This article is an attempt to provide an example that illustrates Hans Reichenbach’s concept of coordination. Throughout Reichenbach’s career the concept of coordination played an important role in his understanding of the connection between reality and how it is scientifically described. Reichenbach never fully specified what coordination is and how exactly it works. Instead, we are left with a variety of hints and gestures, many not entirely consistent with each other and several that are subject to change over the course (...) of his career. Using the example of how to discover and construct causal variables, I will show that most of the features of coordination that Reichenbach described can be instantiated together and formulated precisely. (shrink)

Can it ever be morally justifiable to tell others to do what we ourselves believe is morally wrong to do? The common sense answer is no. It seems that we should never tell others to do something if we think it is morally wrong to do that act. My first goal is to argue that in Analects 17.21, Confucius tells his disciple not to observe a ritual even though Confucius himself believes that it is morally wrong that one does not (...) observe the ritual. My second goal is to argue against the common sense answer and explain how Confucius can be justified in telling his disciple to do what Confucius thought was wrong. The first justification has to do with telling someone to do what is second best when the person cannot do what is morally best. The second justification has to do with the role of a moral advisor. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Hegel calls social life “the living good,” but what this means is unclear. The idea expresses an ontological claim about the kind of being that human societies possess, but it is also normatively significant, clarifying why the category of social pathology is an appropriate tool of social critique. Social life consists in processes of life infused with ethical content. Societies are normatively and functionally constituted living beings that realize the good similarly to how organisms achieve their vital ends: via (...) specialized, coordinated functions. In distinction to living organisms, the living good realizes itself through the consciousness and will of individual social members. (shrink)

If Martin Heidegger was a philosopher who poetized, Wallace Stevens was a poet who philosophized. In "The Sail of Ulysses," one of his later poems, Stevens speaks enigmatically of a "right to be." The phrase is straightforward, if taken to indicate the right to life. But Stevens is rarely, if ever, straightforward. The poem is much more understandable if we take "being" in a Heideggerian sense, as an understanding of what it means to be.

This chapter contains sections titled: Cognition as Information Processing, as Computation, and as Abiding in the Meaningful Operationalism Is This Merely a Terminological Issue? Conclusion.

In recent years, Duncan Pritchard has developed a position in religious epistemology called quasi‐fideism that he claims traces back to John Henry Newman's treatment of the rationality of religious belief. In this paper, we give three reasons to think that Pritchard's reading of Newman as a quasi‐fideist is mistaken. First, Newman's parity argument does not claim that religious and non‐religious beliefs are on a par because both are groundless; instead, for Newman, they are on a par because both often stem (...) from implicit rather than explicit reasoning. Second, pace Pritchard, Newman's distinction between simple and complex assent does not map onto the Wittgensteinian distinction between groundless hinge commitments and beliefs that flow from these hinges. For Newman, simple and complex assent differ in terms of the believer's level of awareness of their grounds. Third, and finally, Newman does not reject Locke's evidentialism in toto. Instead, he argues that certitude is not restricted to beliefs stemming from intuition and demonstration but often rightly includes probabilistically supported (or fallibly evidenced) beliefs. (shrink)

Freedom of thought is often explicitly protected in constitutions and human rights documents, and even more often employed as a rallying cry against state tyranny. It is not so clear, however, just what freedom of thought is, what it would be to threaten it, and how, if at all, it differs from basic liberty or freedom. This essay seeks to analyze the idea of freedom of thought, to pose some skeptical questions about its alleged independent existence, and to ask, again (...) with a skeptical mindset, what it is to protect it and why its protection should be so commonly valued. (shrink)

This article charts the ways in which students negotiate an academic identity whilst pursuing academic tasks that are publicly observable precisely as ‘academic tasks’ to their peers. Previous research into aspects of student interaction that take place within university tutorial sessions has suggested that different kinds of student identity come into conflict as students interact, face-to-face. Most notably, the imperative of ‘doing education’ — as a keen proto-academic seeking a good final degree classification — is often overridden by the imperative (...) of ‘doing being a student’ — as an average and/or indifferent student who does not stand out. In this article, however, it is not the university tutorial but a slightly different and hitherto unexplored site of interaction that is foregrounded: the university library textbook. As with tutorials, the margins of library textbooks are spaces within which individually accomplished research becomes publicly observable — in the former as group work, and in the latter as student marginalia. Drawing on discourse analytic concepts such as ‘footing’ and ‘stake’ this article seeks to understand what student marginalia can tell us about the ways in which the tension between ‘doing education’ and ‘doing being a student’ is managed and negotiated in sites other than the university tutorial. (shrink)

John Searle’s distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is an enduringly important contribution to our understanding of rules, of language, and of rule-based or rule-bounded institutions. It is important to add to Searle’s account, however, by pointing out the regulative function of constitutive rules. Many human activities and goals can be pursued in multiple ways, but constituting the approved or official way of doing things, as is so common in law, has the effect of making alternatives less eligible, less available, (...) or less permitted, all of which can be seen as the regulative overhang of constitutive rules. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that descriptive uncertainty is relevant to what we subjectively ought to do. This leads to a further question: is what we subjectively ought to do sensitive to our moral uncertainty as well? Includers say yes—what we subjectively ought to do is sensitive to both descriptive uncertainty and moral uncertainty. Excluders say no—only descriptive uncertainty matters to what we subjectively ought to do (i.e., moral uncertainty is irrelevant). Excluders argue that common motivations for the subjective ought only give (...) us reason to think that descriptive uncertainty matters. This paper focuses on one motivation: accessibility. Excluders argue that accessibility does not motivate the Includers’ view because moral truths are always accessible – unlike descriptive facts which are not always accessible. My goal is to defend the Includers’ view by arguing that moral truths are not always accessible in the relevant sense. (shrink)

Edmund Burke and India is the first thorough treatment of Burke's views on India, even though the affairs of the British Indian empire occupied more of Burke's attention - and occupy more space among his writings and speeches - than any of the other causes to which he devoted himself during his long public career. Relating Burke's views on India to ideas expressed in his other writings, Whelan offers a comprehensive assessment of Burke's political theory as a whole. Burke appears (...) here as one of the few classic political thinkers in the Western canon to have made a serious and sustained effort to understand a non-European society and culture. (shrink)

In their recent ‘The ethical case for non-directed postmortem sperm donation’, Hodson and Parker outline and defend the concept of voluntary non-directed postmortem sperm donation, the idea that men should be able to register their desire to donate their sperm after death for use by strangers since this would offer a potential means of increasing the quantity and heterogeneity of donor sperm. In this response, we raise some concerns about their proposal, focusing in particular on the fact that current methodologies (...) do not make for a reliable way of ensuring that sperm retrieved postmortem has a good chance of leading to conception, which is in turn likely to make potential recipients reluctant to use such sperm. These concerns add to the ethical doubts that attend aspects of the proposal, making the prospect of implementation of such a policy unlikely at best. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Cultural relativism Ethical absolutism A cognitive alternative to EA: ethical relativism External and internal objections to ER Finding the middle ground: pluralistic relativism Ethics in business Conclusion.

Contemporary liberal theorists generally support open borders and some argue that liberalism is incompatible with substantive immigration control. We argue that it has not been shown that there is an inconsistency in the idea of a liberal state enforcing such controls and that it may be obligatory for a liberal state to impose substantive restrictions on immigration. The immigration control on which we focus is that concerning people from societies that resemble closed societies, particularly those in which Islamic fundamentalism is (...) endemic. We suggest that, if the threat we envision is real, then a liberal state has a right to limit immigration from such societies. (shrink)

Introduction to my three essays on the relevance of Karl Popper to contemporary social, political and philosophical problems.

Is intentionally doing A linked to the intention to do A? Knobe and Burra believe that the link between the English words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ may mislead philosophers and cognitive scientists to falsely believe that intentionally doing an action A requires one to have the intention to do A. Knobe and Burra believe that data from other languages..

What is the relationship between trying, desire, and desiring to try? Is it necessary to desire to do something in order to try to do it? Must Dave desire to quit smoking in order to try to quit? I shall defend the view that desiring to do A is necessary for trying to do A. First, Dave needs motivation to quit smoking and motivation comes in the form of desire. So it seems straightforward that when one tries to do something (...) A, one’s desire to do that thing A is one’s motivation. Second, when Dave throws out a pack of cigarettes, this may or may not be part of an attempt to quit smoking. It may be a political protest against R.J.R. Nabisco. Dave’s throwing out the cigarettes only counts as part of his attempt to quit smoking, if it is done for the right reason, out of the right motivation. Again, the right motivation seems to be the desire to quit smoking. Thus, the desire to do A appears to play important roles in the attempt to do A. At the very least, it helps to motivate, guide, and constitute the attempt as the attempt to do A. It is because Dave wants to quit smoking that his throwing out his cigarettes counts as part of his attempt to quit smoking, not as a political protest. (shrink)

The complex structure of the tragic aspects of globalization has been accounted for in extant literature. What remains unclear is how deglobalization, isolationism and all the radically disruptive movements and politics in-between will shape transnational corporations’ organizational practices. The purpose of this study is to interrogate and problematize the implications of anarchic ‘globalisolationism’ vis-à-vis the atlas of insurrection and the TNCs’ global responsibility towards human-centric management practices. We situate our analysis in the heavily politicized and contested discursive space of emergent (...) global geopolitical and environmental tensions and the global quest to reclaim dignity, freedoms, right to resources and decisions—stakeownership. ‘Globalisolationism’ is conceptualized as a radically non-compromising coexistence of globalization and isolationism by design, aided by new information technologies, reactivated mass consciousness and slack political resources. It is characterized by the radical pursuit of new deals within the global geopolitical and economic order; renegotiation of existing deals for resource appropriation and democratic space for the marginalized; the collapse of the old political order via auto-implosion as a beneficial constraint; and the defence of the status quo in global resource and environmental governance due to ‘translocal’ insurrection. Therefore, the paper suggests how TNCs’ current modus operandi could be transformed into responsible human/environment-centric organisational practices to accommodate emerging sociopolitical and environmental challenges. It further highlights the implications for novel game-changing policies and political action by ‘subaltern’ societies and their metamorphosis from victims of planetary vandalism to stakeowners with sovereignty over their resources. (shrink)

Husserl’s (2023) “Paradox of the Psychological Reduction,” with support and elucidation from Husserl’s published writings, shows the necessity of employing the phenomenological epoché and reduction in order to perform valid psychological research. The relationship between the transcendental and psychological reductions, including their closeness, differences, and peculiar identity are explored. Although necessary, the phenomenological method does not guarantee true psychological knowledge but rather requires a reflexive, self-critical, self-corrective historical process that confronts and overcomes naturalistic prejudice and other misguiding assumptions and dogma (...) as well as superficial and flawed research performances. Phenomenological psychology and philosophy are inseparable, in a bidirectional relationship that informs the socio-cultural sciences including empirical psychology and all disciplines that study persons, communities, human artifacts, and humanity. The implications and relevance of phenomenological method are spelled out in light of the history and contemporary challenges of psychology. (shrink)

In his introduction Professor Edwards remarks that he does not believe that the work will be condemned "as either dull or timid", whatever else may be said about it. And, in the main, he is right in this belief. It is hardly feasible of course to maintain a uniform policy of scintillating provocativeness when one is summarizing the ideas of some rather obscure thinkers or dealing with some highly technical matter. But on controversial issues articles are often lively and make (...) no pretense of Olympian detachment. Some articles, even though useful, may be a bit flat. But the work as a whole certainly does not give this impression. (shrink)

WITHIN the last half century, the relations between the Catholic Church and liberal politics have shifted significantly. To say the least, no one is surprised today to read of Catholic socialists, liberation theologies, or Christian Democratic parties of Catholic inspiration in Europe and Latin America. Many factors contributed to this change, but few would deny a central role to the work of the French philosopher, Jacques Maritain.

Philip McShane has had as one of his leisure specialties the provision of tantalising puzzles which are meant to provide samples of insight but sometimes, instead of promoting insight, reduce his readers to angry frustration. I will take as point of departure for my reflections a single puzzle Philip once presented on his own to some learned society – I forget which. Those present were invited to find the meaning of the letters SMTWTFS; when it was clear they were getting (...) nowhere, Philip rescued them from their frustration with the answer: the letters are the initials for the seven days of the week. Facing then the understandable chagrin of his audience at their failure and their irritated protest that they couldn’t be expected to find a sensible answer to such an absurd question, Philip informed them: ‘I gave the problem to a class in Grade School and they solved it.’ As one of the frustrated academics who didn’t solve the problem, I wish to reflect on this exchange, not just because, like the person in the Gospel, ‘I am willing to justify myself,’ but more importantly because it suggests an appropriate topic for the volume Michael Shute is editing in Philip’s honour, and gives me an opportunity to ponder once more a question we will never ponder enough or come close to exhausting: the working of the human mind as it strives to achieve and sometimes does achieve an insight. How does insight occur? How can it be encouraged to occur? And why in the present case did it not occur in the circle of academics, when it did to a Grade School class? (shrink)

Esoteric versus latent teaching -- The disclosure of hidden providence -- Show and tell: the concept of teaching in St. Augustine's De Magistro -- Philosophy and belief -- Cicero and the philosophy of religion -- Newman and Augustine: the narrative of conversion -- Proof and presence -- Hume's unnatural religion (some humean footnotes) -- Religion and natural law -- American reflections on a century of Catholic social teaching.