, 275d8–e1, is crucial for this question. As this passage is understood by all commentators and translators, it says that the statesperson is not a nurturer. This ought to have settled the question. But the article argues that we cannot read the passage like that. For an adjacent passage, 275b1–7, says that the statesperson is a nurturer. There is no way out of this contradiction, unless we reconsider the traditional reading of 275d8–e1.The article defends a different reading of 275d8–e1, which avoids the contradiction. On this new reading, the passage does not say that the statesperson is not a nurturer, it says that her/his being a nurturer is not the grounds for her/him deserving the title ‘statesperson’. (shrink)

Seit Dodds’ Anwendung des Begriffs „Schamkultur“ auf die griechische Kultur genießt das Thema Scham die besondere Aufmerksamkeit der Gräzisten. Basierend auf einer detaillierten Analyse der relevanten Belegstellen im gesamten platonischen Corpus und einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit den vorherigen einschlägigen Forschungen, versucht die vorliegende Arbeit Platons Konzeption der Scham systematisch zu erläutern, und zwar thematisch unter den folgenden vier Perspektiven: dem sokratischen elenchos, der Wahrheitsliebe, dem Moralverständnis sowie der Moralerziehung im Staat. Die Studie zielt einerseits darauf ab, aufzuzeigen, dass Platons Verständnis (...) von Scham nicht so unreif ist, wie man bislang dachte; andererseits möchte sie vor Augen führen, dass Platon Scham nicht, wie traditionell angenommen, als nur negativ erachtet, sondern ihre positive Rolle in verschiedenen Gebieten durchaus anerkennt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Scham und die ihr verwandten Emotionen von Bedeutung sowohl für den platonischen Sokrates als auch für die platonische Philosophie im Ganzen sind, auch wenn der Begriff „Schamkultur“ wohl keine zutreffende Bezeichnung für seine Zeit darstellt. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that ruling is the sole prerogative of Plato’s philosopher-rulers because they alone possess knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). This knowledge is knowledge of the Good, taken to be the only knowledge there is in Kallipolis. Let us call this the sufficiency condition thesis (the SCT). In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I cast doubt on the adequacy of the SCT, arguing that part of the training and education of the philosopher-rulers involves their gaining practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and experience (...) (ἐμπειρία). To succeed in this, I have two main aims. First, I argue that the philosopher-rulers must attain optimum cognitive success in these three modes of cognition to function efficiently in ruling. This involves showing that Plato, for his political project, appeals to other senses of cognitive successes besides his strictly metaphysical epistemology. Second, I attempt to demonstrate how these three modes of cognition coalesce or coincide in ruling the perceptible world, especially in the judgement and determination of concrete perceptible matters. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore Gadamer’s early reflections on Plato’s utopian thought and its potential topicality. In the following section, I will show how areté, understood as a hermeneutical and existential virtue, is dialectically related to ethics and politics in Gadamer’s phenomenological reception of Plato’s philosophy. I argue that, in Gadamer’s eyes, Socratic-Platonic self-understanding enables human beings to be aware of their political responsibilities, to recognize how they are existentially and mutually related to the other, and to (...) clarify dialectically their own existential possibilities in order to transcend their inherited world of values. In the third section, I aim to show how these are the grounds on which Gadamer’s initial thoughts on the utopian dimension of Platonic political philosophy developed, mainly through his further critical account of the works on the German “political Plato” published in Germany between 1927 and 1933, i.e., Kurt Singer’s Platon, der Gründer (1927), Julius Stenzel’s Platon. Der Erzieher (1928), and Kurt von Hildendrandt‘s Platon, Der Kampf des Geistes um die Macht (1933). Then, in the fourth section, I will express my own views on the relevance of reconsidering how the notions of areté, phrónesis, and andreía are already related in Plato’s dialogues, complementing the insights on Gadamer’s interpretation of areté in section two. My purpose is to go beyond Gadamer’s reading and provide us with a more solid ground to address his late reflections on political courage and its relations with his dialectical understanding of Platonic utopia as a myth. Therefore, I will explore the problem of civil disobedience, a topic that was actually not at the centre of Gadamer’s concerns, as a genuine mode of utopian political action which can enact a true deviation from the sophistic pólis and its understanding of power. Finally, in the conclusion, I will characterize Gadamer’s portrait of Platonic utopia as a dialectical myth which enables human beings to recognize when politics are being reduced to mere power abuse by the State and also suggest why Gadamer’s approach to utopias is still relevant today. (shrink)

Did Plato intend the laws of the Laws to change? While most scholars agree that there is to be legal change in Magnesia, I contend that this issue has been clouded by confusing three distinct questions: (1) whether there are legal mechanisms for changing the law in Magnesia, (2) what the attitudes of Magnesian citizens towards innovation and legal change are, and (3) whether Plato thinks the law is always the ultimate political authority. Once we separate these issues and look (...) at the relevant texts more closely, we see that the Athenian Visitor is primarily concerned with supplementing the original lawgiver’s laws and that any innovation that occurs should be consistent with this lawcode. This does not settle the question about whether it is always right to act in accordance with the existing laws, though it does provide a valuable framework for understanding a central aspect of Platonic political philosophy. Thus, although Plato’s ideal places knowledge above the law, in practice the laws of Magnesia will be fixed and authoritative for those people living under them. (shrink)

The volume studies, from different perspectives, the relationship between ancient thought and biopolitics, that is, theories, discourses, and practices in which the biological life of human populations becomes the focal point of political government. It thus continues and deepens the critical examination, in recent literature, of Michel Foucault's claim concerning the essentially modern character of biopolitics. The nine contributions comprised in the volume explore and utilize the notions of biopolitics and biopower as conceptual tools for articulating the differences and continuities (...) between antiquity and modernity and for narrating Western intellectual and political history in general. Without committing itself to any particular thesis or approach, the volume evaluates both the relevance of ancient thought for the concept and theory of biopolitics and the relevance of biopolitical theory and ideas for the study of ancient thought. The volume is divided into three main parts: part I studies instances of biopolitics in ancient thought; part II focuses on aspects of ancient thought that elude or transcend biopolitics; and part III discusses several modern interpretations of ancient thought in the context of biopolitical theory. (shrink)

The paper discusses different interpretations of Callicles and Thrasymachus’ positions. There are good reasons for interpreting Callicles as a critic of democracy and as an aristocratic political thinker whose political views are closer to Plato’s than is usually assumed. The paper argues that Callicles defends a natural right of the best citizens to rule over the crowd. However, in contrast to Plato, for Callicles the rule of the best should not aim at the common good but at their personal advantage. (...) The paper also discusses the view that Thrasymachus is just a sociologist of power who diagnoses what actually happens in politics (Henning Ottmann, Max Salomon). This interpretation is still current, and enables us to understand important aspects of legislation in contemporary democracies. Finally, the paper argues that there are reasons to understand Thrasymachus not only as a political realist, but, similar to Protagoras, as a moral sceptic. (shrink)

Protagoras’ Grand Speech is traditionally considered to articulate a contractualist approach to political existence and morality. There is, however, a newly emerging line of interpretation among scholars, which explores a naturalist layer in Protagoras’ ethical and political thought. This article aims to make a contribution to this new way of reading Protagoras’ speech, by discussing one of its most elaborate versions.

One puzzling feature of Plato’s Republic is the First City or ‘city of pigs’. Socrates praises the First City as a “true”, “healthy” city, yet Plato abandons it with little explanation. I argue that the problem is not a political failing, as most previous readings have proposed: the First City is a viable political arrangement, where one can live a deeply Socratic lifestyle. But the First City has a psychological corollary, that the soul is simple rather than tripartite. Plato sees (...) this ‘First Soul’ as an inaccurate model of moral psychology, and so rejects it, along with its political analogue. (shrink)