Freedom of Speech

In this paper, I present an obstacle to realizing John Rawls’s system of justice. The basic liberties have lexical priority, but they risk undermining fair equality of opportunity, because freedom of speech allows us to spread false prejudices. I present the obstacle through a pastiche of a notable fiction writer from the Indian sub-continent.

Personal fulfilment depends upon knowledge of one’s identity. A person discovers her identity by trial and error. The experimentation and critical evaluation that are indispensable for that are inhibited by various strands of the currently trendy “identity politics.” I identify and criticise six errors: that self-identification determines identity; that one discovers one’s identity by looking inward; that a person’s identity is substantially determined by her inherited culture; that one can discover one’s identity through consciousness-raising; that criticism or microaggression undermines a (...) person’s identity; and that cultural appropriation is objectionable. I give an example from my own search for my identity to illustrate how each of the six errors subverts self-discovery and puts obstacles in the way of human fulfilment. (shrink)

To what extent are authors morally culpable for harms caused by their published work? Can authors be culpable even if their ideas are misused, perhaps because they failed to take precautions to prevent harmful misinterpretations? Might authors be culpable even if they do take precautions—if, for example, they publish ideas that others can be reasonably expected to put to harmful uses, precautions notwithstanding? Although complete answers to these questions depend upon controversial views about the right to free speech, this paper (...) argues that five notions from philosophy of law and legal practice—liability, burden of proof, legal causation, mens rea, and reasoning by precedent—can be adapted to provide an attractive moral framework for determining whether an author’s work causes harm, whether and how culpable the author is for causing such harm, steps authors may take to immunize themselves from culpability, and how to responsibly develop new rules for publishing ethics. (shrink)

In this article, we identify three key design dimensions along which cryptocurrencies differ -- privacy, censorship-resistance, and consensus procedure. Each raises important normative issues. Our discussion uncovers new ways to approach the question of whether Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies should be used as money, and new avenues for developing a positive answer to that question. A guiding theme is that progress here requires a mixed approach that integrates philosophical tools with the purely technical results of disciplines like computer science and (...) economics. Note: this article is the second entry within a two-part sequence on the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics of Cryptocurrency. (shrink)

In his recent book, Joshi (2021) argues that the open exchange of ideas is essential for the flourishing of individuals and society. He provides two arguments for this claim. First, speaking your mind is essential for the common good: we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth if we share evidence and offer different perspectives. Second, speaking your mind is good for your own sake: it is necessary to develop your rational faculties and exercise intellectual independence, both of which (...) are essential for living a good life. In this paper, I consider the implications of Joshi’s argument and raise several objections to his view. (shrink)

We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the “analytical” method of drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by Rawls’s first principle of justice (i.e., the liberty principle). We argue that the general conditions that feature in Rawls’s own account of the analytical method, which employ (...) the notion of necessity, are too stringent. They ultimately fail to deliver as basic certain particular liberties that should be encompassed within any fully adequate scheme of liberties. To address this under-generation problem, we provide an amended general condition. This replaces Rawls’s necessity condition with a probabilistic condition and it appeals to the standard liberal prohibition on arbitrary coercion by the state. We defend our new approach both as apt to feature in applications of the analytical method and as adequately grounded in justice as fairness as Rawls articulates the theory’s fundamental ideas. (shrink)

Largely thanks to Mill’s influence, the suggestion that the state ought to restrict the distribution of misinformation will strike most philosophers as implausible. Two of Mill’s influential assumptions are particularly relevant here: first, that free speech debates should focus on moral considerations such as the harm that certain forms of expression might cause; second, that false information causes minimal harm due to the fact that human beings are psychologically well equipped to distinguish truth and falsehood. However, in addition to our (...) moral obligations, we also have a distinct set of epistemic obligations—and even when a false belief doesn’t harm anyone, it constitutes an epistemically bad outcome. Moreover, Mill was profoundly mistaken about human psychology: human beings are vulnerable to the influence of a wide variety of false claims via a wide variety of psychological mechanisms. Consequently, there is a purely epistemic justification for restricting the distribution of misinformation: because each of us has an individual epistemic obligation to avoid unnecessary exposure to misinformation, and because avoiding such exposure is simply too difficult when acting alone, we all have a shared epistemic obligation to establish laws or regulations restricting the widespread distribution of misinformation. (shrink)

I claim that hate speech is actually antithetical to free speech. Nevertheless, this claim invokes the misconception that one would be jeopardizing free speech due to a phenomenon known as "false polarization" – a “tendency for disputants to overestimate the extent to which they disagree about whatever contested question is at hand.” The real polarity does not lie between hate speech (as protected free speech) vs. censorship. Rather, hate speech is censorship. It is the censorship of entire sectors of the (...) population, a violation of their right to be heard, and at worse, an incitement to their extinction. The liberal attempt to try to fit the metaphorical 'round peg' of hate speech into the 'square hole' of free speech is impossible without revealing one’s reluctance to endow people of color, the LGBTQ+ community, women, and other socially oppressed/marginalized groups as equal and deserving of full human dignity. I start by providing a clear definition of "hate speech", then rehash the historical political intent of the "freedom of expression" within the US, and finally I illuminate the very concrete social consequences of hate speech. (shrink)

Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

A growing body of work in free speech theory is interested in the nature of counterspeech, i.e. speech that aims to counteract the effects of harmful speech. Counterspeech is usually defined in opposition to legal responses to harmful speech, which try to prevent such speech from occurring in the first place. In this paper we challenge this way of carving up the conceptual terrain. Instead, we argue that our main classificatory division, in theorising responses to harmful speech, should be between (...) pro-discursive and anti-discursive responses. Some legal responses to harmful speech, so we argue, make a positive discursive contribution in their own right. That is, legal restrictions on harmful speech can have a function that is importantly similar to speech that aims at countering the effects of harmful speech. (shrink)

Counterspeech is communication that tries to counteract potential harm brought about by other speech. Theoretical interest in counterspeech partly derives from a libertarian ideal – as captured in the claim that the solution to bad speech is more speech – and partly from a recognition that well-meaning attempts to counteract harm through speech can easily misfire or backfire. Here we survey recent work on the question of what makes counterspeech effective at remedying or preventing harm, in those cases where it (...) is effective, as well as work investigating when and why there is a duty to engage in counterspeech. We suggest that the most fruitful area for philosophical inquiry on this topic, currently, relates to the questions about efficacy. Specifically, we argue that there is a need for better frameworks for conceptualizing the efficacy of counterspeech. Philosophers have collaborative work to do, alongside social scientists, in developing these frameworks. (shrink)

Some thoughts on the value(s) of political protest, to mark the 20th anniversary of the 2003 anti-war demonstrations.

This review critically summarises Alexander Brown and Adriana Sinclair’s book, The Politics of Hate Speech Laws. The review proceeds by canvassing the main arguments presented in each of the book’s nine chapters, while also highlighting the book’s overarching themes and ideas. Ultimately it is suggested that the book will be of use to anyone interested in the political and philosophical aspects of the highly vexed issue of hate speech regulation. In particular the review praises the book’s pluralistic, ecumenical style, arguing (...) that readers are sure to find arguments within the book with which they can engage, regardless of their pre-existing commitments and values. However, the review also notes that the book’s breadth-over-depth approach has several drawbacks. It is suggested, for instance, that some of the key proposals in the book would have benefited from being explored in greater critical detail. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 515-529, May 2022. Much of the recent literature on freedom of speech has focused on the arguments for and against the regulation of certain kinds of speech. Discussions of hate speech and offensive speech, for example, abound in this literature, as do debates concerning the permissibility of pornography. Less attention has been paid, however, at least recently, to the normative foundations of freedom of speech where three classic justifications still prevail, based (...) on the values of truth, autonomy and democracy. In this paper we argue, first, that none of these justifications meet all four intuitive desiderata for an adequate theory of free speech. We go on to sketch an original relational view of free speech, one which grounds its value in the recognition that speakers grant each other when engaging in speech practices, and its limits in the republican ideal of non-dominated co-exercisable liberty. We briefly illustrate the relational approach’s implications for the debate on hate speech regulation and for the response to fake news. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 515-529, May 2022. Much of the recent literature on freedom of speech has focused on the arguments for and against the regulation of certain kinds of speech. Discussions of hate speech and offensive speech, for example, abound in this literature, as do debates concerning the permissibility of pornography. Less attention has been paid, however, at least recently, to the normative foundations of freedom of speech where three classic justifications still prevail, based (...) on the values of truth, autonomy and democracy. In this paper we argue, first, that none of these justifications meet all four intuitive desiderata for an adequate theory of free speech. We go on to sketch an original relational view of free speech, one which grounds its value in the recognition that speakers grant each other when engaging in speech practices, and its limits in the republican ideal of non-dominated co-exercisable liberty. We briefly illustrate the relational approach’s implications for the debate on hate speech regulation and for the response to fake news. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine whether John Stuart Mill’s account of free speech can survive three main challenges posed by social media. First, I consider the problem of social media failing to distinguish between emotive and factual language. Second, I look at the problem of algorithms creating moralism. I then turn to a potential objection to my first two challenges. The objection elucidates the benefits of social media’s emotional and algorithmic character, amplifying arguments and increasing public engagement. However, I take (...) issue with this objection on consequentialist terms. I finally return to the third challenge, where I focus on how anonymity removes the consequences to our words; I contend that this final failure is the ultimate reason why Mill’s account cannot persist in the modern age. In conclusion, I argue that Mill’s account cannot withstand the problems posed by social media. (shrink)

Conditions for recognition of religion or belief (RoRB) continued to deteriorate around the world from June 2021 to June 2022. Authoritarian regimes bent on controlling religious activity maintained a foothold in Africa, Asia and parts of Central and South America. The liberties enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights are at serious threat by the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine. While in Afghanistan, the Taliban's reclamation of power after twenty years of being kept at bay likely signals a new (...) generation of Afghan boys and girls who will not see their fundamental human rights upheld by the very institutions that are supposed to protect them.​ -/- The Religious Recognition Project considers the topic of how countries register religious groups and activities is one of the foremost issues in the modern world when it comes to respecting and protecting freedom of religion or belief (FoRB). The majority of countries and territories (58% or 137 out of 235 studied) either continue to make government registration mandatory for religious groups or provide no registration procedures at all. -/- An even greater majority of countries have established onerous registration procedures, the consequences of which, whether by intention or not, include the disenfranchisement of belief communities, the deregistration or denial of registered status for minority or "untraditional" religious groups, and the state's maintenance of control over the religious and philosophical lives of citizens. In essence, issues of registration remain a harbinger of worse violations of FoRB to come so if a focus is placed on dismantling these misused recognition and registration systems, it is possible that we could see a brighter future for FoRB conditions in countries worst effected by this issue. (shrink)

What makes political freedom valuable to us? Two well-known arguments are that freedom contributes to our desire satisfaction and to our personal responsibility. Here, Boudewijn de Bruin argues that freedom is valuable when it is accompanied by knowledge. He offers an original and systematic account of the relationship between freedom and knowledge and defends two original normative ideals of known freedom and acknowledged freedom. -/- By combining psychological perspectives on choice and philosophical views on the value of knowledge, he shows (...) how known freedom is crucial to satisfy our desires and assume responsibility. Known freedom is compromised when salespeople deploy consumer-obfuscation, or when news outlets use contextual framing techniques to steer the way their audiences process information. Conversely, carefully developed consumer protection and information disclosure regulation can foster known freedom. Acknowledged freedom, from ethical and economic perspectives, offers protection and makes our freedoms more stable. It embodies an ideal of mutual recognition that underlies informed consent and the ethics of communication, and can also contribute to a flourishing corporate culture. -/- This book integrates and extends cutting-edge research from philosophy, economics, psychology, and law to reorient debates on privacy, neuromarketing, sustainable finance, corporate culture, consumer protection, media violence, and freedom of speech. -/- An original account of the relation between freedom and knowledge, integrating cutting-edge research from philosophy, economics, psychology, and law; defends the ideals of known and acknowledged freedom; offers new perspectives on debates surrounding privacy, corporate culture, consumer protection, freedom of speech, and more -/- Introduction: Why Freedom is Not Enough 1:From Choice Overload to Discrimination: Arguments for Freedom 2:From Brainwashing to Neuromarketing: Freedom of Belief 3:From the Value of Knowledge to Skills and Stereotypes: The Individual Ideal of Known Freedom 4:From Common Knowledge to the Ethics of Communication: The Social Ideal of Acknowledged Freedom 5:Sustainable Finance and Responsible Investors 6:Ethics Management and Informed Stakeholders 7:Freedom of Speech and Consumer Autonomy 8:Liberal Privacy and Legal Protection Conclusion: How Freedom Can Be Sufficient . (shrink)

Ancient Philosophy Today, Volume 4, Issue 2, Page 248-250, October, 2022.

In debates over the regulation of communication related to dual-use research, the risks that such communication creates must be weighed against against the value of scientific autonomy. The censorship of such communication seems justifiable in certain cases, given the potentially catastrophic applications of some dual-use research. This conclusion however, gives rise to another kind of danger: that regulators will use overly simplistic cost-benefit analysis to rationalize excessive regulation of scientific research. In response to this, we show how institutional design principles (...) and normative frameworks from free speech theory can be used to help extend the argument for regulating dangerous dual-use research beyond overly simplistic cost-benefit reasoning, but without reverting to an implausibly absolutist view of scientific autonomy. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 580-589, May 2022. Women and girls in contemporary Arab societies suffer from various and intersecting forms of discrimination that deny them their enjoyment of fundamental human rights. The right to freedom of expression is one of the essential areas that may expose this gender-based discrimination and patriarchal attitudes. In many contexts, freedom of expression has enabled women to speak out and organize in civil, political, social, economic and cultural spheres and contexts; (...) participate in their own emancipation and improve their status. Women’s exercise of freedom of expression has also provided them with new rights such as the right to vote, the right to control their own bodies, the right to join unions and the right to equality before the law and to participate in decision-making and hold governments to account. In the last decade, we have witnessed different attacks on women’s rights particularly their right to the freedom of expression, as scholars, journalists, social media users, human rights defenders, politicians and activists. The aim of this article is to explore emerging challenges and to highlight the struggle of Arab women for freedom of expression. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 580-589, May 2022. Women and girls in contemporary Arab societies suffer from various and intersecting forms of discrimination that deny them their enjoyment of fundamental human rights. The right to freedom of expression is one of the essential areas that may expose this gender-based discrimination and patriarchal attitudes. In many contexts, freedom of expression has enabled women to speak out and organize in civil, political, social, economic and cultural spheres and contexts; (...) participate in their own emancipation and improve their status. Women’s exercise of freedom of expression has also provided them with new rights such as the right to vote, the right to control their own bodies, the right to join unions and the right to equality before the law and to participate in decision-making and hold governments to account. In the last decade, we have witnessed different attacks on women’s rights particularly their right to the freedom of expression, as scholars, journalists, social media users, human rights defenders, politicians and activists. The aim of this article is to explore emerging challenges and to highlight the struggle of Arab women for freedom of expression. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 580-589, May 2022. Women and girls in contemporary Arab societies suffer from various and intersecting forms of discrimination that deny them their enjoyment of fundamental human rights. The right to freedom of expression is one of the essential areas that may expose this gender-based discrimination and patriarchal attitudes. In many contexts, freedom of expression has enabled women to speak out and organize in civil, political, social, economic and cultural spheres and contexts; (...) participate in their own emancipation and improve their status. Women’s exercise of freedom of expression has also provided them with new rights such as the right to vote, the right to control their own bodies, the right to join unions and the right to equality before the law and to participate in decision-making and hold governments to account. In the last decade, we have witnessed different attacks on women’s rights particularly their right to the freedom of expression, as scholars, journalists, social media users, human rights defenders, politicians and activists. The aim of this article is to explore emerging challenges and to highlight the struggle of Arab women for freedom of expression. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 580-589, May 2022. Women and girls in contemporary Arab societies suffer from various and intersecting forms of discrimination that deny them their enjoyment of fundamental human rights. The right to freedom of expression is one of the essential areas that may expose this gender-based discrimination and patriarchal attitudes. In many contexts, freedom of expression has enabled women to speak out and organize in civil, political, social, economic and cultural spheres and contexts; (...) participate in their own emancipation and improve their status. Women’s exercise of freedom of expression has also provided them with new rights such as the right to vote, the right to control their own bodies, the right to join unions and the right to equality before the law and to participate in decision-making and hold governments to account. In the last decade, we have witnessed different attacks on women’s rights particularly their right to the freedom of expression, as scholars, journalists, social media users, human rights defenders, politicians and activists. The aim of this article is to explore emerging challenges and to highlight the struggle of Arab women for freedom of expression. (shrink)

The article presents different theories and comparative analyses of freedom of speech in both liberal and non-liberal traditions. Whereas freedom of speech is not an absolute right, the question is if this right should depend wholly on the truth of the respective opinion or statement. Theories that justify free speech on the grounds of autonomy, tend to make truth a moral requirement of speech. Theories based on civility and public reason do restrict freedom of speech even further, often making a (...) form of recognition a precondition of free speech. This reveals to be particularly relevant in multicultural contexts and discussions about blasphemy. From this overview of contemporary, global comparative debates on free speech, the article draws some conclusions. First, there should be the absolute primacy of free speech regarding governments and the powerful: Speak truth to power. Second, free speech should underlie no constraints where important individual rights are at stake. Third, academic freedom has a special status and should not be subject to the same limits as freedom of expression more generally. Forth, in civil society and the public sphere a more moderate approach to free speech should be adopted based on civility, public reason and recognition. Yet, any limits should be of moral and not legal nature. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 460-472, May 2022. The article presents different theories and comparative analyses of freedom of speech in both liberal and non-liberal traditions. Whereas freedom of speech is not an absolute right, the question is if this right should depend wholly on the truth of the respective opinion or statement. Theories that justify free speech on the grounds of autonomy, tend to make truth a moral requirement of speech. Theories based on civility and (...) public reason do restrict freedom of speech even further, often making a form of recognition a precondition of free speech. This reveals to be particularly relevant in multicultural contexts and discussions about blasphemy. From this overview of contemporary, global comparative debates on free speech, the article draws some conclusions. First, there should be the absolute primacy of free speech regarding governments and the powerful: Speak truth to power. Second, free speech should underlie no constraints where important individual rights are at stake. Third, academic freedom has a special status and should not be subject to the same limits as freedom of expression more generally. Forth, in civil society and the public sphere a more moderate approach to free speech should be adopted based on civility, public reason and recognition. Yet, any limits should be of moral and not legal nature. (shrink)

In this post, Teresa Marques discusses her recent article in Journal of Applied Philosophy on whether hate is an essential component of hate speech. [blog post].

Media Dictatorship: How Schools and Educators Can Defend Freedom of Speech examines how the increasing power of the media is dangerous to democracy and modern civilization. Educators and administrators have a responsibility to develop a generation of students who value freedom of speech and can defend and sustain both democracy and civilization.

The issue of religious freedom while serving a sentence of imprisonment often occupies scientists from around the world. Basically, they agree that a prisoner, regardless of the act for which he or she has been convicted, has the right to religious freedom. Problems are posed, however, by the question of delimiting this freedom, especially at the level of the right to practise a chosen religion during prison isolation. The decisions of international tribunals and national courts are not uniform owing to (...) the generality of the rules governing this issue. The initial research question that we pose is this: how does society perceive the right to religious freedom in prisons? Does a convict have the right to demand respect for the rules of his or her religion regarding diet, clothes, appearance and participation in religious services? We look for answers to these questions in research conducted in Polish society, one that is confronted by international regulations. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 590-602, May 2022.

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print.

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 590-602, May 2022.

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print.

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 590-602, May 2022.

In recent years, there has been a concerted attack on many of the precepts of Western civilization relating to the concept of God, truth, Christianity, morality, sex, the family, and even modern science, especially biology. The concern of this volume is to explore these and other attacks through the tools of philosophy, theology, science, and intuition. It seeks to bring clarity to the ongoing struggle of Western civilization to preserve its values and traditions. -/- The West is crumbling at an (...) accelerated rate. The unfolding erasure of history, objective morality, and truth has paved the way for our current predicament. We are now standing at the precipice of the future of human civilization. The attacks on the human person are unrelenting, malicious, multifaceted, and wide-ranging in their scope and breadth, from the time prior to birth until the moment of death. If you are granted the “right” to live, then you must be prepared for unending assaults on your, mind, body, and soul. Nevertheless, the spirit of man and the greatness of God are infinitely greater than any of these assaults. It is by making sense of nonsense that humanity will be able to navigate out of the West’s current quagmire. (shrink)

In this short article, I analyze forms of public speech by individuals in positions of power through a framework based on Austin’s theory of speech acts. I argue that because of the illocutionary and perlocutionary force attached to such individuals’ offices and their public figures, their public speech qualifies for being framed as speech acts—which are not covered by even a broad understanding of freedom of speech or right to privacy. Therefore, I formulate a call for the assessment of public (...) speech by individuals in positions of power through a framework based on “linguistic responsibility.” This framework accounts for the peculiar power structure that such individuals can and do exploit to bring about considerable real-world effects through what could be understood as an exploitation of their speech act power. (shrink)

The right to freedom of expression and information is guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in all member states of the Council of Europe. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) applying Article 10 must be considered an international standard of authority on the protection of this human right, including the right to express, transmit and receive opinions and information without the interference of public (...) authorities. Freedom of expression is one of the most cherished constitutional rights in democracies. Freedom of expression affects every aspect of our social and political system and receives explicit and implicit protection in every modern democratic constitution. Moreover, it is frequently mentioned in public discourse and has inspired an impressive volume of legal and philosophical literature. Since its inclusion in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right to freedom of opinion and expression has been protected in all relevant international human rights treaties. In international law, the freedom to express opinions and ideas is considered essential both at the individual level, insofar as it contributes to the full development of a person, and being a cornerstone of a democratic society. (shrink)

It is often held that people have a moral right to believe and say whatever they want. For instance, one might claim that they have a right to believe racist things as long as they keep those thoughts to themselves. Or, one might claim that they have a right to pursue any philosophical question they want as long as they do so with a civil tone. In this paper I object to those claims and argue that no one has such (...) unlimited moral rights. In Part 1 I explore the value of the freedoms of thought and expression. In Part 2 I argue against the unlimited moral right to free expression, focusing in particular on the special obligations and moral constraints that obtain for academics. In Part 3 I argue against the unlimited moral right to free thought. (shrink)

Here is a familiar liberal argument: just as it can be beneficial to establish a marketplace, in which producers of goods freely compete for the custom of consumers, it can be beneficial to establish a “marketplace of ideas,” in which defenders of ideas freely compete for the acceptance of those ideas by others. This paper is about the preconditions for the proper functioning of liberal marketplaces, and of marketplaces of ideas in particular. I will argue that, just as the proper (...) functioning of marketplaces, in general, requires certain kinds of mutual trust among their participants, the proper functioning of marketplaces of ideas requires certain kinds of mutual trust – which I unite under the heading of “intellectual trust” – among their participants. I apply this conclusion to one problem for the familiar liberal argument, the problem of offensive speech, by arguing that intellectual trust can partially mitigate the harms of offensive speech. (shrink)

Welche Beschränkungen sollten sich Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler bei der Entscheidung auferlegen, wen sie als Vortragende zu universitären Veranstaltungen einladen? Und von welchen Überlegungen sollten sie sich dabei leiten lassen? Gibt es Personen, die für einen Auftritt an der Universität schlechthin ungeeignet sind? Wenn ja, aufgrund welcher Eigenschaften oder aus welchen anderen Gründen? Wir argumentieren zunächst, dass jüngere Kontroversen über die Einladung politisch exponierter Sprecher zu akademischen Veranstaltungen den Blick auf diese universitätspolitischen Fragen eher verstellt haben, insoweit sie als Streit um (...) die Rede- und um die Wissenschaftsfreiheit geführt wurden (1.). Im Anschluss erörtern wir die radikal liberale Auffassung, nach der sich Einladungsverbote überhaupt nicht begründen lassen (2.). Häufiger wird heute vertreten, dass es durchaus kategorische Ausschlussgründe gebe: Einige Debattenteilnehmerinnen ziehen die rote Linie dort, wo bestimmte politischen Positionen vertreten werden, insbesondere solche, in denen Rassismus oder andere Arten gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit zum Ausdruck kommen (3.). Andere ziehen die rote Linie dort, wo zu erwarten ist, dass der Inhalt eines Vortrags Zuhörende psychisch stark belastet (4.). Wir werden in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Auffassungen eine tugendbezogene Antwort auf die Titelfrage vorschlagen (5.). Sie läuft darauf hinaus, dass man sich für eine Einladung an die Universität nicht durch bestimmte Meinungen oder durch bestimmte Wirkungen disqualifiziert, sondern durch einen Mangel an intellektueller Redlichkeit. (shrink)

Freedom of speech in universities is currently an issue of widespread concern and debate. Recent empirical findings in the UK shed some light on whether speech is unduly restricted in the university, but it suffers from two limitations. First, the results appear contradictory. Some studies show that the issue of free speech is overblown by media reportage, whilst others track serious concerns about free speech arising from certain university policies. Second, the findings exclude important issues concerning restrictions to speech on (...) campus that fall outside of the traditional debate around violations to free speech rights. This is particularly the case when certain voices are excluded from important policy conversations, and in issues around diversifying the curriculum. This paper overcomes these two limitations by developing a novel conceptual framework within which to situate current debates concerning speech related matters in universities. It does so by developing a taxonomy around the concept of ‘silencing’. It then considers the current issue of speech matters in universities within this framework to determine whether, and to what extent, speech is indeed unduly restricted, and where this is a concern for free speech violations, and where it falls outside of this issue. (shrink)

McGowan here responds to essays written in critical engagement with her lead essay (Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application). She here responds to Caroline West, Ishani Maitra, Jeremy Waldron, Robert Mark Simpson, Lawrence Lengbeyer, Louise Richardsoon-Self, Laura Caponetto and Bianca Cepollaro.

How poor are they that have not patience! What wound did ever heal but by degrees? Thou knowest we work by wit and not by witchcraft, And wit depends on dilatory time. —Othello II: iii. Have you abandoned your engagement with the project of enlightenment, liberty, and progress because you have grown cynical about the effectiveness of sound argument? When someone tells you you’re wasting your time arguing with them because argument is an illusion, do you have an answer? Today, (...) it’s popular to depict people as irrational puppets of charismatic leaders, drawn unwittingly along by the emotional tides of crowds, mesmerised by the visual propaganda of flag-waving parades and historical statues glistening in the light of ideological firework displays. Witness the otherwise excellent periscopes of Scott Adams. We are told that we are living in a Post-Truth society. Logic and truth are irrelevant. Facts and logic don’t persuade, and “master persuaders” such as Donald Trump avoid them. Adams writes: “A good general rule is that people are more influenced by visual persuasion, emotion, repetition, and simplicity than they are by details and facts…If you’re using super-strong persuasion, you can be wrong on the facts, and even the logic of your argument, and still win.” Scott Adams is in the same tradition of thought as Danielle Kahneman, author of Thinking, Fast and Slow [2011], and winner of the Nobel prize in bias-research. This tradition emphasises the irrational and assumes that biases expose the irrational in humans. Kahneman carefully refrains from saying that humans are robots or 90% irrational, as Adams is inclined to say, but his emphasis still lies on the irrationality of humans. This now fashionable line of thought — though full of fascinating research — can be deeply misleading and demoralising for those committed to sound argument. Fortunately, there is no cause for despondency. (shrink)

While unionization is usually evaluated as an aspect of freedom of association—the idea being that workers have the right to associate and form unions if they want and have an equal right not to do so if they don't, I argue that this is a mistake. Instead of merely allowing unions to form or not depending on the preferences of workers, I argue that unions are a basic and therefore necessary institution of a just society. After analyzing and criticizing the (...) schema developed by John Rawls for evaluating what constitutes a basic institution, I introduce a new principle that allows us to determine what should be considered a basic institution in the context of our existing social institutions and practices. I then apply this principle to unionization, and argue that while unions are subject to post-institutional regulation, just like firms are, their existence is demanded by pre-institutional principles of equality and liberty and therefore not optional. Not only are union shops consistent with our deepest moral principles, including our commitment to liberty, that commitment, when properly understood, actually requires that unionization be universal. (shrink)

Existe una sensación persistente de confusión: de múltiples opiniones y relatos que impiden formar una idea clara de hechos y alternativas. Conforme acumulamos las fuentes accesibles por internet y las redes y media donde ver, oír y leer, más difícil se hace formarse una idea clara y coherente de los hechos. Sin embargo, una democracia se basa en la información plural y veraz, ya que, sin ésta, los electores no pueden tomar decisiones como sujetos de plenos derechos políticos; ni los (...) partidos, grupos o ciudadanos que se presenten a las elecciones tienen posibilidad de ver reflejadas sus alternativas. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between violence and the domination of speech in Spinoza’s political thought. Spinoza describes the cost of such violence to the State, to the collective epistemic resources, and to the members of the polity that domination aims to script and silence. Spinoza shows how obedience to a dominating power requires pretense and deception. The pressure to pretend is the linchpin of an account of how oppression severely degrades the conditions for meaningful communication, and thus the possibilities (...) for thinking and acting in common. Because it belongs to human nature to desire to share our thoughts with others, Spinoza believes that most people experience efforts to control our communication to be acutely intolerable. As a result, such unbearable violence threatens the political order that deploys it. I conclude with some speculative remarks about why, in the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza consistently deploys the superlative form of the adjective violentus in reference to the domination of thought and speech rather than to other modes of political violence. (shrink)