Freedom of Speech

In this chapter, against the backdrop of campus responses to Israel and Gaza, I consider the mission of the university and whether that mission is served by institutional neutrality. On my view, it is not so easy (and may be impossible) to prise apart universities’ core functions and “public matters.” I argue that institutional neutrality is at best a useful fiction and at worst a way of concealing universities’ commitments and reinscribing the status quo. Along the way, I offer a (...) primer on academic and expressive freedoms in the context of universities, and on the importance of articulating and balancing core university values, including the duty of care. I conclude by offering advice on when universities should take a public stand on socio-political matters. -/- [This chapter is forthcoming in 2026 in an as-yet untitled edited collection edited by Marc Spooner and James McNinch and published by University of Regina Press.]. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a challenge to Adam Smith’s specialization recommendations, at least according to the “unzany” interpretation suggested by his famous pin factory example. I present it while attempting the style of a notable fiction writer from the Indian sub-continent, as befits the challenge. I have adapted the style slightly for the Western setting.

Personal fulfilment depends upon knowledge of one’s identity. A person discovers her identity by trial and error. The experimentation and critical evaluation that are indispensable for that are inhibited by various strands of the currently trendy “identity politics.” I identify and criticise six errors: that self-identification determines identity; that one discovers one’s identity by looking inward; that a person’s identity is substantially determined by her inherited culture; that one can discover one’s identity through consciousness-raising; that criticism or microaggression undermines a (...) person’s identity; and that cultural appropriation is objectionable. I give an example from my own search for my identity to illustrate how each of the six errors subverts self-discovery and puts obstacles in the way of human fulfilment. (shrink)

Debates about controversial comedy are rife in public discourse. However, despite a great interest in wider issues surrounding freedom of expression, political philosophers have had curiously little to say about comedy. This is a costly omission because in mainstream public debates, many of the worries about the potential harms of comedy are often confused or conflated, and both the defences of comedians to use controversial material and calls for censorship of such material are usually under-theorised. This paper takes a step (...) towards correcting this oversight by explaining the potential harms of comedy and identifying who should be held responsible for these harms. By transposing existing work on hate speech, three harms of comedy are diagnosed: that it can cause status harms, that it can silence speakers, and that it can motivate violence. Using linguistic theory and the philosophy of language, the paper argues that often, it is audience members and third parties who ought to be held morally responsible for these harms, and therefore, that comedians are not usually under moral duties to modify their comedic expression, even if it is harmful. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that academic institutions have a pro tanto obligation to delegitimize transphobic views, which in many contexts is undefeated. By this, I mean academic institutions generally should not take such views seriously as viable candidates for belief, though sometimes this obligation may be outweighed by other considerations. Three premises together justify this conclusion. First, if academic institutions do not delegitimize transphobic views, then they structurally perpetuate the subordination of trans people. Second, institutions have a pro tanto (...) obligation to avoid structurally perpetuating subordination, which can only be defeated when such avoidance is excessively burdensome. Third, academic institutions can delegitimize transphobic views in a manner that is not excessively burdensome, at least in many contexts. More specifically, delegitimizing transphobic views aligns with important institutional norms and a robust notion of academic freedom. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that academic institutions have a pro tanto obligation to delegitimize transphobic views, which in many contexts is undefeated. By this, I mean academic institutions generally should not take such views seriously as viable candidates for belief, though sometimes this obligation may be outweighed by other considerations. Three premises together justify this conclusion. First, if academic institutions do not delegitimize transphobic views, then they structurally perpetuate the subordination of trans people. Second, institutions have a pro tanto (...) obligation to avoid structurally perpetuating subordination, which can only be defeated when such avoidance is excessively burdensome. Third, academic institutions can delegitimize transphobic views in a manner that is not excessively burdensome, at least in many contexts. More specifically, delegitimizing transphobic views aligns with important institutional norms and a robust notion of academic freedom. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that academic institutions have a pro tanto obligation to delegitimize transphobic views, which in many contexts is undefeated. By this, I mean academic institutions generally should not take such views seriously as viable candidates for belief, though sometimes this obligation may be outweighed by other considerations. Three premises together justify this conclusion. First, if academic institutions do not delegitimize transphobic views, then they structurally perpetuate the subordination of trans people. Second, institutions have a pro tanto (...) obligation to avoid structurally perpetuating subordination, which can only be defeated when such avoidance is excessively burdensome. Third, academic institutions can delegitimize transphobic views in a manner that is not excessively burdensome, at least in many contexts. More specifically, delegitimizing transphobic views aligns with important institutional norms and a robust notion of academic freedom. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that academic institutions have a pro tanto obligation to delegitimize transphobic views, which in many contexts is undefeated. By this, I mean academic institutions generally should not take such views seriously as viable candidates for belief, though sometimes this obligation may be outweighed by other considerations. Three premises together justify this conclusion. First, if academic institutions do not delegitimize transphobic views, then they structurally perpetuate the subordination of trans people. Second, institutions have a pro tanto (...) obligation to avoid structurally perpetuating subordination, which can only be defeated when such avoidance is excessively burdensome. Third, academic institutions can delegitimize transphobic views in a manner that is not excessively burdensome, at least in many contexts. More specifically, delegitimizing transphobic views aligns with important institutional norms and a robust notion of academic freedom. (shrink)

Despite the fact that in recent years there has been an active trend of growth of freedom of expression in Kazakhstan, domestic legislative and judicial practice lags far behind international standards. The purpose of the study is to examine the legal situation concerning freedom of expression in Kazakhstan, particularly with regard to the functioning of the media, and to find ways to effectively ensure and adequately regulate this issue in law. The methodological approach is based on the dialectical method used (...) to investigate the content and legal foundations of freedom of speech, synthesis, analysis, and comparative legal method. The results obtained provide an opportunity to analyse the state of national legislation in the sphere of implementation and protection of the right to freedom of expression, as well as to identify the largest gaps in this sphere and their subsequent resolution. The investigation of international legal experience and a comparative analysis allow identifying a significant difference between the legislations of countries with a high index of press freedom and freedom of speech, and Kazakhstan. This research is of critical importance for the development of the human rights and freedoms protection sector, as well as journalism, especially given the current situation in the Republic associated with strict state control over the activities of the media, the inability to express and publicly broadcast opinions and ideas that are unfavourable for the ruling circles. (shrink)

This paper presents a new version of the democratic argument for the freedom of expression that has the resources to give a plausible reply to the perennial objection—ordinarily considered fatal—that such accounts fail to deliver protections for abstract art, instrumental music, and lots of other deserving nonpolitical speech. The argument begins with the observation that there are different things that a free speech theory might aim to accomplish. It will hope to justify a right to free speech, of course, with (...) a particular scope and shape, but that right might be a moral right, an ordinary legal right, or a specifically constitutional right. The new version of the argument—the refined argument from democracy—aims to justify a specifically constitutional right to political speech, administered by strong-form judicial review. The democracy theorist can accommodate the intuition that abstract art deserves protection by agreeing that we have a moral right, and probably ought to have an ordinary legal right, to produce and view abstract art. She must only insist that abstract art should not be protected by a specifically constitutional right administered by strong-form judicial review. Not because abstract art does not deserve constitutional protection, but because, on this view, whether a particular right ought to be enshrined in the constitution and administered by judicial review is not solely a matter of the importance of the right or the value of the interests it protects. (shrink)

A number of scholars and policy-makers have raised serious concerns about the impact of chatbots and generative artificial intelligence (AI) on the spread of political disinformation. An increasingly popular proposal to address this concern is to pass laws that, by requiring that artificially generated and artificially disseminated content be labeled as such, aim to ensure a degree of transparency in this rapidly transforming environment. This article argues that such laws are misguided, for two reasons. We first aim to show that (...) legally requiring the disclosure of the automated nature of bot accounts and AI-generated content is unlikely to succeed in improving the quality of political discussion on social media. This is because information that an account spreading or creating political information is a bot or a language model is itself politically relevant information, and people reason very poorly about such information. Second, we aim to show that the main motivation for these laws – the threat of coordinated disinformation campaigns (automated or not) – appears overstated. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of freedom of expression by drawing lessons from the strategic logic of China’s censorship regime. It argues that freedom of expression helps build the common knowledge needed for overcoming coordination problems and is, thus, a source of collective power. However, realizing the full empowering potential of freedom of expression requires supplementing it with (a) public sources of information that are reliable, trusted, and democratically accountable and (b) measures that will provide citizens with equal opportunity to (...) speak and be heard in ways that will enable them to contribute to their society’s stock of common knowledge. (shrink)

¿Puede tener la ciudadanía un derecho a recibir noticias de calidad? Hay quien cree que semejante derecho es inviable porque las obligaciones que de él se seguirían implicarían una supresión de facto de las libertades periodísticas. En este artículo defiendo que ese problema afecta solo al derecho a las noticias si se lo concibe como derecho jurídico subjetivo. Concebido como un derecho moral, el derecho de la ciudadanía a las noticias es no solo compatible con las libertades periodísticas, sino el (...) fundamento moral de la institución periodística misma. Además, argumento que el derecho a las noticias puede (y debe) tener importantes efectos jurídicos, ya que impone a las administraciones públicas una obligación de adoptar medidas para protegerlo, las cuales clasifico en directas e indirectas. (shrink)

Reprint of an article published in the Journal of Philosophy of Education (2010) about the tension between a right to academic freedom and a responsibility to promote public goods, discussed largely in the African context.

Should the government censor dangerous anti-vaccination propoganda? Should it restrict the praise of terrorist groups, or speech intended to promote discriminatory attitudes? In other words, should the government curb the advocacy of dangerous ideas and actions (i.e. 'harmful advocacy'), or should the government take a more permissive approach? Strong free speech supporters argue that citizens should be free to engage in and to hear harmful advocacy, arguing that restrictions are deeply objectionable at best, and, at worst, wholly impermissible. To support (...) their position, strong free speech supporters have offered a wide range of arguments and ideas. One of the most interesting arguments revolves around the idea that restrictions on harmful advocacy are deeply insulting to citizens. The worry, broadly understood, is that this kind of censorship is demeaning, treats citizens as though they are stupid, or as though they are children. As such, even when censorship is effective in preventing harms to citizens, it nonetheless comes at the significant political cost of failing to properly respect the citizenry at large. By contrast, so the thought goes, an alternative political scheme that prohibits censorship, or permits it only in exceptional cases, does a better job of respecting citizens as independent, rational, morally responsible agents. This alternative political system may, sometimes, be less effective at preventing speech harms. But it is a political system where citizens can stand tall and hold their heads high. In this paper, I consider and reject three versions of the worry that censorship is insulting. §1 explores the idea that censorship is insulting qua involving a negative appraisal of the citizens being interfered with. The key idea here is that censorship involves a lack of what Stephen Darwall terms ‘appraisal respect’, insofar as the government is suggesting that citizens cannot be trusted to manage their own beliefs and intentions. Drawing on the work of Thomas Nagel, §2 explores the idea that censorship diminishes the political status of citizens. Finally, §3 explores the suggestion that censorship is incompatible with a full appreciation of the thinking nature of citizens, and thus involves a lack of what Darwall would term ‘recognition respect’. The paper argues that censorship is not necessarily premised upon an insulting view of the citizenry. On the contrary, it argues that the best kind of censorship stems from a rich appreciation of the diverse range of capabilities, needs, vulnerabilities, and responsibilities of citizens, as well as the need for co-operation between citizens if societal flourishing is going to be achieved on a large scale. Granted, such a vision places an emphasis on the imperfections and liabilities of citizens – at least when compared to the rather solitary, highly intellectual creature one sometimes finds in the philosophical literature. Still, such a vision of citizens as imperfect falls well short of being genuinely insulting. To err is human. And there’s nothing insulting about being treated like a human. (shrink)

This chapter examines two ways in which liberal thinkers have appealed to claims about disagreement in order to defend a principle of free speech. One argument, from Mill, says that free speech is a necessary condition for healthy disagreement, and that healthy disagreement is conducive to human flourishing. The other argument says that in a community of people who disagree about questions of value, free speech is a necessary condition of legitimate democratic government. We argue that both of these arguments, (...) in their standard guises, are premised upon contestable views about the realpolitik of disagreement in a liberal society. (shrink)

The right to be forgotten enables individuals to remove certain links from search results that appear when their names are entered as search terms. Formulated as a distinct application of the general right to privacy, the right to be forgotten has proven highly controversial, for two reasons. First, it is difficult to see how the specific right to be forgotten can apply to the withdrawal of public information, since the general right to privacy typically covers the disclosure of private information. (...) Second, as a putative right to withdraw information from public reach, the right to be forgotten poses a threat to freedom of speech, which depends on the accessibility of information. By responding to these two objections, this paper develops a novel account of the right to be forgotten, understood as a claim of withdrawal grounded in both privacy and free speech interests. -/- . (shrink)

This paper argues that the well-established fact of political irrationality imposes substantial constraints on how governments may combat the threat of political misinformation. Though attempts at regulating misinformation are becoming increasingly popular, both among policymakers and theorists, I intend to show that, for a wide range of anti-misinformation interventions (collectively termed “debunking” and “source labeling”), these attempts ought to be abandoned. My argument relies primarily on the fact that most people process politically-relevant information in biased and motivated ways. Since debunking (...) or factual correction of politically relevant misinformation (as well as source labeling) themselves consist of providing politically-relevant information, they are also very likely to be processed in irrational ways. This makes it extremely difficult to effectively correct people’s political beliefs and political information processing. Since governments should not pursue policies likely to be futile, they should refrain from mandating such interventions. My conclusion is of relevance to considerable literature in digital ethics of misinformation. It shows that many celebrated works in the field ignore political irrationality and fail to consider its implications. (shrink)

In Why It's OK to Speak Your Mind, Hrishikesh Joshi argues that the open exchange of ideas is essential for the flourishing of individuals and society. He provides two arguments for this claim. First, speaking your mind is essential for the common good: we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth if we share evidence and offer different perspectives. Second, speaking your mind is good for your own sake: it is necessary to develop your rational faculties and exercise intellectual (...) independence, both of which are essential for living a good life. In this paper, I consider the implications of Joshi’s argument and raise several objections to his view. (shrink)

This book argues that misinformation poses a multi-faceted threat to knowledge, while arguing that some forms of content moderation risk exacerbating these threats. It proposes alternative forms of content moderation that aim to address this complexity while enhancing human epistemic agency. The proliferation of fake news, false conspiracy theories, and other forms of misinformation on the internet and especially social media is widely recognized as a threat to individual knowledge and, consequently, to collective deliberation and democracy itself. This book argues (...) that misinformation presents a three-pronged threat to knowledge. While researchers often focus on the role of misinformation in causing false beliefs, this deceptive potential of misinformation exists alongside the potential to suppress trust and to distort the perception of evidence. Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of this threat is essential to the development of effective measures to mitigate the harms associated with misinformation. The book weaves together work in analytic epistemology with emerging empirical work in other disciplines to offer novel insights into the threats posed by misinformation. Additionally, it breaks new ground by systematically assessing different forms of content moderation from the perspective of epistemology. Misinformation, Content Moderation, and Epistemology will appeal to philosophers working in applied and social epistemology, as well as scholars and advanced students in disciplines such as communication studies, political science, and social psychology who are researching misinformation. (shrink)

I. Einleitung -/- II. Das ontologische Kriterium: Meinungen und Tatsachen fallen in distinkte ontologische Kategorien. -/- III. Auf die Klassifikation der Äußerungstypen abstellende Kriterien 1. Meinungsäußerungen sind nicht wahrheitsfähig. 2. Meinungsäußerungen sind keinem Beweis zugänglich. 3. Meinungsäußerungen sind Aussagen mit abgeschwächtem Geltungsanspruch. 4. Meinungsäußerungen sind Werturteile. 5. Meinungsäußerungen zeichnen sich durch das Element des Dafürhaltens und der eigenen Stellungnahme des Sprechers aus. 6. Meinungsäußerungen messen etwas an einem vom Äußernden selbst gewählten Maßstab. 7. Meinungsäußerungen werden anders rezipiert und kognitiv prozessiert (...) als Tatsachenbehauptungen. -/- IV. Auf den Schutzzweck des Grundrechts abstellende Kriterien 1. Für eine Meinungsäußerung muss der Sprecher keine Begründung angeben (können). 2. Geschützt ist der Prozess der autonomen Meinungsbildung, der bei Tatsachenbehauptungen nicht aktiviert wird. 3. Meinungsäußerungen zielen darauf ab, andere zu beeinflussen und damit einen Beitrag zur Meinungsbildung zu leisten. 4. Nicht als Meinungsäußerungen geschützt sind erwiesen unwahre Tatsachenbehauptungen. 5. Nicht als Meinungsäußerungen geschützt sind bewusst unwahre Tatsachenbehauptungen. -/- V. Fazit . (shrink)

At a House hearing on December 5, 2023, the presidents of three universities—Harvard, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania—refused to state that certain kinds of hate speech, specifically calls for genocide of Jews, are prohibited on their campuses. The backlash against two of them, Harvard’s Claudine Gay and Penn’s Liz Magill, was swift and devastating; both of them were successfully pressured to resign. Still, while Professors Gay’s and Magill’s responses were widely criticized as tone-deaf, they were legally correct. At many (...) private, and all public, colleges and universities, even the worst hate speech is generally protected unless it is accompanied by aggressive, threatening, or violent conduct. -/- These “demotions” augur even worse consequences, including termination, for less powerful faculty who say the “wrong” thing, in particular statements in support of Trumpism, an increasingly mainstream ideology that stitches together white supremacy, misogyny, a preference for autocracy over democracy, and several phobias—homophobia, Islamophobia, transphobia, and xenophobia. The question I address in this paper is whether these consequences are constitutional at public schools. Whose right is stronger—a public-school teacher’s First Amendment right to express pro-Trumpist sentiments or a public school’s right to maintain a fair, inclusive, and welcoming learning environment? In this article, I argue that the public school has the upper hand here, that it is indeed constitutionally permitted to prohibit political hate speech that contributes to a hostile learning environment. Still, I narrowly limit this prohibition to dehumanizing speech—that is, speech explicitly suggesting that some human beings are “lesser”, intrinsically less valuable, than other human beings. -/- One objection to this position is that public schools may not prohibit any speech, no matter how dehumanizing, because such prohibition amounts to constitutionally impermissible viewpoint discrimination. I argue, however, that viewpoint discrimination is an integral part of education and therefore constitutionally permissible. Education necessarily involves promoting some values over others. These values fall into seven categories: constitutional principles, the humanist virtues, successful character traits and behaviors, knowledge and truth, art and beauty, health (both mental and physical), and social goods (such as justice, peace, and rule of law). (shrink)

Happy cow messages are instances of commercial speech by the animal industry which, by action or by omission, mislead consumers about the harmful effects that the industry has for nonhuman animals, the environment, or human health. Despite their ubiquity, happy cow messages have received little philosophical scrutiny. This paper aims to call attention to this form of speech, and to make the case for its restriction. To do so we first conceptualize happy cow messages. Second, we argue that they encroach (...) upon individual autonomy in two particularly objectionable ways: by impairing our ability to behave according to our moral convictions, and by thwarting our capacity to identify and reason about our moral duties. This, we hold, grounds a pro tanto case for stricter and more comprehensive regulations of commercial speech by the animal industry. Third, and against the objection that restricting happy cow messages would violate freedom of speech, we contend that none of the most influential arguments for free speech grants them protection. Indeed, we suggest, those rationales seem to call for their restriction. Fourth, and finally, we review some possible ways to defuse the misleading potential of happy cow messages through commercial speech regulations. (shrink)

The Section 230 debate is a proxy for reevaluating constitutional fundamentals. The modern right and the modern left, both attacking Section 230, have abandoned liberalism, together with free speech, public private divide, and the politics of neutrality. Instead of believing in First Amendment value pluralism, each side of the spectrum wishes to realize their own positive normative vision for the political community which, today, is largely defined in the realm of digital culture. Each side recognizes the political other as an (...) enemy to their own utopia, wishing to control, censor, or simply become sovereign thereover. These existential politics of the “culture war” are formally circumscribed by liberal constitutionalism, including the state action doctrine. Regardless of any formal change of the First Amendment interpretation, the government will continue to exercise soft pressures on platforms, thus outsourcing censorship, and creating a novel regulatory dialectic of pressure and cooperation. The government, to become truly sovereign, realize its normative vision, and exclude the other, needs to delegate part of its sovereignty to virtual governments. The Constitution of the United States may thus be undergoing an informal amendment conducted through the private hands of internet intermediaries, which has largely gone unnoticed in the scholarly debate over Gonzalez v. Google, digital sovereignty, and platform regulation. (shrink)

Largely thanks to Mill’s influence, the suggestion that the state ought to restrict the distribution of misinformation will strike most philosophers as implausible. Two of Mill’s influential assumptions are particularly relevant here: first, that free speech debates should focus on moral considerations such as the harm that certain forms of expression might cause; second, that false information causes minimal harm due to the fact that human beings are psychologically well equipped to distinguish truth and falsehood. However, in addition to our (...) moral obligations, we also have a distinct set of epistemic obligations—and even when a false belief doesn’t harm anyone, it constitutes an epistemically bad outcome. Moreover, Mill was profoundly mistaken about human psychology: human beings are vulnerable to the influence of a wide variety of false claims via a wide variety of psychological mechanisms. Consequently, there is a purely epistemic justification for restricting the distribution of misinformation: because each of us has an individual epistemic obligation to avoid unnecessary exposure to misinformation, and because avoiding such exposure is simply too difficult when acting alone, we all have a shared epistemic obligation to establish laws or regulations restricting the widespread distribution of misinformation. (shrink)

This Article addresses the question of what limits, if any, freedom of speech would place on holding authors liable for the reputational damage they cause with fiction. By “freedom of speech” I am not referring to the First Amendment but rather to one conception of the moral idea underlying it. According to this conception, the limits that freedom of speech places on the scope of authors’ liability for causing false and defamatory beliefs are whatever limits are necessary to adequately protect (...) our interests as potential authors and audiences, and whose costs are acceptable in terms of other interests. To apply this conception, it will be necessary to identify our interests as potential authors of and audiences for fiction about real people, and to assess how these interests would be affected by different limits. Ultimately, I will argue that freedom of speech is consistent with holding authors liable for reputational damage caused by their violations of fiction’s “veracity rules” and for reputational damage caused by mistakes that their target audience would be expected to make. But liability for beliefs that are traceable to mistakes that only an author’s incidental audience would be expected to make is, I will argue, prohibitedby freedom of speech, so long as the costs of that protection remain acceptable. (shrink)

Why should musical compositions and artistic images be included among the types of expression covered by free speech principles? One way to answer this question is to show how expression in nonverbal media can be functionally similar to other types of verbal expression. But this leaves us with an intuitively unsatisfying explanation of why free speech principles cover nonverbal creative expression that does not functionally emulate literal speech. In this article, as an alternative justification, we develop and defend the idea (...) that musical and pictorial expression‚ much like literal speech, can be media through which people think aloud, as opposed to mere tools for the transmission of thought. We use this proposal to provide a more robust justification for including nonverbal creative expression in the scope of free speech coverage, and we outline some of the practical policy implications that come with adopting this justificatory strategy. (shrink)

Chilling Effects occur when the risks surrounding a speech restriction inadvertently deter speech that lies outside the restriction’s official scope. Contrary to the standard interpretation of this phenomenon I show how speech deterrence for individuals can sometimes, instead of suppressing discourse at the group level, intensify it – with results that are still unwelcome, but crucially unlike a ‘chill’. Inadvertent deterrence of speech may, counterintuitively, create a Heating Effect. This proposal gives us a promising explanation of the intensity of public (...) debate on topics for which there is, simultaneously, evidence of people self-censoring, for fear of breaching speech restrictions. It also helps to pinpoint two problems with existing theoretical analyses of the Chilling Effect: (i) in how they construe the relation between individual- and group-level discursive phenomena; and (ii) how they characterize the distinctively wrongful nature of inadvertent speech deterrence. (shrink)

We should drop the marketplace of ideas as our go-to metaphor in free speech discourse and take up a new metaphor of the connected city. Cities are more liveable when they have an integrated mix of transport options providing their occupants with a variety of locomotive affordances. Similarly, societies are more liveable when they have a mix of communication platforms that provide a variety of communicative affordances. Whereas the marketplace metaphor invites us to worry primarily about authoritarian control over the (...) content that circulates through our communication networks, the connected-city metaphor invites us to worry, more so, about the homogenization of the tools and formats through which we communicate. I argue that the latter worry demands greater attention under emerging technological conditions. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the ethical and conceptual relationship between free speech and press freedom. Many authors have argued that, despite there being some common ground between them, these two liberties should be treated as properly distinct, both theoretically and practically. The core of the argument, for this “unbundling” approach, is that conflating free speech and press freedom makes it too easy for reasonable democratic regulations on press freedom to be portrayed, by their opponents, as part of a (...) programme of illiberal censorship. While we acknowledge the important grain of truth in that argument, we try to show how the alternative, “unbundling” approach can also be used to undermine or mischaracterise democratically justifiable opposition to media regulations in despotic regimes. In light of the problems on both sides, we defend a contextually-variable account of the relation between these two liberties. (shrink)

The ongoing digital transformation of almost all areas of human action and agency calls for a readjustment of the norms that regulate these practices. For example, the digitisation of communicative practices poses new challenges to their functioning. This paper explains some of these challenges and argues that they cannot be met by a normative framework that focuses mainly on defensive (free speech and property) rights. In the context of mediated digital communication, the application of such a framework may even have (...) paradoxical consequences. Accordingly, this paper argues for a broader system of communicative rights, understood as rights to meaningful participation in well-functioning communicative practices. (shrink)

To what extent are authors morally culpable for harms caused by their published work? Can authors be culpable even if their ideas are misused, perhaps because they failed to take precautions to prevent harmful misinterpretations? Might authors be culpable even if they do take precautions—if, for example, they publish ideas that others can be reasonably expected to put to harmful uses, precautions notwithstanding? Although complete answers to these questions depend upon controversial views about the right to free speech, this paper (...) argues that five notions from philosophy of law and legal practice—liability, burden of proof, legal causation, mens rea, and reasoning by precedent—can be adapted to provide an attractive moral framework for determining whether an author’s work causes harm, whether and how culpable the author is for causing such harm, steps authors may take to immunize themselves from culpability, and how to responsibly develop new rules for publishing ethics. (shrink)

Some thoughts on the value(s) of political protest, to mark the 20th anniversary of the 2003 anti-war demonstrations.

I first point out that we tend to use democracy as a vague general concept that includes various types of constitutional arrangements. I suggest that it would be beneficial to differentiate between these more carefully. I discuss some points made earlier, especially by Michael Oakeshott and Bernard Crick. Due to their long careers, their work reflects long-term change in conceptions of democracy. The huge corporate power and superpower mentality are discussed together with the question of the possibility for real representative, (...) parliamentary systems in the contemporary world. I additionally lean especially on Sheldon S. Wolin’s work. I emphasize that the early critique of behaviourism connects the three theorists profoundly. They also share a historico-philosophical style of writing without the fear of commenting on contemporary developments. I also examine some of today’s surveillance and manipulation techniques posing a threat to ‘democracy’. With help from the crucial case of Julian Assange, and his illegal imprisonment, I ask if late-modern ‘democracies’ already have crossed such boundaries that even the minimal criteria of democracy are fading. I try to bring some coherence to the named topic of the conceptual and practical mess around democracy and suggest some possible approaches for future studies. (shrink)

I investigate the case for being comparatively relaxed about academic no-platforming, based on the 'gatekeeping argument' and 'selectivity argument'. I find more to be concerned about than these arguments suggest.

We often say one thing and mean another. This kind of indirection (concerning the content conveyed) is both ubiquitous and widely recognized. Other forms of indirection, however, are less common and less discussed. For example, we can sometimes address one person with the primary intention of being overheard by someone else. And, sometimes speakers say something simply in order to make it possible for someone else to say that they said it. Politicians generating sounds bites for the media are an (...) example of this kind of indirection. In this paper, I will explore—via a series of fictionalized examples—these less discussed forms of indirection and consider how such forms of indirection can be duplicitous and misleading. (shrink)

We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the “analytical” method of drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by Rawls’s first principle of justice (i.e., the liberty principle). We argue that the general conditions that feature in Rawls’s own account of the analytical method, which employ (...) the notion of necessity, are too stringent. They ultimately fail to deliver as basic certain particular liberties that should be encompassed within any fully adequate scheme of liberties. To address this under-generation problem, we provide an amended general condition. This replaces Rawls’s necessity condition with a probabilistic condition and it appeals to the standard liberal prohibition on arbitrary coercion by the state. We defend our new approach both as apt to feature in applications of the analytical method and as adequately grounded in justice as fairness as Rawls articulates the theory’s fundamental ideas. (shrink)

People sometimes use speech to interfere with other people’s speech, as in the case of a heckler sabotaging a lecture with constant interjections. Some people claim that such interference infringes upon free speech. Against this view, we argue that where competing speakers in a public forum both have an interest in speaking, free speech principles should not automatically give priority to the ‘official’ speaker. Given the ideals underlying free speech, heckling speech sometimes deserves priority. But what can we say, then, (...) about situations in which heckling clearly seems to infringe upon people’s civil liberties, in a way that intuitively justifies intervention? In such cases, we argue, heckling infringes upon people’s associative freedom. We present and defend an ethical framework for the institutional management of ‘Speech Fights’, geared around this insight. (shrink)

Whereas liberal philosophers, from Mill to Rawls, traditionally make a plea for a very extensive freedom of opinion and of the press, invoking the no harm principle, in the last two decades, such liberal philosophers as Onora O’Neill and Jürgen Habermas, rightly worrying about the rise of antidemocratic and illiberal tendencies in the social media and on the increasing diffusion of fake news, advocate not only a self-limitation of the press, but also for substantial restrictions on the freedom of the (...) press. Yet, their references to Kant and Mill entail a deep misunderstanding of their argument in favor of the freedom of opinion. This article attempts to demonstrate that, instead of sheltering public debates from wrong contents, one should promote the capacity of judgement of all individual participants against cognitive vices, which requires individuals to be exposed not only to true contents, but also to wrong and noxious contents. (shrink)

I claim that hate speech is actually antithetical to free speech. Nevertheless, this claim invokes the misconception that one would be jeopardizing free speech due to a phenomenon known as "false polarization" – a “tendency for disputants to overestimate the extent to which they disagree about whatever contested question is at hand.” The real polarity does not lie between hate speech (as protected free speech) vs. censorship. Rather, hate speech is censorship. It is the censorship of entire sectors of the (...) population, a violation of their right to be heard, and at worse, an incitement to their extinction. The liberal attempt to try to fit the metaphorical 'round peg' of hate speech into the 'square hole' of free speech is impossible without revealing one’s reluctance to endow people of color, the LGBTQ+ community, women, and other socially oppressed/marginalized groups as equal and deserving of full human dignity. I start by providing a clear definition of "hate speech" (which is lacking in legislation); then I review the original and alleged political intent of the "freedom of expression" within US history; and finally I illuminate the very material consequences of hate speech. (shrink)

Cancel culture is a form of societal self-defense that becomes prominent particularly during periods of substantial moral upheaval. It can lead to the polarization of incompatible viewpoints if it is indiscriminately demonized. In this brief editorial letter, I consider framing cancel culture as an essentially contested concept (ECC), according to the theory of Walter B. Gallie, with the aim of establishing a groundwork for a more productive discourse on it. In particular, I propose that intermediate agreements and principles of reasonableness (...) can help refocus the debate on cancel culture towards democratic discourse, without blanket justification for every instance. In this context, asserting that cancel culture is an ECC does not dismiss the potential of achieving consensus on its shared core meaning or societal role. Like other similar ECCs, such as democracy or rule of law, it highlights the importance of contestations in shaping our collective understanding of the concept. (shrink)

The article presents the results of the analysis of international legal regulation of the protection of freedom of speech, the right to freedom of expression within the UN and the Council of Europe. A comparative analysis of the definition of the right to express views and beliefs in various international legal acts was made. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights in cases related to the exercise of the right to express one's views and beliefs on the (...) Internet was considered. The analysis of the legislation of foreign countries regulating the right to express views and beliefs online was carried out. The materials of the article are of practical value for scientists and practitioners dealing with the issues of legal regulation of freedom of speech, the right to express views and beliefs, for forecasting and planning scientific research, improving legislation, for higher education teachers in educational activities, as well as for all interested persons. (shrink)

A growing body of work in free speech theory is interested in the nature of counterspeech, i.e. speech that aims to counteract the effects of harmful speech. Counterspeech is usually defined in opposition to legal responses to harmful speech, which try to prevent such speech from occurring in the first place. In this paper we challenge this way of carving up the conceptual terrain. Instead, we argue that our main classificatory division, in theorising responses to harmful speech, should be between (...) pro-discursive and anti-discursive responses. Some legal responses to harmful speech, so we argue, make a positive discursive contribution in their own right. That is, legal restrictions on harmful speech can have a function that is importantly similar to speech that aims at countering the effects of harmful speech. (shrink)

In Spence v. Washington, the Supreme Court devised a two-part test for determining whether a nonverbal action is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. According to the Spence test, a nonverbal action is expressive if and only if: (1) it is intended to communicate a particularized message; and (2) in the circumstances in which the action is performed, the likelihood is great that the message will be understood by observers. -/- In subsequent cases, however, the Court has made clear (...) that the category of "expressive conduct" embraces a much wider variety of nonverbal behaviors than a literal reading of the Spence test would suggest. It includes, for example, such behaviors as composing instrumental music, creating nonrepresentational visual artworks, penning nonsense verse, and dancing in the nude for the entertainment of others. -/- Drawing on the work of Paul Grice, one of the twentieth century's most influential philosophers of language, this Comment develops a two-part expressive conduct test that captures the expressive character of this wider variety of behaviors. It shows that the Gricean test displays striking consistency with the Supreme Court's particularized judgments about which sorts of nonverbal conduct are expressive and which sorts are not. (shrink)

This article reviews recent government incursions on questions of free speech at universities and colleges in Ontario and Alberta and presents the challenge they pose to university autonomy. Inherent in university autonomy is the possibility—or the obligation—that universities make decisions based on ethical responsibilities that can extend beyond the limits of current law. As a case study of university autonomy in matters of expressive freedom, I highlight events at the University of British Columbia, which leads me to a discussion of (...) how questions of ethical responsibility have been raised particularly in relation to the speech protection of transgender members of the university. A central issue is the need for universities to adjudicate when free speech rights meet related responsibilities with which they can conflict. I detail how, for instance, the invitation of some anti-trans speakers can pose such a conflict and should lead university communities to consider adjusting their responses in extreme cases so as to be able to more autonomously regulate hateful speech beyond applicable law. (shrink)